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Religious edict.

Hajj

Pilgrimage to Mecca.

HGIT

Home-grown Islamist terrorism (see chapter 2).

Islamist/Islamism

This is used here to refer to Sunni Muslims following a
politicised version of Islam which underpins Islamist
terrorism. Although there are a wide variety of beliefs
held and not all Islamists are violent, they share the
fundamental desire to incorporate Islam as the basis for
political and legal systems.

Jihad

Although this has a wider meaning, referring to striving to
fulfil God’s will, it is used here as Islamist terrorists
understand it- to refer to violent jihad; violence in the
name of Islam.

Jihadi/jihadist

One who subscribes to militant Islamism and accepts that
jihad involves violence. This term is used interchangeably
with ‘militant’, ‘mujahid’ and ‘terrorist’.

Jihadisation

A distinct and by no means inevitable extension of
radicalisation that involves accepting violent jihad as
one’s personal responsibility.

Militant

Here this refers to Islamist jihadis, mujahedin or terrorists.

Mujahid (pl. Mujahedin)

One who takes up violent jihad in the name of Islam. A
self perceived soldier of Islam. Also see jihadi/ militant/
terrorist.
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The process of developing increasingly extreme and
intolerant beliefs. In the context of Islamist terrorism this
involves coming to accept that a) Islam is under attack
from Western and Western influenced powers b) The
world is divided into Muslims and non-Muslims (‘us’ and
‘them’) and c) Jihad is necessary violence against these
oppressors of Islam.

Terrorism

The use/attempted use, and/or subsidiary involvement in,
politically/religiously justified violence, often against
non-combatants by sub-state
individuals/groups/organisations (see chapter 2).

Terrorist

The meaning of this term is discussed in more detail in
chapter 2. It is used throughout to refer to individuals
included in the sample and to those involved in
perpetrating or supporting violence in the name of Islam
(although of course not all terrorists are Islamists). Also
see jihadi/ militant/ mujahid.

Ummah

A perceived global Muslim community.
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Abstract
Since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 Islamist terrorists
increasingly spread to Western countries and although they were initially focussed on
overseas Muslim regimes and conflict zones, they gradually turned their sights onto the
West as legitimate targets for attack. After the attacks in the US on September 11th 2001
a global ‘war on terror’ was launched, which destroyed much of the organisational
infrastructure in Afghanistan and resulted in further transformation of the movement
into an amorphous network. Islamist militants in the West have increasingly been
described as ‘home-grown’, since they are now often long-term residents and citizens of
these countries and numerous plots to carry out attacks on the domestic stage have been
uncovered each year. Large-scale successful attacks were perpetrated in Madrid in 2004
and London in 2005.
Despite massive increases in national security budgets and a general fascination
with Islamist terrorism there has been little in the way of systematic empirical research.
This study addresses that gap by examining Islamist terrorism involving people living
in, or from, two key countries in the war on terror- the United States and United
Kingdom.
There has been much speculation about the different experiences of Islamist
terrorism in these two countries and it is has generally been accepted that the problem in
the US is far less severe, but without comprehensive study such observations remain
vague. In seeking to clarify this issue the following overarching research question was
posed: ‘What have people living in, or from, the United States and the United Kingdom
been doing to support or advance violent jihad –either at home or abroad- from 2001 to
2008, and what differences are apparent between these two countries?’ The aim was
thus to offer a sound historical account of how Islamist terrorism has developed in each
country and to create an empirical record of as many Islamist terrorism cases as could
be found, relying on open source materials, for the US and UK from 2001-2008.
Firstly, a review of the relevant literature was conducted in order to identify
variables of interest (chapter 2) and to establish a solid understanding of how Islamist
terrorism has developed over time and how and why individuals become involved
(chapters 3, 4 and 5). Next, a more focussed review of Islamist terrorism in the US and
UK was conducted in order to determine specific patterns of development (chapters 6
and 7) which may help explain contemporary differences. In particular, it is highly
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relevant that the UK played a more significant role in foreign terrorist operations during
the 1990s. A preliminary comparison of the two countries based on existing accounts
was then conducted, with the aim of clarifying the posited disparities and identifying
flaws in these accounts (chapter 8). It was established that without in-depth and
exhaustive examination of Islamist terrorism cases the true nature and extent of
differences cannot be reliably determined.
Hence -relying primarily on press reports and freely available legal documentsit was attempted to identify as many Islamist terrorism cases in the US and UK as
possible, according to sampling criteria outlined in chapter 2. The US sample consists of
46 cases involving 91 individuals while the UK sample includes 51 cases (112
individuals). Chronological accounts of each case were constructed (see Appendices A
and B part 2) and each individual’s data was entered into an Excel spreadsheet
according to the predetermined variables of interest. Results for the US and UK are
presented separately in chapters 9 and 10. Then, in accordance with George and
Bennett’s method of structured, focussed, comparison, the two countries were
systematically compared in order to identify similarities and differences (chapter 11).
The findings confirm that the rate of Islamist terrorism cases in the UK is 1.5
times that in the US relative to Muslim population sizes (or 6.1 times relative to overall
population size). Cases in the US have been more geographically dispersed while in the
UK they are mainly confined within 3 hotspots of activity. Demographic profiles of the
two samples are more similar than different (mostly consisting of males aged 30 or
under, most of whom have citizenship or permanent residency rights). However a key
difference is that the UK sample is more heavily dominated by individuals of Pakistani
heritage, which has played an important role in the continued ability of British militants
to make contact with terrorists in Pakistan. Although relying on relatively sparse data, it
is tentatively suggested that there is also an overall difference in levels of ideological
commitment- with more individuals in the US being classed as socially motivated or
‘wannabe’ terrorists. These findings are in accordance with the ‘social transmission
hypothesis’ (discussed in chapters 8-11), which postulates that the presence of greater
numbers of –or highly influential- terrorists in a given location increases the likelihood
of terrorism in or near that location over time.
Differences in behavioural patterns were also found: 63% of the US sample was
found to be preparing for, or actively pursuing, violence compared to 43% in the UK
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and while 24% in the US were classed as ‘offering their services’ by reaching out to
organised militants, 25% in the UK were involved in promoting or encouraging jihad.
These findings appear to relate both to posited ideological differences and to disparate
approaches by law enforcement in that promoting jihad generally involved some level
of ideological commitment while fewer individuals classed as preparing for or pursuing
violence in the UK is reflective of a preference for early intervention and prosecution
for lesser offences (supported by the fact that the average prison term in the UK overall
is less than half that of the US).
The final major difference was that individuals living in or from the US
maintained a much stronger focus on jihad overseas rather than at home and more often
travelled abroad in relation to these aims. Hence 54% of the US sample was focussed on
jihad abroad and there was a corresponding percentage that involved international
operations. By contrast only 25% of the UK sample maintained a purely overseas focus
and 67% were operationally based in Britain.
Despite these differences, there was also general similarity on many of the other
variables including offence date ranges, processes of radicalisation, group
characteristics, the role of the Internet and stated motivations (as well as a shared
underlying fascination with violence and sense of social bravado).
Both samples were also assessed according to pre- vs. post-Iraq generations and
there was also more similarity than difference in terms of changes over time. Findings
lend support to observations made by Sageman, which indicate that the average age of
jihadis has decreased and that educational attainment and occupational standing have
declined (although differences were generally fairly small). Results here also support
general observations about the nature of home-grown Islamist terrorism in that contact
with foreign terrorists has become relatively less common in both countries over time.
It is acknowledged that this report relies on open source material that is of
questionable reliability and validity and is often lacking information. However, it is
nevertheless one of the few relatively large empirical studies of terrorism and thus
represents an important ‘database’ of information and a significant contribution to the
field. In closing, it is emphasised that this is a snapshot of Islamist terrorism in the US
and UK over a particular period in time and as new events unfold the picture will
change.
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Overview
Islamist militants are more commonly referred to as ‘terrorists’, but anyone who
studies terrorism is well aware of the issues surrounding this label. Here, the complexity
of defining ‘terrorism’ is briefly delineated, while stipulating that the term is defined by
the current sample being studied.
Islamist terrorism is defined as that which adheres to a militant Sunni-Islamist
world-view (dividing the world into believers and infidels, believing that Islam is under
attack from the West, and seeing jihad as necessary violence against the perceived
oppressors of Islam). Since September 11th, 2001, individuals driven by this ideology
have become a primary threat to national security in the West. Moreover, a major
concern has been the rise of ‘home-grown’ Islamist terrorism (HGIT) involving longterm residents and citizens of Western democracies.
The present study involves an inclusive, systematic examination of individuals
prosecuted for Islamist terror-offences in the United States (US) and United Kingdom
(UK) from 2001 to 2008. In so doing it seeks to clarify the nature of the threat in each
country and thereby strengthen the knowledge-base that forms of the core of counterterrorism.
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1. Working Definitions
1.1 Terrorism
‘Terrorism’ is a notoriously difficult term to define. A multitude of academics and
governmental bodies continue to struggle to come up with a definition that will
universally satisfy objective analytical and legal requirements.1 Although definitions
touch on recurring themes they vary immensely in the amount of detail incorporated as
they strive to avoid being overly or under-inclusive. An example of a brief definition is
as follows:

“Terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or
violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role.”2

This can be compared to Schmid and Jongman’s definition:

“Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by
(semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or
political reasons, whereby -in contrast to assassination- the direct targets of violence are
not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen
randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets)
from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat -and violence- based
communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and
main target (audiences(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a
target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is
primarily sought.”3

In between these extremes there is an almost limitless number of variations and it is
prudent to take a pragmatic approach to this issue. The following, relatively
straightforward description is representative of core definitional elements that are
addressed in the literature:4

3

The threat or use of violence by sub-sate groups or organisations of varying size with
political and/or religious ideologies, intended to seriously harm or endanger noncombatant members of society and/or influence government policies and a wider
audience through the use of intimidation.

British and American formal definitions are detailed below for comparison in figures 1
and 2. Note that although the US continues to make the distinction between
international and domestic terrorism, the acts involved are the same. Likewise, other
than minor differences in specific terminology, the two definitions are highly congruent.
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Figure 1.1. Definition of terrorism according to the UK Terrorism Act (2000), maintained in the
Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005).6

1.—(1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action
where—
(a) the action falls within subsection (2),
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to
intimidate the public or a section of the public, and
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political,
religious or ideological cause.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it—
(a) involves serious violence against a person,
(b) involves serious damage to property,
(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person
committing the action,
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a
section of the public, or
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an
electronic system.
(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which
involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not
subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.
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Figure 1.2. Definition of terrorism according to the United States Code (as of 19/1/04).7

(1) the term "international terrorism" means activities that (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that
are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of
any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed
within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms
of
the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they
appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which
their perpetrators operate or seek asylum;…
…
(5) the term "domestic terrorism" means activities that (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation
of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States.

Part of the reason why such definitions cannot be reliably applied is because the
term ‘terrorism/terrorist’ is laden with negative connotations and is generally
inseparable from the political values of the user. Hence, the list of terrorist organisations
maintained by the EU and UN has been described as “totally arbitrary” by the Council
of Europe,8 and it is rare for perpetrators of acts of terror to refer to themselves as
terrorists.9 Moreover, ‘terrorism’ involves much more than simply the perpetration of
acts of violence. The daily activities of ‘terrorists’ do not routinely involve planting
bombs in public places or hijacking airplanes, and these types of operation are only
made possible by way of dedicated fund-raising and logistical support activities,
involving various forms of licit and illicit behaviour. Terrorist organisations and
5

networks are also routinely involved in manufacturing and distributing propaganda in
order to attract supporters and new recruits.
It is therefore often very difficult to objectively classify what constitutes
terrorism and who is a terrorist, or to be able to reliably draw the line between terrorists,
their supporters, and sympathisers. Legally speaking, such difficulties are often
compounded by the fact that there is a heavy burden of proof in determining the intent
behind peoples’ actions, especially in cases where law enforcement efforts have
prevented any planned violent action from taking place. This is reflected in the fact that
many cases which begin as prosecutions for terrorist offences frequently result in
charges or convictions under ‘ordinary’ criminal law instead.10
However, instead of endlessly pontificating on definitional issues, which would
be “an inefficient use of time and energy,”11 it is more productive to simply be aware of
the fact that such issues exist, and to clearly define the current sample. By describing
exactly who and what will be the subject of research, the applicability of the label of
‘terrorism’ may be assessed by the reader without affecting the integrity of the work.
More importantly, issues of generalisability and comparability can also be accurately
assessed, determining the degree to which the present sample is relevant to other
samples and populations. Hence it is necessary to utilise a certain degree of ‘common
sense’ and to assess each case individually to see whether it is germane to the questions
at hand. Validity then, is the product of the methodology that is employed and the
generalisations that are made.
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1.2 Islamist Terrorism
The ‘Islamist’ terrorism concerning this report is that which is justified through
reference to fundamentalist Sunni, Salafi/Wahhabi12, Islamic doctrines,13 as popularised
most notably by al-Qaeda14 and also commonly referred to as jihadi terrorism.15
Salafists (also known to ‘outsiders’ as ‘Wahhabists’16) believe in tawhid or the oneness
of God, and view all developments and innovations in Islam since the time of the
Prophet Muhammad and his companions (salaf) as heretical.17 All human behaviour
must be guided by following a strict interpretation of the Quran and Sunna (the
traditions of the Prophet) and there is no tolerance for worshipping of saints or for any
pluralism within Islam- hence a prevailing disdain towards Sufis and Shia Muslims in
particular, sometimes erupting in sectarian violence.18 Salafists are not all politicised
though and Wictorowicz divides them into three broad categories- purists, who are
apolitical and emphasise religious teaching, politicos, who are politically informed and
thus believe they are better suited to apply Salafism to the modern context, and jihadis,
who advocate the use of violence to establish ‘true’ Islamic states.19 The latter two
categories can both be considered Islamists due to their interest in world politics.
Indeed, there is a great deal of diversity within Islamism and most Islamists are nonviolent.20 What these various groups and individuals share is the fundamental belief that
political and legal systems should be based upon Islamic doctrine, and specifically, it is
those who advocate violence with whom we are concerned here.
Hence, the ideologies Islamist terrorists adhere to tend to advocate literal
application of sharia Islamic law, dictating rigorous observation of religious behaviours
and intolerance of other beliefs, although terrorists will themselves not always abide by
such rules in order to avoid drawing attention to themselves. This is in accordance with
takfir21 ideology, which essentially allows Islamists to condemn Western or immoral
behaviour while simultaneously engaging in it to meet their aims, based upon the
grounds that the (stipulated) ends justify the means. Nevertheless, Islamist justifications
for attacks are usually very evident, as when groups make explicit claims of
responsibility.
It is important to recognise though, that Islamist doctrines do not by themselves
cause people to turn to terrorism (see chapter 4). Perhaps the most important
contribution of Islamist ideology in this context is that it promotes a very strong sense
of perceived Muslim identity. This gives rise to feelings of empathy for Muslims around
7

the world, leading to moral outrage22 at injustices and suffering of members of the
perceived Ummah.23 Furthermore, Islamist terrorists’ actions are subsequently
facilitated at the ideological level by coming to accept a radical belief system involving
three basic tenets:


That Islam is under attack from Western, and Western-influenced, powers.



That the world is divided into ‘us’ (‘real’ Muslims) and ‘them’ (infidels).



That jihad is necessary violence against the oppressors of Islam in order to
defend Muslims.

Beyond sharing these perceptions of the world, Islamist militants may differ
considerably in their routine activities, their modus operandi, choice of targets for
attack, and their stated justifications. Hence jihadis in different areas of the world and at
different points in time may be more or less motivated by local, regional, and/or global
factors.24 They may essentially want and do different things, depending upon their
particular circumstances and ideological standpoint. At the same time they are bound by
a basic, Islamist worldview and identity that often enables extensive transnational social
networking and cooperation. As a result of massive counter-terrorism efforts in the
aftermath of 9/11, command and control capabilities of groups such as al-Qaeda have
been severely disrupted, and large, centralised organisational structures can no longer
function efficiently. These structures have been replaced by a proliferation of smaller,
more autonomous groups of militants, many of whom are long-term residents of the
Western countries that they choose to attack.25 It is these ‘home-grown’ militants in the
United States and United Kingdom that are the focus herein.
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1.3 ‘Home-grown’ Islamist Terrorism
To a large extent, Islamist terrorism in the West is now considered to be ‘homegrown’. Generally speaking, the term ‘home-grown’ is only vaguely conceptualised and
rarely elaborated upon.26 The following implications of this term have been outlined as
requirements of stricter definitions of home-grown Islamist terrorism (HGIT):27

That attempted/successful terrorists:
•

Were born and/or spent most of their lives in the West (North America/ Europe/
Australia)

•

Were radicalised within their Western home countries

•

Have trained and achieved attack-capability in their Western home countries

•

Have planned/carried out attacks in their Western home countries

•

And are lacking direct foreign (non-Western) international support or control

Research suggests that radicalisation has been taking place in the West over the
past two decades, and that there has been an increase in the number of terrorists holding
legitimate Western passports.28 As chapter 3 describes, the West also quickly emerged
as a target for attacks, while in the post-9/11 period efforts have been made to train and
carry out campaigns of terror, sometimes independently of any formal terrorist
organisation. These ‘home-grown’ characteristics (attacks against the West by Western
residents with questionable organisational affiliation) have become more apparent since
the invasion of Iraq in 2003.29
However, it still remains to be seen the extent to which groups typically fulfil
each of the above criteria. Instead the manifestation of Islamist terrorism today may
include “a whole spectrum of realities, positioned according to the level of autonomy of
the group.”30 Along these lines Hoffman31 identifies four levels of al-Qaeda: 1) the
remaining core central staff (who still represent the biggest potential threat); 2) various
organisational affiliates; 3) ‘al-Qaeda locals’ who have established links to al-Qaeda;
and finally, 4) the ‘al-Qaeda network’ with no organisational links. For Hoffman,
‘home-grown’ terrorists are defined by their lack of organisational ties and so are
designated part of the wider al-Qaeda network only. However, use of the term more
generally has been liberal and has not been confined to a single (difficult to discern)
dimension.
9

‘Home-grown’ remains a piece of heuristic terminology, which centres upon the
country of residence and radicalisation32 of terrorists in relation to the country they
choose to attack; it implies in a general sense that home-grown terrorism is that which is
committed by long-term –if not life-long- residents of the targeted country, with limited
external involvement. Active supporters of terrorism who did not ‘come from abroad’
may also be considered home-grown.
Within the current study, references to home-grown terrorism/Islamist militancy
refer simply to Islamist terrorist activity within Western Europe, the United States,
Canada, and Australia, involving residents of respective countries. This permits analysis
of the entire range of activity based on relatively straightforward criteria, without being
limited to problematic or self-limiting assumptions or time-frames and staying true to
the fundamentally defining feature of HGIT, that is that the terrorists ‘come from
within.’
The aim of the current study is to describe and compare Islamist militancy in the
US and UK in order to clarify understanding of how exactly the threat is manifest in
each country, which in turn will have implications for counter-terrorism policy.
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Overview
The research questions are identified, as well as goals and justification of the
project. This is followed by a more detailed description of the methodology employed,
outlining the variables of interest, sampling criteria and method of analysis. Care is
taken to draw attention to limitations of the data, which must be borne in mind at all
times, especially when evaluating the reliability and validity of conclusions.
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2. Research Questions and Methodology
2.1 Research Questions
The overarching research question for this project is:

What have people living in, or from, the United States and the United Kingdom been
doing to support or advance violent jihad –either at home or abroad- from 2001 to
2008, and what differences are apparent between these two countries?

In other words, how has ‘home-grown’ Islamist terrorism manifest itself in the US and
UK? This constitutes a number of sub-questions, which have been identified as a result
of reviewing the existing literature:

1. Historically, how has Islamist terrorism developed in America and Britain?
-This is a necessary pre-requisite for beginning to understand how it is
manifest today.
2. What is the average demographic ‘profile’ of terrorists in each country
today?
-Who is being drawn to Islamist terrorism? This has been the focus of
previous studies by Sageman1 and Bakker.2
3. What patterns of radicalisation and operational activity can be identified?
-Are the data from the American and British samples in accordance with
existing accounts of these processes? What exactly are people in each
country doing, and is there anything unique to the US or UK?
4. What group characteristics can be identified? (For example, average group
size, leadership or other roles)?
-Previous research has identified operational leaders, protégés, and
spiritual sanctioners3- to what extent is this confirmed in the current
samples?
5. What are the stated motivations?
-Foreign policy, religion, domestic issues, other?
6. What role does international communication and travel have to play?
-A key concern has been the extent to which Islamist terrorism has
become indigenous to countries in the West, and whether groups or
15

individuals can develop significant capabilities without external
assistance.
7. What has been the contribution of jihadi organisations or foreign terrorists?
-A related concern has been the extent to which Western jihadis are
autonomous, or whether there is an element of direction or control.
8. How significant is the Internet for i) propaganda ii) group formation iii)
gathering information for intelligence or attacks iv) group communication?
-The impact of the Internet is one of the most heavily emphasised
developments in the global jihad. Understanding its precise role is vital.
9. What differences exist on each of these dimensions between the two selected
countries, and what implications does this have for counter-terrorism?

2.2 Goals
The primary goal of this research is to clarify the nature of the full range of
Islamist terrorism in the United States of America and the United Kingdom, and to
determine what differences, if any, exist. In furtherance of this goal, the history of
Islamist terrorism in each country is examined, and detailed case-studies have been
conducted of Islamist militants from each country who were active during the period
September 12th 2001 through to December 31st 2008. Following cross-comparison,
implications for counter-terrorism efforts are considered. Ultimately this research
represents an important empirical record, useful as a ‘database’ of case studies covered,
and in that capacity makes a significant contribution to the terrorism literature, given a
relative lack of empirical research.

2.3 Justification
As Silke has noted, in the field of terrorism research there is a tolerance for poor
quality research and a dearth of systematic, empirical study.4 By adopting a systematic,
cross-comparative approach, this research contributes towards redressing this balance.
Two specific contributions are made: first, it empirically describes the range of ‘homegrown’ Islamist terrorists in the US and UK, and second, it methodically compares these
two key countries.
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The majority of terrorism research in recent years has focussed upon Europe or
upon isolated, cursory case studies. Country-case studies are generally lacking, as are
cross-comparative analyses. In terms of case selection, HGIT in the USA in particular
has been under-researched, and while in the UK this may be less so, it still demands a
great deal more attention. Moreover, by choosing to examine the US in comparison to a
European country, it will be possible to assess whether or not purported differences
between these countries correlate with differences in how terrorism occurs.

2.4 Methodology
This project has commenced over 4 phases: 1. Literature review and
identification of key variables, 2. Case-study selection and data collection, 3. Analysis
of case-data, and 4. Cross comparison and conclusions. By utilising a systematic
approach, identifying key variables to be examined within each case and then
comparing the results for both countries, the methodology adheres to George and
Bennett’s method of structured, focussed comparison.5

2.4.1 Phase 1: Literature Review and Identification of Key Variables
The first stage, as in all studies, is to undertake a comprehensive review of the
existing literature on Islamist terrorism, paying particular attention to Western
countries. Indeed, this is how research questions are identified in the first place.
For answering the questions identified above, it is necessary to understand how
global Islamist terrorism has developed over time, how it has spread to the West, and
specifically how it has manifest itself in the US and UK. It is equally important to
review theories of terrorism and consider how they apply to Islamist terrorism in the
West.
The aim of the literature review is thus to: a) develop a historical understanding
of the development of Islamist terrorism and how it has spread to the West, b) examine
existing theoretical accounts of terrorism and how these apply to HGIT, c) outline
current understanding of the threat and identify gaps in the literature, and d) provide a
more context-specific account, and a preliminary comparison of HGIT in the US and
UK as a way of ‘setting the scene’ ahead of detailed case-study analysis.
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A review of the literature also enables identification of key variables to be
examined within each case. The following variables were identified and form the basis
of the case study analysis:

1. Geographical distribution: Where cases have occurred. Are there
‘hotspots’ of Islamist extremism?
2. Demographic profiles: Gender, age, nationality and ethnic origin, length of
time in the US/UK, place of residence, education completed, occupation,
faith, marital status, criminal record, mental health.
3. Offence date range: From start of ‘offending’ to conclusion of case. This is
defined by the indictable offence period or the first known action taken to
advance the offence for which the person or group has been convicted. Often
radicalisation and related offence behaviours are reported prior to the
specific offence- these are noted in the qualitative account of each case but
are not incorporated into the offence period.
4. Radicalisation: Social vs. self-radicalised? Have social settings such as
mosques and gyms been important? Have significant others played a role?
Has the Internet been significant?
5. Group characteristics: What is the immediate group size? Is there an
identifiable leader? Is there an identifiable ‘spiritual sanctioner’?
6. Operational activity:
i. Ideological commitment:
a) Ideologically committed (‘hardcore’)
b) Social terrorists & ‘wannabes’ (show signs of being less
committed)
c) ‘Troubled’ individuals (mental health issues/ personal
problems)
d) Criminal opportunists (self-serving)
ii. Behavioural classification: Can the case be classed as
a) Active, personal pursuit of violence,
b) Preparation for violence (training),
c) Promoting/facilitating jihad/ recruitment (top-down),
d) Active support/ ‘hands on’ facilitation,
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e) Fundraising for others,
f) Offering services/ support (bottom-up),
g) Possession of terrorist articles and propaganda?
iii. Focus: Is the focus of activity domestic or abroad?
iv. M.O: For attacks, what targets and method of attack have been
chosen?
7. International dimensions & associations: Has related international
communication/travel occurred? If so, where to? Has there been contact with
foreign, organised jihadis and if so, what has been the significance of this
(Control? Influence? Support? Advice?) Additionally, has there been contact
with any known domestic Islamist militants?
8. Role of the Internet: Has the Internet been used for:
a) Creating/disseminating jihadi materials
b) Accessing propaganda/jihadi forums
c) Group formation
d) Gathering intelligence and information useful for attacks
e) Communication with others abroad or at home
f) Fundraising.
9. Stated motivation: Foreign policy/ domestic issues/ personal/ other.
10. Outcomes: How cases end (for example, arrest/ successful attacks/ death)
and what legal penalties are involved (charges applied and length of
sentences).

Each of these variables helps to answer the research questions (above) and each
is important from a pragmatic (atheoretical) standpoint. So, for example, the
geographical distribution of cases is important from a counter-terrorism (CT)
perspective since the identification of hotspots facilitates appropriate allocation of
resources. The more that is understood about the nature of Islamist terrorism in any
given country, the more informed CT strategies will be.
Additionally, it is important to appreciate that current explanations of terrorism
(see chapter 4) were also taken into account when selecting variables, and as such there
are implications for theoretical understanding as well. Geographical distribution over
time has implications for the social transmission hypothesis (see pp.172-173); the
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examination of demographic profiles builds upon previous research, allows empirical
assessment of changes over time, and provides information relevant to explanations of
terrorism in terms of psychopathology, personal trauma, ‘root causes’ and relative
deprivation; radicalisation and group characteristics are both important for
understanding the types of social interaction that take place, which is vital for assessing
the relevance of social explanations of terrorism; international associations help us
understand the extent to which Islamist terrorism in the US and UK is truly ‘homegrown’; the role of the Internet is again relevant to understanding social interaction
between militants; and stated motivations help us comprehend the Islamist terrorist
identity as well as relative contributions of domestic issues and foreign policy.

2.4.2 Phase 2: Case Study Selection and Data Collection

Case Study Selection
The first stage of case study selection involved an exhaustive review of all cases
of Islamist terrorist activity in the US and UK on public record. This involved reviewing
in excess of 120 cases involving more than 200 individuals in both countries (over 240
cases and 420 individuals reviewed in total), and then choosing which cases to include
in the analysis according to pre-defined criteria.

The criteria for inclusion/exclusion are as follows:
-

Case must be classified as related to the global (Sunni) Islamist jihad. These are
not limited to plans to carry out violence, but include the entire spectrum of
support and propaganda activities as well.

-

Cases relating specifically to Palestinian terrorist groups (e.g. Hamas,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad) are excluded, since they have not shown a
demonstrable allegiance to the bin-Laden-led global jihad. This is also the case
for the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) since despite declaring an affinity
with al-Qaeda in November 2007, there appears to be little evidence of a
tangible realisation of this ‘merger’.6

-

The focus is on terrorist activity from September 12th 2001-December 31st 2008,
therefore there must be evidence of activity during this period. Cases which
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began before this period are included as long as they continued after 11th
September. Cases which concluded before this period, and those which began
afterwards are not included.
-

Cases where criminal conduct, such as fraud or immigration violations, has
occurred but where this has been prosecuted separately to any allegations of
involvement in terrorism are excluded.

-

Individuals who have not been charged (even if subject to control orders or
similar sanctions without trial), those who have been acquitted, and those whose
convictions have been quashed are all excluded.

-

Individuals do not have to be convicted under terrorism statutes to be included in
the sample, but their conviction (or guilty plea) must be in direct relation to
terrorism offences.

-

Cases that are still going through the judicial process –and as such remain at the
level of allegation- are excluded.

-

4 cases that fail to strictly meet these criteria have nevertheless been included:
these are Adam Gadahn and Omar Hammami from the US, and Abu Qatada and
Feroz Abassi from the UK. These ‘special’ cases are included based upon
individual case-assessments and are included based on the judgement that the
quantity and quality of intelligence is so high that it cannot be ignored and
excluding these case would represent significant omissions that would detract
from the thoroughness of the study. Individual justifications are given with each
case summary (see Appendices A and B).

These criteria are rather strict. As a result, numerous cases that are undoubtedly
relevant to understanding Islamist militancy in both countries are excluded. For
example, if a case involving possession of terrorism literature results in a conviction but
is then quashed, it is not the possession of the material that is disputed, rather the legal
definition of whether an offence has occurred. By maintaining a standard of inclusion
that is equivalent to legal standards, the current study is focussing on cases where the
most (quantitative or qualitative) evidence exists. This can be interpreted in different
ways. On the one hand it may represent only the most serious cases, where involvement
in terrorism is so deep that the evidence is irrefutable, or where they have attracted
sufficient attention from police and security services to uncover larger amounts of
condemning material. A potential counter-argument to this is that only the less savvy
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individuals have been inept enough to create sufficient evidence of their actions. This
argument seems to have more relevance to cases involving for example fundraising
activities, which can carry on undetected indefinitely. However, for plans of attack,
those that escape detection will eventually surface when the attack actually takes place
(at which point investigators invariably uncover large amounts of information).
Essentially there is a disparity between terrorist-offending that results in conviction,
and terrorist-offending that is known about or suspected but remains at the level of
intelligence (even if it results in formal sanctions such as asset-freezing or control
orders, which do not require the same level of proof). By restricting the sample to the
level of most certainty, the current project limits its scope but maintains a higher level
of confidence in its conclusions and minimises false positives (including individuals
who are not involved in terrorism).
Finally, there are criteria for inclusion of individuals within cases. Individuals were
included in the sample for analysis so long as they were a resident of the country in
question, regardless of where the offence was carried out. Foreign jihadis who were
complicit in the conspiracy were excluded from statistical analysis of demographic
characteristics, even though they are included in the qualitative description (Appendices
A and B Part 2). This maintains the focus on people living in, or from, the US and UK
respectively, as outlined in the overarching research question.
The end result of the selection process is a sample of 46 cases (91 individuals) from
the US, and 51 cases (112 individuals) from the UK. The full details of these cases are
provided in Appendices A & B Part 2 and are analysed in chapters 9, 10 and 11, whilst
a list of significant excluded cases is also included (Appendices A & B Part 3). It is also
worth noting that once information on the outcome of cases which are currently pending
is available, the picture will change considerably. For the US this will potentially add 2
cases from 2007 (involving 2 US residents) and 12 more cases in 2009 (42 individuals).
For the UK there is currently only 1 case from 2004 (2 individuals) and 1 case from
2009 (4 individuals). It is thus imperative to remember that the situation is constantly
changing, and will also have to be adapted in retrospect as new information emerges.

Data Collection
As with the vast majority of terrorism research this study relies upon exclusively
open source materials as no other sources are readily available (and there is no research
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budget).7 Primary data was not therefore collected first-hand by the researcher, nor were
data sources intended for research purposes. It is thus an inescapable reality that the data
on which analyses are based are of questionable reliability and validity. There will
undoubtedly be missing and inaccurate data. However, the assumption (made by most
terrorism researchers) is that there is enough accurate data that makes it into the public
domain to ‘point us in the right direction.’ As long as the reader remains cognizant of
the limitations of open source data and how it is being used, the chances of treating
findings with a level of confidence that is unwarranted are reduced.

The main sources utilised are as follows:


‘Official’ reports including publicly available indictments and criminal
complaints (only made available by American and not British authorities),
various forms of press release or online information by law enforcement,
justice departments and security services, and in some instances limited
transcripts of court appearances;



Press reports (the single largest source of information); and



Other published accounts, such as academic studies and reports by nongovernmental organisations

All sources of data were primarily sought and acquired online, utilising specific
websites (e.g. www.findlaw.com for legal articles, newspaper websites for press
reports). The search engine ‘Google’ (and Google News Archive) were also used as a
means for searching the Internet for information. Although extremely broad in scope,
this was useful for unearthing information which otherwise might not have been found
by referring only to sites or sources already known. Most sources were free, however
the news archiving service www.highbeamresearch.com was subscribed to in order to
further increase the range of accessible articles. Each source was assessed in terms of
reliability and validity.
All sources are prone to omissions of relevant information, and to accidental or
deliberate falsification. ‘Facts’ that have been established in court are perhaps of
greatest reliability and validity, since they are the product of rigorous investigation and
sustained attempts by different parties to test or undermine those facts. Whilst acquiring
direct access to court reports is more desirable than relying on second-hand accounts of
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those reports, which adds another layer of potential distortion, this is for the most part
not possible.
Press reports vary in reliability and validity. An uncorroborated report is
especially doubtful, but given that information is often shared or passed on by different
members of the press, even multiple accounts of the same information are not
necessarily true. In assessing the worth of press reports it is necessary to: 1. Consider
the source (e.g. the reputation of the newspaper, agency or even reporter) as a proxy
measure of the standards of reporting. 2. Strive for sources with local access to the case
at hand (e.g. British news for UK cases, American news for US cases). 3. Consider the
extent to which the reported information is ‘factual’ observation or subjective
judgement (the former being more reliable than the latter). Finally, other publications
such as academic reports were also assessed according to the references cited, and
according to the apparent validity of analyses or conclusions drawn. These sorts of
publication can also serve as a useful way of discovering further relevant data sources.
The aim for each case study was to construct a coherent, chronological
biography of the development and activities of the individual or group in question
(establishing the who, what, where, when and why of each case).

Limitations of the Data
As already mentioned the data on which this report relies were not collected for
research purposes. Inaccuracies are sometimes reported, which later information then
clarifies and corrects. Other times speculation in the press is later refuted by authorities
as their investigation progresses and more information is gleaned. And on yet other
occasions convictions are sometimes overturned. It is thus necessary to continue to
collect new information on cases as it arises, even if this is after the apparent
‘conclusion.’ It must also be assumed that the data set as a whole is likely to contain at
least some erroneous information, despite the best efforts to minimise this (reading
multiple accounts of the same case, following cases beyond their conclusion, striving
for sources of high credibility, avoiding treating speculation or opinion as fact).
More of a problem than incorrect information though is missing (or deliberately
withheld) information. The amount of information that is included for each case varies
immensely- most often the more serious and high profile cases receive the most
coverage, and include the most details in indictments etc. Omitted details are a serious
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obstacle to being able to reliably assess each selected variable, and the somewhat
deflating fact is that if the information is not there, there is nothing that can be done.
However, as long as the researcher does not assume the presence of variables that are
not made explicit, and avoids extrapolating beyond the information that is there, the
project is still manageable.
A final limitation that must be mentioned relates to sampling choices. As
explained, the strict criteria applied in this study limit the scope to convicted jihadis,
hence disregarding a lot of undoubtedly relevant information on individuals not
convicted but who –as far as various government bodies are concerned- are nevertheless
clearly involved. A way of complementing this report in the future would be to conduct
a study also including cases which remain at the level of intelligence or allegation,
thereby achieving a representation of the two extremes of reliability of information.
Despite striving for the highest levels of reliability by using the sample criteria
applied herein, this report is still relying upon second or third-hand reports of publicly
available information. Even by focussing only on cases which have resulted in
convictions, there is always a margin of doubt. This report should not be treated as
anything more than a study of allegations and admissions made by others. It should not
be treated as a set of fresh allegations, as an indictment or as a judgement of the
individuals included in the sample (nor as an exoneration of anyone not included). It is
essentially a historical document examining public accounts of certain events.

2.4.3 Phase 3: Case-study Analysis
The case-study analysis (chapters 9 and 10) involved first conducting an
exhaustive review of articles and documents available for each case, then constructing a
chronological (qualitative) account of what exactly (is alleged to have) happened,
paying attention to the presence or absence of the selected variables (see Appendices).
A database for each sample was constructed using Excel including data on the variables.
A statistical (quantitative) analysis of the presence/absence of variables at the
cumulative level was then conducted, giving an overall statistical ‘profile’ for each
country.
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2.4.4 Phase 4: Cross-Comparison & Conclusions
Cross-comparison is fundamentally necessary for answering the research
questions at hand, which revolve around topical issues in the study of terrorism- namely
differences between the US and UK. There is a relative lack of this approach in
terrorism studies, which are overrun by one-off case studies, anecdotes and selective
reporting. Cross-comparative approaches hold great potential for gaining insight into the
unique manifestations of terrorism in different countries (making causal inferences
possible) and also enable description of the range of phenomena under study, and an
assessment of the generalisability of different theories.8 Moreover, as George and
Bennett9 point out, “there is a growing consensus that the strongest means of drawing
inferences from case studies is the combination of within-case analysis and cross case
comparisons within a single study or research program.”
Cross-comparison in the current study involved comparing the statistical profiles
for the US and UK to examine if any differences exist, and if so where those differences
lie. The outcome of this comparative process is discussed in the context of existing
discussions about the nature of Islamist terrorism in the US and UK (do the results
support or undermine existing ‘wisdom’?) and in relation to counter-terrorism (do the
results imply differential approaches to counter-terrorism in each country?).
Conclusions drawn (although tentative, given limitations of the data discussed) are thus
based on an exhaustive and meticulous approach to reviewing literature and collecting
data, careful selection of relevant variables, and a systematic, empirical crosscomparison of each sample. The end result makes a highly significant contribution to
our understanding of the manifestation of Islamist terrorism in the US and UK within
the specified time-period.
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Overview
In order to understand how and why Islamist terrorism has developed in Western
countries it is necessary to examine its historical roots. In this section the evolution of
HGIT is described with reference to worldwide events of direct relevance. The actions
of secular Palestinian organisations are seen to have been important to the
internationalisation of terrorism at a time when militant Islam was on the rise in the
Middle East, beginning in the late 1960’s. Radical Sunni Islam –both non-violent and
violent forms- swelled in response to the Shia Iranian revolution, and then rallied to the
call of jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviets.
Al-Qaeda was born in Afghanistan, and following the withdrawal of the Soviets
in 1989, gradually emerged as the central organisation aimed at propagating ‘global
jihad’ against the United States and its allies, which were viewed as the real enemies of
Islam. Mujahedin spread throughout Europe and the West during the 1990’s, where they
were able to attract Western recruits from early on and began to formulate plans of
attack against America and Europe.
During this period jihadis were inspired by ethnic-nationalist conflicts involving
Muslims, which served to sustain the growing Islamist movement. The attacks on
September 11th, 2001 then acted as an exemplary form of ‘propaganda by the deed’,
striking at the perceived cause of Muslim oppression. However, as a result of the
destruction of al-Qaeda headquarters in Afghanistan, the organisation was badly
damaged. In accordance with al-Qaeda ideology, dispersed networks of semiautonomous Islamists continued to attempt and to perpetrate terrorist attacks against
Western interests around the world, and attempted attacks also increased in frequency
within Western countries. This transformation was greatly facilitated by al-Qaeda’s
transnational presence and inter-organisational connections, and the growth of the
Internet.
It soon became apparent in Europe and America that many terrorists were
second or third generation immigrants, who had radicalised in the West and were
choosing to attack their home (‘host’) countries. Many of these ‘home-grown’ Islamists
were motivated by a mix of local and global grievances, most notably the continued
military presence in Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
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3. The Evolution of Home-grown Islamist Terrorism in the West
The development of HGIT in the West is the culmination of decades –even
centuries- of varying interactions between primarily Middle Eastern and Western
individuals and countries. It can therefore only be understood by way of reference to the
evolution of Islamist terrorism1 more generally and to global events that have
accompanied if not facilitated this phenomenon. Ongoing Arab/Israeli disputes, secular
Middle Eastern terrorism2, the growth of diaspora Muslim communities, the Iranian
revolution, the Soviet-Afghan war, the spread of Wahhabi Islam, the end of the Cold
War, ongoing Western involvement in world politics and military presence in Muslim
countries, conflicts in Algeria, Kashmir, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya and elsewhere,
Western complacency, globalisation in general, and various technological
advancements, are all part of the tapestry of contemporary Islamist terrorism.
Whole libraries could be filled on any one of these topics, which interact with
each other and overlap in time. Here a concise, historical overview of Islamist terrorism,
with reference to global events of direct relevance is presented.
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3.1 Terror in the Middle East & the Move from Secular to ‘Spiritual’ Terrorism
In order to understand the historical consciousness of the fathers of ‘global
jihad’, it is useful to briefly review the political climate in the Middle East which
immediately preceded their rise to prominence, and the transition from secular to
religiously oriented terrorism. Although very few of today’s ‘global’ Islamist terrorists
are Palestinians, the Arab/Israeli dispute is nevertheless relevant as a constant source of
rancour, seen by bin Laden et al as confirmation of an alliance between ‘Zionist’ Jews
and American ‘Crusaders.’3 Moreover, the historical development of the struggle
against Israel is inextricably interwoven with the growth of terrorism as a transnational
phenomenon and the emergence of terror in the name of Islam.
Violent clashes between Arabs and Jews have been taking place since at least
the 1920’s and intensified after the state of Israel was established in 1948. Over 700,000
Palestinian Arabs became refugees between 1947 and 1949; “[h]undreds of thousands
emigrated to the Persian Gulf, Europe, and North America, [many] becoming successful
in business, academic, and professional activity”.4 Terrorist tactics were utilised by both
sides of the Arab/Israeli dispute, but became the staple of Palestinian groups, in
particular following the 1967 ‘Six Day War’, when Israel demonstrated its military
superiority over its Arab neighbours and took control over what are now referred to as
the Occupied Territories.
The 1967 war created feelings of military impotency in the Arab world and
growing disillusionment with existing secular governments. It also created a new surge
of Palestinian refugees, who fled to nearby Arab countries and elsewhere around the
globe. In addition, a number of interconnected nationalist Palestinian organisations
grew out of this turmoil, including the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and
Al-Fatah under Yasser Arafat,5 the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP)6 and the Black September group,7 an offshoot of Al-Fatah. These groups were
primarily secular in nature, focussed on the establishment of a Palestinian state, and
utilised terrorist tactics both at the local level against Israel and internationally to draw
attention to their cause.8 Notable operations included the 1968 hijacking of an El Al
flight out of Rome,9 the disastrous 1972 kidnapping of Israeli athletes at the Olympic
Games in Munich,10 and the 1975 storming of an OPEC11 meeting in Vienna (led by
Illich Ramirez Sanchez, aka Carlos).12 At the same time the Abu Nidal group13 was also
active in perpetrating numerous terrorist attacks around the world in the name of
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Palestinian resistance. Although distinct from the current wave of Islamist terrorism,
Middle Eastern terrorists had thus already struck upon Western soil –effectively
internationalising terrorism- before many of the fathers of today’s global jihadi
movement had met one another. However, these secular terrorist groups failed to
achieve a Palestinian state, and were largely supplanted by Islamic organisations, which
rose to prominence after the first intifada14 beginning in 1987. Hence, Islamists came to
dominate one of the most compelling and protracted struggles in the Arab world, and
terror in the name of Islam became a firmly established phenomenon there under the
banners of Palestinian Islamic Jihad15 (PIJ) and Hamas16 (both with links to the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood17).
Meanwhile, Islamic activists and militant groups had been on the rise in Egypt
since the late 1960’s. Inspired by Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones, published in 1964, and lead
by one of his disciples, Muhammad Abd al-Salam al-Faraj, these groups were allowed
to proliferate under President Anwar al-Sadat, beginning in the late 1960’s.18 The
feeling that “Islam is the solution”19 had flourished after Sadat’s secular predecessor,
Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser had lead the country to defeat against Israel in 1967, and
for Faraj’s trans-Egyptian network this meant that a ‘true’ Islamic state under Sharia
law must be established by way of armed jihad. The ‘Jihad Organisation’ (Tanzim alJihad) succeeded in assassinating Sadat (who had signed a peace treaty with Israel in
197920 and whom they saw as an apostate) on October 6th 1981 but failed to take control
of the country.21 A great number of militants were arrested and Faraj was executed, yet
the majority of the detained Islamists were released after three years. Time in prison
appeared not to deter them from pursuing their goal of overthrowing the Egyptian
government. But at the time many (including Ayman al-Zawahiri) chose to go to
Afghanistan to assist their Muslim ‘brothers’ in the fight against Soviet occupation.22
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3.2 The Iranian Revolution & the Afghan Jihad
The resurgent tide of militant Sunni activism swelled in response to two
extremely significant events that occurred in 1979 (by which time the United States had
secured its super-power status and was the key external player in Middle Eastern
politics). First, the Iranian revolution took place, overthrowing the corrupt and
murderous regime that had been in power, and replacing it with an idealised (though
perhaps just as murderous) Shia Islamic government led by Ayatollah Khomeini.23
Although fundamentally incompatible with the Sunni Wahhabi ideals of future Islamist
terrorists such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the revolution in Iran is
widely accepted to have been a highly influential factor in demonstrating that Islamic
revolution was indeed possible. Moreover, the new Iranian government encouraged the
formation of radical Shiite groups elsewhere, most notably Hizballah,24 which was
formed in Lebanon in 1982 following the invasion by Israel.25 Hizballah went on to
become a hugely successful and influential terrorist organisation. In 1983 it was
responsible for two massive suicide bomb attacks against foreign troops that killed 241
US marines and 53 French paratroopers and lead to the withdrawal of foreign military
from Lebanon.26 Fledgling Sunni terrorists in nearby Middle Eastern countries such as
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan thus learned that terrorism could be used
effectively against the West.
The establishment of a Shia government in Iran also prompted reaction from
other Arab states. Of particular importance is the fact that Saudi Arabia felt inclined to
more aggressively promote their brand of Sunni Wahhabi Islam (to which most of
today’s Islamist terrorists subscribe).27 The Saudi government thus proceeded to donate
millions of dollars in setting up Wahhabi Islamic centres and mosques throughout the
world, including in Great Britain, the United States and elsewhere. Hence a form of
fundamentalist Islam compatible with today’s terrorists’ beliefs became prevalent in the
West. In the following years this facilitated the travel of militant preachers to Western
countries, who were able to exploit the situation to promote their cause and expand
operations.
The second major event of 1979 was the Soviet (Communist) invasion of
Afghanistan. This act of aggression against an ‘Islamic’ country inspired thousands of
young Muslim men from around the globe to flock to Afghanistan in order to fight
against the invaders. The Afghans themselves were organised into several different
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factions, often opposed to each other as well as the Soviets. Foreign mujahedin28 were
organised in the early 1980’s by Abdullah Azzam –a Palestinian-Jordanian refugee of
the 1967 war who had split from the PLO’s secular-nationalist stance29- assisted by his
wealthy protégé, Osama bin Laden. Based in Peshawar in Pakistan, together they
established the Mekhtab al-Khidemat or ‘Service Bureau’ in 1984, which operated in
some 35 countries to raise funds and recruit volunteers for the Afghan jihad.30 At the
time militant Sunni activists were seen as a counter against encroaching Communism
and growing Shia terrorism.31 They were encouraged by Arab regimes –Egypt and
Saudi Arabia in particular- to go to Afghanistan, where they might prove themselves to
be useful against the Soviets (and at the least would no longer be a security threat at
home). This process was also supported by the Pakistani intelligence services, who in
turn received support from the US.32
Afghanistan during the 1980’s was the birthplace of modern Islamist terrorism.
Azzam and bin Laden were soon joined by other future senior al-Qaeda leaders such as
Ayman al-Zawahiri, who had been part of the network of radicals responsible for the
assassination of Sadat in 1981. Together they helped organise and provide paramilitary
training to thousands of volunteers to fight the occupying Soviet force. At this point in
time the Islamists were focussed on repelling foreign invaders of Muslim lands, a
defensive jihad that was easily justified. Anti-western sentiments had always been
strong, since external involvement in Middle Eastern affairs was fiercely resented, but
Western forces were not the immediate enemy. When the Soviets began their
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988 there were mixed feelings about whether and how
to continue the jihad. Many volunteers returned to their home countries but others could
not, due to government persecution. Among the latter, a significant number sought
asylum in the West, and for those who chose to stay in Afghanistan, the debate about
what to do next intensified.33 Azzam, the most influential proponent of maintaining an
essentially defensive stance, was assassinated in 1989, not long after conceptualising the
‘Solid Base’ (al-Qaeda) organisation as a means of facilitating jihad. A transitional
period of relative disarray ensued. During this time the idea that the West and the US in
particular were the true enemies of Islam came to be fully embraced, fuelled by a sense
of outrage at the US military presence in Saudi Arabia following the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait in 1990.
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3.3 The Rise & Fall of al-Qaeda & the Seeds of Home-Grown Terrorism
If al-Qaeda was to fulfil its potential as an organisation aimed at recruiting and
training volunteers for jihad, it would require a base of operations. In the years
following the end of the Soviet-Afghan war, sites for training in guerrilla warfare and
terrorist tactics were maintained in Afghanistan and established in various other
countries including Yemen, Sudan, and Bosnia.34 Al-Qaeda headquarters were set up in
Sudan in the early 1990’s, at a time when world events colluded to further engender the
idea of global jihad. Remaining Service Bureau apparatus were then used by the
fledgling al-Qaeda to support and direct mujahedin to conflict zones in Kashmir and
Chechnya in particular, as well as Mindanao, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Somalia,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan, Yemen, Algeria and
Egypt.35

3.3.1 The Jihadi Warzones
In Kashmir, a heralded cause of many Islamists, a pattern of events akin to those
in Palestine was unfolding. Mass demonstrations in 1989, inspired by the Palestinian
Intifada of the same year, swiftly led to armed insurgency initially dominated by the
“Muslim but secularist” Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).36 By the mid to
late 1990’s the secularist groups were replaced by more strongly Islamist organisations,
some with links to al-Qaeda,37 such as Lashkar e-Taiba38 (LeT) and then Jaish eMohammad39 (JeM).
1989 also bore witness to a flashpoint in the development of conflict in Kosovo,
as Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic stripped the Kosovars of independence. The
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged in 1993, representing the country’s
persecuted ethnic Albanians (mostly Muslims) and began taking action against Serbian
forces. A number of Islamists were inspired by this conflict and came to participate,
especially after the 1995 Dayton Accords, 40 which designated peace agreements in
Bosnia and coincided with the ongoing growth of the KLA.41
In 1991, a year on from the start of the crisis in Kosovo, the Chechens
announced their separation from Russia. The ensuing struggle in Chechnya was to
become one of the most compelling sources of motivation for both experienced and
aspiring mujahedin from around the globe, and as with the other jihadi destinations, the
Islamists attempted, with limited success, to inject their Salafi/Wahhabi rhetoric into the
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local scene.42 The Chechen cause was fiercely promoted within Islamist circles and was
often the first choice destination for mujahedin, (although many were unable to make it
into the country).43
1992 was another eventful year in the formative years of al-Qaeda when war
erupted in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As part of the rapidly dissolving Republic of
Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina was comprised of three main ethnic groups, Bosnians
(who were primarily Muslim), Croats and Serbs. After a declaration of independence
was rejected by the Serbs, a brutal conflict ensued, producing yet another situation
where ethno-nationalist concerns could be utilised by Islamists to promote their own
ideology and agenda amidst a backdrop of war crimes and atrocities.44
Even more significant in 1992 was the government cancellation of elections in
Algeria in January, which prevented the Islamic Salvation Front Party (FIS) from
gaining power. This decision reaffirmed the Islamists’ belief that an Islamic state could
not be achieved by non-violent means45 and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA)46 was
promptly established by Algerian veterans of the Afghan war, with violence firmly in
mind.47
Each of these conflicts, which intensified more or less independently of one
another in the late 1980’s into the 1990’s, perpetuated the Islamists’ belief that Muslims
worldwide were falling victim to a Western conspiracy against Islam (despite the fact
that intervention by the likes of NATO48 often came to the aid of Muslim civilians).
Wars involving Muslims became extremely influential sources of motivation for
thousands of Islamist militants, many of whom might otherwise have never become
involved in terrorism. These conflicts also served as vital training grounds and places
where mujahedin could gain practical experience in combat (adding to the collective
paramilitary experience of the movement, which could then be passed on to the next
generation of jihadis and used in recruitment efforts).
Islamist ideology was by no means unquestionably adopted by respective local
populaces who tended to be far less austere in their practice of Islam. However, a small
minority did come to adopt militant Salafism, thereby spreading the message to more
diverse populations. On a more practical level, the geographic and social networks of
the Islamists were expanded. Veterans of the Afghan war maintained contact with each
other –able to activate dormant social ties as and when needed- and as they spread out
across the globe, the number and range of contacts increased exponentially. ‘Arab36
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Afghans’ who ‘set up shop’ in Europe were instrumental in sending new recruits to the
jihadi battlegrounds and providing support. Sheikh Anwar Shabaan had supported the
Bosnian jihad from the Islamic Cultural Institute (established 1989) in Milan.49 The now
infamous preachers, Abu Qatada and Abu Hamza similarly aided the Algerians,
working out of the Baker St. and Finsbury Park mosques in London.50 And in
Chechnya, foreign volunteers were originally drawn via Afghanistan and organised in
Chechnya by the Saudi, Samir Salih Abdallah al-Suwaylim, better known as Ibn alKhattab.51 The network surrounding the London-based Algerian Islamist, Abu Doha
was also involved in sending recruits to the Caucasus.52 Thus local conflicts were drawn
into the realm of global terrorism.
Perhaps most significantly of all, the jihad was moving ever closer to the West,
each warzone representing a stepping stone closer. Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo and
Algeria all represented physical steps closer, and held potential to act as staging grounds
for attacks against Europe. Indeed, this strategic possibility represented a key reason for
involvement in the first place. High-ranking al-Qaeda members involved in Bosnia and
in contact with bin Laden at the time are reported to have stated that his primary,
desired objective in Bosnia “was to establish a base for operations in Europe against al
Qaeda’s true enemy, the United States”.53 Access to Western countries including the US
was also facilitated by way of increased numbers of immigrants, refugees and asylum
seekers, a situation which the Islamists did not hesitate to exploit. Recruits drawn from
the jihadi wars (in particular those volunteers with Western passports) could often travel
unhindered within Europe and elsewhere, and potentially expand the theatre of
operations. Hence, the Afghan veteran networks merged with those of ‘local’ jihadis
and their militant diaspora, and mutually facilitated one another’s movement into the
West.54 In particular this seems to have been the case with the Algerian militants, who
took the jihad onto European territory as early as 1994 (see below) and who readily
integrated themselves into the al-Qaeda network.
Thus, while the significance of Afghanistan as a base of operations temporarily
waned in 1989, numerous ethnic/nationalist struggles involving Muslims emerged
elsewhere. These served to build upon the sense of inspiration derived from the defeat
of the Soviets, motivating the jihadis whilst simultaneously providing opportunity to
sustain and grow their organisational capacities while reaffirming their Islamist
worldview.
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3.3.2 The First Attacks in the West
Meanwhile, circa 1990, bin Laden had become vehemently opposed to the US
military presence on Saudi Arabian soil during the Gulf War, and was disgusted with
the Saudi government for allowing it. US involvement in Somalia under ‘Operation
Restore Hope’ in 1992 and 1993 added to this animosity.55 Bin Laden fell from favour
with the Saudi monarchy after publicly expressing his discontent with them at the
conclusion of the Gulf War in 199156 (going on to publish anti-Saudi propaganda via
the ‘Advice and Reformation Committee’, set up in London in July, 1994).57 He moved
to Peshawar and then on to Sudan, where at least several hundred Afghan veterans were
by then based at the invitation of Dr. Hasan al-Turabi’s National Islamic Front (NIF),
which had come to power in 1989.58 This effectively finalised the establishment of alQaeda headquarters in Sudan, where it was to remain until 1996.
Whilst bin Laden continued to narrow his focus onto the United States and its
allies as a target for attack, others were advancing similar plans. February 26th 1993
marked the first significant instance of an Islamist terrorist attack in the West59 when a
powerful bomb was detonated in the underground car park beneath the World Trade
Centre (WTC) in New York City, killing six and injuring over a thousand.60 Although
al-Qaeda members were not far removed from the network responsible for the first
WTC attack, it was not an al-Qaeda operation. However, it confirmed general sentiment
that the US was the true enemy and demonstrated that it was also vulnerable to attacks
at home. Islamist militants lead by Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman of the Egyptian
Gamaa’ Islamiyah attempted to consolidate this move against the US at home in the
following months, but the so called ‘NYC Landmarks’ plot was thwarted and the
immediate network convicted and imprisoned.61
The 1993 attacks were essentially ‘imported terrorism.’ The majority of
conspirators involved had come from Middle Eastern countries, had ties to a number of
terrorist organisations (including Gamaa’ Islamiyah, Islamic Jihad, Hamas and the
Sudanese National Islamic Front as well as an American sect-like group called alFuqrah)62 and had also received financial assistance from abroad.63 However, it is
important to note certain precursors to the ‘home-grown’ phenomenon in that several
members of the Yousef/Rahman network had been resident in the US for some time64
(e.g. Nidal Ayyad was a naturalised US citizen65) and there were two American-born
members of the Landmarks plot (Clement Rodney Hampton-El and Victor Alvarez).66
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At the same time as America was being confronted by embryonic Islamists from
the Middle East, Algerian terror networks began gaining momentum in Europe. In 1993
the presence of Armed Islamic Group (GIA) support networks –established following
the dissolution of the FIS67 the previous year- became evident in France (which was
targeted because of its enduring, post-colonial involvement in Algerian affairs); thus
GIA operations, including attacks on French citizens in Algeria, were facilitated by
members active on Western soil.68 Then, on December 24th 1994,69 four GIA members
hijacked a plane bound for France at Algiers airport, eventually landing in Marseilles
where they were killed by a French terrorism intervention squad.70 The following July,
the GIA assassinated FIS founder, Imam Abdelbaki Sahrawi at Myrha St. mosque in
Paris; then from July 25th to October 14th, 1995, executed a series of bombings and
attempted bombings in the Paris and Lyon regions, leaving 13 dead and over 180
wounded.71
It is significant that the networks behind these attacks involved extensive foreign
elements and transnational cooperation as they were directed from Algeria and
supported from ‘Londonistan’ in the UK. Rachid Ramda of the GIA had been based in
London in the early 1990’s and was eventually extradited to France in December 2005
where he received separate convictions for conspiring towards and financing the 1995
bombings.72 Notably, Ramda had contributed to al-Ansar magazine, which was run by
Abu Qatada and Abu Hamza, two highly influential ideologues of the global jihad
movement based in London. This period marked the integration of Algerian networks
with Islamist veterans of the Afghan jihad who were settling throughout Europe.73
There was sustained social contact, collaboration and exchange of ideas between North
African and Middle Eastern militants engaged in propaganda, support and operational
activities in the West.
The attacks in France also included terrorists who had been born and/or raised
there. The alleged ‘cell leader,’ Khaled Kelkal74 –who was killed in a televised shootout
with police on September 29th, 1995- had come to France from Algeria at the age of two
and had begun his journey into radical Islam whilst in prison there, beginning in 1991.75
In 1997, 40 militants were brought to trial in France charged with providing
instrumental support to Kelkal’s campaign,76 36 of whom were convicted for belonging
to a terrorist organisation.77 Amongst them was the man who admittedly recruited
Kelkal, namely Safé Bourada, who was likewise a Frenchman of Algerian descent.78
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There were also French converts to Islam involved, including Joseph Jaime, David
Vallat, and Alain Celle.79
European converts to Islam further demonstrated their dedication and violent
potential the year after Kelkal’s death. Christophe Caze and fellow French convert
Lionel Dumont had formed the ‘Roubaix Gang’ after returning to France from fighting
alongside foreign mujahedin in Bosnia in the early 1990’s.80 Their group performed a
number of armed robberies before attempting a car-bomb attack on a G7 jobs summit in
Lille in March 1996.81 Thus, from its earliest days in the West, Islamist terrorism was
able to attract Western citizens; their willingness to participate in violence is indicative
of how quickly ‘Islamism’ took root and began to incorporate ‘home-grown’ elements.

3.3.3 Al-Qaeda Takes Centre Stage
Meanwhile, the al-Qaeda organisation continued to develop as its members
dispersed and Islamism took root around the globe. 1996 was a key juncture, as bin
Laden et al were forced to leave Sudan, which was coming under international pressure
for harbouring terrorists (bin Laden’s name had come up in relation to the November
13th, 1995, bombing of a National Guard base in Saudi Arabia, and international
concern deepened after an assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
in Ethiopia on June 26th, 1995).82 Al-Qaeda subsequently relocated its base of
operations back to Afghanistan just as the Pakistani-supported Taliban were coming to
power.83 From this point, up until the end of 2001, the organisation and related wider
movement went from strength to strength. On August 23rd, 1996 bin Laden published
his ‘Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Lands of the Two Holy
Places’, in which he stated:

“My Muslim Brothers of The World: Your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the
two Holy Places are calling upon your help and asking you to take part in fighting
against the enemy --your enemy and their enemy-- the Americans and the Israelis”.84

Although such bold, antagonistic actions caused considerable unease amongst
the Taliban, the relationship on the whole remained one of protective, tolerant hosts and
resourceful, outspoken, guests.85 By this time planning had already begun86 for what
was to be al-Qaeda’s first real strike against American targets, the bombing of US
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embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which took place on August 7th, 1998, resulting in
over 240 fatalities (12 of US nationality).87 There was little in the way of repercussions
(a missile strike on training grounds on August 20th, followed by US sanctions against
the Taliban in 1999) and operations –including training of new recruits and planning
future attacks- continued.
The global jihad perspective had become official five and a half months earlier
on February 23rd, 1998 with the issuing of a fatwa by bin Laden and four cosignatories88
under the name of the World Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders. In it they
declared that:

“…to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty
for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to
liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order
for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten
any Muslim”.89

Civilians were first declared legitimate targets in Algeria in 1996 in a fatwa
issued by then emir of the GIA, Antar Zouabri90 and the previous attacks in America
and France had of course embraced this way of thinking. Although the GIA’s move
resulted in widespread loss of support, the al-Qaeda leadership were careful to restrict
this to infidel, and not Muslim, civilians. Moreover, the Islamic Front fatwa galvanised
the idea for Islamists around the world that attacks in the West were legitimate, and they
were further encouraged by the embassy bombings in August.

3.3.4 The West as a Primary Target
In the following years more and more evidence came to light that the Islamists
had turned their sights to the West. Investigations of Algerian terrorists operating in
France in the early 1990’s had uncovered a vast network of Islamists interspersed
throughout Europe, with links to the ‘Far East’ and Canada.91 The Canadian network
was run by Fateh Kamel, who had fought in Bosnia and maintained links with Caze and
Dumont of the Roubaix Gang.92
Kamel’s network was involved in document forgery and theft in support of
Islamist mujahedin around the globe, with direct links to al-Qaeda. They had come to
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the attention of the French authorities in 1996 and were also the subject of Canadian
surveillance. Kamel himself was extradited to France in April 1999 where he was
sentenced to eight years for charges in relation to the 1995/’96 bombings and the
activities of the Roubaix gang;93 however, it was not until December 14th, 1999 that the
potency of the Islamist presence in Canada was realised. Ahmed Ressam of Algeria was
arrested at the Canadian/US border trying to enter the United States with more than
50kg of explosives intended for detonation in Los Angeles LAX airport.94 Ressam had
spent some time living in France before travelling on false documents to Montreal in
1994, where he was swiftly absorbed into the militant diaspora subculture. He received
paramilitary training in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in 1998/1999,95 and had enlisted
the help of others in Montreal before arranging to meet up with a friend-of-a-friend
contact based in New York who would assist him in his mission. Ressam also
maintained links to Islamists in Pakistan and London. The most significant among these
contacts was Amar Makhlulif, better known as Abu Doha, an affiliate of the Groupe
Salafist Pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) and al-Qaeda who was heavily
involved in transnational Islamist activities.96
At around the same time, a plot was being developed by Algerian Islamists in
Frankfurt, Germany, to most likely launch an attack in Strasbourg, France.97 German
intelligence had been assisted in identifying the Frankfurt cell by their counterparts in
the UK, Italy and France in 2000. As was often the case, Islamists in London (again
under Abu Doha, with direct links to al-Qaeda) played a significant coordinating role.98
Four members of the operational terrorist cell in Frankfurt –who had met each other
whilst undergoing terrorist training in Afghanistan-99 were arrested on December 25th,
2000, and sentenced in 2002 to between ten and twelve years in prison.100 Following on
from the initial arrests, police in the UK raided several London flats in February 2001
and arrested nine militants, including Mustafa Labsi (who had been a close confederate
in Ressam’s millennium plot) and the radical cleric Abu Qatada.101 Two weeks later,
Abu Doha was also arrested trying to leave the country and “it became clear that the
whole plot had been conceived, directed, and funded in England”.102 In addition to
being wanted by the Germans and French for the Strasbourg plot, Abu Doha was
wanted by the US for his role in the failed millennium attack. He was also implicated by
the Italians regarding an aborted plot detected in January 2001 to attack the US embassy
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in Rome, which involved Algerian and Tunisian terrorists with links to the Islamic
Cultural Institute (ICI) in Milan.103
By the late 1990’s into the new millennium, Islamist extremists had become
entrenched within European countries, which served as breeding grounds for the
increasingly globalised movement. Training and combat zones such as Afghanistan and
Chechnya continued to stand out as beacons of jihad to aspiring mujahedin. However,
Afghanistan in particular often represented a way-station for Islamists to go to graduate
to the next level in the path towards terrorist activity. Whilst training abroad in alQaeda-run camps, they would also ‘network’ with peers before returning to Europe to
proselytise, undertake fund-raising and support activities, or plan attacks. Radical
mosques denoted hives of activity within transnational, fluid networks, allowing
Islamists to move between locales as necessary. Of crucial importance is the fact that
fledgling terrorists were becoming radicalised within the West through contact with
experienced mujahedin, and that militant networks were continually expanding.
It was within this context, beginning around 1996, that the ‘Planes Operation,’
which became 9/11, was conceived and developed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed with
the help of bin Laden and others.104 Those who became the ‘muscle’ hijackers were
primarily of Saudi Arabian origin and only entered the US a few months before the
attack took place. However, it is now well-known that three of the four pilots, who also
played vital planning roles, radicalised in Germany and came to America more than a
year previously.105
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Table 3.1. List of significant Islamist and al-Qaeda terrorist attacks/plots against Western targets
worldwide, from 1993 until September 11th, 2001. Bold type indicates al-Qaeda involvement. Red cells
represent successful attacks, orange cells represent unplanned attacks or those of limited success/failure,
and yellow cells represent cases where intervention occurred prior to any attack taking place.

Date
Feb 1993

Event
1st World Trade Centre attack.

Oct 1993

Attack on US troops in Mogadishu, Somalia by al‐Qaeda trained fighters. 106

Dec 1994
July‐Oct 1995
Jun 1996
Nov 1997
Aug 1998
Dec 1999
Oct 2000
Dec 2000
Sep 2001

GIA Air France hijacking.
Series of bombings of French transport system by Algerian militants.
Attack on US military Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.
Gamaa' Islamiyah attack on tourists, near Luxor, Egypt.
Al‐Qaeda bombings of US embassies in Kenya & Tanzania.
Al‐Qaeda LAX millennium plot involving Algerian Islamists in Canada.
Al‐Qaeda Bombing of USS Cole in Yemen.
Al‐Qaeda Christmas market plot in Germany/France.
9/11 Al‐Qaeda attacks on World Trade Centre & Pentagon.

The devastation caused on September 11th, 2001 marked a turning point in the
history of al-Qaeda and Islamist terrorism in the West. Aside from being the most
destructive terrorist attack in history, causing nearly three thousand fatalities, it was
instrumental in popularising the jihadi cause and inviting the US-led ‘war on terror.’ In
consequence, Westerners became conscious of al-Qaeda and its cause on a large scale,
simultaneously causing widespread condemnation of their tactics but also increasing the
number of sympathisers and potential recruits. At the same time, al-Qaeda’s ability to
coordinate and control Islamist terrorist operations around the globe was severely
disrupted as a result of worldwide punitive measures, spearheaded by the United States’
‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ launched on 17th October, 2001. The rule of the Taliban
had been cruel and lacking legitimacy and as support from Pakistan was also
withdrawn, al-Qaeda’s ally was unable to withstand the heavy military assault against
them.107 Within nine weeks the Taliban regime crumbled, terrorist training camps were
destroyed and many militants were captured or killed. Al-Qaeda had lost its sanctuary
for the time-being.108
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3.3.5 Al-Qaeda as a ‘Brand-Name’ & the Growth of HGIT
The world had awoken to the Islamist threat and authorities now realised that
Western countries were an integral part of the terrorists’ operations. Counter-terrorism
measures were reorganised and enhanced, including legislation changes and increased
surveillance of known radicals, extremist mosques and Islamist preachers, making it
more difficult for the terrorists to communicate, travel and coordinate activities.
Numerous al-Qaeda members and leaders were captured or killed, and governments also
succeeded in freezing large amounts of bin Laden’s assets, which further debilitated alQaeda’s organisational capacities to fund terrorism.109
However, heightened counter-terrorism measures did not prevent Islamist
extremists from attempting further attacks. To begin with, several al-Qaeda-linked plots
were underway and nearing completion in the direct aftermath of 9/11. On September
13th, 2001 Belgian police arrested the Tunisian, Nizar Trabelsi, who was part of a cell
planning to carry out a suicide attack on a Belgian US military base. Among others,
Trabelsi was also in communication with French-Algerian, Djamel Beghal, later
convicted of planning to bomb the US embassy in Paris, also in 2001.110 Trabelsi and
Beghal had both attended Finsbury Park mosque in London, where they allegedly
associated with Zacarias Moussaoui (the allegedly intended 20th 9/11 hijacker) and
Richard Reid, the British convert who, on December 22nd, 2001 attempted to detonate a
bomb hidden in his shoes onboard a Miami-bound flight from Paris.111
Over the coming years, there was a proliferation of Islamist terrorist activity on
Western soil as a succession of plots was uncovered in numerous countries including
the UK, France, Spain, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway,
Austria, the US, Canada and Australia. Moreover, it became increasingly apparent that
the terrorists were very often long-term Western residents or citizens (including second
or third generation immigrants and Caucasian converts to Islam) as opposed to recent
immigrants from the Middle East or North Africa.112 Hence Islamist terrorism was not
simply an imported phenomenon- it was developing from an exogenous to endogenous
or ‘home-grown’ threat.113
Table 3.2 below shows a selection of some of the most significant cases of
Islamist terror plots and attacks in the West between 2002 and 2008 (42 of more than 60
are included).114 6 cases were discovered in 2002, 6 in 2003, 13 in 2004, 10 in 2005, 11
in 2006, 10 in 2007, and 5 in 2008, based in 15 different Western countries. There have
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been 3 successful attacks in the West (March 11th, 2004 in Spain; November 2nd, 2004
in the Netherlands; and July 7th, 2005 in the UK) as well as 4 unplanned/ limited
success/failed attacks (January 14th, 2003; July 21st, 2005; June 29th and 30th, 2007; and
the May 22nd, 2008, all in the UK). It is also important to note that attacks represent the
‘tip of the iceberg’ in terms of terrorist activity, which also includes various forms of
proselytising and recruitment as well as both seemingly legal and illegal means of fundraising.
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Table 3.2. Selected significant Islamist terror plots/ attacks in the West, 2002-2008 inclusive. Red cells
represent successful attacks, orange cells represent unplanned attacks or those of limited success/failure,
and yellow cells represent cases where intervention occurred prior to any attack taking place.

Date
May ‘02

Country
US

Event
Jose Padilla arrested in Chicago; convicted on terrorism charges.

Oct ‘02

US

‘Portland 7' arrested in Portland, Oregon, US; later convicted on
terrorism charges.

Dec ‘02

France

1st ‘Chechen network’ arrests in Paris; thought to be developing
chemicals for attacks on the Russian embassy; later convicted

Jan ‘03

UK

Ricin plot & murder of DC Stephen Oake by Algerian Islamists; 1
conviction (Kamel Bourgass).

Mar ‘03

US

Jun ‘03

US

Nov ‘03

UK

Jan ‘04

France

Mar ‘04

Spain

Mar ‘04

UK

Aug ‘04

UK/ US

Aug ‘04

US

Oct ‘04
Nov ‘04

Spain
Netherlands

Jul ‘05
Jul ‘05

UK
UK

Aug ‘05

US

Oct ‘05

Denmark/
Bosnia

Oct ‘05

UK

Nov ‘05

Australia

Dec ‘05

US

Iyman Faris arrested re. terrorism support & plot to attack Brooklyn
Bridge; later convicted.
Virginia paintball' arrests; later convicted.
Sajid Badat arrested for planned bombing onboard an airplane in
2001 with Richard Reid; convicted.
Arrests of 'Chechen network' French‐Algerians planning chemical
attacks.
‘3/11' Madrid bombings.
‘Operation Crevice' aka 'Fertiliser bomb plot' arrests, involving links
to US & Canada.
Dhiren Barot et al charged with planning attacks; later convicted.
James Elshafay & Shahawar Matin Siraj charged with plotting to
attack the New York subway; later convicted.
Martyrs of Morocco' arrested planning terrorist attacks.
Mohammed Bouyeri murders Theo Van Gogh.
‘7/7' bombings.
‘21/7' attempted bombings.
Kevin James & 3 others charged with creating a terrorist
organisation; later plead guilty.
Arrests of 'Glostrup cell' in Denmark, planning attacks in Bosnia; links
to Islamists in Bosnia, as well as Younis Tsouli in UK.
Younis Tsouli 'cyber jihadist' arrested; links to Bosnia & Canada; later
convicted with 2 others.
‘Operation Pendennis' arrests.
Michael Reynolds arrested, planning terrorist attacks; later
convicted.
…continued…
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Table 3.2 continued…

Date

Country

Apr ‘06

US

Jun ‘06

Canada

Jun ‘06

US

Jul ‘06
Aug ‘06

Germany
UK

Sep ‘06

Norway

Sep ‘06

Denmark

Jan ‘07

UK

May ‘07
Jun ‘07
Jun ‘07

US
US/ Trinidad
UK

Sep ‘07

Denmark

Sep ‘07

Germany

Sep ‘07

UK

Jan ‘08
Feb ‘08
Apr ‘08
May ‘08

Spain
Denmark
UK
UK

Event
Syed Haris Ahmed & Eshanul Islam Sadequee charged with supporting
terrorists.
Toronto 17' arrests; planning attacks; linked to Younis Tsouli in UK.
Sears Tower' arrests in Miami; planning attacks; now facing third re‐
trial.
2 Lebanese men place faulty bombs onboard trains in Cologne.
Aircraft plot' to blow up several planes.
4 arrests re. plot to attack synagogues & the US & Israeli embassies in
Oslo.
Vollsmose cell' arrests; planning attacks in Denmark; 3 convictions.
Parviz Khan et arrested in plot to behead a British Muslim soldier; 5
convicted.
6 arrested in plot to attack Fort Dix.
1 arrest in NY & 2 in Trinidad; plotting to attack JFK airport.
Failed car bomb attacks in London + attack on Glasgow airport;
8 arrests made re. attacks being planned in Copenhagen; direct links
to al‐Qaeda alleged.
Operation Alberich' arrests; plotting attacks in Germany.
Scottish student Mohammed Atif Siddique arrested; later convicted of
possessing & distributing material useful to terrorists.
14 arrests re. plot to assassinate visiting Pakistani President.
5 arrested in plot to assassinate Danish 'Muhammad' cartoonist.
Andrew Ibrahim arrested in Bristol re. plotting terrorist attacks.
Nicky Reilly failed nail‐bomb attack in Exeter; convicted.

In hindsight it is apparent that the development of HGIT in the West was an
almost inevitable outcome of the sustained Islamist presence brought about by
deliberate geographical expansion of terrorist networks since the late 1980’s. The events
of September 11th, 2001 then acted as a catalyst for the transformation of al-Qaeda and
for the inextricably linked growth of HGIT in its present form.
The significance of the various terrorist plots in the West, as well as attacks
against Western/Jewish targets by groups with links to al-Qaeda in Tunisia, Bali, Saudi
Arabia, Morocco, Turkey, and elsewhere, was perhaps at first poorly appreciated (the
US State Department claimed in January 2004 that al-Qaeda was 70% destroyed and
that its days were “numbered”115). However, following the first successful attack in the
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West on March 11th, 2004 in Madrid –where a network of mostly Moroccan terrorists
based in Spain bombed four trains, killing 191 people116- opinions changed. It became
widely acknowledged that whilst core elements of the al-Qaeda organisation had indeed
suffered in the aftermath of 9/11, the al-Qaeda ‘brand-name’ had grown in stature.
Affiliated organisations and like-minded Islamists the world over were thus inspired to
carry on the fight.117
In the words of Hoffman, “since 9/11, bin Laden and his lieutenants have
engineered nothing short of a stunning transformation of Al Qaeda from the more or
less unitary, near bureaucratic entity it once had been to something more akin to an
ideology…an amorphous movement tenuously held together by a loosely networked
transnational constituency rather than a monolithic, international terrorist organization
with either a defined or identifiable command and control apparatus. The result is that
today there are many Al Qaedas rather than the single Al Qaeda of the past. It has
become a vast enterprise –an international movement or franchise operation with likeminded local representatives, loosely connected to a central ideological or motivational
base, but advancing their common goal independently of one another”.118
The Madrid ‘3/11’ bombers exemplify this transition from networks that have
been assembled top-down by al-Qaeda or a similar organisation, to home-grown, or
“grass roots” networks that have spontaneously come together, are tactically
independent and show only marginal organisational affiliation.119 Members of the
network were in contact with experienced jihadis with links to the Moroccan Islamic
Combatant Group –GICM- and al-Qaeda, and claimed responsibility for the attacks in
the name of ‘Supporters of al-Qaeda in Europe;’ however, the organisationally
connected figures were seemingly only peripherally involved in the group, only one
member was an alleged jihadi war veteran, and there is no evidence of top-down
external control.120
Since 2004, there has been a significant amount of variation in the apparent
levels of involvement of established terrorist organisations in terrorist plots and attacks
in the West. Mohammed Bouyeri –who murdered Theo Van Gogh in Amsterdam in
November, 2004 for ‘insulting Islam’- was part of a home-grown network of Islamists
with seemingly no organisational affiliation.121 The July 7th (‘7/7’) London bombers
show a seemingly mixed profile; Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer
received some terrorist training in Pakistan, however, the involvement of al-Qaeda or
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any similar organisation remains unclear and the group had radicalised at home and was
otherwise independent.122
In the past, continuous, concrete involvement of (foreign) ‘parental’ terrorist
organisations had been taken for granted as a feature of plots and attacks. Since 9/11
that assumption has been increasingly eroded and replaced by the realisation that the
majority of Islamist terrorists active in the West are likely to have radicalised at home
and to be largely self-organised, with varying, limited organisational support.
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3.4 Explaining the Evolution of Global Islamist Terrorism
The spontaneous adaptation of al-Qaeda and Islamist terrorism in the face of
repressive counter-terrorism campaigns is the combined result of –among other thingsthe unprecedented impact that 9/11 had as a form of ‘propaganda by the deed’; the
continued geographical dispersion of the network (including infiltration of the West and
al-Qaeda’s ‘networking’ with other organisations before and after 2001); inflammatory
world events which served to mobilise new generations of jihadi terrorists; and
improved media capabilities and utilisation of the Internet.
After 9/11 more people than ever before became aware of al-Qaeda and its
mission, and although most of course condemned the attacks, this new exposure also
instantly increased the pool of sympathisers and potential terrorists. At the same time,
existing radical Islamists with varying terrorist connections and degrees of influence
over others were inspired to praise bin Laden and to further promote their cause. For
example, the London-based group, al-Muhajiroun had published just nine press releases
from 1999 to 2001, compared to almost fifty in the next two years.123 This example also
illustrates the fact that radicals were still able to exploit Western commitment to human
rights and freedom of speech.124 Changes in the law did take place in numerous
countries but Western governments on the whole were initially ill-equipped to take
decisive action against the new wave of Islamism.125
The growth of al-Qaeda as a social movement and figurehead of Islamist
terrorism was also facilitated by its inter-organisational world connections. Bin Laden’s
organisation had been involved with localised Islamist movements from early on in its
development (among them the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Gamaa’ Islamiyah -also of
Egypt- the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah, or JI, the Algerian GIA and GSPC, and of
course the Taliban and aforementioned insurgency groups- see ‘The Jihadi Warzones’
above). Pre-9/11, these organisations would send their operatives to al-Qaeda camps for
paramilitary training, and would also receive financial aid and logistical support for
operations.126 Al-Qaeda used the opportunity to promulgate their agenda of global jihad
and to convince others to take the fight to the US and its allies.127 This influence was
reflected in targets selected for attack and in proclamations of affinity with the global
movement by previously nationally-focussed groups.
The Egyptian Islamic Jihad group under Ayman al-Zawahiri had been
progressively integrated into al-Qaeda, culminating in a formal merger in 2001,128 thus
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embracing its methods and ideals. Likewise, the 1998 World Islamic Front fatwa had
been endorsed by a leading member of Gamaa’ Islamiyah. Al-Qaeda’s influence has
also persisted since 9/11. For example, there was considerable cooperation between alQaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (instances include the 2001/2002 plot to attack the US
and Israeli embassies in Singapore involving the Canadian-Kuwaiti, Mohammad
Mansour Jabarah,129 the 2002 bombing of Bali nightclubs frequented by Westerners,
and the 2008 alleged plot to bomb Western embassies in Manila).130 Meanwhile, the
Algerian GIA had been keen to align itself with the bin Laden network and ideals, as
was its successor, the GSPC, which pledged allegiance to bin Laden in 2003, eventually
changing its name in 2007 to ‘al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’ (AQIM). Thus the
GSPC became the third organisation to formally adopt the al-Qaeda name in the post9/11 era, after Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al-Tawhid w’al-Jihad organisation became ‘alQaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers’ (aka al-Qaeda in Iraq) in October, 2004,131
followed by the formation of ‘al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’ (AQAP) in Saudi
Arabia in December of the same year.132 Although most groups retain their own name
and sense of individuality, the list of known or suspected al-Qaeda affiliates includes
some 36 other terrorist organisations operating in 65 countries around the world.133
These inter-organisational relations have not been uniform across the different
groups involved, and have fluctuated over time, e.g. Gamaa’ Islamiyah renounced
violence in 1997134 and JI’s appetite for the global jihad may have waned with the
emergence of a more locally focussed leadership.135 Nevertheless, even fleeting contact
has been significant. Although many locally-based organisations’ primary aim remains
unchanged (usually to create an Islamic state in their home country) global jihad has
now been publicly endorsed –and sporadically pursued- by an increasingly wide range
of organisations in different countries. The spread of the al-Qaeda network and ideology
has created a multitude of possibilities for communication and collaboration in terrorist
activity. In actuality, the overall network of Islamist terrorists may lack strategic focus
and coordination.136 Yet at the same time, public declarations of affinity in combination
with successful attacks, optimistic self-assessment137 and the physical growth of
networks have lent credence to the perception of a unified, underground Islamist
ummah, lead by a ubiquitous, but ethereal al-Qaeda. The maintenance of such
perceptions is likely to be crucial for attracting new recruits and to the overall longevity
of the global movement.
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To make matters worse, certain world events have played into Islamist rhetoric
pointing to a Western conspiracy against Islam, serving to confirm the terrorists’ worldbelief and to motivate a new generation of recruits. Most significant among such events
was the US-led invasion of Iraq in March, 2003. This was at first promoted as being not
only a blow against a murderous dictator suspected of developing weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) but also an opportunity to quell the tide of Islamist terrorism (as
then US President George W. Bush declared “We are fighting them there so we don’t
have to fight them here”138). However, such arguments have now been “patently
discredited”.139 The false pretences of the invasion have instead caused Iraq to become a
symbolic source of outrage and “rallying point”140 for terrorists.

““We thank God for appeasing us with the dilemmas in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
Americans are facing a delicate situation in both countries. If they withdraw they will
lose everything and if they stay, they will continue to bleed to death.” -Ayman alZawahiri, September 2003.141

The situation in Iraq has thus been viewed by al-Qaeda as “a means to influence
and radicalize Muslim public opinion worldwide and as a magnet to draw in as many
recruits as possible”.142 Concomitantly, a variety of terrorist cells and networks involved
in sending foreign recruits to Iraq from the Middle East, Europe, North Africa, South
and Central Asia, and the Caucasus has been discovered. As the US State Department
points out, these “networks were strategically significant in their own right, because
they pose an enduring threat to their parent societies after the immediate conflict in Iraq
has diminished”.143 This reflected fears that events surrounding Iraq may follow the
same pattern as for Afghanistan, whereby veteran mujahedin were instrumental in
exporting the terrorist threat after leaving the country.144
Even more importantly, the invasion of Iraq is seen as a major catalyst in the
propagation of home-grown terrorism, affecting a crucial turning point in the evolution
of the global jihad. Sageman contends there have so far been three waves or generations
of Islamist terrorists.145 The first wave consisted of mainly Egyptian veterans of
Afghanistan; the second wave was dominated by Saudis and North Africans who joined
the jihad in the 1990’s and trained at camps in Afghanistan; and the third wave consists
of a large number of European-born and raised Muslims who joined in the jihad after
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Iraq was invaded, and are unable to take advantage of the now-destroyed Afghan alQaeda infrastructure. Similarly, focussing on Europe, Nesser contends that there have
been three stages of development.146 From 1994-1996, Europe functioned as an “arena
for local jihad”, i.e. a base of operations and occasional target for Algerian Islamists;
from 1998-2003/4 Europe functioned as an “arena for global jihad” i.e. a base of
operations for terrorists linked to al-Qaeda, targeting US and Israeli interests, and to a
minor extent, France; finally in the third period, 2003/4-present, Europe has emerged as
a target for global jihad, whereby Western-based jihadis “motivated principally by
European participation in the invasion of Iraq”147 are attacking their home countries.
Accordingly, terrorists behind attacks in the West since 2004 have cited the
importance of Iraq as a key motivating factor amongst other global and local
grievances.148 This was most obviously the case with the Madrid bombers who
specifically demanded the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq, and planned a series
of follow-up attacks despite Spanish acquiescence to their demands.149
There has also been speculation that the terrorists in Madrid were influenced by
an online document advocating attacks against Spain as a means of pressuring
withdrawal from Iraq. Plans for the attack were in fact well underway by that time;150
however the growth of the Internet is nevertheless seen to be an enabling factor behind
changes in media and communication which have been integral to the decentralisation
of al-Qaeda and growth of the Islamist social movement. Specifically, the Internet has
enabled the ‘virtualisation’ of jihad.151 That is to say that “the ideological and
organisational development of jihadist networks and individuals is increasingly taking
place on or with the help of the Internet”.152
Existing terrorists make use of online communication and intelligence gathering,
allowing dispersed networks of otherwise unconnected individuals to share information,
coordinate activities and plan attacks.153 The most well-known example to date is that of
London-based Moroccan student, Younis Tsouli, aka ‘Irhabi [Terrorist] 007’, who was
able to rise to prominence in online jihadi networks and was in communication with
Islamists developing terrorist attacks in Bosnia and Canada in 2005.154
Meanwhile, Islamist propaganda has become more and more accessible via the
Internet. In turn this has made the movement more inclusive, seeming to unite people
from around the world, and a more diverse array of individuals are able to identify with
the idea of being a global Islamic warrior. This has been instrumental to the ongoing
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development of HGIT in the West, where the Internet is highly accessible and largely
uncensored. Moreover, increasing Islamist use of the Internet is thought to be a crucial
factor in changing jihadi profiles. Hence the fact that it is younger people (in their teens
and early 20’s) who tend to spend the most time online is reflected in evidence of
decreasing average age of terrorists.155
The accessibility of the Internet has also meant that more females are gradually
getting involved in this traditionally, heavily male dominated arena.156 Finally, the
freedom of expression which the Internet allows also facilitates innovative adaptations
of the Islamist, Salafi message. Al-Qaeda ideology has subsequently been combined
(with no sense of irony) with hip-hop culture. Islamism has thus found a form of
expression that is at once palatable to Western youth, and likely alien to the founders of
the movement. As Vidino observes, “[m]any youngsters from the Muslim-majority
ghettoes of various European cities adopt several behaviors typical of Western street
culture, such as dressing like rappers, smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol, yet
watching jihadi videos and having pictures of Osama bin Laden on the display of their
cell phones”.157 Whether or not such developments have further ramifications (possibly
‘diluting’ the Islamist message) they are evidence of fundamentally Western
contributions to the global jihad, confirming that it has become a truly ‘home-grown’
phenomenon.
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Overview
Having reviewed key historical developments it is necessary to discuss how
Islamist terrorism operates in more detail. This involves an overview of explanations for
terrorism (why individuals choose to take part in ‘the jihad’) and an examination of key
processes including radicalisation and operational functioning (covered in more detail in
the next chapter).
Individual, societal, and social explanations must all be considered in trying to
understand why and how terrorism occurs. Individual grievances, adversity and
inequalities in society as well as peer-group dynamics are all important. Almost
universally, issues of social identity underlie motivational processes. Yet even with an
understanding of the range of different factors that may drive people towards joining a
terrorist group, our ability to predict where and when terrorism will occur, and who will
be involved, is limited.
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4. Explaining Terrorism
Explanations for why terrorism occurs can be broadly grouped into three interrelated
and overlapping categories: individual, societal, and social.1

4.1 Individual Explanations
4.1.1 Psychopathology
Individual explanations have been based on the assumption that there is
something different about people who become terrorists in comparison to the ‘normal’
population. Such approaches have generally viewed terrorist behaviour as the result of
some traumatic experience, usually during childhood or adolescence, resulting in
narcissistic, paranoid, authoritarian or psychopathic personality disorders, leading to
grandiose violent behaviour.2
However, terrorist activity is most often a group activity and mental illness
could jeopardise terrorist groups’ need for secrecy and compromise group functioning.3
Psychometric testing and interviews with terrorists have lead to the realisation that they
“do not seem to be characterised by a unique set of psychological traits or pathologies”,4
they are not “dysfunctional”,5 and in the words of Post, a former advocate of the
‘medical model’, “[t]he concepts of abnormality or psychopathology are not useful in
understanding terrorist psychology and behaviour”.6
Specifically with regards to Islamist terrorism, Sageman found that of 61
terrorists for whom there was some data within a sample of ‘global mujahedin’ only 4
showed any signs of childhood conduct disorder, and there was no evidence that their
childhoods were particularly traumatic.7 Furthermore there was no evidence, with one
or two exceptions, of any symptoms of paranoid, authoritarian, or other personality
disorders. They did not appear to be socially inept (many had strong friendships with
each other) and 83 of 114 were married,8 which does not rule out sexual frustration as a
potentially exacerbating factor, but at least tentatively refutes this as a key motivator.
Based on a sample of European-based Islamist terrorists,9 Bakker10 found evidence of
“mental illness” in 5% -significantly higher than Sageman’s 1%- but qualified that over
a third of those became ‘ill’ after their arrest.11 Bakker also found that of 66 terrorists
for whom there was available data, 47 were married or engaged (59% to Sageman’s
73%).12 Overall, despite emphasising differences between the two samples (see below)
Bakker concluded that “[b]asically, they seem to live ‘normal’ lives that look similar to
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those of most within their communities”.13 Analysis by Sageman of an updated sample
of over 500 Islamist terrorists confirms that with few exceptions, individual pathologies
or disorders are not present.14

4.1.2 Personal Trauma
Individual explanations for involvement in terrorism nevertheless persist in
various forms. Rather than being the outcome of an innate character flaw or traumatic
childhood, people may turn to terrorism as the direct result of painful experiences or
personal difficulties in adulthood. For example, in a study of Chechen suicide terrorism,
Speckhard and Ahkmedova found “overwhelming evidence that the experience of
extreme traumas and bereavement within one’s inner circle of family and friends
contributed to glaring psychological vulnerabilities to a terrorist ideology promoting
martyrdom”.15 Thus terrorism became a cathartic form of revenge. Nevertheless, as
these authors acknowledge, most people who have experienced victimisation or loss of
family at the hands of an oppressive ruling force do not become terrorists. Conversely
some people who do become terrorists have not experienced trauma, i.e. this is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition. Moreover, other factors were involved.
Specifically, individuals needed exposure to a legitimising ideology and to an
organisation that encouraged and made acts of terrorism practically possible for them.
As already mentioned, neither Sageman nor Bakker found evidence of a great
deal of personal anguish in the lives of global or European mujahedin. Sageman did find
individual social circumstances to be important. 70% of individuals in the study had
joined the jihad in a foreign country, cut off from family and friends, while another 14%
were second generation immigrants in the West,16 perhaps feeling ‘lost’, out of touch
with their origins and ill at ease in their host society. 17 Hence he concluded that “before
they joined the jihad, the prospective mujahedin were socially and spiritually alienated
and probably in some form of distress”.18 This is reminiscent of Post’s observation
nearly twenty years earlier that “[t]he lives of the terrorist before joining [the group]
were characterised by social isolation and personal failure. For these lonely and
alienated individuals from the margins of society the terrorist group was to become the
family they never had”.19 Focussing on Islamist terrorists in Europe (these “distressed”
second or third generation immigrants) Nesser states that “they come across as quite
“normal”, but somehow troubled young adults,” who were often irreligious prior to
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involvement with Islamists, took drugs and were involved in petty crime, and/or had
experienced racism, “persecution” by authorities, or personal crises such as divorce or
death in the family.20 Arguably, such ‘unconventional’ lifestyles and apparent added
difficulty in dealing with normal adversity in life are the result of living in the ‘cultural
limbo’ of being born into a diaspora community, to which Sageman refers (see ‘Social
Explanations’ below).
The fact remains, however, that of the millions of people who experience
trauma, adversity, and social or cultural ‘uprootedness’, those who become terrorists
represent an infinitesimal minority. At the same time, it has by no means been clearly
established that all terrorists have suffered or are ill at ease in their country of residence.
In fact many may have lived quite comfortable or even privileged lives, come from
loving –and still living- families, and appear to be integrated into society. For Bakker’s
European sample (mostly second or third generation immigrants) 80% radicalised in
their country of residence, “not far from their families and friends, and in many ways
were at home in the countries of recruitment”.21 Obvious individual adversity thus
appears to be a risk factor to involvement in terrorism, but it is not sufficient, and may
not be necessary. Of course feelings of discontent or disillusionment with one’s lifecircumstances may not always manifest themselves in outwardly noticeable ways;
therefore ‘alienation’ theories may not be falsifiable.
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4.2 Societal Explanations
4.2.1 Root Causes
Societal explanations for why terrorism occurs often highlight so called ‘root
causes’ such as civil war, state oppression, restricted civil liberties, poverty, and lack of
educational and occupational opportunities. According to the frustration-aggression
hypothesis, these conditions, broadly speaking, constitute deprivation, which causes
frustration and aggression. This formula is not universal, but appears most likely to hold
true when people are deprived of expected sources of gratification, and when they
believe that the deprivation is deliberate and unjust.22 This at first appears to be an
appealing argument. As a form of asymmetric warfare, terrorism seems to represent the
poor man’s (quite possibly rational) struggle against superior might using limited
resources. Terrorism has also thrived in developing countries such as Afghanistan and
Pakistan. But in contradiction to this argument terrorism throughout history has also
occurred in financially wealthy countries whilst at the same time not occurring in
poorer, unstable countries that would appear to be more at risk. The advent of HGIT in
the West punctuates this very point.
Moreover, at the individual level, clear relationships between experienced
deprivation and terrorism have not been established. For example, Krueger and
Maleckova found that public support for terrorism in the West Bank and Gaza did not
decrease with higher education and living standards; participation in Hizballah in
Lebanon was positively associated with living above the poverty line and having a
secondary school education; and Israelis who attacked Palestinians in the 1980’s were
overwhelmingly from high-paying occupations.23 These authors subsequently suggest
that a certain level of economic well-being and education may in fact increase
likelihood of receptivity to terrorist ideology, as together they afford the luxury of being
concerned with more than mere subsistence, and increase political awareness.24
Sageman’s findings for global jihadis from around the world indicate that the
socioeconomic status of individuals varies geographically and temporally;25 the Islamist
movement was initiated in the 1980’s by mostly well-off, often highly educated
individuals from upper-class backgrounds in the Middle East. It was continued by
mostly middle class Saudis and Muslim expatriates, who had often begun if not
completed tertiary education in the 1990’s; and since 2003 has consisted of a mix of
middle and lower-class, less well educated, second or third generation immigrants and
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converts based in Europe.26 Bakkers’s European sample supports this: while 54% were
lower class, a further 42% were middle class and only 4% were upper class; and from
48 people for whom there were data, 88% had completed secondary education and 31%
had completed university.27 Despite a larger contingent of lower class individuals as a
reflection of the circumstances of Muslim immigrant populations in Europe,28 only 15%
of Bakker’s sample was unemployed, and the continued participation of a large
proportion of middle class and some upper class individuals refutes the significance of
absolute deprivation.

4.2.2 Relative Deprivation
Relative deprivation is a more robust concept for explaining terrorism, especially
when combined with vicarious perceptions of deprivation or persecution.29 Rather than
being deprived in absolute terms, relative deprivation takes into account the importance
of overall well-being in comparison to another social group or desired status. In
addition, the vicarious element of relative deprivation allows for feelings of injustice on
behalf of social group(s), which the perceiver feels they belong to and represent. Hence
the likes of bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, who come from privileged backgrounds, are
driven by the suffering of other Muslims (their ‘People’). The same motives serve to
motivate Islamists the world over from all social classes, and a common theme in
accounts of radicalisation (see below) involves strong emotional responses to atrocities
inflicted upon Muslims, which, in the words of bin Laden, “send shivers in the body and
shake the conscience”.30
Those terrorists who are less well off or deprived may at the same time feel
embittered by their own state of affairs in relation to another social group. So for homegrown second generation Islamists living in Europe and elsewhere, the fact that they are
of similar standing to others in their community is less important than the fact that they
feel discriminated against in relation to native Europeans, and excluded from political
process. Statements made by Islamists themselves have confirmed this. For example,
Mohammed Bouyeri –the killer of Theo van Gogh- left a note on van Gogh’s body
expressing outrage at domestic Dutch policy towards Muslims, including proposed
‘screening’ measures for Muslim immigrants, which were viewed as part of a Jewish
conspiracy.31
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Relative deprivation thus appears to be an important factor in beginning to
explain terrorist motivations. However, it shares the same shortcoming as other societal
(and indeed most) explanations for terrorism, which is that there are more exceptions to
the rule than examples which seem to confirm it, i.e. many more people who experience
the same conditions but do not turn to terrorism. It may be necessary but not sufficient,
and is too vague a concept to have a great deal of predictive power.32
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4.3 Social Explanations
Individual and societal explanations are geared towards answering questions
about who terrorists are and why they do what they do. Social explanations place more
emphasis on studying how people become involved in terrorism. The level of analysis
thus shifts away from the individual or society to the context of the immediate social
group and the types of interaction which take place among group members. This is
useful for avoiding the idiosyncrasy of individual approaches and the generality of
societal approaches.33 Moreover, the validity of taking a social perspective is further
reinforced by the fact that terrorism is “undeniably a group process”,34 both as a product
of the complexity of tasks, and the importance of social support systems.35 Social
influence, identity and structure are all examined, helping to illuminate group conditions
and social circumstances which facilitate pathways into terrorism.

4.3.1 Social Influence
Brainwashing
For most people, it is unimaginable to conceive how others can become
terrorists, especially if the person is a relative or someone that they know. Because of
this, it is tempting to believe that these people are coerced in some way. The most
extreme versions of this hold that vulnerable young men are ‘brainwashed’ either by
their own families from birth, or by insidious preachers during adolescence or early
adulthood.

“‘Ask from us blood, We will drench you’... ‘When I wander into Jerusalem I’ll turn
into a feda’ye [warrior who sacrifices himself], In battledress, In battledress, In
battledress’” –Chant recited by Palestinian school children.36

Such examples of indoctrination of children for martyrdom in Palestine led
Burdman to conclude that “[t]he hatred and urge to violence [there] is extremely
widespread resulting from a deliberate, carefully planned, well orchestrated campaign
drawing on strongly held cultural belief systems and a variety of deep-seated
psychological mechanisms”.37 Instances like these of early socialisation lend support to
the brainwashing hypothesis. However, they are very context-specific. The assumption
has been that the pathways of global Islamist terrorists (distinct to nationally-focussed
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Palestinian terrorists) have been facilitated via life-long adherence to fundamentalist
Islam and radical ideology. This assumption is not supported by the data. Sageman
found that of 137 terrorists, only 23 (17%) had attended a religious school, and half of
this number were Southeast Asians who had attended Islamic boarding schools run by
Jemaah Islamiyah. The sample also included 33 ‘Core Arabs’, many of whom grew up
in Saudi Arabia where even secular schools include religious instruction; if they are
included in the religious category, the figure becomes 41%.38 Of the Maghreb Arabs
(many of whom were based in Europe) not a single one attended a religious school.
Overall, of 108 terrorists, 53 (49%) were described as religious in childhood. In the
updated sample, about a quarter had been very religious when young, compared to two
thirds secular.39
Bakker found similarly little evidence of religion in childhood; 14 of 50 (28%)
had converted from Christianity (with one case of prior Hinduism); 25 (50%) had
secular upbringings; and 11 (22%) had a religious childhood.40 In terms of Sageman’s
waves of Islamist terrorism, about two thirds of the first wave –the founders and leaders
of al-Qaeda- came from religious backgrounds; about a third of the second wave –those
who joined in the 1990’s while the camps in Afghanistan were still in operation- had
been religious; and “only a very small minority” of the third –post-Iraq, often Westernbased- wave were religious.41 97% of Sageman’s original sample and 95% of Bakker’s
showed evidence of increased faith in Islam immediately prior to getting actively
involved in terrorism.42 These figures demonstrate that many Islamist terrorists have
lead secular lives, and refute the idea that they become terrorists as a result of radical,
religious brainwashing or lifelong socialisation. The increase in their religiousness may
be more of a product of their involvement with radicals, rather than a cause of it, and in
fact greater prior religious knowledge may increase the likelihood of critical assessment
–and rejection- of Islamists’ selective interpretation of the Quran.43

Top-down vs. Bottom-up Influence
Islamists are generally not raised into the jihad from birth, however, this does
not rule out the potential importance of possibly persuasive or coercive social influence
as part of the ‘recruitment’ process. Conventional understanding of terrorism posits that
central to the growth of an organisation is a process of top-down recruitment. Hence
‘vulnerable’ individuals are actively persuaded and indoctrinated into the movement by
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existing, experienced ‘recruiters’ on the lookout for potential new members. The
recruitment process is not always so deliberate though. Both Sageman44 and Bakker45
found that initial involvement in Islamist terrorism was often facilitated by way of
family and friends with terrorist associations.46
Friendships in general are often based on existing levels of homogeneity, which
increase over time through shared knowledge and experience,47 and peer groups are
among the most powerful units of socialisation. Therefore, sustained contact with
‘connected’ extremists presents not only practical opportunities for involvement, but
increases the likelihood that such opportunities will be desired.48 In accordance with
principles of differential association49 and social learning theories,50 pathways into
terrorism can thus begin as a result of simple geographical and social proximity. The
more that individuals then participate in radical social milieus, the more they become
familiar with –and the more they come to subscribe to- the particular values and
systems of social reward.51 As highlighted by Weerman,52 co-offending situations
involve social exchange, and immaterial/expressive ‘goods’ can be just as important for
participation in criminal groups as material/instrumental rewards. Equally this model
can be applied to understanding groups of terrorists, for whom appreciation and
acceptance are often significant motivations for initial and continued involvement. This
makes recruitment a matter of ‘routine association’ and almost inadvertent, rather than
deliberate, social influence.

“The freedom to be yourself, the freedom to be with a good friend, getting on well, a
group, a tight-knit group. That was the most important thing.”
-Khaled Kelkal, leader of the group responsible for the series of bombings in France in
1995.53
Sageman54 further discredited the active top-down recruitment model, presenting
evidence of a bottom-up process of joining the ‘global Salafi jihad’. Small groups of
friends such as the Hamburg 9/11 ‘cell’ often came together and spontaneously
embraced Islamist ideology in the context of local radical mosques. Such groups
seemed to become increasingly extreme in their views as a result of social isolation55
and intra-group competition or ‘oneupsmanship,’ and eventually actively sought out
someone in contact with a terrorist organisation needed for training and resources. Thus
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potential new recruits were most crucially influenced by each other, and the deciding
factor in whether they graduated to becoming terrorists was whether they encountered a
terrorist ‘gatekeeper’ who could refer them to an organisation such as al-Qaeda.56
More recently, the self-reliance of Islamist terrorists has been increasingly
emphasised. Since the destruction of al-Qaeda headquarters in Afghanistan it has been
far more difficult for ‘wannabe’ terrorists to establish contact with a terrorist
organisation. But due to the proliferation of material on the Internet such as bombmaking instructions and advice on counter-surveillance techniques, home-grown or
‘self-starting’ Islamist terrorists can now potentially develop attack capabilities in the
absence of organisational support.57 A good deal of current understanding of Islamist
terrorism thus places far greater emphasis on bottom-up self-radicalisation versus topdown social influence.
Nevertheless, the influence of Islamist preachers, experienced mujahedin, and
self-educated charismatic individuals should not be denied. The likes of Abu Hamza alMasri and other preachers who ran radical mosques with connections to terrorist
organisations have played important proselytising and facilitating roles.58 These figures
are often revered within radical subcultures and are likely to have fuelled the aspirations
to jihad of scores of young men, whether through personal contact or via recorded
media. Furthermore, studies of terrorist groups continue to highlight the importance of
certain influential individuals.
Nesser identified distinct jihadi profiles or social roles amongst groups of
terrorists, each with their own pathway into terrorism.59 The majority of Islamists could
be described as ‘drifters’ who become involved in terrorism through an almost
unconscious process of social affiliation, allowing themselves to become swept along
by their circumstances. ‘Misfit’ terrorists include those who are driven out of a search
for salvation from troubled lives, or a sense of loyalty to friends. ‘Protégés’ are more
politically minded than drifters or misfits but also tend to be young and impressionable,
and greatly influenced by a mentor. Finally, mentors are described as ‘entrepreneurs’
who are generally a little older and are ideologically driven, religious, and politically
minded leaders. Nesser found that entrepreneurs could be classified as active
‘recruiters’, and asserts that in their absence the jihadi movement would dwindle.60 This
echoes Gupta’s earlier argument (from an organisational-level perspective) that “while
aspects of absolute and relative deprivation provide the necessary condition, the
74

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
presence of a political innovator provides us with the sufficient condition for producing
collective movements in general, and terrorism, in particular”.61
In a study of eleven Islamist terror cells based throughout the Western world
discovered between 2001 and 2006, Silber and Bhatt of the New York Police
Department reached a similar conclusion.62 For any group to progress to acts of
terrorism, it appeared necessary for a ‘spiritual sanctioner’ to provide ideological
justification, and for an operational leader to motivate, control and manage the group
towards taking on a violent objective.
There remains some disagreement as to the relative importance of bottom-up
and top-down patterns of influence within the world of Islamist terrorism. In reality
both are likely to be important. There is clearly a large motivational drive from below in
terms of individuals and groups of primarily young men absorbing propaganda and
seeking involvement in jihadi warzones or terrorism at home. At the same time these
people draw inspiration –either directly or indirectly- from influential figures within this
subculture. Within groups, more articulate, ideologically driven members may spur their
friends on, but are also likely to draw validation and encouragement from their
comrades.

Ideology & Behaviour
It is important here to elucidate that just as processes of social influence are not
one-directional, they are not entirely ideologically based either. The fact that there is a
strong behavioural component to learning is sometimes overshadowed by an overlycognitive focus upon ideological transformation as a basis for action. In the words of
Becker, based on interviews with marijuana users, “the presence of a given kind of
behaviour is the result of a sequence of social experiences during which the person
acquires a conception of the meaning of the behaviour and perceptions and judgements
of objects and situations, all of which make the activity possible and desirable. Thus, the
motivation or disposition to engage in the activity is built up in the course of learning to
engage in it, and does not antedate this learning process”.63 As such “deviant motives
actually develop in the course of experience with the deviant activity”.64
This reinforces the significance of social affiliation as a pathway to deviant
involvement and is illustrative of mutual affect between behaviour and cognition.
Sageman65 also makes this point in drawing attention to the fact that terrorists are not
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always aware of the main reasons for their actions: “[c]onsciousness, like solidarity and
collective identity, does not always precede action, but may arise in the process of
carrying out an action”.66 Likewise, Horgan contends that “for the individual terrorist
increasing psychological investment, or the process of becoming a more committed
member, is shaped most remarkably through engagement in terrorist activities”.67 Thus
thinking often leads to doing, but doing also leads to thinking.68 This fact is very often
lost when contemplating pathways into terrorism, where the emphasis tends to be on the
transfer of ideas through discussion or absorption of various forms of media. Becker’s
analysis highlights how crucial it is to interact and get involved in discussions and
activities for ideas to take hold, and is congruent with Nesser’s69 contention that many,
if not most people become Islamist terrorists through a process of ‘drift’ (see above).
By the same token, just as learning may be usefully conceptualised as an active
process, so too may teaching and leadership.70 Terrorist leaders tend to be described as
calculating mentors or masterminds, who deliberately assemble groups of like-minded
followers to carry out their fiendish plans.71 However, mentoring and leadership at the
group level in terrorism is still very poorly understood. Focussing upon the ideological
influence that such figures seem to exercise, maintains a cognitive and pre-meditated
interpretation of the way in which a group progresses towards acts of destruction. This
may override the importance of interactive, behavioural and escalatory processes. Hence
group support is vital for condoning and reinforcing leader behaviour, and advancement
of group ideas and actions can be envisioned as both collaborative and cumulative.
Moreover, leadership may often be characterised more as a form of behavioural
instigation rather than deliberate coercion or direction. This has been observed in
delinquent co-offending situations,72 as well as the commission of adult armed
robbery73 and gang rape.74 Of course the immediacy of offence circumstances is
significantly different to longer-term, daily group interactions, but these observations
are still relevant to any serious research into the nature of terrorist leadership.
Talk of a ‘leaderless jihad’ may make sense in terms of emphasising the lack of
a formal organisational hierarchy and clearly established line of command and control.
However, in terms of recognising the complexity of patterns of social influence, it
seems prudent to acknowledge the significance of informal, subcultural status systems
and mutual affect between players at the group level.
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4.3.2 Social Identity
All terrorist groups have a distinct social identity and claim to represent a
particular segment of society. For the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) it was
Irish Catholics; for Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) it is the Basque people; and for
Islamist terrorists it is the Ummah or worldwide community of (‘real’) Muslims. To
class oneself as part of the represented social category is an almost universal
precondition for involvement in terrorism. Being of a particular ethnic and/ or religious
or social background facilitates interaction with similar others, which is the crucial first
step for many eventual terrorists.75 Initial identification is thus the gateway to sustained
contact and socialisation. Simply put, “shared group identity…is the key to
understanding the origins of shared beliefs”.76
Aspects of identity can be innate or inherited, but they are also subjective and
dynamic. Hence the process of adopting a self-perceived identity that is congruent with
that of terrorists is different for different people. For the original Islamists who grew up
mainly in the Middle East and North Africa and became active in the 1970’s and ‘80’s,
their sense of identity as Muslims fuelled their opposition with local government.
Having experienced state oppression first hand, their eyes were opened to the plight of
other Muslims whilst in Afghanistan. Recognition of Muslim peoples’ troubles around
the world went hand in hand with the development of an increasingly globalised Islamic
identity and the growing perception of an anti-Islamic identity in the ‘far enemy’ of the
United States and its allies.

Identity ‘Crises’
Taarnby77 distinguishes between three types of candidates for contemporary
Islamist terrorism in Europe. First, ‘outsiders’ and recent immigrants to the West from
‘Muslim’ countries are described as experiencing social isolation and a ‘crisis’ of
identity; ‘cut off’ from their home and ill-at-ease in their host society, they find solace
in the imagined worldwide Ummah portrayed by Islamists. These were the Islamist
terrorists of the 1990’s. Today’s ‘home-grown’ terrorists fall into Taarnby’s next two
categories: ‘second-generation immigrants’ are described as “superficially integrated”
into Western society but in reality experience “deep resentment” against it.78 Muslims
born in the West who turn to Islamism reject their host culture due to experiences and
perceptions of discrimination, racism and inequality.79 They may also resent their
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parents’ apparent passivity in responding to such problems.80 Islamism offers them a
strong sense of belonging and an identity that enables them to fight perceived injustices.
In reality, the picture may be more complex than this. In a more thorough
dissection of second-generation identity issues and terrorism, Stroink81 suggests three
different forms of identification. The first pattern is referred to as ‘ingroup
identification.’ This involves second-‘generationers’ who in fact identify with Western
culture but are seeking to ‘improve’ it, or are reacting against changes in Western
society that they perceive to be threatening. ‘Outgroup identification’ characterises
those who have never subjectively identified with the mainstream culture. This category
includes people who are ‘separated’ from Western values and identify only with a
‘heritage’ culture into which they are socialised from a young age. Outgroup
identification also includes people who do not identify with either the host or heritage
cultures, and find a sense of self-esteem and stability in unambiguous and powerful
radical identities. In either case, perceptions of ‘identity exclusivity’ or incompatibility
between the different identities prevail. Finally, a pattern of ‘transitional outgroup
identification’ is the case for second-generation immigrants who went through a phase
of identifying with Western culture, but then appear to go through a process of
rediscovering their ethnic/religious identity. Such journeys of rediscovery may be
sparked by a need for distinctiveness, or by perceived exclusion, discrimination, or
bullying.
Taarnby’s final category includes ‘Western converts to Islam’, who make up a
minority of Islamist terrorists. They tend to be ‘marginalised’ in some way and often
show excessive zeal as a way of demonstrating their commitment.82 Roy sub-divides
converts into four types:83 1. ‘Politicised rebels’ attracted by the anti-establishment
aspects of Islamism, 2. ‘Religious nomads’ who find Islamism through searching for the
‘right’ religion, 3. Former drug addicts and petty thieves who find a sense of belonging
and an escape from a life of crime, and 4. Ethnic minoroties who find rebuke against a
racist society.
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Theories of Identity and Terrorism
The Islamist identity therefore has a broad appeal, offering solutions to a variety
of problems (indeed it should also be emphasised that each of the ‘crises’ of identity
detailed above have multiple possible solutions or outcomes- only a tiny minority find
the ‘answer’ in terrorism). Beyond broad descriptions of personal circumstances, which
appear to increase the likelihood of initial identification, more explicit applications of
psychological theories of identity help to further explain terrorism.
Theories of identity exist in two main branches, which have traditionally been
treated as being quite separate. These are ‘Identity Theory’ (IT)84 and ‘Social Identity
Theory’ (SIT)85. The former is concerned primarily with processes of identifying with
particular social roles, which guide interaction with others, while the latter focuses on
identifying with social categories or groups, and how this affects intergroup attitudes
and behaviour. Very generally speaking, IT emphasises interpersonal differences, while
SIT emphasises interpersonal similarity and intergroup difference. Arena and Arrigo86
have argued that IT and SIT are incompatible, choosing to apply IT as their theory of
choice for studying terrorism. They focus upon intragroup interactions and socialisation,
highlighting the importance of adopting a ‘martial’ role (similar to della Porta’s
‘freedom fighter’ identity87), which demands violence in response to perceived
subjugation.
However, to view IT and SIT as fundamentally at odds with one another is based
upon a rigid interpretation of each. Their differences may be more a matter of emphasis,
and in both cases processes of identification seem to be guided by motivations to
maintain or enhance self-esteem, self-efficacy, self-consistency, and self-regulation.88
The two theories may be usefully combined in order to formulate a more comprehensive
theory of self.89 Hence, it is prudent to acknowledge multiple, interacting levels of
identity, including individuals’ personal identity, or enduring sense of self, as well as
different group- and role-related identities. Moreover, people have as many identities as
roles they play or groups they belong to, all of which are likely to have subjective and
dynamic elements. Each identity will be more or less salient for different people
depending upon the situation and specific goals, as they strive to strike a balance
between individual distinctiveness and group assimilation.90 The particular level of
analysis and social context will then dictate to what extent interacting group- and rolerelated identities are of relevance to understanding cognition, behaviour and affect.
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Given this understanding, greater insight can be gained into the psychological
workings of the different types of people who become involved in terrorist activity. SIT
is particularly useful for specifying conditions that are likely to affect processes of
group-identification, and for predicting particular types of strategy in different
situations.91 Since people’s social identities are an important source of self-esteem (or
conversely, negative affect) they adopt varying strategies in order to maintain or boost
self-esteem when their identity is threatened in some way.92 Individuals can feel
personally threatened when their salient group identity is derogated or evaluated
negatively somehow in comparison to an outgroup (i.e. a group to which the individual
does not belong). Threat can also arise from perceived lack of distinctiveness and from
social isolation.93
Depending on situational constraints and individual levels of commitment to a
particular group/collective identity, people may respond to threats to personal and group
identity in a number of ways. When group commitment is low, people often choose to
distance themselves from an unwanted social identity, or if this is not possible (e.g. with
ethnicity) they may seek to redefine it. Meanwhile, when commitment is high, people
often choose to express that identity, to seek affiliation with similar others, or to reaffirm the value of the group, which may also involve derogating a relevant outgroup.94

Theories of Identity Applied
Radical Islamist ideology and thinking at the organisational level, as conceived
by leaders such as bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, can be understood as a response to
threatened social identity. Claims that the United States and its allies are attacking the
Muslim world, images of a glorious Islamic past now lost, and condemnation of
modernisation are all clear indicators of perceived threats to group value, morality, and
distinctiveness. The response, given high group commitment, is as predicted by SIT:
ingroup affirmation, outgroup derogation, and use of stereotyping. Moreover, it is vital
that the actions of the outgroup are perceived to be deliberate and unjust, as well as
threatening.95 This triggers strong emotions and directly fuels justification necessary for
acts of violence.
SIT further improves our understanding of those who join the cause. Table 4.1
below depicts social identity concerns for the different types of candidate for Islamist
terrorism in the West. Each cell represents a dominant concern or strategy based upon
80

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
descriptions of the different candidates and upon theories of identity (as discussed
above). It is important to note that due to the subjective nature of identity, different
types of threat and coping response are indeed possible within the same categories. This
may especially be the case for second and third generation immigrants who appear to
show varying levels of commitment to different, and –for those who experience such a
‘crisis’- competing identities. This complexity is reflected by the use of arrows to show
mixed strategies according to subjective experience. In addition, omitted horizontal
dividing lines within certain columns indicate heightened relevance for all types of
candidate, differences being a matter of emphasis.

Table 4.1. Proposed primary processes of social identification for different types of people who become
involved in Islamist terrorism.

Type of candidate

Initial ingroup
commitment

Situation

Role experience

Primary threat
type

Recent immigrants

More secure/ high
commitment

Isolation

Unsatisfactory social
roles in new group

To personal self

ID tension

Unsatisfactory social
roles in available groups

To group &
personal selves

Less secure/ low
commitment

Disillusionment

Unsatisfactory social
roles in existing group

To group self

Type of candidate

Motivation

Social response

What Islamist ID offers

Situationally
dependent
outcome

Recent immigrants

Search for
belonging (coalition)

Group affirmation

Belonging

Group bonding
(radical affiliation)

2nd/ 3rd generation
immigrants

Search for ID/
sense of self

Strong ID

Group bonding
(radical affiliation)

Western converts

Rebellion/ search
for alternate self

2nd/ 3rd generation
immigrants
Western converts

Table 4.1 continued…

Individual mobility (seek Alternative 'righteous' ID Group bonding
alternate group)
& clear worldview
(radical affiliation)

An important feature of the Islamist identity is that it caters for different needs
and is thus able to remedy a range of different identity concerns, although some form of
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social affiliation is necessary. As a person categorises themselves in terms of an Islamist
identity, they come to learn and to adhere to related behavioural norms.
In addition to collective identity concerns, individual motivations affected by
personal and role-related identities will influence specific pathways into terrorism.
Table 4.2 below depicts the proposed relationship between primary individual
motivations (personal identity) and likely type of involvement in Islamist terrorism,
taking into account Nesser’s96 prescribed terrorist social roles (see above). In reality
individuals will experience a mixture of different motivations, and as depicted by the
double-headed arrows, religious motivations are especially difficult to classify. Again,
proposed differences are a matter of emphasis rather than distinct or mutually exclusive
categories.

Table 4.2. Proposed relationship between individual motivations (personal identity) and involvement in
Islamist terrorism.
Individual
Attraction to
Pathway into
motivations radical Islamism
terrorism
Political

Likely
terrorist role

Social
influence
exerted

Type of
commitment

Leader

Dominance/
instigation

To the cause

Loyalty/
endorsement

To the
immediate
group

More cognitive

Entrepreneurial/
deliberate

More affective

Drift/ 'accidental' Foot-soldier

Religious

Social

Whilst broader issues of self-categorisation as delineated in Table 4.1 affect a
general vulnerability or potential propensity towards militant Islam, individual identities
and motivations (Table 4.2) will affect the quality or style of involvement.
Note that level of commitment to group and cause cannot be predicted based
upon criteria in Table 4.2 alone. Intuitively –and in line with Nesser’s analysis- more
politicised motivation, combined with a more important role would seem to indicate
greater commitment. Indeed, commitment to the cause implies commitment to the
‘People’, i.e. the wider collective, which the immediate group claims to represent. But
the power of affective attachments should not be underestimated. Indeed, a combination
of different motivations and satisfied social, religious, and cognitive needs would
appear to instil greatest commitment. Although it may be a very idiosyncratic feature of
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involvement, degree of commitment is also likely to be affected by the quality of factors
experienced in Table 4.1. So for example, a deeper subjective experience of crisis,
coupled with a more profound and pervasive sense of solace in Islamism may heighten
ideological and social dedication.97

Processes of Identification
SIT can be further employed to ‘tie together’ several psychological processes
that appear to be common features of terrorist involvement.98 Strong feelings of
empathy inspired by ‘moral shocks’ brought about through media and rhetoric are a
common experience.99 Viewing footage of Muslims being killed or tortured often
provokes outrage and a desire to fight back in their defence, thus representing a gateway
for further involvement. Empathy can be viewed as both a cause and product of social
identification, facilitating vicarious suffering and feelings of relative deprivation. In this
way, empathising with Muslims around the world contributes to the development of a
super-ordinate and pervasive collective identity. This collective identity is nourished
and rewarded by the immediate group, which represents a self-perceived elite identity
(the ‘vanguard’, fighting to save the Ummah) within the larger collective.
Raised awareness of the suffering and death of other perceived ingroup members
may also increase the salience of one’s own mortality. Mortality salience in turn has
been shown to increase levels of ingroup positivity and outgroup negativity.100
Originally these effects were understood as a means of buffering anxiety caused by the
fear of death (Terror Management Theory101). But more recently, mortality salience has
been re-conceptualised in terms of inculcating a desire to form a coalition with others in
order to overcome threat.102 This makes sense in the case of Islamist terrorism, since by
seeking involvement in armed conflict militants are increasing their chances of being
killed, and where ‘martyrdom’ is sought after one’s own death is actively pursued for
the sake of the collective. Furthermore, framing mortality salience effects as a response
to adaptive challenges is wholly in accordance with SIT’s concern with maintaining
ingroup positivity and taking action against an outgroup in the face of deliberate and
unjust oppression.
The Islamist identity further exacerbates processes of social identification. By
framing two primary world identities as being in direct opposition to one another (‘us’
and ‘them’, Muslims and their enemies) a tendency towards polarisation is created
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(“whatever they are, we are not”).103 Polarisation creates perceptions of wide disparity
between groups, the ingroup being especially positive and the outgroup especially
negative. Viewing each social category as internally undifferentiated (good or bad)
encourages stereotyping, which is a natural feature of social identification. Stereotyping
the outgroup effectively dehumanises them, helping to remove psychological barriers
against violence.104 Stereotyping the ingroup is likely to heighten perceptions of
similarity, which facilitates diffusion of responsibility, so that individual members are
less likely to feel personally responsible for harm done against the enemy.105 Islamist
terrorists thus psychologically maintain as much social, cultural, and moral distance
between themselves and their enemy as they can. By also often maintaining
‘mechanical’ distance (use of remote killing technology such as bombs) terrorists’
dehumanisation of the enemy is maximised.

4.3.3 Social Organisation
Social structure or organisation affects how groups of people are able to function
in terms of interacting and communicating with each other, and with people outside of
the group.106 Organisation affects patterns of social influence and formation of identity,
as well as group stability and permeability (movement into and out of the group).

Structural Developments in Islamist Terrorism
Prior to the US assault on al-Qaeda’s headquarters in Afghanistan at the end of
2001, the al-Qaeda organisation was viewed as the central coordinating body of Sunni
Islamist terrorism around the globe. ‘Al-Qaeda Central’ (consisting of the figureheads
and ideological and operational leaders) acted to promote their agenda of global jihad
by disseminating propaganda, providing training and resources for various other
Islamist organisations, and encouraging attacks against Western targets. Up until 2001,
Islamist terrorism was thus characterised as an essentially hierarchical ‘wheel’
arrangement (al-Qaeda representing the hub, with various transnational ‘spokes’).
However, it was undoubtedly a complex and dynamic organisational structure, changing
according to specific points of contact between individuals around the world, and
varying opportunities.
After the Afghan base of operations was destroyed and worldwide counterterrorism measures tightened, the command and communication abilities of al-Qaeda
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were severely debilitated. It is widely agreed that this resulted in significant changes to
the social organisation of Islamist terrorism.107 The role of al-Qaeda and other formal
organisations diminished, and there was a proliferation of smaller, autonomous or semiautonomous groups of Islamist militants. These groups are thought to have varying, but
generally spurious links to terrorist organisations, and are therefore self-organised, selffunded and essentially independent in their actions. Islamist terrorism now exists as an
even more fluid network than in the past, characterised by ‘flatter’ decision-making
processes (lack of formal hierarchy) and potentially more resilient to law-enforcement
efforts due to greater levels of autonomy and lack of clear structure.108 It is in light of
such analyses that the ‘Hofstad’ group active in the Netherlands has been described as
more like a youth gang than a terrorist organisation.109 Similarly, the ‘3/11’ Madrid
bombers have been called a ‘grass-roots’ jihadi network,110 while the ‘7/7’ bombers are
described as ‘self-starters.’111 All emerged from within wider radical networks, and
although international travel and communication occurred, none appeared to have
concrete organisational links or formal, rigid systems of internal organisation.
It is noteworthy that similar, informal, ‘fluid’ social systems have been found to
occur amongst ‘ordinary’ criminals. Thus youth and adult offenders often form small
groups within a wider, “loose web of affiliations,” linked to other groups via peripheralor non-members known to the group.112 This is in accordance with Granovetter’s113
research demonstrating that informal human interaction is often organised as relatively
small groups of people linked to others through ‘weak-ties.’ What this implies is that the
social organisation of Islamist terrorism today appears to fundamentally adhere to a
basic template for informal human interaction, which is then shaped according to
specific demands and opportunities.114
These developments are significant, given that “probably the world’s foremost
‘jihadi theoretician’”,115 Abu Musab al-Suri (aka Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam
Nasar) is best known for advocating just such a system of organisation in “The Global
Islamic Resistance Call”, a 1600 page document which was published online in 2005
under the name of Umar Abd al-Hakim, and is highly regarded among jihadists.116 AlSuri’s slogan is nizam, la tanzim, meaning ‘system, not organisation’, which he
envisaged as being manifest through the formation of small resistance units operating
independently from one another and from any centralised leadership, yet sharing a
common cause.117 There is an obvious correspondence between this basic prescription
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and the current situation; however it has evolved organically, both as a ‘natural’
informal organisation and in response to counter-terrorism, rather than as an entirely
deliberate strategy and the reality is far less effective than al-Suri had hoped for –
nevertheless it is still important to note that jihadists are self-aware and in some cases
are striving to turn their current situation to their advantage.
A further implication of informal organisation based upon friendships is that
patterns of social influence between group-members are likely to be mutual and
dynamic (collaborative effects and simultaneous top-down and bottom-up processes).
The division of labour and social roles may also be loosely defined and flexible,
depending on individual abilities and circumstances. Having said this, contemporary
Islamist terrorism encompasses “a whole spectrum of realities, positioned according to
the level of autonomy of the group”.118 It is thus reasonable to hypothesise that groups
with more concrete organisational affiliation and support may be more likely to utilise
formalised group structures (e.g. having clearly identified leader/s), while more selfsufficient groups may be more likely to be informally organised. In either case how this
affects group behaviour and factors such as resilience to law enforcement efforts may
depend upon the specific group reality, e.g. the degree to which formal/informal
authority is seen as legitimate and the extent to which individuals and roles are unique
or replaceable.

Stability, Identity, & Permeability
Group stability is likely to affect role-performance, individual and collective
senses of identity, and movement into and out of the group. Stability implies consensus
in the pursuit of shared goals (clear group identity) as well as stable group membership
(low permeability). Sustained membership over time also increases the chances that
roles within the group become routinised, that individuals may come to specialise in
certain tasks, and that they may also develop a shared understanding of each other’s
roles (thereby developing ‘shared mental models’, which can enhance group
performance119). As a result individuals are likely to develop a clear sense of their role
within the group, and a clear sense of collective identity. “Group stability is thus the
mechanism by which specific identities are able to consume individuals to the exclusion
of (legitimate) alternatives”.120
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Processes of radicalisation and operational planning routinely involve lengthy
periods of daily interaction and conspiratorial planning,121 which, in light of their deadly
goals and high levels of risk, create “exceptional degrees of internal pressure”.122 Jihadi
terrorists operating within Europe have also been seen to have clearly defined roles and
tasks within the group.123 Hence groups of terrorists are characterised as relatively longlasting, highly stable and cohesive, and with low levels of permeability (as compared,
for example, to criminal groups, which are generally highly transient124). Despite
descriptions of highly cohesive and closed group structures, it must be reiterated that
Islamist terrorists in the West are still seen as being part of fluid and dispersed social
networks. This allows geographic mobility between different groups within the wider
network, utilising both direct and indirect personal contacts (examples of this type of
movement abound, e.g. the radical milieu centred around Finsbury Park Mosque in
London played host to jihadis from all over the world125). Groups of Islamists may
therefore not always be as stable and cohesive as commonly described during periods of
initial engagement and planning attacks. Therefore different elements within the overall
network may vary in their degree of permeability.

Islamist Terrorism as a Social Movement
The decline in significance of al-Qaeda as a central organisation and the rise of
(semi)-autonomous groups of militants operating within a global, amorphous network
has led a number of analysts to view contemporary Islamist terrorism as a social
movement.126 At its most basic level this simply involves giving recognition to the fact
that Islamist terrorism is not a clearly defined organisation, but a much more loosely
organised and dynamic network. More specific application of Social Movement Theory
(SMT) is useful for multi-level analysis and greater understanding of the dynamics of
collective action (for example as per della Porta’s excellent study of Leftistrevolutionary terrorists active in Italy and Germany in the latter half of the 20th
century127).
From a social movement perspective, violent groups often represent a minority
component within a much larger movement consisting of a wide variety of
organisations, institutions and groups, varying in degrees of formality and legality.
Whilst grievances or strain are ubiquitous across societies, movements are thought to
arise via an essentially rational process of entrepreneurial action, which is shaped by
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available opportunity structures.128 Varying movement organisations compete for
available resources and adopt different strategies to attract and mobilise the target
population; and key to the success of any movement organisation or group is its ability
to construct a ‘frame’ or way of interpreting the world that resonates with the
experiences of prospective joiners.129
Della Porta analysed how violent terrorist groups including the Red Army
Faction and Red Brigades emerged from within broader movements of social protest in
Italy and Germany.130 She concluded that societal (macro-level) conditions –in
particular each country’s overall approach to the policing of protest- were critical to
initial violent developments. Both movements then escalated at the meso- (interorganisational) level, as they clashed with the state as well as other movement
organisations. Small groups specialising in violence emerged, affected by precipitating
factors often linked to the threat of oppression from law enforcement. These groups
were sustained through strong friendships and a shared sense of identity (the “Freedom
Fighter”). They became increasingly radical as a result of social isolation, which in turn
only exacerbated that isolation, depriving them of resources and weakening the groups’
grasp of reality. The development of terrorism was thus the result of continuing
dynamic interactions at different levels (societal, organisational, and individual).
Likewise for Wiktorowicz, SMT provides a useful unifying theoretical
framework for studying Islamic activism in general, including its more violent forms.131
Thus, Islamist terrorists represent a deviant aspect of broader Islamist activism, which
includes a vast array of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), charities, advocacy
groups and so on. Using this approach, Wiktorowicz132 described how the radical
Islamist organisation al-Muhajiroun (AM) based in the UK was able to mobilise people
into their particular brand of high-risk activism (discussed in more detail under in the
next chapter). Although it did not officially perpetrate any act of terrorism, the group’s
leader, Omar Bakri Mohammed, consistently advocated violent jihad. As in Italy and
Germany, AM’s development was driven by ongoing, dynamic interactions at three
interrelated levels. At the systemic level this involved clashes with police and
government, the struggle to maintain a positive image in the media, and responses to
worldwide events, especially acts of terrorism. At the organisational level there was
competition with alternate groups, both fundamentalists and moderate Muslims. And at
the individual level there were varying interactions between existing AM activists and
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potential recruits, and particularly important personal interactions with Bakri
Mohammed as a highly influential individual.133 AM did not officially ‘go
underground’, however the group was officially dissolved in 2004 as the climate in the
UK had become increasingly restrictive and difficult to operate in, limiting the
organisation’s resources and mobilisation capacity.134 AM splinter groups ‘AlGhurabaa’ and ‘The Saved Sect’ have since been banned.135
A greater number of comparative investigations are necessary to reveal more
about the dynamics of the Islamist social movement, and how specific groups emerge
and decline within that movement. SMT thus represents yet another potentially useful
perspective from which to study terrorism. Moreover, SMT might be combined with
other theoretical approaches in a move towards establishing a comprehensive
understanding of political violence.
For example, according to criteria identified by Gamson, terrorists’ rhetoric
fulfils all three elements of ‘collective action frames’ necessary to effectively mobilise
others in the name of a cause. These include: 1. clearly defined antagonists (us and
them), 2. collectively defined roots and solutions to a problem, and 3. an emphasis on
injustice, which can be righted through a challenger’s action.136 Thus SMT appears to
resonate rather well with a social identity perspective. Both approaches emphasise the
importance of similar underlying processes in forging common bonds amongst people
and motivating them towards collective and ultimately violent action. SMT and SIT are
also both flexible and can be used for analysis at micro- meso- and macro- levels.
Moreover they do not seem to be mutually exclusive and may in fact complement one
another. Accordingly, della Porta emphasises that vital to the progression of terrorism in
her samples was a shared sense of collective identity and feeling part of a collectivity:
“[o]nly this feeling can produce the solidarity needed for collective actions”.137

An Alternative Social Movement Perspective
A rather different set of implications of Islamist terrorism as a social movement
are discussed by Roy138 (though he does not explicitly apply SMT). By conceptualising
‘Al Qaeda’ as a youth movement, Roy contends that the Islamist terrorism movement
has far more in common with other youth-protest movements than is generally assumed,
and can be understood best as part of the contemporary phenomena of violence that
affects societies in general. Although Islamist militancy directly emerged from
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Afghanistan, and was undoubtedly influenced by the then current local/ global historical
context, it is not in Roy’s eyes a continuation of Islamic or Middle Eastern history. In
other words, the extent to which Islamist terrorism is about localised –Middle Eastern,
North African and other- political situations has been over-emphasised, as has the role
of religion and ideology.
Instead, Islamist terrorism has become an anti-establishment, anti-imperialist
and de-territorialised movement, more akin to the far Left terrorism of the 1960’s and
’70’s than to nationally-focussed forms of ‘Islamic’ terror.139 Thus Roy suggests that
disaffected youth in Western countries are attracted to al-Qaeda the social movement
through a combination of disillusionment, rebellion against the parental generation,
involvement in petty delinquency, and a fascination with violence. Islamist terrorism
offers a powerful narrative, a heroic, noble identity that is given credence and meaning
through religious and historical rhetoric, but is ultimately aimed at fighting the global
order.
Various evidence supports Roy’s claims, such as the lack of a concrete political
agenda, continuous tensions between global jihadis and local insurgents in Iraq,
Afghanistan and elsewhere, the lack of religiousness of many Islamist militants,
common links to delinquent forms of crime, and –intriguingly- that “the map of
radicalisation does not really fit with that of the Muslim population”.140 This last point
draws attention to the notion that radical Islamists are not evenly geographically
distributed amongst Muslim populations (at least in France) but seem to be concentrated
in regions where there has been a tradition of leftist radicalism and high youth
delinquency. Of course other factors are also likely involved –such as the physical
distribution of initial waves of radicals, which would be vital to the social transmission
and propagation of the movement (see p.171). Geographical profiling of terrorism may
yet reveal informative patterns.
In line with Roy’s analysis, recent work has demonstrated considerable
similarity between terrorists and ‘ordinary’ criminals in terms of systems of social
influence, organisation, and identification.141 Roy’s theory also does not contradict
social identity approaches (above) and further support comes from Nesser’s terrorist
typology.142 While entrepreneurs and their protégés may be more politically motivated,
intellectually minded and religious, Nesser asserts that the majority of Islamist terrorists
in the West are social misfits or drifters. Accordingly, most people seem to join the
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Islamist movement through a combination of personal difficulties and social affiliation
as opposed to pre-existing religious or political convictions. Nevertheless, some degree
of religious belief is often involved since it is this element which makes such high-risk
activity worthwhile and therefore rational.143 Moreover, it may be the more astute and
dedicated minority that is responsible for the continuation of the movement and the
ongoing construction of its narrative.144 Hence Islamist terrorism may be ‘about’
different things for different people. It may have begun for different reasons than for
why it persists today, and those who lead and those who follow may have quite different
conceptualisations of what they are fighting for.
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Overview
Moving beyond general theoretical explanations of terrorism, further insight is
gained by studying existing accounts of patterns of radicalisation and operational
behaviour of Islamist terrorists. This also forms the basis for selecting the criteria of
interest during case study analysis.
Firstly, precipitating ‘risk factors’ which increase potential susceptibility to
involvement with extremists are considered. Next, the combined importance of ideology
and social support and the specific impact of small group psychology are covered.
Patterns of radicalisation and operational behaviour are of particular interest from a
counter-terrorism perspective. Finally, recent developments are considered, including
increased autonomy, the impact of the Internet and changing demographic profiles.
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5. The Radicalisation Process: From Initial Exposure to Going Operational
Here we shall examine the process of becoming an Islamist terrorist. Processes
of radicalisation are multifaceted, involving changes in thoughts, feelings and actions.
To become radicalised essentially means to become increasingly committed to a
particular social group and belief system, which seeks to change the status quo.1 Most
radical Islamist groups are in fact non-violent; however the focus here is on those
radicals who pursue violent jihad or acts of terrorism.
The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) use the term
jihadisation to refer to the process whereby radical individuals and groups mobilise
themselves to carry out acts of violence in the name of their cause.2 Although this
particular use of terminology is not widespread, it is a useful reminder that commitment
to violence represents a pinnacle of radicalisation that is by no means universal or
inevitable.
It is thus more extreme levels of radicalisation that are of particular interest.
“Functionally, [extreme] political radicalization is increased preparation for and
commitment to intergroup conflict. Descriptively, radicalization means change in
beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence
and demand sacrifice in defense of the ingroup”.3 Psychologically, radicalisation
involves coming to accept Islamist ideology, aims, and method (i.e. how to achieve
those aims). Behaviourally, it generally involves sustained interaction with likeminded
radicals, and participation in ideologically congruent group activities. The select few
who progress to terrorism are likely to feel especially ideologically and/or socially
committed and must accept that it is their personal responsibility to pursue group goals
by violent means.
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5.1 Precipitating Risk Factors
A number of factors appear to make it more likely that an individual will be
susceptible to initial radicalisation. As discussed already (see ‘Individual Explanations’chapter 4), risk factors can include traumatic experiences or feelings of victimisation.
Horgan4 identifies a number of other factors, which when experienced in combination
help explain why particular individuals become terrorists while others do not. These
include:


Emotional vulnerability in terms of anger, alienation, or disenfranchisement;



Dissatisfaction with current activity and the belief that conventional political
avenues are an ineffectual means of change;



Identification with victims (oppressed Muslims);



The belief that terrorism is morally defensible;



Positive expectations about involvement in the movement; and



Access to the group, especially ties of friendship or kinship (social proximity).

Taken together these individual circumstances or proclivities may represent
“openness to socialisation” into terrorism.5 Wiktorowicz6 refers to this openness in
terms of ‘cognitive openings’ whereby individuals come to question existing beliefs and
become more receptive to the possibility of alternative worldviews. Cognitive openings
resonate with the importance of emotional vulnerability or dissatisfaction in life and
appear to be prompted by different sorts of ‘crisis.’ According to Wiktorowicz, crises
“can be categorized as economic (losing a job, blocked mobility), social/cultural (sense
of cultural weakness, racism, humiliation), and political (repression, torture, political
discrimination). [They may also be] “personal,” since cognitive openings can be
produced by idiosyncratic experiences, such as a death in the family, victimization by
crime, and family feuds”.7 Finally, cognitive openings can be deliberately fostered by
‘outreach’ activities where Islamist radicals draw attention to pressing issues or attempt
to create ‘moral shock’ using provocative images of mutilated Muslims in places like
Palestine and Iraq.8
It is quite striking that ubiquitous, almost mundane life experiences such as losing a
job or falling out with family members can open people’s minds to Islamist militancy.
People from all walks of life experience adversity and change in their lives every day
but only the tiniest fraction of these people become terrorists. It seems unlikely that
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many of those who do become terrorists will believe apriori that terrorism is acceptable.
They may well have little in the way of expectations about participation in Islamist
groups, and may not even identify particularly from the outset with Muslims around the
world. More often these may be consequences of initial involvement. The key to
whether or not a person is likely to adopt radical Islamist ideology thus seems to be
exposure, especially where it involves social interaction. Although by no means
sufficient or deterministic, (most people still reject militant Islam), ideological exposure
is the most important, fundamentally necessary risk factor for further radicalisation.
However, as already discussed (see ‘Social Influence’- chapter 4) the absorption of
ideology generally relies on social and behavioural mechanisms. Where ideology is also
embedded in valued and sustained social exchange, radicalisation becomes far more
likely.
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5.2 Ideological & Social Progression
The adoption of radical worldviews is incremental: a person does not instantly
accept that Islam is under attack, that ‘moderate’ Muslims are all wrong, or that
terrorism is the answer. Rather it seems that individuals are drawn in gradually to
militant Islam.9 For Wiktorowicz, cognitive openings foster receptivity to new ideas and
inspire ‘religious seeking’ whereby individuals –often guided by existing radicalsexplore religion as a way of explaining the world. The term ‘religious seeking’ might be
better conceptualised simply as a desire for meaning, since there is nothing to indicate
that a secular ideology might also prove satisfactory. The fact that Islamist activists
often conceal or play down their ‘religious’ agenda in preliminary interactions with
people10 seems to confirm this.
As Wiktorowcz describes, individuals are often initially ‘hooked’, not
necessarily by religious edicts, but through discussion of ‘real world’ issues and
inequalities. By tapping into existing concerns and patterns of belief, there is a degree of
perceptual common ground or ‘frame alignment’ between potential and existing
radicals.11 Put simply, Islamist ideology is able to strike a chord with people by drawing
attention to problems that people can agree with (e.g. that Britain is a racist society, that
Muslims are under-represented in government, or that atrocities have been committed
against Muslims). Initial levels of agreement then pave the way for acceptance of
further ideological tenets, i.e. identifying a solution to these problems in Islamist terms.
In terms of the psychology of persuasion, this parallels the ‘foot in the door’
technique, whereby agreements to smaller requests often increase the likelihood of
agreement to future, more demanding requests.12 Frame alignment on first contact, as
well as continued receptivity to the Islamist message appears to depend not only upon
ideological content (including consistency and relevance to culture and identity) but
also upon characteristics of the source of information.13 In the case of al-Muhajiroun a
major factor affecting peoples’ willingness to listen and desire to learn more was how
impressed they were by the organisational leader, Omar Bakri Mohammed. Hence –in
line with the literature on persuasion- it is important for the source of a message to be
perceived as knowledgeable, likeable, and free from ulterior motives. Where this is the
case –especially when in comparison to other competing sources of information, and
when the message-receiver’s own expertise is lacking- the message is more likely to be
perceived as compelling and ultimately credible.14 Moreover, the greater freedom an
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individual has in discovering an ideology and new way of life for themselves (lack of
coercion), the greater their sense of ownership for, and commitment to those ideas. To
paraphrase Bakri Mohammed, the fundamental condition of conviction is selfdetermination.15
Once a person has accepted basic ideological tenets and is keen to learn and
interact more with radical Islamists, more in-depth socialisation can occur.16
Wiktorowicz found that this involved more intense interaction, often in more exclusive
groups in more private settings. As individuals became more socially committed to
Islamist activism they tended to withdraw from non-Islamist friendships and activities,
resulting in progressive social isolation. This pattern of behaviour has also been
observed in less formal, ‘self-radicalising’ groups17 and may create a ‘cycle of
radicalisation’18 whereby increasingly extreme beliefs isolate groups within society,
simultaneously making group membership all the more important. Hence escalation of
beliefs may be interdependent with social isolation and escalation of group
commitment.
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5.3 The Mechanism of the Group
As group bonding intensifies, individuals increasingly view themselves in terms
of the Islamist identity, affecting what social identity theorists refer to as
depersonalisation (whereby a given collective identity becomes the primary ‘lens’
through which individuals view the world).19 Identification not just with Muslims, but
with extremist Muslims, goes hand in hand with ideological conviction, including the
belief that violent action represents a necessary antidote to the oppression of Islam.20
For many, ideological radicalisation and active social participation are thus inextricably
linked. Increased acceptance of religious/political principles can even follow on from
taking part in group activities (see ‘Ideology & Behaviour’- chapter 4). Behavioural
participation in group activities (social inclusion) can be a very rewarding experience
and the more that individuals come to like others in the group, the more their views are
listened to and accepted. Behaviour may also affect changes in cognition through an
ongoing process of “self-persuasion”.21 Therefore, in trying to maintain a consistent
self-image, people justify their own behaviour in terms of salient ideology. It is thus
gradually internalised, which in turn prompts further congruent behaviour (the “slippery
slope” of radicalisation22). This effect can be exacerbated by in-group competition as
individuals strive to prove their worth or achieve status by becoming more extreme
(affecting what is commonly referred to as “risky shift”23).
Devotion to fellow group members may further intensify under conditions of
perceived threat, which is an integral part of the Islamist message (“the West is against
us”) and which also increases with further radicalisation since coming under scrutiny
from law-enforcement or security agencies becomes a realistic possibility. Threat and
isolation affect group cohesion in terms of a strong sense of mutual interdependence,
which creates pressure towards behavioural and ideological conformity.24 As mentioned
above, increasing extremity and isolation can create a cycle of radicalisation whereby
the group becomes all-important. External social ties may lose their significance and the
radical identity may be chronically activated, permeating all aspects of group members’
perception of the world. Moreover, in-group ‘love’ cultivates feelings of social
obligation and represents a significant barrier to exiting the group.25 Paradoxically,
resultant increased costs of participation, for example, greater levels of risk or expended
effort, may also decrease the likelihood of disengagement via ‘sunk-cost’ effects26
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(better known as ‘chasing your losses’, continuing a line of decision-making because it
has cost so much already).

5.4 Patterns of Radicalisation
Although there is no fixed rate or pre-determined sequence of radicalisation, certain
patterns of behaviour have been observed.

5.4.1 Joining the Radical Social Scene
Prior to 9/11 Islamists could often operate quite freely in Western society and so
the starting point for many was attendance at a radical mosque. Islamist militants now
keep a lower profile but there is evidence that mosques or other social settings, such as
Islamic book shops, youth clubs, or gyms still serve as important initial meeting
points.27 Other important locations include schools, work places, family homes, and
prisons.28 Increasingly so, face-to-face interaction may be preceded by autonomous
Internet browsing of radical sites and chat rooms, and groups continue to use the
Internet and other Islamist media resources.29
As individuals come to adopt Islamist identities, they generally associate more
and more exclusively with like-minded associates and to varying extents exhibit
increased religious behaviours (e.g. growing a beard, wearing traditional clothing).30
Other marked behavioural changes may include refraining from ‘un-Islamic’ behaviours
such as drinking alcohol or going to clubs, and instead showing increased levels of
religious-oriented community activism31 (though of course individuals harldy stand out
in society as a result). Having said this, overt signs of radicalisation are by no means
inevitable. Heightened concern for avoiding attention means that these behaviours are
often kept to a deliberate minimum, whilst the doctrine of ‘necessity permits the
forbidden’ in accordance with takfir ideology means that Western appearance and
lifestyles can be maintained to fool the infidel.32 More recently, youth gangs such as the
‘Muslim Boys’ of London have adopted the ‘Islamist’ identity, blending it with hip-hop
culture and living resolutely criminal lifestyles.33 Hence there is also a great deal of
tolerance for contradictions in ideology and behaviour.
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5.4.2 Increasing Militancy
In cases where groups have formed in public settings, there is often a deliberate
move away from the mosque or other location to more private settings as beliefs
become more extreme.34 Sometimes withdrawal from the mosque is preceded by heated
arguments with mosque officials deemed to be too moderate in their views.35 Increasing
privacy and isolation is thus indicative of the development of an increasingly exclusive
and intolerant identity, as well as increased concern for security. Conversely, as the
Islamist identity becomes ever-important, group members are sometimes outspoken
about their beliefs, openly criticising the West and moderate Muslims alike, and
declaring their desire for jihad. Further signs of increased militancy tend to include selforganised training within the country of residence in the form of activities such as
martial arts, weight-lifting and fitness, and going on outdoor ‘adventure weekends’
involving obstacle courses, paintballing, or similar activities.36

5.4.3 Training for Jihad
Continuing to draw inspiration from jihadi videos and also sometimes from
communication with fellow Islamists online, the decision to become actively involved
in jihad is frequently preceded by international travel in pursuit of ‘real’ paramilitary
training and combat.37 For many (as was the case with the Hamburg 9/11 contingent38)
the original intention is to participate in military struggles, such as in Chechnya,
Afghanistan, Iraq or Somalia. Even where some form of training is obtained it is often
not possible to join in foreign jihadi wars as it is difficult to access these countries.
Hence, as in the past before the camps in Afghanistan were destroyed, those who travel
abroad in pursuit of jihad generally return home. A number of these individuals are
successful in acquiring new skills and a sense of having become a ‘real’ mujahid. Some
may have decided before leaving that they want to carry out acts of terrorism on return.
Others decide to do this during or after training, while a further, unknown percentage39
decides that violent jihad is not for them, and gives up on the pursuit of violence.40
In the post 9/11 era training with terrorist organisations has become increasingly
difficult to acquire. It has not, however, stopped aspiring militants from risking
exposure by travelling in search of it (going mainly to the tribal areas of North West
Pakistan).41 Training in the past appears to have been more easily accessible and more
formally organised, consisting not only of a wide range of military skills training
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(physical, weapons, intelligence, counter-intelligence) but also involving intense
religious and ideological instruction in a structured, top-down system.42 The foreign
training that is acquired by the current generation of Western-based jihadis may vary
enormously in degree of professionalism, but nevertheless represents a hugely important
step in the radicalisation process that dramatically increases the level of threat posed by
otherwise home-grown groups.43
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5.5 Going Operational
Going operational involves the –usually collective- decision to carry out an
actual terrorist attack (and as discussed above may be seen as evidence of
‘jihadisation’44). This stage of development is likely to be characterised by intensified
efforts to protect the secrecy of the group and its plans using counter-surveillance
techniques learned via the Internet or during training. The Internet is also likely to
continue to be used for communication and inspiration, but in addition may now be used
for gathering intelligence on specific targets for attack.45 Numerous possible targets may
be visited and videotaped. If traditional Islamic dress was previously adopted, efforts to
blend in with Western society may now be made (although as already mentioned this –
or indeed any of the behaviours here- are far from inevitable).
By this stage if group members have not done so already, they may quit their job
or studies. Financing operations in the past sometimes involved ‘seed money’46 from alQaeda or a similar organisation, however home-grown groups now appear to be largely
self-financed through a mixture of legal and illegal means. For example, the Madrid
‘3/11’ bombers were involved in drug dealing, theft and robbery,47 while the London
‘7/7’ bombers appeared to mostly rely on credit cards and loans.48 The former cost an
estimated US$53,000-$70,000 while the latter cost less than £8,000 (around
US$13,000)49; thus effective operations can be carried out at varying, but relatively low
cost. As the date of the operation approaches it is possible that the terrorists will miss
payments on loans or credit cards, deplete their bank accounts, or show other financial
irregularities,50 especially where martyrdom is planned and a family may be left behind
without means to support themsleves.
The most common form of (planned) attack involves using home-made bombs
(IEDs or improvised explosive devices). ‘Recipes’ and assembly plans may have been
learned in training or potentially via the Internet. IEDs generally use volatile chemical
mixtures and makeshift electronic detonators. At the stage where groups are committed
to attack, they tend to buy material such as hair bleach, fertiliser and
industrial/agricultural chemicals necessary to construct their bombs. The quantities
required can range from a few kilos (e.g. as with the London bombings) to several
tonnes (e.g. Operation Crevice51). Once chemical ingredients have been acquired, they
must be mixed. ‘Safe-houses’ may be rented for this specific purpose, and an outward
sign of working with chemicals sometimes includes lightening of hair due to the
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bleaching effect.52 Bombs are then often tested in remote areas. ‘Dry runs’ of the
operation may be performed by the group, visiting the selected target/s as they plan to
do on the day.
Video testimonies (martyrdom videos) are usually recorded at some point where
suicide is planned as part of the operation. These tend to feature the intended shaheed in
Islamic dress, holding the Quran and/or a gun, sometimes sitting in front of a flag or
banner. Individuals offer justification for the intended attacks –referred to as if they
have happened already since the videos are not meant to be discovered until afterwardsand frequently cite the Quran with an index finger raised in mimicry of bin Laden, alZawahiri and others. Psychologically, this may be a ‘point of no return’ as each
individual commits to the plan and to each other, effectively sealing a collective pact to
follow through to the end.53 If suicide is not planned, videoed or written demands may
be recorded to later be sent to the media, as in the case of the attacks in Madrid.54
In the final days and moments before an attack, behaviour seems in general to be
unremarkable although there may be occasional cracks in the terrorists’ demeanour as
the pressure mounts. In the case of the 9/11 attacks –the most professionally executed
and complex operation to date- there were reports of suspicious remarks hinting to
outsiders that ‘something big’ was going to happen soon.55 Ziad Jarrah, one of the
pilots, also received a speeding ticket just two days before the final date.56 Hence
despite the necessity of absolute control, there are occasional lapses in judgement or
emotional control and unnecessary brushes with the law. This serves as a reminder that
despite great efforts to be as professional as possible, terrorists do not always fulfil their
aspirations. Throughout their development they sometimes break protocol and make
mistakes.
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5.6 Recent Developments
Processes and patterns of radicalisation over the years share many
commonalities in terms of basic beliefs and behaviours. However, there are a number of
developments that may have affected significant differences between older and more
recent generations of Islamist terrorists. Notable interrelated developments include
increased levels of autonomy, greater use of the Internet and changes in the profiles of
jihadists. Although these issues have been touched upon at various points already it is
worth re-examining them with specific regard to their impact upon processes of
radicalisation and operational functioning.

5.6.1 Increased Autonomy
The organisational affiliation of home-grown groups tends to be questionable in
comparison to groups operating in the late 1990’s and early millennium. The earlier
generation often included jihadi combat veterans. Many had ‘formal’ memberships in
organisations such as the GIA, GSPC or al-Qaeda (that is to say they may have filled
out application forms to attend training camps and in numerous cases had sworn
allegiance to bin Laden and were fully integrated into terrorist networks, although by no
means are official registers of members always kept). They were generally well trained
in paramilitary-style camps (mainly in Afghanistan); there was a degree of top-down
control in that they tended to receive financing for operations; and they received tactical
support and advice if not direct orders. Often teams were assembled during training, or
individuals were sent to certain locations to team up with local operatives for a
mission.57
In contrast, home-grown groups of terrorists seem to come together
spontaneously. They often appear to be self-assembled as a group, and although they
may still be in contact with influential radical individuals in the community, it seems
these figures are less well ‘connected’ than in the past. Training for jihad often begins at
home in a makeshift manner and where training abroad is obtained (often in Pakistan), it
is less formally organised and varies in the degree of professionalism. Training abroad
is less accessible than in the past and not all group members may receive it (in which
case cell leaders or ‘entrepreneurs’ tend to be those who go to train58). Overall, homegrown terrorists appear to have “only marginal ties to structured terrorist groups”59 and
are therefore more autonomous, lacking in organisational support or control.
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Autonomy must not be viewed as an all-or-non variable, however. In this
context it must be assessed in relation to 1) radicalisation, 2) training and 3) operational
functioning. As for radicalisation, a lot has been said about the impact of the Internet
(see below) and Islamist ideology and propaganda is certainly more readily available
than in the past. However, it is also important to remember that the earlier generation of
Islamist terrorists (recent immigrants) were also very active in their own radicalisation.
They listened to preachers or mujahedin who they came in contact with and absorbed
various forms of media. But they also became increasingly extreme in their beliefs
through interaction with each other, and often sought violent jihad of their own
accord.60 As already discussed, conversion or commitment, as opposed to conformity or
compliance, requires a sense of individual freedom (see ‘Ideological & Social
Progression’ above). Hence some degree of autonomy may have always been a feature
of processes of radicalisation.
The topic of training has already been covered, and here it does seem that homegrown groups are, against their desires, more independent than in the past. This feeds
directly into operational functioning, in that lack of organisational affiliation means that
financing, strategy and tactics all tend to be essentially up to the group. Islamist
terrorists of the past, who were more clearly part of an organisation, seem on average to
have enjoyed greater levels of support, and were more often instructed, or at least given
a basic plan to follow. As a result they also had greater operational and technical ability
and were more successful in carrying out attacks.

5.6.2 The Impact of the Internet
Just as society in general has done so, Islamist terrorists have increasingly
utilised the Internet as it has flourished over the past decade or so- referred to by the
Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) as the “virtualisation of
jihad”.61 Radical websites and chat-rooms have proliferated, and propaganda, videos,
and information on bomb-making and other practical issues have become more readily
available. Users can browse and participate in online extremist groups with low levels
of risk and a sense of empowerment as their true identity remains anonymous. The
Internet also facilitates networking with like-minded individuals, including international
communication- potentially serving as a virtual ‘bridge’ to organised terrorists.62
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Potentially, individuals can undergo the entire radicalisation process and go operational
without any direct human contact. In support of this the AIVD allege that ‘Yahya K.’,
an 18-year old Islamist arrested in November 2004 for posting online threats against
Dutch politicians and the Security Service, and found to be in possession of home-made
explosives, “had gone through the entire process of radicalisation and recruitment seated
in front of the virtual world of his pc screen”.63
Use of the Internet is now a common theme in reports of home-grown terror
groups. Its networking and operational-planning potential have been demonstrated most
significantly in the case of Younis Tsouli, the London-based Yemeni student and
‘superstar’ cyber-jihadist who was in communication with both home-grown and
organised terrorists around the globe, arrested in 2005.64 There is also the case of an
alleged plot in 2006 to destroy underground tunnels in New York City, involving eight
people spread over six countries who had never met as a group, had never been to the
US, and used the Internet to communicate and accumulate information on targets.65 As
Emerson remarks, “[t]he potential for “virtual” recruitment, training, and other
“management functions” controlled from one part of the world while the attackers
operate and plan in another, without ever physically meeting, becomes quite real”.66
However, the impact of the Internet may have been overstated. As Stevens and
Neumann point out, Younis Tsouli represents an exceptional case rather than the rule.67
They conclude that “[s]elf-radicalisation and self-recruitment via the internet with little
or no relation to the outside world rarely happens, and there is no reason to suppose that
this situation will change in the near future.”68 Thus the Internet may serve as a starting
point for radicalisation, and as a continuing source of inspiration and information. But
generally speaking, as in the past, face-to-face interaction with fellow Islamists is
sought and seems to remain the most powerful and common mechanism of increasing
extremism and commitment to violence.69 Similarly, based on a survey of recent cases
in Europe, Nesser concludes that while the Internet was indeed of practical significance
for recruitment, radicalisation and operational purposes, its role as a “virtual training
camp” has been overstated.70
Pending more detailed and comprehensive examination of the role of the
Internet in different groups of contemporary terrorists, it seems that the impact of the
Internet has been significant, becoming an integral part of radicalisation, training, and
operational functioning. However, its effects should not be over-exaggerated and it
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should not be viewed in isolation from direct, face-to-face interactions which continue
to be hugely important to terrorism as a process.

5.6.3 Changing Jihadi Profiles
The term ‘home-grown’ terrorism reflects the fact that there have been changes
in the average jihadi profile. Islamist terrorists in the West are now more often second
or third-generation, rather than recent immigrants, and have radicalised ‘at home’. They
also appear to be younger, to include more converts and females, and to have a history
of involvement in crime.71 Changing profiles are the consequence of the Islamist cause
taking hold in the West and becoming increasingly publicised after 9/11. The
involvement of younger, Western-born radicals and the continuing adaptation of
Islamist messages are also both a consequence and cause of the expansion of militant
Islam on the Internet.
The growth of HGIT in the West and the resultant differences in the
backgrounds of terrorists may be expressed in terms of changing social identities.72 As
Table 4.1 demonstrates (see ‘Theories of Identity Applied’- chapter 4) different identity
‘crises’ or tensions may be felt by recent versus second or third-generation immigrants
and converts to Islam. In other words the type of tension felt, and the related pathway to
terrorism, is likely to be affected by each individual’s existing social identity. Terrorists
of the earlier generation (many of whom had directly experienced violence or
oppression growing up in the Middle East or elsewhere) were born into an identity
which was congruent with the Islamist cause. By contrast, home-grown terrorists
consciously reject the Western elements of their identities. Hence Roy remarks that
“[t]o convert to Islam today is a way for a European rebel to find a cause; it has little to
do with theology”73 and Durodié has suggested that acts of home-grown terrorism are
“akin to the Columbine high school massacre”,74 finding their basis in cultural
nihilism.75
At the same time, there may have been a change in expectations about what it
means to get involved in radical and militant Islam. Silber and Bhatt claim that “there is
no longer any illusion as to what the adoption of jihadi-Salafi ideology means” and that
processes of radicalisation are accelerating.76 Likewise, Taarnby Jensen observes that
individuals drawn to radical mosques “often know exactly which interpretation of Islam
they want to hear”77 and Nesser asserts that Europe’s home-grown generation of
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Islamist terrorists is more impatient and reckless than their predecessors.78 It is thus
possible to distinguish between earlier generations of Islamist terrorists and their homegrown ‘descendants’ based upon their social identities. Relatively speaking, in earlier
generations an identity congruent with the cause preceded or went hand in hand with
some form of frustration and desire to act, whilst in later generations ‘frustration’
precedes adoption of an identity which enables action.79
From this perspective, the radical Islamist ideology behind HGIT is more of a
vehicle for expression rather than a cause of violence per se. This therefore implies, in
line with Roy’s social movement analysis (see ‘An Alternative Social Movement
Perspective’- chapter 4) that in the absence of Islamist ideology groups and individuals
would presumably find some alternative avenue of expression. Viewed this way, HGIT
represents a ‘less real’ manifestation of the Islamist cause. Participants are often less
professional than in the past, they may have a less coherent understanding of their
actions, and less clearly defined goals. However, this does not rule out the need to
address the religion and ideology of home-grown Islamist terrorists as they are
nonetheless often deeply committed to violence and should not be underestimated.
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Overview
There has been considerable speculation as to differences between the United
States and Europe regarding rates of Islamist terrorism. It is generally agreed that the
US faces a far less serious home-grown threat –quantitatively speaking and relative to
its population size- in comparison to European countries. The aim of this chapter is to
give a historical overview of Islamist terrorist activity in the US in order to
contextualise the more detailed comparison included in the ensuing chapters.
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6. Islamist Terrorism in the United States
6.1 Historical Overview of Terrorism in America
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Figure 6.1: Terrorist attacks in the US, 1970-2007 (created using the START Global Terrorism Database
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?country=217).

Terrorism in general and Islamist terrorist activity in particular are both often
assumed to have been rare occurrences on American soil. Of course it depends upon
how ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islamist terrorism’ are defined but in both cases there is a
surprising amount to speak of. According to the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism (START) Global Terrorism Database, between 1970 and 2007 there were
1,347 terrorist attacks in the United States, involving in excess of 125 different groups
and resulting in 3,338 fatalities (including 9/11) and 1,983 injuries.1 Consistent with
this, Hewitt notes that although the US has not experienced the severity of terrorism
campaigns in other Western nations such as the UK, it is neither new nor trivial.2 He
describes terrorism in America as having a “fragmented quality”, being characterised by
remarkable ideological diversity and a multitude of different organisations even within
the same ideological groupings, as well as a significant number of lone individuals.3
Hewitt identifies nine overlapping waves of terrorism in the US between the mid
1950’s up until the 2000’s.4 The first wave consisted of white racist violence in
response to civil rights campaigns. It began in 1954, peaked in 1964 and had largely
disappeared by 1970. The second wave was characterised by Black nationalist and
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religious groups (including Nation of Islam affiliates and groups such as the Death
Angels and the Mau Mau) which began in the mid 1960’s, peaking around 1970 and
ending around 1975. Revolutionary leftist terrorism by the likes of the Weather
Underground began in 1969, quickly peaked in 1971 and dissipated over the next
fourteen years, lasting until 1985. The fourth wave was marked by Puerto Rican
nationalists (most notably the Armed Forces of National Liberation and the Macheteros)
who exhibited renewed activity in 1969, peaking towards the end of the 1970’s and
declining into the early 1990’s. The date-range for the fifth wave (Jewish terrorism) is
not specified but based on an examination of the START database5 this began in 1970,
peaked around the end of the decade and ended in 1986. The sixth wave consisted of
anti-Castro Cuban violence, much of which was in Miami, and lasted from 1968 until
the early 1980’s.
In addition to these historical waves of terrorism, Hewitt lists three ongoing
6

waves. The first of these is anti-abortionist violence, which began in 1977 and
increased in 1984 and 1992. Not covered by Hewitt but perhaps as important as antiabortionist terrorism are other ‘single issue’ groups concerned with animal rights and
the environment, such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Earth Liberation
Front (ELF) respectively. Both of these groups began destructive operations around
1998 (generally targeting businesses and property, causing extensive and costly
damage7) and have continued into the 2000’s.8 Hewitt’s second ongoing wave is that of
far right-wing violence, which began in 1978 and is more geographically spread and
organisationally diverse than the Klan-related terrorism of the ’50’s and ’60’s; and
finally, the threat from Islamist extremists, which became apparent as a direct threat to
domestic security in the US with the advent of the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing.

6.2 Islamist Terrorism in the US
6.2.1 Pre-1993
Vidino traces early incidents of violence inspired by politicised forms of Islam
back to the 1970’s.9 He points out that such acts mostly involved black Americans who
tended to adhere more to Americanised versions of Islam and who were acting out of a
mixture of motives that were distinct to those of contemporary Islamist terrorists.10
Nevertheless, Saudi Wahhabism began to gain popularity in the United States as early
as the 1960’s and a considerable number of African Americans travelled to Saudi
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Arabia for the hajj or to study in Islamic universities.11 Reportedly, “dozens of nativeborn Americans” travelled to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets during the 1980’s12 but
confirmed examples before 1990 are hard to come by.
As with the rest of the Western world, the encroachment of the initial wave of
‘global’ Islamist extremists into the American homeland began in the 1980’s. Not long
after the Mekhtab al-Khidemat was established in Pakistan in 1984 by Abdullah Azzam,
international offices were set up in the US under the name of the Al-Kifah Refugee
Centre, ostensibly a charitable organisation.13 The first US offices were at the Islamic
Centre of Tucson (ICT) in Arizona, which published Al-Jihad, a magazine that called
for support in the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan and that allegedly reached up
to 50,000 people, around half of whom were in the US.14 In addition, Emerson asserts
that “[f]rom 1985 to 1989, Azzam, and his top aide, Palestinian Sheikh Tamim alAdnani, [personally] visited dozens of American cities, exhorting recruits to pick up the
sword against the enemies of Islam. They raised tens of thousands of dollars and
enlisted hundreds and hundreds of fighters and believers”.15 According to Bob Blitzer,
who headed the first Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Islamist terrorism squad in
1994, between 40 to 50 jihadists left to go overseas from just two New York mosques
during the 1990’s.16 Kaplan17 reports that Pakistani intelligence sources corroborate
these figures and estimate that around 400 Americans trained at jihadi camps in
Afghanistan between 1989 and 2001 (estimates of total numbers trained from around
the world during this time-frame vary immensely, but 50,000 has been suggested as a
conservative figure).18
The growing contingent of Sunni Islamist militants within the United States was
driven and supported by a growing infrastructure centred around the offices of Al-Kifah
and related mosques and other institutions, organised by figures who were part of the
Afghan jihad network. Emerson maintains that in addition to Tucson, “dozens” more
Al-Kifah offices were established in the US, including in Brooklyn (which swiftly
became the headquarters in America), Jersey City, Boston, Chicago and Atlanta.19 He
alleges that as early as 1987 the Al-Farouq mosque in Brooklyn was involved in
counterfeiting money, falsifying passports, sending explosives overseas to Hamas and
recruiting and sending volunteers to foreign jihadi conflict zones.20
Certainly New York was a hive of Islamist activity in the late 1980’s into the
1990’s. The FBI had placed a group of jihadists under surveillance during July 1989.21
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Among them were El Sayyid Nosair, Clement Rodney Hampton-El, Mahmoud
Abouhalima, Mohammad Salameh, and Nidal Ayyad.22 At the time they were observed
firing AK-47 assault rifles at a shooting range and it also transpired that they were in
communication with the ‘Blind Sheikh’ Omar Abdel Rahman of the Egyptian Gamaa’
Islamiyah. Rahman then joined them in 1990 to lead what was the first operational
Islamist terrorist group based in the West.23
The year that Rahman arrived two murders took place in connection to the New
York network. Imam Rashad Khalifa was killed in Tucson, Arizona on January 31st
1990,24 apparently due to offence caused by his interpretation of the Quran.25 Although
no-one was convicted for his murder, two members of Al-Fuqra, a sect-like organisation
also known in the US as ‘Muslims of the Americas’ (and with which Hampton-El was
also affiliated) were convicted for conspiring to kill him.26 It was also established that
Wadih el-Hage (resident in the US since the early 1980’s, deeply involved in the
emergent al-Qaeda network, and later convicted in relation to his extensive role in the
1998 East African embassy bombings27) had played host to an unidentified individual
from New York who conducted surveillance on Imam Khalifa before his death.28 ElHage was known to have been in contact with members of the New York network
including Mahmoud Abouhalima since at least 1988, and spent time in New York in
1991 visiting El Sayeed Nosair (by then in jail).29
On November 5th, 1990, Rabbi Meir Kahane, the founder of the extremist Jewish
Defence League was assassinated during a speech at the Marriot Hotel in New York.
The assassin is firmly believed to have been El Sayeed Nosair, who was convicted for
firearms offences (shooting and wounding two people as he fled the scene) although
evidence was insufficient to secure a conviction for murder.30 A third assassination then
took place in February/March 1991 when Mustapha Shalabi –previously appointed by
Abdullah Azzam as the head of Al-Kifah in the US- was found with a gunshot wound to
the head and multiple stab wounds.31 Shalabi had reportedly been under pressure from
Rahman and his followers to relinquish control of operations in America, and although
no-one was ever charged with the killing, it is alleged that Rahman had issued a fatwa
calling for Shalabi’s death.32
The true impact of the New York network’s endeavours was not felt, however,
until the February 26th bombing of the World Trade Centre in 1993, which killed 6
people and injured over a thousand.33 This attack was led by Ramzi Yousef (aka Abdul
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Basit Karim, nephew of the 9/11 ‘mastermind’ Khalid Sheikh Mohammed34) who had
trained at the camps in Afghanistan and arrived in the US in September 1992, meeting
up with members of Rahman’s network shortly afterwards. Following the attacks the
perpetrators were traced via remnants of the rental van they had used to transport the
bomb, and in 1994 Mohammad Salameh, Mahmoud Abouhalima, Nidal Ayyad and
Mohammed Ajaj were all sentenced to 240 years in prison. Yousef had fled the country
but was apprehended in Pakistan in 1995 and received the same sentence in 1997.35
After the attacks in February, Emad Salem, an informer working for the FBI
resumed tape recording conversations with the remaining members of Rahman’s
network and on June 24th, 1993 over a dozen individuals were arrested.36 Under
Rahman’s supervision the group had been planning to bomb numerous New York
landmarks and buildings and to assassinate Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. Ten
defendants including Rahman were found guilty in October 1995 and received
sentences ranging from 25 years to life.37
It is quite remarkable how quickly members of the Afghan jihadi network were
able to establish an infrastructure in the United States and to enlist the help of long-term
American residents and citizens. This all took place as the jihadi movement as a whole
was in its early stages opf development and ideological issues (‘near’ vs. ‘far’ enemy
priorities) were still being ‘ironed out.’ The Yousef/Rahman network itself obviously
reflected the changing shift in emphasis towards the ‘far’ enemy, i.e. America and its
allies, seen to be propping up hated regimes in the Muslim world. It also reflected the
growing emphasis placed on religion, as evidenced by the ‘spiritual advisor’ role played
by Rahman and in statements made by members of the network. Indeed by the time of
the first World Trade Centre attack, the camps in Afghanistan –which incorporated
intensive religious instruction38- had been in operation for a decade. However, despite
the fact that Yousef had been through such camps, it appears he was “a secular terrorist
who mobilized others by playing on their religious zeal”.39 Justification for the attack
was also expressed in purely nationalistic and political terms in a letter posted to the
New York Times by Nidal Ayyad, which focussed on US support for Israel and
involvement in Middle Eastern affairs.40 In hindsight the events of 1993 in New York
are a clear indicator of ideological developments that were taking place and are an
example of the cross-over between more traditional and ‘new’ forms of terrorism.
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6.2.2 1993-2001
US military action overseas in the first Gulf War in 1990-’91 and in Somalia in
1992-’93 were major drivers behind the increasing focus upon attacking American
targets (facilitated by the death of Azzam, who had been opposed to this changing
strategy). However, the first attacks in the US were pre-emptive of bin Laden’s 1996
fatwa declaring ‘War against the Americans’ and a more definite desire to strike against
the American homeland itself. In the years 1993-2001 Western-based activities were
mostly in support of operations abroad, including attacks on Americans overseas, and to
otherwise maintain and spread the Islamist movement. Notable successful attacks
during this period took place in Somalia in 1993, Saudi Arabia in 1996, Kenya and
Tanzania in 1998 and Yemen in 2000.41
The indictment filed against bin Laden and twenty-one others in relation to the
August 7th, 1998, bombings in Kenya and Tanzania42 is revealing of the integral part
that activities on US soil had to play in the developing global jihad. Two figures in
particular stand out due to the fact that they were both based in the US for long periods
of time beginning in the mid-1980’s, both obtained US citizenship, and both played
very active militant roles, becoming part of bin Laden’s inner circle.
Wadih el-Hage (discussed above in relation to his New York connections) was
born in Lebanon and converted to Islam in his teens. He had studied at the University of
South Louisiana in 1978 before going to Pakistan to join the Afghan jihad.43 He
returned to the US in 1985, married and was resident in Tucson, Arizona from 1986 to
1990, before spending a year in Arlington, Texas. This was followed by a brief spell in
New York after the murder of Mustapha Shalabi.44 Then from 1992-1994 he was based
in Sudan, along with his family, and from 1994-1997 they lived in Kenya before
returning to Texas in September 1997.45 El-Hage was acting as bin Laden’s personal
secretary since at least the early 1990’s46 and travelled extensively, spending time in
Pakistan and Afghanistan. He played a major coordinating role in the planning of the
East African embassy bombings, which began at least as early as 199347 and throughout
this time up until his conviction in 2001 El-Hage was in communication with central alQaeda figures including the US-based Ali Mohammed.
Mohammed –originally from Egypt- was named as an unindicted co-conspirator
in both the first World Trade Centre attack and in the East Africa attacks.48 He also
came to the United States in 1985 (preceded by Special Forces training in 1981 at Fort
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Bragg in North Carolina with the Egyptian army) going on to join the US military in
1986.49 Mohammed allegedly supplied military manuals and gave training to Islamist
militants he met in Jersey City, including El Sayeed Nosair.50 He left the military in
1989 and was based in Santa Clara, California from then on; although like El-Hage he
travelled extensively, including to train mujahedin in the camps of Afghanistan51 and in
1991 he supervised bin Laden’s move to Sudan.52 In 1993 he was “asked by bin Laden
to conduct surveillance of American, British, French, and Israeli targets in Nairobi
[Kenya]”53 and in 1996 assisted with the move back to Afghanistan. Mohammed was
eventually arrested in 1998 and pleaded guilty to all charges against him in 2000.54
What is remarkable about these overlapping stories is not only that the
movements of figures so close to bin Laden were facilitated by having American
passports, but that they used the US as their home-base to which they would always
return, and through which they would channel communications and resources. For
example, in 1995 Ali Mohammed sent details regarding the trial of Omar Abdel
Rahman to Wadih El-Hage in Kenya.55 El-Hage visited Mohammed in California later
that same year, as well as another unnamed ‘co-conspirator’ in Florida in January
1996.56 El-Hage maintained communication with his contact in Florida in addition to
others in Texas and Oregon, giving updates on his activities and al-Qaeda affairs
overseas.57 Early in 1998, Ali Mohammed also communicated with El-Hage by way of
an intermediary in Arlington, Texas.58 These examples demonstrate both the entrenched
nature of the US jihadi contingent and its significance to the wider network.
In addition to the exchange of information, US-based contacts were also used to
acquire vital equipment. For example, naturalised US citizens Ziyad Khaleel and Tarik
Hamdi respectively bought and delivered a satellite phone and battery pack to bin Laden
in May 1998, which was then reportedly used in connection to the embassy bombings in
August.59 Hence the American-based network of Islamist militants formed an integrated
part of global operations aimed at attacking the US abroad.
Meanwhile Islamists in America continued to raise funds and recruit new
volunteers for jihad. The Brooklyn office of Al-Kifah (the charity front set up by
associates of bin Laden to spread jihadi literature, raise funds and attract recruits) was
shut down following the first World Trade Centre attack and Landmarks plot, and was
later named a Specially Designated Terrorist Organization after 9/11.60 However,
similar charitable organisations were incorporated, fulfilling many of the same
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functions. Among these was Care International, established in Boston, which allegedly
functioned as “an outgrowth of, and successor to, Al Kifah Boston and was engaged in
non-charitable activities”61 including “engag[ing] in the solicitation and expenditure of
funds to support the mujahideen and promote jihad...[and] assum[ing] the activities of
Al-Kifah including the publication of its pro-jihad newsletter, Al-Hussam”.62 Terrorism
charges were not brought in this case, although ultimately, Care International directors
Emadeddin Muntasser and Muhamed Mubayyid were convicted on charges of tax-fraud
in January 2008, resulting in 11 and 12 month prison sentences respectively.63
Fund-raising in America for overseas Islamist terrorist groups through mosques,
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and charitable fronts appears to have been
extensive. Emerson64 details a complex and ever-changing fund-raising network with
links to numerous terrorist organisations (primarily Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad
as well as affiliates of al-Qaeda). Many of these companies were founded in the late
1980’s and early 1990’s and since being investigated in the wake of 9/11 it has been
established that millions of dollars have been raised in America for jihad. For example,
the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), part of a network of organisations
combined under the heading of the Council of American Muslim Charities, is recorded
to have raised more than $17.5 million between 1993 and 2001.65 BIF had its assets
frozen in 2001 and was designated a terrorist organisation in November 2002.66 The
coordinator of BIF-USA, Enaam Arnaout is alleged to have previously worked for bin
Laden in Afghanistan, and in 2003 admitted to sending significant amounts of the
charity-proceeds to fighters in Bosnia and Chechnya. Arnaout was sentenced in 2006 to
ten years in prison for defrauding charity-donors.67
As the former National Coordinator for Security and Infrastructure Protection,
Richard Clarke, testified in 2003, “it is now widely known that every major Islamist
terrorist organization, from HAMAS to Islamic Jihad to Al Qaeda, has leveraged the
financial resources and institutions of the United States to build their
capabilities...enjoy[ing] a significant degree of cooperation and coordination within our
borders”.68 Prior to 2001 Islamist activities in the United States went comparatively
unmonitored and were conducted quite freely. Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s deputy,
is even reported to have come to the US on fund-raising tours of California in 199369
and 1995.70
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While Americans were both knowingly and unwittingly making financial
contributions to violent jihadist operations, a smaller number of individuals and groups
of young men, often centred around influential figures in their community, were
becoming radicalised to the point of pursuing armed conflict. As reported by Kaplan,71
young Americans had been inspired to join foreign jihadi wars since the 1980’s and this
continued throughout the ’90’s. American-born Raed Hijazi reportedly turned to radical
Islam whilst attending the Islamic Assistance Organization in Sacramento, where he
was influenced to go to Afghanistan by a Fijian Muslim.72 Hijazi met up with numerous
other suspected al-Qaeda militants who spent time in Boston and New York during the
mid 1990’s73 and was later convicted and sentenced to death for planning attacks in
Jordan in 1999.74
Another example is Kamal Derwish, a US citizen raised in Yemen and Saudi
Arabia and accredited with being the instigator behind the so-called ‘Lackawanna 6’,
the group of American-Yemeni men who radicalised on the outskirts of Buffalo after
Derwish returned to the US in 1998.75 Derwish had previously trained in Afghanistan
and fought in Bosnia. He maintained his jihadi connections (investigators later revealed
that he had been in communication with Tawfiq bin Attash, a planner of the USS Cole
attack in Yemen in 200076) and he quickly built up a group of followers around him,
whom he urged to join the jihad. Six of Derwish’s followers attended training camps in
Afghanistan in May 2001 and returned to the US later that year before being arrested in
September 2002.77 Evidence suggested the men had been deterred by the experience and
were not planning any form of terrorist attack, although they were still convicted on
terror-related charges and were sentenced to between 7 and 10 years in prison in 2003
(Derwish was killed the year before by a Predator Drone in Yemen).78
There are numerous other examples of groups and individuals who became
significantly radicalised in the US before the 9/11 attacks and then went abroad in
search of violent jihad. Jose Padilla became part of a network of extremists based in
Broward County, Florida that set up several Islamist charity fronts for supporting
mujahedin around the world and conspired towards acts of terrorism between 1993 and
2001.79 Padilla left America in 1998, trained in Afghanistan in 2000, was arrested on his
return to the US in 2002, and was convicted on terrorism charges along with coconspirators Adham Amin Hassoun and Kifah Wael Jayyousi in August 2007.80 US
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officials maintain that Padilla had trained with the specific intent of carrying out attacks
in America.81
Individuals such as Adam Gadahn who radicalised in the US at around the same
time were also part of broader networks which had a profound impact upon their lives
and actively ‘plugged them in’ to the global jihad. Another convert, Gadahn had
radicalised between 1996-1997 through his contact with Hisham Diab –a Bosnian war
veteran- and Khalil Deek –reportedly an established jihadi with links to the Montreal
network that spawned the ‘Millennial plotter’ Ahmed Ressam.82 Through these contacts
Gadahn left for Pakistan in 1997/1998, going on to become a media-spokesman for alQaeda, warning in one video that “[t]he streets of America shall run red with blood”.83
Elsewhere, in Portland, Oregon, a group who became known as the ‘Portland 7’
had come together at the local mosque and had radicalised during the late 1990’s,
reportedly heavily influenced by a former veteran of the Afghan-Soviet war, Habis
Abdulla al-Saoub84 (killed by Pakistani forces in 2003).85 By the summer of 2001 they
were engaged in self-styled paramilitary training and in October that year five group
members left the US seeking (unsuccessfully) to join the Taliban in Afghanistan.86
Arrests were made in 2002, resulting in lengthy prison sentences.87
A similar group had surfaced in Virginia, again centred around radical figures at
the local mosque, this time in the form of Ali al-Timimi, an American-born Islamic
scholar educated in Saudi Arabia, and Randal Todd Royer, a former US army soldier
and veteran of the Bosnian jihad in 1994.88 Members of the ‘Virginia Paintball Jihad’
network trained in the US before leaving for Pakistan where they underwent training
with Lashkar e-Taiba in 2000 and 2001.89 As in Portland, the group had intended to join
the Taliban fighting American troops but apparently were not able to do so, and
although back in the US there were no clear plans to attack their homeland, they had
amassed a stockpile of firearms.90 Arrests were made in 2003 leading to eleven eventual
convictions (although two were for firearms offences only).91
These examples (some of which are dealt with in more detail in Appendix A
Part 2) demonstrate the emergence of pockets of Islamist militancy across the US built
up around influential individuals, many of whom had embraced the jihadi cause whilst
overseas. These figures strove to support mujahedin abroad and acted as recruiters on
American soil. They tended to have impressive religious knowledge and a considerable
number had prior combat experience in foreign jihadi conflicts. Ultimately they served
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to spread the word of jihad inside America while forming a connection to the worldwide
Islamist network.
Patterns of radicalisation in the US during the late 1980’s and through the
1990’s thus tended to show groups of young men gravitating toward charismatic
individuals in their community as they wished to learn more about Islam. Discovery of
religion was soon directed towards a focus on the plight of Muslims in overseas
conflicts, and, often within two or three years of coming together, group members
would travel abroad in search of armed jihad. The original aim was almost exclusively
to take part in military battles, not to carry out terrorist attacks at home. However, many
returned home after training but without having fulfilled their dream. Moreover, from
the late 1990’s onwards there was an increasing intent amongst the foreign mujahedin to
attack America itself and this was being encouraged in the Afghan camps.
Ahmed Ressam was an Algerian who radicalised whilst part of the diaspora
community in Montreal, Canada, which featured a number of jihadi war veterans. He
trained in Afghanistan between 1998 and 1999 where he became part of a plot to attack
Los Angeles LAX airport, and made arrangements to be assisted by a New York-based
contact, Abdelghani Meskini.92 Although Ressam failed in his mission (being stopped
by alert border security on December 14th, 1999) his story is illustrative of the growing
desire to strike within the US.
Far more significantly, the 9/11 attacks had been in preparation since 199693 and
future hijackers had entered the United States as early as January 2000 for the specific
purpose of learning to fly for the operation.94 In fact, the plot mastermind Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed had come to the US from Kuwait in 1983, obtaining his degree in
mechanical engineering at the North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State
University in 1986 before going to take part in the Afghan jihad in 1987.95 One of the
pilots, Hani Hanjour, had also previously spent time in the US, learning to fly during the
late 1990’s while based in Arizona. “It is clear that when Hanjour lived in Arizona in
the 1990’s, he associated with several individuals holding extremist beliefs who have
been the subject of counterterrorism investigations. Some of them trained with Hanjour
to be pilots. Others had apparent connections to al Qaeda, including training in
Afghanistan”.96
Although not proven, it is thought unlikely that the other 9/11 operatives entered
the country without any pre-arranged contacts. Indeed, Nawaf al-Hazmi (initially
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accompanied by Khalid al-Midhar and then by Hanjour) received considerable
assistance from individuals they met at mosques, notably in San Diego and Falls
Church, Virginia (the latter also playing host to the above-mentioned ‘Virginia Paintball
Jihad’ group and others, as well as being the site of offices of charities which have been
repeatedly investigated for their ties to terrorism97). While in the US, al-Hazmi,
accompanied by al-Midhar and then by Hanjour, also attended sermons by Anwar alAwlaki, the Yemen-based extremist preacher of American citizenship who is now
suspected of direct involvement in terrorist operations.98
The 9/11 attacks were a case of infiltration from abroad, although the activities
of the hijackers clearly intersected at times with established radical elements in the US.
When the attacks came on September 11th, 2001 the Western world reeled in shock, yet
the impact of course was felt most directly in the US. Hewitt describes a wave of panic
followed by a surge in patriotism and a resounding desire for revenge (sadly resulting in
several hundred known attacks against persons thought to be Muslims,99 including some
fatalities100). There was a massive investigative response within America in which
several thousand Middle Eastern immigrants and visitors were interviewed by the
FBI,101 emergency powers were granted to the government, the much-criticised Patriot
Act was passed and security budgets were increased exponentially.102
In addition to the domestic response there was a worldwide crackdown on
Islamist militants, spearheaded by the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. At the
same time as terrorist networks were being hunted down and dismantled, the 9/11
attacks had raised the profile of the Islamist cause and inspired many more people to
join the jihad.103 Ultimately it was a turning point in history which led to the
transformation of Islamist terrorism worldwide, and a metamorphosis of the movement
within Western borders.

6.2.3 Post-9/11
A more thorough chronological analysis of terrorism cases since 2001 in the US
and UK will be presented as the main body of research in the following chapters. Here a
brief overview of recent developments is given as an introductory examination of the
contemporary context and current understanding of the home-grown threat.
As described in chapter 3 global counter-terrorism measures employed after
September 11th, 2001 transformed the functioning of violent Islamist networks,
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destroying much of the central al-Qaeda infrastructure and forcing disparate groups of
jihadis in the West to be increasingly self-reliant. Rather than laying low though, many
of those who had radicalised before September 11th were spurred on in their own pursuit
of destruction. On the international stage plots were discovered during 2001 aiming to
attack a US military base in Belgium, the US embassy in Paris, and a Miami-bound
flight on which Richard Reid of the UK attempted to detonate an explosive device
hidden in his shoe.
Cases involving Islamist militants also continued to surface in the US. To begin
with, as in Europe, it was mostly people who had been involved in radical Islamist
networks well before 2001. There has been a number of notable, high profile
investigations of Islamic charities and related organisations, many established in the late
1980’s/ early 1990’s, suspected of providing millions of dollars for terrorist
organisations overseas. However, charges relating directly to terrorism have proven
extremely difficult to prove in these instances and prosecutors have tended to rely on
charges of fraud, tax evasion and money laundering. This is despite the fact that several
of these charities were designated financiers of terrorism and had their assets frozen
after September 11th. For example, the Global Relief Foundation (GRF) was shut down
and its chairman Rabih Haddad was arrested in December 2001 amidst allegations that
it had provided support to al-Qaeda.104 Yet Haddad was detained and later deported
simply for violating the conditions of his visa and (as with Care International- above) no
terror-related charges were ever brought.105
Similarly, plots to carry out attacks which were uncovered in the years 2001 to
2003 involved individuals who had radicalised much earlier, many of whom had made
contact with al-Qaeda and had trained overseas (as illustrated in the Lackawanna,
Portland and Virginia cases above). In some of these cases (others including Imran
Mandhai and Shueyb Mossa Jokhan,106 Jose Padilla, Iyman Faris107 and Nuradin
Abdi108) there was varying evidence of intent to carry out attacks within the US itself.
However, in the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks no significantly advanced
plots with clearly identified domestic targets were uncovered.
Nevertheless it gradually became apparent that a relatively small but persistent
number of American residents and citizens, many of whom had no history of
involvement prior to 2001, were being drawn to violent Islamist ideology and were
willing to actively support the jihad if not engage in violence themselves. This became
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increasingly salient after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, which has been seen as a
massive boost to the jihadist cause. Since then several cases involving US-based
Islamist militants have been discovered each year. Typically these have included small
groups and individuals of varying backgrounds, often with little or no organisational
affiliation and limited attack capabilities (several have acquired firearms but none have
independently constructed working explosive devices in America109).
Participation in overseas conflicts remains a popular goal of many ‘homegrown’ American Islamists (Somalia being an increasingly popular destination) but
plots to perpetrate domestic attacks have also been uncovered. Many of these plots have
been detected by law enforcement from a very early stage and have involved informants
and undercover agents playing roles that have been integral to the development of the
conspiracy. With the exception of two separate shooting sprees in June and November
of 2009 carried out by lone individuals (Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammed and Nidal
Malik Hasan) no planned attacks have so far have been successful.
The closest America has come to experiencing an organised Islamist terrorist
attack at home since 2001 came on December 25th, 2009 when Umar Farooq
Abdulmuttalab of Nigeria (thought to have radicalised in London)110 attempted to set
off explosives that had been sewn into his underwear shortly before landing in Detroit
by using a syringe of chemicals to start a reaction.111 After the explosives failed to
detonate Abdulmutallab was overpowered by passengers and detained and it soon
emerged that he had been acting on behalf of the Yemen-based contingent of al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).112
Even more recently, Pakistani-American Faisal Shahzad stands accused of
planting a car-bomb in Times Square in New York (which failed to explode) on May
1st, 2010. He has allegedly admitted to undergoing explosives training in Pakistan, and
was reportedly aided by members of the Pakistani Taliban.113
Casual observers could thus be forgiven for thinking that the only real threat to
the United States continues to come from foreign terrorist organisations. However, the
entire range of terrorist activity (including distribution of propaganda, various forms of
financing and recruitment, conducting training exercises at home, liaising with terrorists
overseas, travelling to conflict zones, and planning domestic attacks) continues to take
place on American soil.
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In fact a somewhat contradictory impression of Islamist terrorism in America
has emerged. On the one hand it is apparent that US-based Islamists from abroad played
an important role for the global jihad prior to 2001, and that a considerable number of
United States residents have actively taken to the cause, including plans to perpetrate
violence at home. On the other hand (as is examined in more detail in chapter 8)
analysts have tended to minimise HGIT in the US, playing down the domestic threat in
comparison to a greater danger which is perceived to emanate from European-based
jihadis.
The situation is diverse, complex and often poorly understood. With the
exception of a handful of case studies and comparative studies with small samples114
there has been very little empirical examination of Islamist terrorism in the US since
2001. The present research addresses this shortcoming in the literature and thus gives an
accurate portrayal of HGIT in America, which will dramatically improve our
understanding of the contemporary terrorism-landscape.
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Overview
As in the previous chapter, an introductory contextualisation of Islamist
terrorism is outlined, this time focussing on the UK. The British experience of terrorism
in general is briefly described, followed by a historical account of the development of
Islamist militancy from the pre-9/11 era, ranging through to the present (‘post-7/7’).
Particular attention is paid to the years preceding 2001 when significant militant
networks were established in London, centred around a few high profile preachers, and
featuring strong links to North Africa and Afghanistan. More detailed understanding of
the period ranging from 2001-2008 will result from the analysis in the following
chapters, but at least some UK-based jihadis have utilised ties to mujahedin in Pakistan,
thereby achieving a level of organisation and sophistication that has not been seen in the
US. Profiles are, however, varied and more will be learned from a more thorough
examination of cases.
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7. Islamist Terrorism in the United Kingdom
7.1 Historical Overview of Terrorism in Britain

Terrorist Attacks in the UK: 1970‐2007
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Figure 7.1. Terrorist Attacks in the UK –excluding Northern Ireland- 1970-2007 (created using the
START Global Terrorism Database, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?country=216).

Terrorism in the UK is generally thought of as synonymous with Irish terrorist
activity. The Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Global
Terrorism Database lists 592 terrorist attacks in the UK from 1970 to 2007 (including
532 fatalities and 2,255 injuries).1 Examination of this dataset reveals 57 identifiable
groups responsible for these attacks (compared to 125 in the US). 303 (51%) of all UK
attacks are attributed to 5 Irish terrorist groups –predominately the Irish Republican
Army (IRA)- while the remainder are attributed to the other 52 identified groups as well
as unknown groups and individuals. This confirms the dominance of Irish terrorism on
the UK mainland.
Moreover, the British government maintained a military presence in Northern
Ireland beginning in 1969, taking over responsibility for security there in March, 1972.2
The START database for Northern Ireland (see figure 7.2 below) shows that between
1970-2007 there have been an additional 3,774 attacks (including 2,837 fatalities and
2,709 injuries).3 The combined number of terrorist attacks for the UK and Northern
Ireland thus comes to 4,366, for which identifiable Irish groups are responsible for at
least 3,742 (86%) of this total. By comparison, the total number of terrorist attacks
142

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
identified in the US during the same period comes to 1,347, roughly one third (see
chapter 6).
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Figure 7.2. Terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland, 1970-2007 (created using the START Global Terrorism
Database, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?country=233).

Among the non-Irish groups active on the UK mainland were the Jewish
Defence League (JDL- responsible for just two incidents in 1970 and 1983), Palestinian
terror groups including Black September (attributed with 3 incidents in 1971-1972) and
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP- credited with one attack in
1973 and one in 1978).4 The almost unheard-of Army for Freeing Scotland perpetrated
3 attacks in 1975, then other Scottish nationalist groups carried out a handful of attacks
from 1981 to 1986 and again in 20025 (the last incident occurring on March 1st of that
year when Prime Minister Tony Blair’s wife received a package from the Scottish
National Liberation Army containing what was labelled as skin lotion but in fact
contained a harmful substance resembling sodium hydroxide6).
Welsh nationalists also perpetrated attacks in 1980-1981 and then in a more
concentrated wave from 1987-1990 (resulting in 0 fatalities and just 1 injury). Armenian
terrorists were responsible for 5 attacks from 1979 to 1983, while Libyan extremists are
credited with attacks in 1980, 1984 and 1988 (the latter being the bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, which killed around 270 people7). As in America,
animal rights extremists have also been responsible for numerous attacks in the UK,
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most involving damage to property and businesses, primarily from 1982-1990, and
again from 2000-2001.8 The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and associated groups
continue to be sporadically active, for example, successfully putting a halt on the
construction of animal testing centres in Cambridge and Oxford in 2003-2004.9
As this brief discussion reveals, it is apparent that the activities of non-Irish
terrorist groups in the UK have been sporadic and short-lived as compared to the far
more organised and formidable Irish groups. Irish terrorism on the UK mainland has
been a sustained affair since the early 1970’s, peaking from 1973-1975, peaking again
in 1979, and then again from 1990-1994.10 Irish terrorist attacks have declined
significantly following on from the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, just 10 incidents
taking place on the UK mainland in 2000 and 2001 (8 of which were attributed to the
Real IRA) and no attacks recorded since then.11 But whilst Irish terrorism was
beginning to wind down in Britain,12 Islamist extremists were gradually gathering
strength.

7.2 Islamist Terrorism in the UK
7.2.1 Pre-9/11
Prior to 2001 the British security services remained preoccupied with Irish
terrorism as the primary threat to the United Kingdom. As a country which prides itself
on offering asylum to political dissidents the UK was liberal in allowing large numbers
of former jihadis to settle on its shores following the withdrawal of the Soviets from
Afghanistan. A commitment to freedom of speech, combined with the fact that Islamist
militants were for the time being primarily concerned with events in the Muslim world,
meant that they were also given free rein to do much as they pleased. At a time when
politicised Islam was on the rise following the Rushdie affair of 1988, the UK thus
became a hub of Islamist activism and militancy. Jihadists from Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Jordan, Libya and –particularly- Algeria, as well as elsewhere, were prolific in
publishing propaganda, fundraising and recruitment, and in some instances,
coordinating terrorist operations abroad.13
Three individuals in particular –Omar Bakri Mohammed, Omar Mahmoud
Mohammed Othman, aka Abu Qatada, and Mustafa Kamel Mustafa, aka Abu Hamzalater dubbed the ‘Unholy Trinity’, settled in London during this period and emerged as
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globally influential Islamist preachers. Syrian-born Omar Bakri Mohammed arrived in
the UK in 1986 and promptly started up his own branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir14 (HuTfounded in Jordan in 195215). From its inception HuT had been banned throughout the
Middle East for its subversive aims, i.e. to overthrow existing regimes in favour of its
own version of Islamic rule. But it in Britain it was allowed to operate freely and it
swiftly developed a significant following, establishing a presence at certain mosques
and on college and university campuses.16 By 1990 HuT had an estimated membership
of about 400 individuals in Britain and that year, after the Gulf War broke out,
Mohammed made headlines by declaring in the press that then Prime Minister John
Major was a legitimate target for assassination according to Islamic law.17
Although ostensibly HuT is a non-violent organisation it advocates military
coups in the Middle East, it has maintained a derogatory and antagonistic stance
towards Britain and the West, and propagates many of the same ideas that jihadis hold
dear. According to Ed Husain, a former HuT activist during the 1990’s, “[h]ome-grown
British suicide-bombers are a direct result of Hizb ut-Tahrir disseminating ideas of
jihad, martyrdom, confrontation, and anti-Americanism, and nurturing a sense of
separation among Britain’s Muslims”.18 Husain describes a well-organised pattern of
aggressive recruitment targeting young British Muslims and an ethos of confrontation
and intolerance. In 1995 –in the view of Husain- this contributed directly to the murder
of Nigerian student Ayotunde Obanubi, who was stabbed by an Islamist convert outside
Newham college in east London in a dispute between Muslim and non-Muslim
students.19 The killer, Saeed Nur, was sentenced to life and an accomplice, Umran
Qadir, was jailed at her majesty’s pleasure. Charges were dropped against a third man,
Kazi Nurur Rahman, who later received jihadi training in Pakistan and was jailed for 9
years in 2007 for trying to buy automatic weapons and missiles with the intention of
carrying out terrorist attacks.20
In fact Mohammed’s style of activism was considered too controversial for the
HuT global leadership and in January 1996 he resigned, founding his own more radical
group, al-Muhajiroun (AM), which advocated the establishment of an Islamic state even
in Britain.21 Based in London, AM also adopted an active recruitment policy and
according to Mohammed, by 2004 it had spread to 30 cities and towns throughout the
UK, had 170 formal members, 700 regular attendees of its lectures, and around 7,000
‘contacts’ who were at least partially involved.22
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AM cannot be considered a terrorist organisation in the sense that it did not
organise attacks (until 2005 Mohammed claimed to adhere to a ‘covenant of security’
based upon Islamic doctrine,23 whereby attacks against the UK were considered
illegitimate as long as authorities did not interfere with their activities24) but a number
of AM-affiliates became involved in violence.
Three incidents are of note prior to 9/11. On December 17th, 1998 19-year old
AM activist Amer Mirza threw an incendiary device at a military barracks in west
London just three hours after a protest against UK troops being in Iraq.25 He was later
sentenced to 6 months in jail.26 A little under two years later in October 2000, Iftikhar
Ali (a London Underground worker) was arrested for distributing AM leaflets calling
for Muslims to kill Jews and advertising an upcoming speech by Omar Bakri
Mohammed. Ali was convicted in 2002 (age 33) for distributing material with the
intention of stirring up racial hatred and was fined £3,000 plus court costs and ordered
to do 200 hours of community service, making him the first person to be convicted of
inciting racial hatred using an Islamic religious text.27
Then in December 2000 it was reported that a 24-year-old British Muslim from
Birmingham, named as Bilal Mohammed or Mohammed Bilal, was responsible for a
suicide attack in Kashmir on December 25th of that year, killing 6 Indian soldiers and 3
Kashmiri students.28 The Pakistani group Jaish e-Mohammed (JeM) claimed
responsibility, saying that Bilal had been in Pakistan since 1994.29 And while the Home
Office failed to confirm these reports, Omar Bakri Mohammed claimed to know the
bomber and vouched for his British origin, adding “I am not surprised by his actions. He
becomes a martyr and that is the wish of every Muslim in order to go to paradise”.30 He
claimed that as many as 2000 British Muslims had gone abroad to fight for jihadi
causes.31
While the precise role of AM in relation to organised jihadi violence is difficult
to ascertain, Wiktorowicz claims that from its inception it engaged in fundraising for
jihadi groups in Palestine, Kashmir and Chechnya,32 and it has since been reported that
it was active in recruiting people to fight in Afghanistan and later Iraq.33 The extent of
these endeavours is impossible to gauge and similar allegations relating to AM activists
did not surface again until 2003 (see below). With hindsight, the significance of Omar
Bakri Mohammed and al-Muhajiroun as agents of Islamist radicalisation in British
society is now widely recognised (Mohammed was deemed “not conducive to the
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public good” and banned from re-entering the UK in August 200534). However their
involvement in Islamist terrorism appears to have been less direct than some of
Mohammed’s counterparts.
Abu Qatada, born near Bethlehem in 1960, lived in Jordan until 1989 before
fleeing to Pakistan, claiming persecution from the government. He worked as a teacher
in Peshawar and allegedly met with Osama bin Laden the same year that he left Jordan.
He arrived in the UK in 1993 and was granted political asylum.35 From at least 1995
Qatada allegedly acted as a ‘spiritual advisor’ to terrorist organisations overseas,
including the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Salafist Group for Preaching
and Combat (GSPC), the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Qaeda. In that capacity –based
at the Four Feathers Social Club in central London- he co-edited the GIA newsletter alAnsar36 and issued fatwas justifying all manner of violence and crime committed by
these groups.37 For example in March 1995, he issued a fatwa justifying the killing of
wives and children of ‘apostates’ in Algeria;38 in December 1996 he legitimised the
killing of Jews in Britain; and in October 1999 he declared that Jewish children could
also be killed, and that there was no difference between Jews, Americans and English.39
Qatada is deemed to have been highly influential and to have been associated
with numerous well-known Islamist militants. For example, he is described as a former
“close associate” of Abu Doha, an al-Qaeda-linked militant held in Britain and wanted
by the Americans, French and Italians in relation to different terrorist plots.40 He also
admits being associated with Abu Dahdah –jailed for 27 years for running a Spanish alQaeda cell, which helped organise 9/1141- and is credited with the recruitment of
Djamel Beghal, jailed for 10 years in 2005 in relation to a plan to bomb the US embassy
in Paris in 2001.42 Tapes of Qatada’s sermons were also later found in the home of
Mohammed Atta, the operational leader of the September 11th attacks.43
In 1997 (the year Beghal came to London44) Qatada is reported to have been
actively recruiting people to attend training camps in Afghanistan and from 1999-2001
he “played a leading role in the UK in raising funds and providing logistic support and
recruits for the Arab mujahedin in Chechnya”.45 This involved speeches and collections
both in London and other parts of the country as Qatada travelled around taking an
entourage with him.46 In April 1999 he was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment
in Jordan for conspiracy to conduct terrorist activities, and then in September 2000 he
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was sentenced again, this time to 15 years for his alleged involvement in a plan to carry
out attacks in Jordan at the millennium.47
At home in the UK Qatada continued to maintain extremist associations and in
February 2001 his home was raided by police as part of the investigation into Abu
Doha. There was not enough evidence to press charges, but £170,000 in cash was found
in mixed currencies, including an envelope containing £805 marked ‘For the Chechen
Mujahedin’. It was assessed that this money had been collected from Islamists around
Europe and that it was Qatada’s responsibility to distribute it to a mixture of Islamic
charitable causes and jihadist factions.48
It was not until after 9/11 that new legislation (the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act, 2001) enabled the detention without charge of foreign nationals deemed a
threat to national security, and thereby led to the curtailment of Qatada’s activities.49
Nevertheless, considerable damage had already been done given the profound impact he
made on so many others. Among them was Abu Hamza, “the best student he ever
had”.50
Hamza first came to the UK from Egypt in 1979 on a tourist visa, married a
British woman soon after and was eventually granted citizenship in 1986.51 It was
around that time (while studying civil engineering in Brighton) that he took a renewed
interest in Islam and in 1987 he went on the hajj to Mecca. There he met Abdullah
Azzam, the father of the modern jihadi movement, and from then on became
increasingly immersed in militant Islamism. From 1991-1993 he and his family lived in
Afghanistan, returning to the UK after he lost both hands and an eye in an explosion.
This was the same year that Abu Qatada arrived in the UK and Hamza was soon taking
lessons from him, memorising Qatada’s interpretation of the Quran.52
In 1995 Hamza spent time in Bosnia, thereafter assuming a position at a mosque
in Luton, which he used to propagate his increasingly militant messages and expand his
Supporters of Sharia (SoS) group, which he founded in 1994.53 But it was at Finsbury
Park mosque in north London where he settled in 1997 and his infamy grew. Finsbury
Park was to become synonymous with Islamist militancy in Britain and after 9/11 it
transpired that a veritable who’s who of terrorists had congregated there. Among them
were the aforementioned Djamel Beghal, the suspected ‘20th hijacker’ Zacarias
Massaoui, shoe-bomber Richard Reid, Kamel Bourgass, later jailed for murdering a
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police officer and trying to develop the deadly poison ricin, and Feroz Abassi, captured
in Afghanistan with the Taliban in December 2001.54
The first real indication of terrorist activity at Finsbury Park (and for which
Hamza has since been indicted for in the US) came in 1998 when a group of five
Britons were detained in Yemen on December 23rd in possession of a stockpile of
firearms and explosives. Among them were one of Abu Hamza’s ‘bodyguards’ Shahid
Butt and his stepson, Mohsen Ghailan.55 Five days later a group of Western tourists
were kidnapped by a group calling itself the Islamic Army of Aden, led by Abu Hassan.
It is alleged that Hassan used a satellite phone provided to him by Hamza’s recruits in
order to call Hamza in London for advice on how to proceed with the hostage
situation.56 It is further alleged that Hamza had been sending funds to the jihadis in
Yemen, and that the group of eight Britons in total (three more were rounded up,
including Hamza’s son, Mohammed Mostafa Kamel) had been undergoing paramilitary
training in preparation for terrorist attacks.57 What is certain is that four of the hostages
were killed, the Britons and the hostage takers were separately put on trial and
convicted (the Britons receiving sentences ranging up to 7 years for planning a bombing
campaign) and Yemen’s requests for the extradition of Abu Hamza were refused.58
The US indictments against Hamza (first issued in 2004) further accuse him of
having conspired with a number of his Finsbury Park acolytes to set up a jihadi training
camp in Oregon in the United States, among them US citizen Earnest James Ujaama,
Swedish citizen Oussama Abdallah Kassir and UK-born Haroon Rashid Aswat.59
Ujamma first travelled to the proposed site owned by one of his friends, then, leaving
Britain on November 26th, 1999 and arriving in the US in December, Aswat and Kassir
joined him to run the camp for several volunteers Ujaama had gathered together.
However, by all accounts Aswat and Kassir quickly deemed the site unsuitable and left
after two weeks, the idea being abandoned. Nevertheless, whilst there they had
allegedly taught how best to slit people’s throats and had distributed CDs featuring
bomb-making instructions.60 Ujaama would later plead guilty to charges of supporting
the Taliban,61 Kassir was convicted for his part in the Oregon conspiracy,62 while the
charges remain outstanding against Hamza and Aswat (both detained in the UK).
Finally, the US indictment also alleges that beginning in June 2000 Hamza
funded and organised the travel of Ujamma and young British convert Feroz Abbasi to
Afghanistan, the former taking funds for the Taliban, the latter going to undertake jihadi
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training.63 Indeed, it was charges relating to this to which Ujaama pleaded guilty to,
while Abassi spent more than three years in Guantanamo Bay detention centre after
being captured in Afghanistan in December 2001 (later acknowledging that “I actually
left Britain to either join the Taleban or fight for the sake of Allah in Kashmir”).64
It is no exaggeration to assert that almost every jihadist in Europe, and many
more around the world, has heard of Omar Bakri Mohammed, Abu Qatada and Abu
Hamza, and has listened to recordings of their speeches. Indeed, Pantucci offers a
concise overview of Islamist terrorism in the UK up until 2009 and concludes that as
late as 2007 almost every terrorist plot emanating from Britain shows evidence of being
ideologically influenced by Mohammed or Hamza.65
Yet these accounts barely scratch the surface of Islamist militancy in Britain
prior to 9/11, which earned the capital the nickname ‘Londonistan’.66 Other notable
figures include Khalid al-Fawwaz, Ibrahim Eidarous and Adel Abdel Bary, who arrived
in London between 1994-1997 and were collectively responsible for establishing the
Advice and Reformation Committee (described as “the London office of al-Qaeda”67),
sending supplies including telecommunications equipment to Afghanistan, publishing
bin Laden’s hugely influential 1996 and 1998 fatwas, and the claims of responsibility
for the 1998 east African embassy bombings (apparently faxed to them before the
attacks took place).68 All three were arrested in 1998 and are still fighting extradition to
the US.69 Others who eventually were extradited (in both cases to France) were
Algerians Rachid Ramda (an associate of Abu Qatada who was sentenced separately to
10 years and then life in prison for helping to fund and organise the 1995 Paris metro
bombings from London70) and Rabah Kadre (initially accused of planning attacks in
Britain and sentenced to 6 years in prison in France for his part in the Abu Doha-led
conspiracy to bomb a Christmas market in Strasbourg71).
The list of convicted terrorists goes on. London in particular as well as other
British cities (such as Manchester) played host to a large community of Islamist
militants and their sympathisers, which spanned across Europe and the globe and was
dominated by several highly influential preachers. Individuals traded in false
documents, engaged in fraud and other means of fundraising for jihad, openly published
propaganda, exhorted new recruits to join them, and –by virtue of direct connections to
terrorist organisations in North Africa, the Middle East and Afghanistan- were able to
facilitate jihadi training and combat abroad for those who heeded their call. There was
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gathering evidence that jihadists in Britain were playing an active role in conspiracies
overseas, including the attacks in Paris in 1995, the December 1999 millennial plot
involving Ahmed Ressam in Canada72 and the Christmas 2000 Strasbourg plot.73
What’s more, although it was not appreciated at the time, the UK itself was
becoming a viable target in the eyes of Islamists living there. This transpired when
Moinul Abedin and Faisal Mostafa, both of Bangladeshi origin, were arrested in
Birmingham in November 2000 and police uncovered a ‘bomb factory’ where the men
were manufacturing the high explosive HMTD.74 A martyrdom note making reference
to mujahedin was found under Abedin’s bed75 and he was ultimately convicted of
intending to cause an explosion and sentenced to 20 years (while Mostafa was cleared
of all charges).76 This has since been referred to as the first ‘al-Qaeda’ plot in Great
Britain, although no evidence of organisational affiliation has been made public.77
Doubts about the involvement of British Islamists with al-Qaeda, and about whether
they might attack the UK, would evaporate in the years after September 11th 2001.

7.2.2 2001-2005
After 9/11, as UK authorities joined in the ‘War on Terror’ numerous British
citizens and residents were found actively supporting and pursuing violent jihad. As in
the US a number of organisations and individuals had their assets frozen for suspected
ties to terrorism,78 and there also emerged a number of cases involving individuals who
had radicalised and were preparing operations prior to 9/11. Richard Reid for example,
had previously trained in Afghanistan where he most likely obtained his explosives.79
Several Britons were also captured in Afghanistan and taken to Guantanamo Bay,
although the truth of US-allegations against them will never be known and most were
eventually released without charge.
Meanwhile there was a clampdown on Islamists at home with the introduction of
ever more powerful counter-terrorism laws. For instance, Jamaican-born preacher
Abdullah El-Faisal was arrested in February 2002 and later convicted for soliciting
murder and inciting racial hatred in his sermons, whereas previously he had been
allowed to say whatever he liked, just as Qatada and others had done. The ‘Unholy
Trinity’ attracted increased scrutiny from the security services (who had made contact
with these men in previous years but had underestimated their influence). Qatada went
on the run in December 2001 until being detained on grounds of national security in
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October the following year (making sure to use the Internet to reach out to his followers
during the interim period).80 Finsbury Park mosque was raided in January 2003
following an investigation into a network of Algerian extremists thought to be
developing ricin for use in attacks. Inside the house of worship were found an array of
knives, chemical protection suits, military and camping equipment and “hundreds” of
forged documents and credit cards.81 Hamza grew in infamy after being ousted from the
mosque as he continued to preach in the street outside until he was finally arrested on
May 27th, 2004, later being convicted of similar charges to his protégé, El-Faisal.82
Meanwhile Omar Bakri Mohammed utilised 9/11 as an opportunity to court
controversy and draw the spotlight on himself as a means to attract new recruits. As
reported by Wiktorowicz, AM had released just nine press-releases prior to 9/11, a
number which shot to fifty in the next two years alone.83
In the post-9/11 period there were also increased reports of AM members being
active in encouraging, if not facilitating, overseas travel of recruits in order to engage in
violent jihad.84 On April 30th 2003, Asif Hanif from Hounslow in London blew himself
up at a bar in Tel Aviv, killing 3 people. His accomplice, Omar Khan Sharif from
Derby, was found dead a few days later and it soon emerged that both men had been
affiliated with AM, receiving religious instruction from Mohammed.85 A year later
Hamas released video footage of the two men vilifying Israel and calling on God to
punish Prime Minister Tony Blair and US President George W. Bush.86
By 2003 AM had also established offices in Pakistan, run by Sajeel Shahid.
Shahid was arrested by Pakistani authorities in late 2004 for suspected ties to al-Qaeda
and was deported back to Britain after spending three months in jail.87 He was later
reported to have played a role in organising paramilitary training for British extremists
in Pakistan, including several men –led by Omar Khyam- later convicted of planning
terror attacks in the UK88 (no charges have been brought against Shahid and a key
figure in this plot who later turned informant, Mohammed Junaid Babar, testified that
Shahid had actually dissuaded him from training in explosives at an earlier stage)89.
Despite such allegations AM was not subject to any legal restrictions and when it
disbanded in October 2004, it did so on a voluntary basis, with Mohammed citing
disunity among Muslims as the reason.90
Akin to the situation in the US, there was very limited evidence of any plans to
carry out attacks in Britain until after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. However, this changed
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dramatically in 2004 with the discovery of Omar Khyam’s so-called ‘Crevice’ group
(named after the police investigation).91 Of great significance in this plot is the fact that
the men maintained international links (assisted by Babar, who was a member of the –
far smaller- American chapter of AM, and Canadian computer-expert Mohammed
Momin Khawaja). They were also in contact with numerous British extremists out-with
their immediate group (among them Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer)
and had received explosives training in Pakistan in 2003. Moreover, they had amassed
600kg of fertiliser for constructing a bomb and were thought to be within no more than
a few weeks of finalising a target and carrying out an attack.92
Later the same year, another serious plot was uncovered with direct links to alQaeda involving Dhiren Barot and seven others (who had previously carried out
surveillance for possible attacks in America as well)93. Both cases involved long-term
UK residents and citizens who represented realistic threats and in the case of Kyam et al
had developed genuine attack capabilities.
These and other cases since 9/11 demonstrate that ‘home-grown’ jihadists from
Britain have managed to continue to establish contact with organised militants in
Pakistan in particular and to acquire training in explosives that has made them a more
formidable threat than many of their American counterparts. The previously thriving
(North-African-dominated) networks that existed prior to 2001 and that were so clearly
inspired by Abu Hamza and others have been subject to multiple arrests and more
restrictive security measures. And yet 9/11 and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan
and Iraq have clearly served to radicalise a new generation of jihadis in the UK (now
seemingly dominated by British-Pakistanis), some of whom are committed to violence.
The seriousness of this threat was made clear on July 7th, 2005 when four men,
Mohammed Siddique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Jermaine Lindsay and Hasib Hussain,
blew themselves up in London, killing 52 people.94

7.2.3 Post 7/7
Having directly felt the impact of Islamist terrorism at home, the British
government further hardened its resolve to combat extremism. Abu Qatada, who had
been released in 2004, was re-arrested under a deportation order in August 2005.95 The
same month, Omar Bakri Mohammed left the UK for Lebanon and it was announced
that he was not welcome back.96 In February 2006 Abu Hamza –charged in 2004- was
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convicted for inciting murder and sentenced to seven years.97 And three months later
AM offshoot organisations al-Ghurabaa and the Saved Sect, run by Mohammed’s
followers, were banned under new laws prohibiting the glorification of terrorism.98
Yet the problem has persisted. As quickly as the organisational offspring of AM
are shut down, new groups emerge to replace them (current incarnations include Ahlus
Sunnah wal Jammah and Islam4UK.com99) thus providing ideological and social
mechanisms of radicalisation and demonstrating both the sustained popularity of radical
Islamism and the difficulty of trying to constrain it. Even more serious are the minority
of extremists who transgress legal boundaries, with numerous prosecutions taking place
each year under anti-terror legislation, most seemingly involving British citizens. The
profiles and activities of UK jihadis are varied. There are undoubtedly many ‘wannabe’
extremists who are largely disconnected from wider networks and who represent the
lower end of the threat-spectrum. At the same time, these individuals cannot be
discounted. The failed attacks in London and Glasgow in June 2007100 show a level of
zeal and commitment to carrying out attacks that if matched in future cases may result
in far greater destruction. Similar lessons may be drawn from the case of Nicky Reilly, a
convert who managed to detonate home-made explosives in an Exeter restaurant in May
2008.101 Although in both instances the only people injured were the attackers, it is
apparent that a) such individuals may be more likely to be overlooked by security
services and thus carry out their plans, and b) working Improvised Explosive Devices
can be constructed without hands-on training, and future, more powerful devices are
possible.
More worrying of course are instances of well-organised jihadis with links to
experienced mujahedin in Pakistan and elsewhere, who have been trained in making
explosives and who are intent on committing mass murder. The most notorious example
of this occurred in August 2006 when multiple arrests were made in Britain and
Pakistan and a plot to bring down as many as twelve US-bound aircraft using liquid
explosives was uncovered.102
In between these two extremes lies a greater number of seemingly ideologically
committed extremists often in possession of large amounts of militant literature
including instruction manuals on such things as bomb-making, which they actively
disseminate. They sometimes also engage in paramilitary-style training at home and in a
few cases have attempted to join jihadi conflicts abroad. Such individuals are clearly
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important to sustaining the Islamist cause and radicalising others, although their own
ultimate intentions are difficult to discern (since arrests and prosecution do not depend
on plans for attack).
The domestic threat from Islamist militants in the UK is generally portrayed as
being far more serious and ingrained than that in the US. Yet despite operational links
overseas in several cases there still appears to be considerable autonomy among ‘homegrown’ British jihadists, and far less attention has been paid to the less dramatic cases.
Overall, there has still been little systematic study that extends analysis beyond casual
observation and understanding based on impressions. One report that does adopt a
systematic approach has highlighted the significance of the British-Pakistani ‘pipeline’
as a source of both ideological radicalisation and operational strength-building.103
However, it also adopts a rather indiscriminate sampling technique, including numerous
individuals who were never charged or were acquitted of terrorism. Comprehension of
the nature of Islamist terrorist activity of British residents thus stands to benefit from a
more rigorous examination.
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Overview
The previous chapters provided a brief, qualitative description of how Islamist
terrorism has evolved in the US and UK. This chapter offers a directly comparative and
more quantitative approach to understanding HGIT in these countries. Existing accounts
and explanations of differential rates between the US and Europe are outlined and
critiqued, and rates of Islamist terrorism involving residents of America and Britain are
compared. The picture that emerges is far from clear at this stage, given a reliance on
extremely problematic statistics. Nevertheless, it does appear that relative to overall
population sizes, rates of HGIT have been higher in the UK than in the US and one of
the variables that may help explain this is the differential historic migration of Islamist
terrorists to these countries during the 1980’s and 1990’s. Moreover, the examination of
cases here refers only to those including an active pursuit of violence (i.e. the most
extreme in terms of behaviour). Far greater appreciation of the nature of Islamist
militancy will be achieved through a more inclusive and detailed analysis of case
studies, which follows in the ensuing chapters.
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8. HGIT in the US and UK: Preliminary Comparisons
Western, democracies have a great deal in common besides being primary
targets and hosts of ‘global’ Islamist terrorists. However, each country is unique in
terms of its history of terrorism (Islamist and otherwise), its particular political, legal
and law-enforcements policies, its involvement in world affairs, the make-up of its
population (both ethnic and religious), and in terms of its domestic problems. All of
these factors are likely to affect the particular manifestation of contemporary Islamist
terrorism.

8.1. ‘Facts’ and Figures
A number of authors have commented on apparent differences between the US
and Europe, generally agreeing that the US has had far less of a home-grown problem.1
This is supported by estimated numbers of terror-related arrests reported by Sageman2
who claims that there have been around 2,300 such arrests in Europe in the period from
September 11th, 2001, up until 2008, compared to around 60 in the US. The figures
quoted by Sageman have, however, been accused of being grossly underestimated for
the US and correspondingly overestimated for Europe.3
An initial analysis of statistics provided in a US Department of Justice (DOJ)
audit report4 confirm that Sageman’s figures regarding terrorism-related arrests in the
US appear to be well below official reports. However, the main thrust of the DOJ report
was concerned with highlighting the extremely unreliable nature of these statistics. For
example, there is a huge difference between the numbers of people arrested as part of a
‘terrorism’ investigation, compared to those actually convicted for terrorism charges.
Moreover, individuals are frequently charged under ordinary criminal law for lesser
offences even when terrorist involvement is sometimes strongly suspected. Hence both
arrest and conviction figures are potentially misleading.
Many investigations begin as suspected terrorism cases, but turn out not to be, or
else cannot be proven. Because of this and other reasons (not least being problems of
how to define a case as ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorism-related’) official statistics are deeply
problematic.5 For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported 206
terrorism-related convictions for the financial year 2004, while the DOJ could only find
evidence to support 141 convictions.6 By comparison, the Executive Office for United
States Attorneys (EOUSA) reported 118 terrorism convictions for the same year, whilst
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only 97 could be supported.7 These figures are not differentiated by type of terrorism,
although they potentially suggest much larger numbers than Sageman reports, given that
they are for one year only, compared to his six- to seven-year period.
A perhaps more informative source of statistics for the US comes in the form of
the Center on Law and Security’s ‘Terrorist Trial Report Card’8, which is based upon
public records and “thousands of hours” of researching court reports. According to these
researchers, there have been 693 charges in the US, which were originally billed as
being in relation to terrorism from September 11th, 2001 to 2008. Of these, 228 were
actually charged with a terrorism statute; there were 93 convictions among this number,
12 acquittals, and 25 cases that were dismissed or declared a retrial.9 In addition there
were a further 98 terrorism trials pending. Of the 693 cases, 88 (13%) were alleged to
involve affiliation with al-Qaeda, while 405 cases (58%) had no known alleged
affiliation.10
Meanwhile, Sageman’s figures quoted for Europe are based on personal
communications with Europol and the UK Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre. These
cannot be confirmed, and in fact Europol did not begin collecting data on terrorism until
2007 (for the year 2006) so figures prior to then are estimates.11 For Europe, excluding
the UK, Europol report that during 2006 there were a total of 257 arrests in relation to
Islamist terrorism, compared to 201 in 2007 and 187 in 2008.12 On average this gives an
arrest rate of 215 arrests per year, which would very tentatively suggest around 1,500
arrests for the period September 11th, 2001 to 2008 (again, excluding the UK). During
2008 there were also 190 court verdicts passed in relation to Islamist terrorism, 65
(34%) of which were acquittals, thus leaving 125 cases that ended in conviction or
otherwise (details are not given).
The Center on Law and Security report that for the period September 11th, 2001
until the end of 2007, in the UK there were a total of 497 individuals charged under
anti-terrorism law or under ordinary law but in relation to terrorism.13 288 individuals
were charged specifically under terrorism legislation; 72 of whom were convicted and a
further 93 were awaiting trial. The figures provided by the Center on Law and Security
roughly accord with those provided by the Home Office,14 which reported 1,228
terrorism-related arrests from September 11th, 2001 to March 31st, 2007 for the UK
excluding Northern Ireland; 669 were released without charge, 241 were charged either
with terrorism legislation exclusively, or with terrorism legislation in addition to
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ordinary criminal charges. A further 195 were charged under other legislation including
murder, grievous bodily harm, firearms, explosives offences, fraud, and false
documents. There were 41 convictions at the time under the Terrorism Act, 183
convictions under other legislation, and 114 at or awaiting trial.15 However, the UK
statistics do not distinguish between types of terrorism –Islamist or otherwise- which is
why they are not included in the Europol numbers.
Sageman concludes that, given his figures on numbers of arrests, and given
population sizes of 300 million (including 2.35 million estimated Muslims) for the US
and 340 million (including between 12 and 20 million estimated Muslims) for Europe,
that “the rate of arrests on terrorism charges per capita among Muslims is six times
higher in Europe than in the United States”.16 Daniel Pipes17 vigorously disputes this
assessment, claiming that in fact the US rate of arrest is 2.5 times higher than for
Europe (based on a US Muslim population of 3 million, with 527 arrests, and a
European Muslim population of 21 million, with 1400 arrests). Pipes’ arrest figures are
also highly questionable and the above examination of the various statistics available
suggests that the US rates of arrest and charge do appear to be lower than for Europe.
However, the size of that difference is very difficult to accurately determine and may
not be as large as Sageman claims.
Focussing specifically on the UK, given a national population of nearly 61
million,18 including an estimated 2 million Muslims,19 the rate of arrest using the Home
Office figure of 1,228 arrests, which likely inflates the arrest rate since it also includes
non-Islamist terrorism, gives a rate that is 25 times higher than Sageman’s US figures,
and 4 times higher than Pipes’ US figures. This would give an estimated arrest rate
amongst UK Muslims for terrorism offences that is on average 14.5 times higher than
for the US. Nevertheless it cannot be overemphasised how unreliable all of these figures
are, and how rough an estimate this is. It is thus unreasonable to lay claim to a definitive
quantitative analysis, which remains elusive given poor quality and lacking data. Rates
of arrest alone could hardly be regarded as a sound indicator of the problem since the
majority do not result in terrorism convictions, and therefore to some extent reflect
differences in law and policing practice. At this point it must simply be acknowledged
that available data suggests that Islamist terrorists appear to be more active on UK soil
as compared to the US.
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Additional data on (alleged) planned or perpetrated attacks and participation in
conflict overseas adds to this discussion. Actively pursuing violent activity is only the
tip of the iceberg of the broader spectrum of terrorist activity, but it does give some
indication of the number of individuals who are willing to personally inflict harm and
destruction. These cases also tend to be the most high profile ones in the media and are
likely to drive peoples’ perceptions about the nature of the threat.
Table 8.1 below illustrates significant reported cases of Islamist terrorism from
1993 to 2010 involving residents of the US and UK who have been involved in planning
or perpetrating violence at home or abroad.20 This can be considered ‘terrorism at a
glance’ since it does not include many less well-known cases. ‘Linked’ cases are those
where either country (in fact only the US) has been targeted at home from overseas
(although Richard Reid, as a British citizen, is included in the UK column).
Red cells represent successful attacks. Orange cells represent attacks that were
unplanned (i.e. spur of the moment) or were of limited success/failure but were
nevertheless carried out. Yellow cells represent cases where intervention occurred prior
to any attack taking place, and green cells represent instances where individuals have
been successful in joining an overseas conflict. Finally, writing in italics indicates that
violent activities exclusively took place in, or were aimed at, an overseas (non-Western)
country.
Cases excluded here are those where intent to attack has not been alleged, for
example, domestic ‘paramilitary’ training without further action, possession of terrorist
materials such as bomb-making instructions, non-violent support activities such as
distribution of propaganda, and hoax bomb threats. Such cases are included in the more
thorough case-study analysis in the ensuing chapters. Cases excluded both here and
from the case study analysis are those where charges relating to terrorist activity were
dropped or never made (Feroz Abassi would fall into this category except he admitted
his actions and intentions) and attacks that cannot be considered a part of modern global
Islamist terrorism. Also note that Table 8.1 generally presents cases according to the
dates which they ended (e.g. an attack took place or arrests were made).
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Table 8.1. Violent Islamist terrorism cases involving residents of the US and UK, 1993-2010. Red cells =
successful attacks; orange cells = unplanned attacks or those of limited success/failure; yellow cells =
cases where intervention occurred prior to any attack taking place and green cells = having successfully
joined an overseas conflict.
YEAR
1993

US
Feb 26: WTC bombing
NYC Landmarks plot

Linked

Dec: 8 Britons arrested in
Yemen. Convicted for
planning attacks

1998
Dec: Ahmed
Ressam's millennium
plot

1999

Dec: Moinul Abedin:
home-made explosives
Dec: 'Bilal Mohammed'
suicide bomb, Kashmir

2000

2001

2002

UK

Nov: John Walker Lindh
captured in Afghanistan

Dec: Feroz Abassi
captured in Afghanistan
Dec: Richard Reid shoebomb attempt

Feb: Mandhai & Jokhan
planned domestic
attacks

Feb: Ahmed Omar
Saeed Sheikh- kidnap of
Daniel Pearl in Pakistan

Sep: 9/11

May: Jose Padilla et al
alleged attack planning
Sep: 'Lackawanna 6'
trained in Afghanistan
Oct: 'Portland 7' tried to
join Taliban
2003

2004

March: Iyman Farisscouted Brooklyn Bridge

Jan: Ricin plot & murder
of DC Stephen Oake

June: Abu Ali arrestedplanned assassination of
President Bush

Nov: Saajid Badat
(Reid's co-conspirator)
arrested

June: 'Virginia Paintball'
jihad training
Nov: Nuradin Abdi
shopping mall plot
April: Mohammed
Junaid Babar arrested
(witness in UK Crevice
trial)
Aug: Aref & Hossain
missile sting
Aug: Elshafay & Siraj
NY subway plot

March: Operation
Crevice- fertiliser bomb
plot
Aug: Dhiren Barot et al
attack planning

...Continued..
.
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Table 8.1. Continued…
YEAR
2005

US
May: Ronald Grecula
offered services to alQaeda

Linked

March: Abu Bakr
Mansha plot to kill soldier

June: Hamid Hayat
trained for jihad
Aug: Kevin James et al
JIS case

July: 7/7 bombings
July: 21/7 failed attack

Dec: Michael Reynolds
offered services to alQaeda
2006

Feb: Zaki Amawi et alplanning jihad in Iraq
March: Taheri-Azar N.
Carolina car-attack
April: Ahmed &
Sadequee- surveillance
video
June: 'Liberty City 7'
Sears Tower plot

UK

Oct: Younis Tsouli et al
online support to plotters
worldwide
Aug: Airliner plot
Oct: Sohail Qureshi,
planning jihad abroad
July: Overseas NY
Tunnels plot

Nov: Ruben Shumpert
joins Somali jihad (later
killed)
Dec 06: Derrick Shareef
shopping mall attack plot
2007

2008

Jan: Daniel Maldonado
captured in Somalia

Jan: Parviz Khan
beheading plot

April: Chris Paul
arrested- fought abroad
& trained others

Feb: Kevin Gardner
planning attacks in jail

May: Fort Dix plot

June: London & Glasgow
failed/semi-successful
attacks.

June: JFK fuel lines plot

Dec: Hassan Tabbakhpreparing explosives

July: Aafia Siddiqui
arrested in Afghanistan

April: Andrew Ibrahim
shopping mall plot

Nov: Bryant Neal Vinas
arrested in Pakistan
(joined al-Qaeda)

April: Mohammed
Abushamma- tried to join
Afghan jihad
May: Nicky Reilly suicide
bomb attempt
Sep: Ali Beheshti et al
arson attack

...Continued..
.
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Table 8.1. Continued…
YEAR
2009

US
May: James Cromitie et
al planted 'bombs' at
Jewish targets

Linked
Dec: NW Airlines
Flight 253 attempted
attack

UK
Nov: Munir Ahmed
Farooqi et al alleged
preparation for jihad

June: Carlos Bledsoe
Little Rock shooting
July: Daniel Boyd et al
planning jihad
Aug: Minnesota-Somali
jihad network uncovered
Aug: Betim Kaziu
arrested in Kosovo
pursuing jihad
Sep: Omar Hammami
reported fighting in
Somali
Sep: Najibullah Zazi et
al arrested planning
NYC attacks
Sep: Hosam Smadi set
off (inert) VBIED in
Dallas
Oct: Headley et al
arrested, accused re.
Mumbai & cartoonist
plots
Oct: Michael Finton set
off (inert) VBIED in
Springfield
Oct: Colleen LaRose
arrested re. cartoonist
plot
Nov: Nidal Malik Hassan
Fort Hood shooting
2010

May: Times Square
attempted car bombing

Feb: Rajib Karim planned
martyrdom

Table 8.1 shows that from 1993-2010 there have been (at least) 44 significant,
alleged planned/perpetrated terror attacks (including joining overseas conflicts)
involving US residents/citizens. Among these, 4 attacks have been successful, 3 have
been semi-successful (including 1 abroad) and 6 have involved individuals successfully
joining overseas conflicts. This compares to a total of 26 cases involving UK
residents/citizens during the same period. Among the UK cases, 3 have involved
successful attacks (including 2 abroad), 6 have been semi-successful (including 1
abroad), and there is one instance of an individual successfully joining a foreign conflict
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(although as in the US this likely represents the tip of the iceberg of such activity since
we are relying here on publicised information). Table 8.2 summarises these figures for
the periods 2001 to 2008 and 2001 to 2010 (pre-9/11 cases are excluded).

Table 8.2. Summary statistics for (alleged) violent Islamist terrorism cases involving residents of the US
and UK, for the periods 2001-2008 and 2001-2010.
US

UK

2001-2008
Successful
attacks

Semisuccessful
attacks

US

UK

3

2

2001-2010
1

2

(9/11)

(Inc. 1
abroad)

2

6

(Inc. 1
abroad)

(Inc. 1
abroad)

Successful
attacks

(Inc. 1
abroad)
Semisuccessful
attacks

Joined
foreign
conflict
Thwarted

4

1

22

12

Joined
foreign
conflict
Thwarted

Total

28

21

Total

3

6

(Inc. 1
abroad)

(Inc. 1
abroad)

6

1

30
(Inc. 2
abroad)
42

14

23

Glancing briefly ahead to include the years 2009 and 2010 so far (which will not
be analysed in later chapters since information on the outcome of these cases is still
pending) it is immediately apparent that the number of cases involving residents of the
US has increased dramatically. 12 American cases involving the pursuit of violence
were uncovered in 2009 alone, representing a 32% increase.i On the one hand this does
appear to be significant and is possibly indicative of a change in American HGIT. On
the other hand it is important to note that there is a disparity between when cases
actually begin and when intervention occurs or they are otherwise made public. Many of
the cases publicised in 2009 in fact began much earlier (e.g. Daniel Boyd is reported to
have fought in Afghanistan in 198921). The public culmination of cases should thus be
considered to be the peak in an ongoing process of jihadist activity, which will be
unique to each case as well as each individual within each case. An evaluation of the
true nature and significance of the apparent increase in numbers of American jihadis
i

Update: As of November 2010 there have been 15 reported US terrorism cases this year, compared to 2
in the UK.
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will only be possible once these more recent cases have passed through the courts and
the information on them can be treated with greater certainty. For now we remain
focussed on the period 2001-2008.
The figures shown in Table 8.2 demonstrate that there were quite similar
absolute rates of violent Islamist terrorism in the US and UK from 2001 to 2008: there
were 28 cases in total in the US (3.5 on average per year) and 21 in the UK (2.6 on
average per year). Remember these numbers exclude all cases where violence has not
been pursued at the point of intervention.
However, it appears that a) joining foreign conflicts is more popular among
Americans, and b) semi-successful attacks on domestic soil have been more common in
the UK, whilst American authorities have thwarted more cases. Focussing on domestic
plots only, 6 of 18 cases in the UK ‘slipped through the net’, resulting in successful or
semi-successful attacks (i.e. a 33% success rate for terrorists). The US figures show that
from 2001-2008 (excluding 9/11 and foreign cases) there was just 1 semi-successful
attack from a total of 23 (a success rate of just 4%). But these figures should be treated
with extreme caution as there are likely to be multiple reasons for such differences,
pertaining both to characteristics of perpetrators and law enforcement, and also to which
cases are included. For example, numerous British cases where intervention occurred
prior to plans for violence emerging are here excluded, thereby reducing the number of
thwarted cases and increasing the apparent terrorist success-rate. The more inclusive
analysis in the following chapters will shed more light on this.
Whether or not the preliminary figures presented in Table in 8.2 translate into
significantly different rates of occurrence according to respective Muslim population
sizes depends upon how these are estimated (UK figures are based on the national
Census while US figures are based upon various surveys and extrapolation from Census
data regarding country of origin and preferred language).22 If the US Muslim population
is closer to 2.35 million as suggested by the Pew Research Center23 and quoted by
Sageman, then the rate of incidences appears to be 1.5 times higher in the US than in the
UK.ii If it is closer to 3 million, then the US rate is 1.2 times higher.iii
But given relative overall population sizes irrespective of religion, the problem
is more endemic in the UK, being almost 3 times the rate in America.iv This supports
ii

US: 44/2,350,000 = 0.0000187. UK: 25/2,000,000 = 0.0000125. US/UK = 1.496.
US: 44/3,000,000 = 0.00001467. UK: 25/2,000,000 = 0.0000125. US/UK = 1.174.
iv
US: 44/300,000,000 = 0.00000015. UK: 25/61,000,000 = 0.00000041. UK/US = 2.733.
iii
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the prevailing conclusion that the US has a proportionately less severe quantitative
manifestation of violent home-grown terrorism relative to its overall population size.
These figures are further refined in chapter 11 when the results from the far more
exhaustive analyses in chapters 9 and 10 are compared.

8.2 Explaining the Difference
The apparent difference in the size of militant populations has been explained in
terms of immigration histories, asylum and welfare policies, cultural identity, social and
economic conditions, and policing practice. In short, Muslim populations in Europe are
depicted as being far less privileged and integrated than in America, breeding feelings
of resentment and increasing the likelihood that terrorism may come to represent a
legitimate cause in the minds of a significant minority. Lax immigration policies in
Europe allowed unskilled Muslim immigrants to enter countries like the UK under
‘guestworker’ programs, which burgeoned during the 1950’s. Then, under family
reunification schemes, workers were joined by their families and Muslim communities
took root.24 However, integration into European societies is thought to have been
limited as a result of strong, exclusionary national identities, discriminatory labour
markets and generous social benefit schemes.25 Combined, these factors have prevented
European Muslims from succeeding in society, supported by higher unemployment
rates, lower incomes and higher rates of imprisonment. For example, 61% of UK
Muslims are reported to be earning less than £20,000 compared to 39% of the general
population (circa 2006) whilst in the US 35% of Muslims earn below $30,000 compared
to 33% of the general population.26
These conditions have also resulted in the establishment of deprived social
enclaves or ‘ghettos,’ which serve as breeding grounds for radical subcultures, as
compared to the geographically “diffused” situation of America’s more affluent Muslim
population.27 Finally, to compound these issues, instances of heavy-handed policing
have fostered distrust and further resentment (hence, Sageman is under the impression
that “British police are losing the hearts-and-minds battle with their Muslim
community”28).
In contrast, the United States’ more selective immigration policies have created
a middle to upper class Muslim contingent able to buy into individualism and to achieve
occupational success. The American population is characterised as subscribing to a
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‘melting pot’ ethos, welcoming newcomers into the country, whilst ethnically
representative police forces enable effective community policing.29 The latter point,
however, and the way in which Sageman contrasts this to the UK, seems to be a rather
crudely made and unfounded observation. Police forces in both countries place a strong
emphasis on the importance of building community relations in the fight against
terrorism, and both countries face similar problems.30 There still may be some validity
to the assertion that “[i]t seems easier to be anti-American from afar than from within
[and that] [t]he absence of anti-Americanism among Muslim Americans undermines the
appeal of the global Islamist message”.31 Yet this may also underestimate AmericanMuslim attitudes (see below).
A thusfar overlooked point of potential importance to the ‘Atlantic divide’ is
that (as illustrated in chapters 6 and 7) it seems that more terrorists rather than Muslims
per se immigrated and ‘set up shop’ in Europe than in America. Once established in
Europe, Islamist terrorists were extremely active (it has thus been asserted that almost
every Islamist terrorist attack around the world has had a vital European component32)
and this is likely to be crucial to the social transmission of terrorism. It is this
observation that gives rise to the ‘social transmission hypothesis’:

The Social Transmission Hypothesis- The presence of greater numbers of (and/or highly
influential) Islamist terrorists in a given location will increase the likelihood of other
violent Islamist extremists being found nearby over time as a function of localised
social interaction, creating a subculture of militancy.

This is in accordance with Horgan’s observation that terrorism is “undeniably a group
[i.e. social] process”.33 It also congruent with Nesser’s observation that individual
terrorist ‘entrepreneurs’ are cruicial to the occurrence of terrorism34, and with
explanations of terrorism which emphasise social interaction (see chapter 4). It involves
the creation, communication and maintenance of shared counter-cultural values and
behavioural norms via localised (often face-to-face) interaction. Given that proximity
(next to similarity) is a major determinant of who interacts with whom, and that the
more extreme a given counter-culture is, the less likely it will be adopted by outsiders, it
follows that Islamist militancy will develop a natural ‘centre of gravity’ around its
original distribution in social space. Of course individual mobility and, more
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significantly, the growth of militant ideology, imagery and ‘virtual’ interaction on the
Internet, mean that extremism can spread in unpredictable ways. But according to the
social transmission hypothesis there will always be a greater likelihood that the spread
of Islamist terrorism will be geographically bounded according to its original
distribution in any given country.
This is in line with current, popular explanations, which explicitly point out that
Europe’s “broad” asylum policies were exploited by veterans of the Afghan jihad,
implying that the US, whilst also infiltrated this way, did not represent such an easy
safe-haven (i.e. more Islamist terrorists originally came to Europe).35 This is supported
by figures offered by Leiken and Brooke,36 who examined a data set of 373 charged,
convicted, or killed Islamist terrorists active in the West in recent years (66% of whom
were hosted by European countries, 25% by the US, and the remainder in Canada,
Australia and elsewhere37). According to these researchers (based on 206 individuals for
whom there was adequate data) 47% of British-hosted individuals entered the country
by way of asylum claims -contributing to an overall rate of 29% for all of Western
Europe- compared to just 8% of US-hosted individuals (having said this, the Pew
Research Centre’s survey of the American Muslim population reported that 20% of
those who were foreign-born came to the US fleeing conflict or persecution38).
Moreover, the UK Muslim population accounted for just 12% of the total European
Muslim population, yet hosted 20% of the sample of European terrorists.39 Although the
sample may not be representative, this suggests that numbers of Islamist terrorists active
in a given country may not necessarily be proportionate to the size of the Muslim
population.
Additionally, the contention that the presence of terrorists has been a vital
component to differential growth-rates of terrorism is in accordance with explanations
of terrorism more generally. As we have seen, relative deprivation and frustrationaggression (which underlie current justifications for the Atlantic divide) are hardly
infallible, and the presence of terrorist entrepreneurs is likely to be highly significant.
As Vidino points out, despite that Islamist networks have been operating in the US for
the last three decades, and have been more active than is commonly assumed, “their
activities cannot be compared in intensity to those operating in Europe. Although places
such as Brooklyn’s al Farooq mosque or Tucson’s Islamic Center saw extensive jihadist
activities in the 1990s, they pale in comparison to recruiting headquarters such as
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London’s Finsbury Park, Hamburg’s al Quds mosque, or Milan’s Islamic Cultural
Institute”.40
The recognition of the significance of the presence of terrorists from abroad to
the emergence of home-grown terrorism is also important in order to avoid further
stigmatising Muslim communities, and avoids potentially problematic assumptions. The
potential for radicalisation within Muslim populations has generally so far been inferred
based upon average socio-economic standing. McCauley and Scheckter41 focus more
explicitly on survey data relating to attitudes demonstrating a propensity to support
terrorism. For example, 8% of US Muslims reported that they believed that suicide
terrorism is often or sometimes justified. The corresponding percentage in Britain,
France, Germany, and Spain ranged from 7 to 16% (15% for the UK42). Meanwhile, for
a comparable question, 14% of Pakistanis expressed that suicide attacks were
often/sometimes justified, compared to 16% of Indonesians, 35% of Moroccans, and
61% of Egyptians. Based on these and other questionnaire items, McCauley and
Scheckter conclude that “American exceptionalism” is a fallacy, and that US Muslims
differ little on average in their attitudes compared to Muslims from Europe, Morocco,
Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia. That is to say that although there may be significant
differences between particular countries, differences are often small and US Muslims do
not stand out as unique amongst the world’s Muslim population. This seems to be a
matter of emphasis however, and would require more research using identical, rather
than roughly comparable surveys in order to make more confident judgements.
Nevertheless, this work is useful for pointing out that 1) There is not necessarily
any clear-cut relationship between demographic factors and attitudes in relation to
terrorism, 2) Attitudes of US and European Muslims in particular may not be vastly
different, despite socioeconomic differences, and 3) There are other potentially
important variables to consider. These include possibly greater reach and resources of
US security and law enforcement, greater willingness to cooperate with these services
by those opposed to jihadi ideology, and a less salient Muslim population43 (the latter
contention resonating with assertions that the dispersed nature of the US Muslim
population –versus the ‘ghettoised’ European situation- limits the potential for radical
action).
Finally, Vidino adds that in addition to better economic situations, a lack of
Muslim ghettos in the US, and tougher immigration policies, differential immigration
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patterns are also important in that many American Muslims are of ethnic backgrounds
that tend to espouse moderate forms of Islam, including Iranians and Indians.44 That
said, Arabic Muslims including the Middle East and North Africa (24%) and South
Asians (18%) constitute the two largest regions of origin of the US Muslim population
after those born in the US itself (35%).45 Moreover, the range of backgrounds of
Islamist terrorists is extremely diverse, and there is no clear relationship between ethnic
origin and support for, or opposition to terrorism.
US Muslims do appear to be generally financially well off and to express low
levels of support for Islamist terrorism. A lack of perceived discriminatory grievances
and a dispersed community may have limited the ability of extremists to be more
influential. The social transmission of terrorism would also be severely hampered by the
presence of fewer terrorists, as affected by country-unique immigration and asylum
histories. Yet there is also the possibility of growing alienation of US Muslims,
especially amongst the second or third generation46 (together constituting 35% of the
Muslim population47) which could lead to the development of a “rejectionist
generation”48 similar to Roy’s description of Islamist terrorism as a youth movement
(see chapter 4). Indeed, second and third generations appear to show considerably more
dissatisfaction with their current situation, which potentially acts as a risk factor for
radicalisation. Native born US Muslims (62%) were more likely than their foreign-born
counterparts (49%) and the general population (50%) to rate their personal financial
situation as fair/poor; they were more likely to be dissatisfied with the state of the US
(77% compared to 45% of foreign-born Muslims and 61% of the general population);
and they were more likely to opine that Muslims coming to the US today should try to
remain distinct (38% compared to 21% of foreign-born Muslims).49
Intuitively this makes sense since presumably new arrivals may have come from
less affluent circumstances, may be excited to be in a new country, or simply
preoccupied with establishing a new life. Meanwhile second or third generation
immigrants are likely to be far more familiar with the host country and its problems, and
therefore more likely to hold grievances. Notably, only 35% of the US Muslim
population is thought to be second or third generation, equating to 822,500
individuals.50 This compares to 46% of the UK Muslim population in 2001.51 If we
assume that the percentage has changed very little, but take into account an estimated
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current population of 2 million52 this means that the number of Muslims born in the UK
is currently around 920,000, considerably larger than in the US.
In addition to generation (foreign vs. home-grown) youth may also be a key
demographic variable. Although the age-distribution of the above (sub)-populations are
not reported, it is notable that 36% (850,000) of the total US Muslim population is
under 18, 19% (450,000) is aged 18-29, with a further 17% (390,000) aged 30-39.53
Those aged 18-29 were found to be more extreme in their views, with 15% of 18-29
year olds reporting that suicide bombings are often or sometimes justified.54 In the UK,
34% of the Muslim population was under 16 in 2001, and a further 37% were aged 163455 (assuming constant percentages these figures would equate to approximately
680,000 and 740,000 respectively in 2009). 15% of the total UK Muslim population felt
that suicide bombings were often/sometimes justified,56 a figure which would
presumably be higher amongst younger respondents.
The last key demographic factor of interest is gender, since the overwhelming
majority of terrorists are males. 54% (810,000) of the adult US Muslim population are
males.57 If a further 50% (425,000) of the minor population are male, this would give a
total male Muslim population of 1,235,000. In the UK, 52% of the total Muslim
population were males in 2001.58 Maintaining the same percentage in 2009 would mean
there are approximately 1,040,000 male Muslims in the UK.
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8.3. Reflecting on Current Explanations
In summary, the picture is highly complex and there is little that can be reliably
inferred from demographic data. Amongst background information, those variables
which have been shown to have a more reliable relationship to terrorism would
intuitively seem to hold the most potential to be meaningful (though not necessarily
useful in practical terms). Gender and youth in particular stand out. Generation (foreignborn versus home-grown) may also be significant. On these dimensions the UK and US
are roughly comparable: there are more males in the US (1,235,000 vs. 1,040,000);
there are similar numbers of young people (840,000 aged 18-39 in the US vs. 740,000
aged 16-34 in the UK); and there is a somewhat larger number of home-grown Muslims
in the UK (920,000 vs. 822,500). Generation is of particular interest by virtue of the fact
that home-grown US Muslims appear to experience relatively high levels of
dissatisfaction despite overall comparable socioeconomic standing with the general
population. This seems to undermine the argument that differential rates of Islamist
terrorism can be explained by socioeconomic status or perceived domestic grievances
alone.
The fact that the UK has a relatively large home-grown Muslim population and
ample reason for them to be frustrated contributes towards our understanding of its high
levels of Islamist terrorist activity. This is far from the whole picture though. The
geographic distribution of Muslim populations remains appealing as a potential
explanatory factor in that the more concentrated, ethnically bounded communities in the
UK are conceivably more amenable to the spread of extremism. Perhaps most
importantly though, it has been the presence of terrorists (particular individuals as well
as groups) that have been most crucial to sowing the seeds of home-grown terrorism.
They have been the vessels of social transmission, drawing other people around them to
their cause and mobilising them. The comparative lack of such an early boost to
terrorism in the US may thus explain the more limited and slower mobilisation of
American residents. Now, with the spread of Islamist ideology on the Internet, and the
establishment of jihadism as a counter-culture that is ‘out there’ for consumption and
reinvention, it seems possible that HGIT could emerge anywhere (indeed, the US has by
no means been exempt). Finally, increasing numbers of American cases over the last
two years are changing analysts’ perceptions. Leiken, Hoffman and Pape have all
recently noted the importance of continued American military operations in Afghanistan
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and Iraq as fuelling terrorism at home.59 As Leiken observes “[t]he notion of a
difference between Europe and United States remains relevant...[However]...the length
of U.S. involvement in these countries is provoking more Muslim Americans to
react”.60
Overall, it is superficial to suggest that different forms of Islamist terrorism in
Western countries can be explained solely by cursory descriptions of their respective
Muslim populations. Moreover, in this chapter we have only briefly examined cases
involving residents of the US and UK who have shown a commitment to actively
pursuing violence. A more accurate picture of Islamist terrorism in America and Britain
will be achieved in the following chapters, which entail a more inclusive and detailed
examination of terrorism cases (including active supporters who did not personally take
steps towards violent activity).

178

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
8.4. The Need for Further Research
We have considered a number of different explanations for terrorism, and how
they relate to contemporary Islamist terrorism in the West. We have also examined the
radicalisation process, from initial contact with Islamist groups to carrying out acts of
terrorism. Finally, we briefly reviewed apparent differences in the severity of HGIT in
the UK and US. However, the picture that has emerged is far from conclusive, and may
be thought of as a preliminary introduction to HGIT in either country. In particular,
what is lacking is a detailed, systematic study of the various cases that have emerged
and the groups and individuals involved. There is a dearth of this type of research
within the field of terrorism studies, which frequently relies upon anecdotal reporting of
isolated incidents and sweeping generalisations.61 Case-studies of particular countries
are lacking, as are cross-comparative approaches. These methods are required in order
to be able to critically assess accounts of differences between countries, and to be able
to gain insight into possibly unique manifestations of Islamist terrorism. Crosscomparison also enables description of the range of phenomena under study, and
assessment of the generalisability of theories.62
There are a number of specific areas of concern that demand clarification. There
is the need for a more comprehensive breakdown of who is involved in Islamist
terrorism in particular countries (including demographic backgrounds, country of origin,
age, where they are based). There is a need to identify patterns of radicalisation in
different countries and to systematically examine operational functioning, paying
particular attention to the nature of international travel and communication, and the role
of foreign, organised terrorists. The social structure of groups of terrorists is also poorly
understood, especially the nature of social influence and leadership. The significance of
the Internet for propaganda, radicalisation, group formation, acquiring intelligence and
attack data, and for group communication must also be more thoroughly examined.
The present study aims to shed some light on each of these elements of Islamist
terrorism by systematically examining groups of terrorists active in the US and UK,
offering in-depth analyses of the range of HGIT in either country. By carrying out a
cross-country comparison this will also elucidate whether there are differences in the
manifestation and functioning of HGIT on either side of the Atlantic.
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Overview
The sample of US cases –people from or living in the United States involved in
Islamist terrorism from 2001-2008- is analysed, focussing on the ten variables of
interest identified in chapter 2. This covers geographic distribution, demographic
profiles, offence ranges, radicalisation, group characteristics, operational activity,
international dimensions and associations, the role of the Internet, stated motivations,
and outcomes. These results are further discussed in chapter 11 in comparison to results
from the UK.
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9. Case Study Analysis Part 1: Islamist Terrorism in the United States: 2001-2008

9.1 Statistical Summary
46 cases (including 91 individuals) were included in the sample of Islamist
militants who were residents of the United States active between 2001 and 2008.
Appendix A (Part 1) lists these individuals in chronological order according to the date
range of offending behaviour. Appendix A (Part 2) gives a summary of each case in
chronological order of when they began. Finally, Appendix A (Part 3) lists 51 cases
(125 individuals) excluded from the sample and a brief description of the reason for
exclusion. Here, the statistical analysis of the included cases is presented.
Table 9.1 below shows the number of Islamist terrorism cases -also shown as
numbers of individuals- involving US residents from 2001 to 2008 (pre-2001 cases are
those which began any time before then and also continued after September 2001). The
top two rows show when cases/individuals began offending, while the bottom two rows
show when cases/individuals ceased offending (usually through being arrested). Note
that the total number of cases ended within this time-frame is less than the overall
sample total because 2 cases ended after 2008 and 2 are currently ongoing. Figure 9.1
shows these numbers in graph form, minus the pre-2001 cases since they span an
eleven-year period, from 1990-2000, and their inclusion is potentially visually
misleading (since only those which continued after 2001 are included in the sample).

Table 9.1. Number of Islamist terrorism cases/individuals involving US residents/citizens from 2001 to
2008.

Pre‐
2001

2001

2002

8

2

5

5

8

5

7

4

2

46

20

8

8

8

14

10

11

7

5

91

Cases
ended*

0

2

4

6

6

6

8

6

4

42

Individuals
ended

0

2

12

16

7

13

16

11

7

84

Year
Cases
began
Individuals
began

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Total

*1 case (#46- Jamal Sheikh Bana et al) ended in 2009; 1 case (#44- Khalid Ouazzani) ended in 2010; & 2
cases (#11- Adam Gadahn and #39- Omar Hammami) are currently ongoing.
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Figure 9.1. Number of Islamist terrorism cases/individuals involving US residents/citizens from 2001 to
2008.
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Based on the present sample, there have been 46 cases of Islamist terrorism
involving 91 individuals who were resident in the US. The average number of cases
began each year is 4.75 (8.9 individuals) and the average number ended each year is
5.25. Among those offending in the period 2001-2008, 8 cases (20 individuals) began
prior to 2001, constituting 17.4% of the total sample of cases (22% of all individuals).
The distribution of cases/individuals (both began and ended) varies slightly each
year but overall appears to be fairly consistent. The rise in the number of cases
beginning from 2001 through to 2004 can be understood as a response to 9/11 and the
2003 invasion of Iraq, both of which have been seen as motivational influences and
catalysts for action among Islamist extremists. The graph also gives the impression that
there has been a decrease in the number of cases beginning in 2008 in particular;
however this interpretation is almost certainly flawed. Many of the cases which have
emerged in 2009 (currently excluded from the sample) in fact began in 2008 or even
2007. The picture will thus change as more information becomes available.
Given the significance that has been attributed to the invasion of Iraq as a global
radicalising influence, it makes sense to examine the sample according to the pre- vs.
post Iraq time-periods. This is defined here as pre-2004 (i.e. inclusive of 2003) and
2004-2008. The reason 2003 is included in the pre-Iraq period is because it takes time to
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radicalise and then act: the majority of individuals actually offending in 2003 therefore
most likely radicalised before then (and in that sense Iraq may be considered a ‘last
straw’ for some already-radicalised individuals, versus a source of cognitive opening, or
a direct instigator of radicalisation, for individuals who could not previously be
considered Islamist extremists).
Looking at the US sample, 12 cases (24 individuals) began from 2001-2003
inclusive, compared to 26 cases (47 individuals) from 2004-2008. Of course the former
is a 3 year period compared to the latter 5 year period, but the number of cases more
than doubles. If we include all pre-2004 cases in the sample there are still more cases
and individuals beginning in the 5-year period from 2004 to 2008 as compared to the 14
years spanning from 1990 to 2003 (20 cases, 44 individuals). Cases which began and
ended before 2001 are excluded from the sample, but the figures are nevertheless quite
striking and clearly support the hypothesis that the invasion of Iraq has played an
important role in inspiring individuals living in, or from, Western countries to join the
violent Sunni jihad.
The sample will be examined in terms of pre- vs. post-Iraq generations
throughout the chapter in order to further assess its impact and it should be borne in
mind that the number of individuals in each category is very close (44 vs. 47) making
comparison relatively straight-forward, numerically speaking. Each of the variables of
interest identified in chapter 2 will now be addressed.
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9.2 Analysis of Variables
9.2.1 Geographical Distribution
Figure 9.2. Geographical distribution of US Islamist terrorism cases, 2001-2008.

Original map downloaded from http://www.united-states-map.com/usa-map.htm

Figure 9.2 shows the geographical distribution of cases (individuals in
parentheses) of Islamist terrorism, from 2001-2008, involving people living in the US
according to their last known residence before the onset of offending. It is striking that
26 out of 51i (51%) of cases are firmly located on the east coast and many of the rest are
located nearby. Only 6 of 51 (12%) of cases have involved individuals living on the
west coast.
Overall, 21 states are represented in the sample, numerically representing 51
cases (the actual case-total of 46 is increased due to individuals who were part of the
same case living in different states). This translates into an average of 2.2 cases, or 4.3
individuals per state where people have become involved in Islamist terrorism. Table
9.2 below shows the top eleven states ranked according to the number of cases and then
individuals (Oregon is included since the number of individuals is above average).

i

Although the total number of cases is 46, because a few involve individuals resident in different states
the geographic total is 51.

187

Table 9.2. Top eleven US states ranked according to number of Islamist terrorism
cases/individuals hosted.

State
New York
Pennsylvania
Minnesota
Florida
California
Ohio
Illinois
Virginia
Maryland
Texas
Oregon

Cases
8
5
4
4
4
4
4
2
2
2
1

Individuals
11
5
10
9
8
6
5
9
3
3
7

New York has played host to the largest number of cases and individuals (16%
and 12% respectively) and this is in keeping with the hypothesis that the distribution of
Islamist militancy over time is to some extent determined by the original distribution of
militants arriving in the West (the social transmission hypothesis). It is also in keeping
with the fact that New York City remains a highly valued symbolic target for Islamist
terrorists (or indeed, almost any other type of terrorists active in America).
Importantly, according to the American Muslim Council,1 California represents
the state with the highest percentage of American Muslims, although it only ranks fifth
in terms of terrorism. On the other hand, most of the remaining states named in their
top-ten of American Muslim populations are apparently on the east coast or nearby:
New York is ranked number 2 followed by Illinois and New Jersey; Indiana, which has
not so far figured in the HGIT-equation, is ranked fifth and this is followed by
Michigan, Virginia, Texas, Ohio and Maryland.2
There is no direct relationship between the distribution of Muslims and Islamist
terrorists. Larger Muslim populations might be considered a potential risk-factor (hence,
for example, Minnesota is reportedly home to the largest Somali population in the US
and has become an area for concern regarding young Somalis returning to their
homeland for violent jihad3). However –in line with the social transmission hypothesisthe original distribution of Islamist terrorists also seems to show some relation to the
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geographic occurrence of extremism over time (although of course this does not prevent
‘random’ occurrences). This will be discussed more in chapter 11.

9.2.2 Demographic Profiles

Gender, Nationality and Age
Table 9.3. Gender; nationality; time in the US; legal status and average age at the start and end of
offending in US Islamist terrorism cases, 2001-2008.

% Male

1st
nationality
American

2nd
nationality
American*

Av. years in US
(Non‐American
1st nationality)

Entered US
illegally

Av. age
at start
of
offence

Av. age
at end
of
offence

89/91

42/91

27/91

10.3 yrs

5/89

27.9

30.1

(98%
Total)

(46% Total)

(30% Total)

(n=41)

(6% n)

(n=90)

(n=90)

*Includes legal permanent residents.

In line with general findings on the gender of terrorists, Table 9.3 shows that
98% of the total sample are males. Of the two females, one (October Martinique Lewis
of the ‘Portland 7’ –case #10) played a supporting role only, while the second (Aafia
Siddiqui, who attempted kill US officials after being apprehended in Afghanistan- case
#45) was involved in an impromptu attack. Quantitatively, women who have lived in
the US are barely involved in the global jihad. Numbers are too few to be able to
accurately categorise the roles that they play, but the potential for females to perpetrate
violence should not be overlooked.
In terms of nationality, 46% of the sample are Americans by birth, while a
further 30% are naturalised US citizens or legal permanent residents. Among those
individuals whose first nationality is not American, the average length of time in the US
prior to offending was 10.3 years. The minimum was 0 years (for two individuals- Ali
Saleh Kalah al-Marri who was sent to the US in 2001 as a ‘sleeper agent’ by Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed- case #4; and Egyptian Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohammed who
came to the US as a student in 2007- case #41) while several individuals had been living
in the US for more than 20 years.

189

Twenty-one nationalities other than American were represented in the sample,
mostly from the Middle East.ii However, among non-US first nationalities, the top 5
were: Pakistani (16 individuals or 18% of the overall total); Somali (10 individuals or
11%); Jordanian (4 individuals or 4%); Albanian (3 individuals or 3%) and Moroccan (2
individuals or 2%). The prominence of Pakistanis in the sample is reflective of the
central position that that country continues to occupy in the global jihad and the
increasing numbers of Somalis are evidence of developments in East Africa. Overall
though, the sample is quite mixed in terms of ethnicity and this also applies to ethnic
heritage or ‘second nationality’, which was not determined in 41 individuals, seemingly
because most did not have any to speak of. Among those who did, there were no more
than 1 or 2 individuals from any non-American country (not counting African
Americas), for example, 2 had Puerto Rican heritage, 2 were of Pakistani descent and
there were 5 individuals each with origins in different Middle Eastern countries.
Contrary to public impressions, only 5 of 89 (6% of all those for whom there
were data) had entered the US illegally. Although a further 3 cases involved expired
visas, the number of individuals involved in Islamist terrorism who have come from
abroad and entered the country via illicit means has so far been minimal.
Finally, Table 9.3 show that the average age at the onset of offending was 27.9
years and by the time the offence ended (almost exclusively by way of arrest) was 30.1.
68 (76%) of the sample was aged 30 or under when they started offending; the
minimum age was 17 and the eldest was 68. By comparison Sageman reported an
average age for those ‘joining the jihad’ of 25.7 years based on a global sample of 172
individuals, and Bakker reported an average age of 27.3 at the time of arrest based on a
European sample of more than 200.4 The American average ‘joining’ age of 27.9 and
arrest-age of 30.1 are thus slightly higher than these previous studies.
More recently Sageman has suggested that the average age of jihadi recruits in
Europe and Canada has “dramatically decreased” down to about 20 years old (based on
a sample of those detained since 2006).5 He divides the global Islamist movement into
three waves: those who joined in the 1980’s and fought the Soviets in Afghanistan;
those who joined in the 1990’s; and those who became involved after the invasion of
Iraq in 2003.6 Studies of jihadis in Denmark and the Netherlands support Sageman’s
ii

These are: Pakistani, Somali, Jordanian, Albanian, Moroccan, Bangladeshi, Iraqi, Saudi Arabian,
Syrian, Egyptian, Haitian, Indian, Iranian, Kurdish, Lebanese, Qatari, South Korean, Turkish, Yemeni,
Puerto Rican and Canadian.
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claim that recruits are getting younger, a trend which appears to be facilitated by the
growing accessibility of violent Islamist messages on the Internet.7
By dividing the American sample according to whether individuals became
active in the pre- vs post-Iraq era (defined here as anything prior to 2004, and 2004
onwards, thus counting 2003 in the pre-Iraq period to allow for ‘incubation’ time) the
respective average ages at the time of arrest are 33 and 27.4. Hence the slightly higher
average age of American jihadis is maintained, although there is some indication that
this is decreasing in absolute terms, thus showing conformity to global trends. These
results are reinforced by those from another study conducted by this author, an
exhaustive examination of Australian Islamist militants, which revealed an average age
of 28 at the onset of offending and 29 at the time of arrest.8
Of course, the criteria applied in the current study are also quite strict and are
based on actual offence behaviour- in reality this obscures the fact that the radicalisation
of these individuals most often began at least a year prior to breaking the law. The
problem is that it is extremely difficult to judge exactly when offending commenced,
and even more so to judge when the process of radicalisation was initiated or when it
concluded. Ages at the time of arrest are more accurate but by themselves tell us little
about how long a person may have been involved in militancy already. The basic
conclusion regarding age is that most Islamist terrorists are young (in their 20’s and
30’s), that the potential for involvement begins in the teenage years, and that there is no
upper age limit that precludes the possibility of offending.

Education
Table 9.4. Level of education completed in US Islamist terrorism cases, 2001-2008.

Education
completed

Unknown

Number
% n (52)
% TOT

39
N/A
43%

Did not
finish high
school
4
8%
4%

High
school

University/
college degree

25
48%
27%

23
44%
25%

Level of education completed is another variable of interest. Table 9.4 shows
that, for 52 individuals on whom there were data, only 4(8%) did not finish high school.
48% did graduate from high school and another 44% went on to complete degrees at
university. The vast majority (92%) thus completed at least a basic level of education.
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Recalling the discussion from chapter 4, this is comparable with Bakker’s findings that
88% of his sample had completed secondary education.9 However, only 30% of people
for whom there were data in his sample had completed a degree, compared to 44% here;
although data was even scarcer in Bakker’s study (information was available for just 47
out of 242 individuals) hence limiting the validity of comparisons.
At this point it should be noted that ‘findings’ using limited data are to some
extent an artefact of the way the numbers are expressed. The tendency in the press (the
primary data source for background information) is to report the presence of certain
variables but not their absence. So, for example, if a person is married, or they have a
mental health problem, or they hold a master’s degree, this tends to be reported. The
absence of those variables is of less interest and so goes unreported. This may be
thought of as ‘positive-reporting’. Applied to education, in all likelihood the vast
majority of cases for whom we do not have data probably did complete high school at
least, while there is less probability that they either did not finish, or that they completed
further education. Even if positive-reporting was not a factor, these outcomes are
statistically less likely anyway. Expressed as a percentage of the total sample, the
proportion of people with a completed university education is 25% and for this variable
this is more likely accurate, although we can treat the ‘%n’ and ‘%total’ as upper and
lower limits, i.e. the real figure is between 25% and 44% with a greater probability of
lying at the lower end of this spectrum.
If we also take into consideration Sageman’s10 contention that the level of
education among the post-Iraq generation of jihadis is somewhat less than their
predecessors, the data here shows some support. Sixteen of 21 (76%) of individuals for
whom there were data in the pre-Iraq era had completed university/college education
compared to 7 of 31 (23%) in the post-Iraq era, plus all 4 individuals who did not finish
high school were also in this latter period. Having said that, 20 individuals (65%) for
whom there were data and began offending in the post-Iraq period were confirmed to
have completed high school, showing that a basic level of education is still the norm.
The veracity of these tentative indications will be clarified by a more inclusive sample,
taking into account pre-9/11 and post-2009 offenders. For now, the conclusion is simply
that most Islamist terrorists from, or living in, America have a reasonable level of
education- they are by no means clearly less, or clearly more educated than the general
population.
192

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Occupation
Table 9.5. Occupation of individuals involved in US Islamist terrorism cases, 2001-2008.

Occupation

High
Un‐
Prisoner
Student Unskilled
school
employed

Semi‐
skilled

Skilled

Number

1

1

1

18

19

30

11

% n (81)

1%

1%

1%

22%

23%

37%

14%

% TOT

1%

1%

1%

20%

21%

33%

12%

Turning to occupation at the time that offending began, information was
available for the majority of the sample. Only one person was explicitly reported to
have been unemployed directly before the start of offending, although in reality this
figure is slightly higher given that several individuals quit their jobs and at least some of
the 10 for whom there was no information did not appear to be in employment.
Nevertheless, the vast majority of the US sample was employed prior to their
involvement in Islamist terrorism, and in particular for those that did not go overseas,
many stayed employed even as they committed their crimes. Also, once involved in
terrorism very few might be classed as ‘full-time’ terrorists able to support themselves
through such activity, with the possible exception of Adam Gadahn (case #11) who has
been part of Islamist militant networks in Pakistan and Afghanistan for more than 10
years now. Individuals such as Jose Padilla (case #3) or John Walker Lindh (case #9)
might also be considered full-time, if only for the duration of their time in Afghanistan.
Table 9.5 shows that at the time of involvement in Islamist terrorism most
individuals (37%) were employed in semi-skilled occupations such as running a small
business, managing a store, or working in a trade such as construction. Those working
in unskilled jobs (23%) constituted the next largest group and occupied such positions
as retail or security. Almost as many (22%) were students, while those in skilled
positions such as doctors and computer programmers made up just 14% of those for
whom there were data. By comparison, Bakker11 found that 33% of his European
sample was in unskilled occupations, 18% were semi-skilled and 12% were skilled.
Putting aside potential differences in subjective judgements, it would appear that overall
the US jihadis were in slightly better occupations than those in Europe (as might be
generally predicted based upon the economic situation of respective Muslim
populations).
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If we return again to Sageman’s observation that there has been a decline in the
social class and achievements of subsequent generations of jihadis, the data here are
supportive. Table 9.6 below divides occupation according to whether individuals began
offending prior to the invasion of Iraq (inclusive of 2003) or after (2004 onwards). More
individuals in the sample were in unskilled occupations after 2003; fewer were in semiskilled jobs after 2003; and most of those in skilled occupations began their offences
before 2004 (actually in 2002 or earlier).

Table 9.6. Occupation of individuals involved in US Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008) divided by
whether they began before or after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. Percentages refer to %n for the pre- vs.
post-Iraq populations.

Occupation

High
Un‐
Prisoner
Student Unskilled
school
employed

Semi‐
skilled

Skilled

Number

1

1

1

18

19

30

11

Pre‐2004

0

0

0

7 (18%)

6 (15%)

17
(44%)

9
(23%)

2004‐2008

1 (2%)

1 (2%)

1 (2%)

11
(26%)

13 (31%)

13
(31%)

2 (5%)

Finally, although the data does support a gradual decline in skilled occupational
–and possibly educational- achievements, further education remains popular. Indeed, a
greater proportion of the sample were students after 2003 than were before 2004. That
said, many of them dropped out of college or university to take part in the jihad, which
may help explain somewhat lower educational attainment over time. Looking at the
content of study, it is important to note that out of 13 for whom there was available
information, 10 (77%) were studying some form of engineering or computer science.
Such subjects can potentially foster a rigid mindset that lends itself to jihadist ideology
and their popularity among jihadis borders on notoriety.12 The US data suggest that this
trend does not appear to be waning.
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Faith
Table 9.7. Religious faith of individuals involved in US Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Number

Born
Muslim
58

% n (89)

65%

Faith

24

Religious
offshoot
10

Non‐
Muslim
2

27%

11%

2%

Convert

Unsurprisingly, most Islamist terrorists are Muslims. However, there is not
much reported about individual religious practices or beliefs. The majority ‘born
Muslim’ category refers to people who effectively inherited their faith from their
parents and is in fact the only variable that has been inferred based on ethnicity and the
fact that they are participating in Islamist terrorism. The extent to which people in this
group practiced their religion throughout their lives, or whether they ‘reverted’ to their
faith at some point is largely unknown.
Most of the rest of the sample (27%) were converts to Islam, which compares
very closely to Bakker’s figure for European jihadis of 28%.13 Moreover the converts in
the US sample are divided quite equally according to the pre vs. post-Iraq divide: 13
(54%) of them began offending in 2004 or later, thus showing a continued –if not
marginally increasing- susceptibility to militant Islamism among America’s convert
population.
The last religious category is that of religious/ideological ‘offshoots’. There are
10 individuals hereiii, constituting 3 cases- those of Kevin James’ JIS group formed in
prison (case #25); Narseale Batiste’s Moorish Science Temple/Islamist group formed in
Miami (case #33); and Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar, who taught himself the Quran
(case #35). The fact that other versions of jihadi ideology have emerged should not be
surprising given that it is now ‘out there’ for public consumption. In fact many
individuals involved in Islamist terrorism who purportedly adhere to the ‘same’
ideology and religion are likely to hold varied interpretations of their faith and to
emphasise different aspects as it suits them. Faith should thus be considered a
continuum of belief and practice.

iii

Note that the JIS group members and Taheri-Azar were also converts (except Hammad Samana of JIS,
who was a ‘born’ Muslim).They are thus counted twice: under the ‘offshoot’ heading and under converts
(x4) and born Muslims (x1).
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Marital Status
Table 9.8. Marital status of individuals involved in US Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Marital
Status
Number
% TOT

Unknown

Single

Married

Divorced

30
33%

14
15%

39
43%

8
9%

Table 9.8 shows the marital status of the sample. 43% were reported to be
married at the time of offending. Of those who were married, there was 1 polygamist, 1
arranged marriage and at least 1 person on their second marriage. Children were
mentioned in 26 (67%) of marriages. A further 9% of the total sample was divorced,
15% were reported to be unmarried, and for 33% there was no information (although
the tendency towards positive-reporting makes it likely that many of those where
nothing was reported were in fact unmarried). 73% of Sageman’s original sample, and
59% of Bakker’s were married;14 both these percentages were expressed as a proportion
of the number with available information though. If the same method is applied here it
inflates the married percentage to 64%.
However, similar to here, Bakker also noted that many for whom there was no
specific information appeared to be single. It seems a reasonable estimate then to
conclude that around half of the current sample was married. Regardless of the precise
numbers, it is evident that a significant proportion of Islamist terrorists have wives (and
often children) and they should not be expected to be socially isolated. Nevertheless,
looking at marital status according to the pre vs. post-Iraq divide, 28 individuals who
began offending in 2003 or earlier were confirmed to be married, compared to just 11
who began offending in 2004 or afterwards (i.e. 63% of the pre-Iraq generation vs. 23%
of the post-Iraq generation were confirmed to be married). Marriage is certainly not
uncommon in America’s post-Iraq generation of jihadis but it appears to have become
significantly less likely over time.
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Criminal Record
Table 9.9. Criminal records of individuals involved in US Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Criminal
record
Number
% n (25)
Criminal
record
Number
% n (25)

Unspecified
felony
1
4%
Gang
related*
4
16%

Parental
kidnap
1
4%

Theft

Unspecified

1
4%

2
8%
Traffic
offence
9
36%

Misdemeanour

Violent

4
16%

7
28%

*Applies to the theft and 3 of the convictions for violence.

Criminal histories of terrorists are of interest as they have implications for
assumptions that they are simply criminal or violent ‘types’ or that they might follow a
typical pattern of offending prior to involvement in terrorism. No such assumptions are
supported by the data. Specific information on criminal records was only available for
33 (36%) of the sample and –in accordance with positive-reporting- 25 of these
individuals (i.e. 27% of the total sample) had records, while only 8 were explicitly
referred to as having no prior record. The histories of the remaining 58 people (64% of
the total) are not known here. Of course some of this number will have prior
convictions, but in all likelihood if they had been serious offenders it would have been
reported. Sageman and Bakker both also found that about 25% of their samples had
criminal records,15 which is comparable to the figure of 27% found here.
As for the type of offending history, it appears to be quite diverse. The largest
single category of offence is for traffic violations (which most likely applies to the
general population also). Just over a quarter of individuals with criminal records had
been arrested or convicted for violence (assault and armed robbery) and the remainder
were mixed. The overall impression is that Islamist terrorists living in, or from, the US
are not by and large serious, dedicated offenders and that the types of previous offences
are varied.
It is worth noting that Sageman and Bakker reported that among those who had
a criminal record in their studies, most were for relatively petty offences and Sageman
specifically named the offences of forgery, document trafficking, fraud and drugdealing.16 None of these offences showed up as previous convictions in the current
sample, although fraud, money laundering, immigration violations and firearms
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offences were all prosecuted concurrently to the terrorism investigation in several
instances.
Two points arise from this. 1) It is possible that the differing patterns of offence
may reflect different types of jihadi activities in America and Europe. Given heavy
European and North African contingents in Sageman’s sample, their different patterns
of offending may be reflective of larger jihadi support networks, which often rely on
‘everyday’ crime such as drug-dealing to raise funds, and have also dealt extensively in
false documents. Examples include individuals connected to Finsbury Park mosque in
London, and the network behind the 2004 Madrid train bombings. As opposed to these
entrenched and possibly more visible criminal networks, fundraising for Islamist
militants in the US appears to have chiefly taken place via charitable frontorganisations, which have proven very difficult for prosecutors to secure convictions
against, even for lesser crimes such as fraud. Enaam Arnout (case #2) –included in the
current sample- is one of the few instances of successful prosecution of such an
organisation and was convicted of fraud only- but he does not have any reported prior
convictions. This leads to the second point.
2) It is important to distinguish between previous crimes and crimes that are
committed in direct relation to terrorism offences. Fraud-type offences, as noted by
Sageman are certainly common within terrorism and this is where they show up in the
current sample. The fact that Sageman’s sample had prior convictions for such crimes
might also be indicative of repeat offenders, or of terrorists deliberately seeking out
criminals with the requisite skill-sets to fulfil their needs.
Concurrent, related convictions reveal a variety of criminal exploits, which also
to some degree reflect the social standing of the individuals involved. So, for example,
members of Kevin James’ group (case #25) lived in a poor area of Los Angeles and
were led outside of prison by convicted felon Levar Washington. In order to raise funds
they carried out a series of armed robberies, which quickly led to their arrest. By
comparison, Khalid Ouazzani (case #44- arrested in Kansas City in February 2010) ran
his own used car dealership and from at least 2007 onwards raised funds for al-Qaeda
via fraud and money laundering. Despite the fact that terrorist activity is often closely
associated with other forms of crime, Islamist terrorists do not appear to be ‘career
criminals’ with a long history of unrelated offending.
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A final point to consider with respect to prior offending is whether or not
criminal records have become more common in the post-Iraq generation of jihadis. The
data here supports this, with 18 of 25 (72%) of individuals with criminal records
beginning their terrorist careers in or after 2004. The reasons for this, however, are not
entirely clear. Sageman observes that terrorists these days are more likely to be selfsufficient in the absence of funding from al-Qaeda Central and therefore resort to
criminal means for funding,17 but this does not explain previous unrelated criminality. It
is possible of course that terrorists are making more effort to deliberately recruit
criminals but this is not readily apparent from the US sample. A more plausible
explanation may be that militant Islamist ideology has simply found a wider audience
and manages to resonate with the feelings of a minority of ordinary criminals.

Mental Health
Table 9.10. Mental health of individuals involved in US Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Mental
Health

Unknown

No
issues

Low IQ

Questioned
at trial

Number
% TOT

80
88%

6
7%

1
1%

2
2%

History
of
illness
2
2%

As detailed in chapter 4, mental health has largely been discounted as playing a
role in how or why individuals become terrorists. The present sample supports this.
Only 1 individual was reported to have below average IQ (Shahawar Matin Siraj,
convicted of plotting to attack the New York Herald Square subway station- case #23)
and 2 others were reported to have had a diagnosable mental disorder. Of these 2, only
Siraj’s co-conspirator, James Elshafay, suffered from long-term illness (including
delusions, depression and schizophrenia) while the other, JIS member Hammad Samana
(case #25), was temporarily deemed unfit to stand trial. Overall it is a safe assumption
that the vast majority of individuals for whom information was lacking did not suffer
from mental illness and it is clearly not useful for explaining the behaviour of the
sample.
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9.2.3 Offence Date Range
Table 9.11. Offence date ranges in US Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Offence
date
range

Min

Max

Average

Mode

<1
week

17
years

2.59
years

1 year
or less

Offence date ranges were coded by the year rather than exact dates, since they
are extremely difficult to accurately pinpoint. The minimum offence range was,
however, less than 1 week. For example, there is no publicly available information
which makes it clear that Mohammed Taheri-Azar or Aafia Siddiqui (cases #35 & #45both of whom were prosecuted for attempted murder) had engaged in much preparation
for their attacks. Taheri-Azar appears to have begun active preparation a day or two
before, while Siddiqui’s attack was clearly a product of the moment. Having said this, it
also highlights the fact that the focus here is upon identifiable offending behaviour,
which precludes the build up of radicalisation and numerous other potentially relevant
behaviours. Generally speaking, most of the individuals studied here embarked on the
path to radicalisation at least a year prior to actively offending.
The maximum offence range was 17 years (which was for Christopher Paul –
case #1- who left the US for training in 1990 and was not apprehended until 2007)
while the average was 2.6 years. However, the most frequently occurring offence range
was 1 year or less, which applied to 57% of cases. Further dividing the sample into preIraq (up to and including 2003) and post-Iraq (2004 onwards) is also revealing. The
average pre-2004 offence range is 3.95 years compared to 1.4 years after 2003. Given
the fact that the longest-running cases began before 2001, plus the effect of increased
scrutiny after 9/11, it appears that Islamist terrorists are now more likely to be caught at
an earlier stage of offending. A related argument would be that terrorists are making
effort to advance their plans more rapidly or that individuals are progressing from being
more or less inactive to going operational within a shorter space of time than has been
the case in the past. However, whilst the speed that cases sometimes progress at is
striking, the actual degree of change that might have occurred is very difficult to assess.
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9.2.4 Radicalisation
Table 9.12. Radicalisation classification for individuals involved in US Islamist terrorism cases (20012008).

Radicalisation Individual
Number
% n (16)
% TOT

1
6%
1%

Virtual

Social

Mixed

1
6%
1%

7
44%
8%

5
31%
5%

Not
radicalised
2
13%
2%

Unknown
75
N/A
82%

Despite a general interest in how radicalisation takes place, there was very little
reliable information available on individual pathways into Islamist extremism. One
subject (Taheri-Azar –case #35- who ran several students over at the University of
North Carolina in 2006) appeared to have largely radicalised on an individual basis,
reading the Quran by himself. However, he was also reportedly influenced by a family
friend with extremist views and may well have accessed online propaganda. Ryan
Anderson (case #21) the National Guardsman who attempted to provide al-Qaeda with
military intelligence in 2004, appears to have turned to Islamist militancy almost
entirely by way of websites and online chat-rooms (swiftly bringing him to the attention
of authorities) and there are no references to anyone else having influenced him.
Seven individuals are classed as having radicalised primarily via face-to-face
social interaction: 4 of these are the JIS group headed by Kevin James (James
radicalised in prison, Washington was influenced by James, and in turn influenced
Patterson and Samana). The remaining 3, Jose Padilla (case #3), ‘Mike’ Hawash (case
#10) and Ahmed Omar Abu Ali (case #13) were clearly influenced by individuals
whom they were in direct contact with (the first 2 cases within the United States and the
latter in Saudi Arabia). 5 more individuals, Adam Gadahn (case #11); Mohammed
Junaid Babar (case #14); Elshafay and Siraj (case #23); and Omar Hammami (case
#39), all showed signs of active searching on the Internet as well as influential face-toface interaction. And just 2 individuals, Ronald Grecula (case #29) and Michael
Reynolds (case #31) were not radicalised in that they were first and foremost criminal
opportunists/ ‘troubled’ individuals who were not apparently Muslims.
It may be surprising that so little information is available, but unless a great
many assumptions are made it is not possible to classify the majority of individuals in
this sample without seriously compromising the validity of the study. However, it is
worth noting that for a great many of the 75 unclassified individuals (constituting 82%
201

of the total) face-to-face social interaction appears to have played an important role. Use
of the Internet to access jihadi propaganda and forums is certainly common as well –and
in this sense, processes of radicalisation are very often a combination of the social and
the virtual- but ‘real-life’ interaction with other like-minded individuals and significant
others remains a key ingredient in the lives of many Islamist terrorists emerging from
America.
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9.2.5 Group Characteristics

Immediate Group Size
Table 9.13. Immediate group size of US Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Immediate
Group Size
Overall
(46)
Pre‐2004
(20)
2004‐2008
(26)

Min.

Max.

Average

Mode

1

11

2.4

1

11

3.1

1

5

1.8

1
57% TOT
1
45% n
1
65% n

Table 9.13 shows the immediate group size of the US terrorism cases. The
minimum was just 1 individual acting entirely alone; the maximum was 11 and the
average was 2.4. Like many of the variables examined here though, group size is not
always an objective factor, which can be clearly determined. It is quite common for
other individuals to have frequent contact with groups of individuals later convicted for
terrorism offences (e.g. all acquitted individuals who were still frequent group-members
were excluded from the current sample). Furthermore, many groups and individuals are
also part of wider, poorly defined networks that have some influence on how they
function. Immediate group size thus focuses quite narrowly on the particular individuals
that were prosecuted within the same case and should not be thought of as a ‘concrete’
variable.
The fact that groups of 1 are apparently the most frequently occurring
(regardless of time-period) at face value seems to contradict the above discussion on
radicalisation, which emphasises the importance of face-to-face interaction. However,
these figures are quite misleading. 26 out of 46 cases were classified as having a groupsize of 1 because they were not part of an identifiable group either in the US or abroad.
But the majority of these ‘lone’ cases were in fact very much part of larger networks
and many of them became part of jihadi organisations overseas. For example,
Christopher Paul, Adam Gadahn and Omar Hammami are each dealt with as individuals
in terms of their offending behaviour, but all were absorbed into wider militant
networks and should not be considered lone individuals at all.
Of the 26 ‘individual’ cases, only 8 (17% of the overall total) appear to be
genuinely lone actors as far as their specific offences are concerned (Ryan Anderson
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(case #21); Ahmed Hassan al-Uqaily (case #22); Mark Robert Walker (case #24);
Ronald Allen Grecula (case #29); Mohammad Radwan Obeid (case #30); Michael
Reynolds (case #31); Mohammed Taheri-Azar (case #35); and Aafia Siddiquiiv (case
#45)). Interestingly, all of these cases began in 2004 or later. The reasons for this are
complex but seem to relate to the widespread public awareness of Islamist terrorism
(essentially increasing exposure to it and making it seem a viable cause to grasp onto for
certain people), combined with general disillusionment with the Iraq war and other
issues. In addition, networks of Islamist militants have come under increased scrutiny
after 9/11 –making them harder to connect to for many individuals. One thing that is for
certain though is that, generally speaking, US Islamist terrorism is still very much a
social phenomenon.
This point is emphasised by considering another issue regarding how group-size
is recorded, which relates directly to a prominent feature in the investigation of
terrorism in America, i.e. the use of informants and undercover agents. Informants were
not recorded as part of the immediate group size, but nevertheless play quite active roles
in the way in which groups progress. Moreover, their presence is of undoubted
psychological significance to the other individuals involved (to the extent that
entrapment has routinely been questioned). Thus, for example, an ‘individual’ like
Derrick Shareef (case #36) was clearly willing to go ahead with planned violence
against civilians, but he did not believe he was acting alone. The informant’s
collaboration in the plan was vital to Shareef’s progression. Therefore –regardless of
legal issues of entrapment- we should not understand his actions as those of a lone
individual. As an alternative to the coding used in the current study, it would be quite
feasible to include informants and undercover agents as part of the group.

iv

Siddiqui acted alone in terms of the offence for which she was prosecuted; however she is suspected to
have been part of the al-Qaeda network.
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Leadership
Table 9.14. Leadership in US Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Unknown

None

Leader
only

18
39% TOT

10
22% TOT

0
0% TOT

Spiritual
sanctioner
only

Both/
mixed

0
0% TOT

4
9% TOT

Top‐down
influence
out‐with
group
2
4% TOT

Overseas
leaders/
sanctioners
12
26% TOT

Leadership is another variable on which there is very limited data, making it
extremely difficult to objectively classify. Within-group leaders only (i.e. where an
individual was credited with instigating events but not with any great deal of religious
authority) or the reverse, sanctioners only (with religious but not operational authority)
could not be reliably identified. There were, however, 4 cases where both types of
leader could be identified, or where single individuals seemed to fulfil both roles
(demonstrating the fact that there is overlap between operational and religious
concerns). These were: Ali al-Timimi and Randall Todd Royer in the Virginia jihad
network (case #7); Habis Abdulla al-Saoub in the Portland 7 (case #10); Kevin James
and Levar Washington in the JIS case (case #25); and Narseale Batiste in the Liberty
City Sears Tower plot (case #33). There were no clear leaders, but some evidence of
top-down influence from others out-with the group in 2 cases (those of Syed Haris
Ahmed and Ehsanul Islam Sadequee (case #27); and Zubair and Khaleel Ahmed- case
#28). A further 12 casesv again showed no clear evidence of leadership on the domestic
stage but, by virtue of the fact that individuals joined overseas terrorist organisations it
can be inferred with some confidence that once overseas they were subject to an
established hierarchy (note that this is distinct to domestic cases being controlled from
abroad, which was not apparent).
Finally, the available information indicated that leaders and sanctioners were
absent from 10 cases (almost all individuals, mostly active after the invasion of Iraq)
and 18 cases (39% of the entire sample) could not be classified. Nevertheless, these
results should not be seen as refuting claims that leadership is an important factor in the
operational activities of Islamist terrorists. First, it is a reflection of lacking and poor
quality data. Second, it seems an indication of informal leadership styles- there may be
v

Padilla (case #3); al-Marri (case #4); Faris (case #6); Lindh (case #9); Gadahn (case #11); Ali (case
#13); Maldonado (case #38); Hammami (case #39); Shumpert (case #40); Vinas (case #42); Isse et al
(case #43); Maruf et al (case #46).
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fairly clearly understood ‘pecking orders’ in many groups but it is rare for these to be
formalised in such a way that lower individuals in the group’s hierarchy are following
orders issued by higher-up group members.
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9.2.6 Operational Activity

Ideological Commitment
Table 9.15. Ideological commitment of individuals involved in US Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Ideological
offshoot

Criminal
Troubled/
opportunists criminal

Troubled
individuals
(Islamist)

Social
terrorists/
wannabes

Hardcore/
Hardcore
social

U/K

9

5

2

2

26

13

15

19

10% TOT

5% TOT

2% TOT

2% TOT

29% TOT

14% TOT

16% TOT

21%
TOT

Before examining what people are doing to support jihad, it is useful to consider
the extent to which individuals appear personally committed to violent Islamist
ideology. This has ramifications for understanding how and why people become
involved, and for the prospective rehabilitation of different individuals. This proved a
particularly difficult judgement to make with any degree of confidence since it is an
attempt at inferring individuals’ mindsets based on their behaviour, including things
they have said and done both before and after offending, yet relying on very limited
available data (hence 21% of individuals could not be classified- although they appeared
to lie somewhere between social and hardcore).
In particular it is extremely difficult to draw the line between ‘social’ terrorists
(those who appear to be driven more by factors such as a sense of belonging or selfesteem) and those who are ‘hardcore’ (firmly committed to the Islamist ideologysomeone who is unlikely to change their views under any circumstances). The problem
is that even social ‘wannabes’ can commit the most extreme acts, such as joining an
overseas conflict or planting a bomb in a public place. By the same token hardcore
terrorists might deny their convictions, be cooperative and maintain a pretence of regret
if they are caught in an attempt to escape punishment. As with several other variables,
ideological commitment is thus a matter of emphasis and there is undoubtedly overlap
between categories.
Caveats aside, 9 individuals (Kevin James’ JIS gang arrested in LA in 2005 and
the Sears Tower plotters arrested in Miami in 2006) were classed primarily as
‘ideological offshoots’- combining violent Islamism with other elements- an Islamist
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‘protocol’ established by James in prison and teachings of the Moorish Science Temple
respectively. Another 5 individuals were classed as criminal opportunists, willing to
engage with Islamist militants largely for personal gain as opposed to any ideological
commitment of their own. This applied most clearly to Saifullah Anjum Ranjha (case
#20) and Abdul Tawala Ibn Alishtari (case #34) both of whom agreed to launder money
they believed was going to fund violent Islamists. The others were Ilyas Ali (case #12)
who was struggling financially and became involved in a drug trafficking scheme
seemingly aimed mostly at monetary profit (although missiles were asked to be ‘thrown
into’ the deal, which were intended for al-Qaeda). Finally, Yassin Muhiddin Aref and
Mohammed Mosharref Hossain (case #17) were caught in an FBI sting in which they
agreed to launder money believed to be from the sale of a stinger missile for Jaish eMohammed (JeM), and little evidence has been presented that they were personally
committed to violent Islamism.
Two more individuals (Ronald Grecula and Michael Reynolds- cases #29 & 31)
were classed as ‘troubled’ criminal opportunists. Both attempted to reach out to alQaeda to offer their services and both showed evidence of being driven by a
combination of dissatisfaction in their personal lives as well as financial gain. In
addition, 2 more individuals were classed as apparently troubled individuals but at the
same time inspired by violent Islamist ideology. This applies to Ahmed Hassan alUqaily (case #22) who in 2004 –acting alone- made sustained efforts to acquire
weapons and grenades whilst voicing his disdain for Jews; and Mohammed Taheri-Azar
(case #35) who apparently taught himself the Quran and claimed that Mohammed Atta
was a role model of his.
A large proportion of the US sample appeared to be ‘social’ terrorists or
‘wannabes’ caught up in their sense of belonging or self-esteem within a specific group,
although within this category there was still variation in terms of motivation and
behaviour. For example, most of the members of the Virginia jihad group were classed
as social rather than hardcore- they were inspired by a charismatic leader (al-Timimi)
and actively encouraged by higher-status group members (those with experience of
overseas training, such as Royer) to go overseas for training and combat. Furthermore,
their offence planning took place in a socially-enclosed group environment within the
emotionally charged context immediately following 9/11 with the imminent US
invasion of Afghanistan. Their motivations were also more attuned to feelings of
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altruism and the need to defend Muslims overseas, as opposed to ones of hatred and the
need to kill civilians at home. By contrast, another ‘social’ terrorist, Derrick Shareef
(case #36) was actively planning along with an informant to plant grenades in a
shopping mall during the busy Christmas period. On the face of it he would appear
hardcore; however the impression from reading transcripts of Shareef’s conversations
with his accomplice is of an ill-informed young man with few prospects in life, barely
aware of the consequences of his actions and intent on playing a role of bravado.
Another 13 individuals defied classification as either social or hardcore,
apparently crossing the divide between the two. For example, Daniel Maldonado (case
#38) who trained with Somali Islamist insurgents at the end of 2006 seemed truly
committed to the ideal of establishing an Islamist state through violence, but at the same
time could be described as a zealous convert desperate to demonstrate his commitment
over and above other Muslims (a process of social comparison) and was cooperative
with authorities once captured. Meanwhile, the Fort Dix plotters (case #37) seemed to
be hardcore in the sense that they were moving ever closer to carrying out a militarystyle assault on an army base in the name of Islam, but were also ‘kept in the game’ by
each other’s declarations of seriousness and on several occasions there were discussions
about who was ‘in’ or ‘out’. Of course –as discussed in chapter 4- social mechanisms
are very important to the way in which terrorists develop and just because such
processes are apparent does not mean individuals are necessarily less committed.
Moreover, even the most extreme of hardcore individuals have to go through some
process to reach the stage they are at.
Examples of hardcore militants in the sample include Christopher Paul (involved
with violent Islamists for around 17 years), Adam Gadahn (al-Qaeda’s American
spokesman since 2004), Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohammed (who sent sarcastic and
taunting letters to the prison deputy after he was incarcerated), and Shirwa Ahmed (case
#43) who blew himself up in Somalia in 2008). Such individuals generally show
sustained association with violent Islamists, an enduring willingness and enthusiasm to
support, promote or personally carry out acts of violence, and in instances where they
have been captured are more often defiant. Thirteen of 15 hardcore militants began
offending prior to 2004 (constituting 30% of the earlier generation vs. 4% of the latter),
which might be read as an indication that the most recent generation of Islamist
terrorists are less committed or less dangerous than their predecessors. However, it
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might equally be an artefact of the way that it has been coded here, taking into account
length of time offending and the nature of associations and contacts.
Overall, it must be concluded that ideological commitment is probably too
unreliable –based on the available data- to tell us much about how US Islamist terrorists
operate or what chances of rehabilitation there might be.

Behavioural Classification
Table 9.16. Behavioural classification of US Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008). The top two rows
refer to individuals; the bottom two rows refer to cases.*

Promoting Facilitating:
jihad
Top‐down
4
4% I
4
9% C

1
1% I
1
2% C

Facilitating:
Facilitating/ Offering Preparation
Active
fundraising services for violence
support
2
2% I
2
4% C

7
8% I
6
13% C

14
15% I
11
24% C

24
26% I
11
24% C

Active
pursuit
Misc.
of
violence
38
1
42% I
1% I
18
1
39% C
2% C

*Note that the case total is greater than 46 since some individuals performed different roles within cases,
bringing the total to 54. Case percentages are still derived using 46 as the total.

Behavioural classification is a more direct indicator of operational activity and is
one of the main variables of interest since it tells us what exactly individuals from, or
living in, the US are doing in furtherance of violent Islamist ideology. Like many of the
variables here it proved difficult to classify, given overlapping behaviours within groups
and individuals, and unclear boundaries between categories. Classification should thus
be considered a matter of emphasis rather than an absolute steadfast system of division.
Figures are shown both for individuals (the top two rows) and cases (the bottom
two rows) since individuals within the same case are not always fulfilling the same
function. In particular, facilitating/fundraising the activities of others, and preparation
for violence were both carried out within groups that were primarily concerned with
other activities. The pursuit of violence obviously involved prior preparation, but also
demonstrated more determined, overt steps to perpetrate violence against others.
Offering of services to organised jihadis such as al-Qaeda also encompassed a range of
behaviours, characterised by people ‘reaching out’ in a bottom-up fashion in an attempt

210

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
to provide services (or in a few cases being asked to perform services) such as logistic
support activities, training others, locating targets or manufacturing explosives.
Promoting jihad applied to 4 cases- those of Ali al-Timimi, the spiritual leader
in Virginia; Adam Gadahn, who became the American spokesperson of al-Qaeda;
Mohammad Radwan Obeid (case #30) who promoted jihad online; and Ahmed
Abdellatif Sherif Mohammed (case #41) who posted an online instructional video on
how to make a remote-controlled detonator.
Top-down facilitation of jihad was rare. The single case referred to here is that
of Kevin James, who devised his own jihadi group whose activities he was not directly
involved in only because he was in prison. Active support was also rare. The cases here
were those of Ali Asad Chandia of the Virginia jihad network who assisted senior
Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT) operative Mohammed Ajmal Khan (UK case #11), and
Mohammed Junaid Babar (case #14) who set up a training camp in Pakistan attended by
a group of British jihadis led by Omar Khyam (UK case #14).
The 6 cases involving facilitation/fundraising were somewhat different to the
‘top-down’ and ‘active’ forms of facilitation in that they were not clearly directing
others or providing such hands-on support and specifically involved the transfer of
money. They include Enaam Arnaout (case #2) who ran a charity-front company, the
Benevolence International Foundation; Adham Amin Hassoun and Kifah Wael
Jayyousi, who were involved in recruiting Jose Padilla (case #3); October Martinique
Lewis, who sent money to her partner, Jeffrey Battle (case #10); Abdulrahman Farhane,
an associate of Tarik Shah, who discussed money-raising schemes for jihad (case #15);
Abdul Tawala Ibn Alishtari (case #34) who agreed to launder money for Islamist
militants; and Khalid Ouazzani (case #44) who laundered money and made donations to
al-Qaeda.
There were 11 casesvi that were classed as ‘offering services’, which involved
either individuals ‘advertising’ the fact that they wished to perform tasks such as
training others (Tarik Shah- case #15) or helping to build bombs and/or identify targets
for attack (Grecula and Reynolds- cases #29 and #31), or else involved individuals who
were asked to perform certain tasks and agreed to do so, e.g. Uzair Paracha (case #16)

vi

Ilyas Ali (US case #12); Tarik Shah et al (US case #15); Uzair Paracha (US case #16); Aref & Hossain
(case #17); Saifullah Ranjha (US case #20); Ryan Anderson (US case #21); Mark Walker (US case #24);
Syed Hashmi (US case #26); Ahmed & Sadequee (US case #27); Ronald Grecula (US case #29); Michael
Reynolds (US case #31)
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and Syed Hashmi (case #26), both of whom agreed to perform different logistic support
activities for terrorist organisations. These cases show some overlap with the facilitation
cases but did not necessarily involve money and were either characterised by bottom-up
searching or reaching out to terrorist organisations, or else were organised more by
other people rather than the individuals who were prosecuted.
Most of the remaining cases involved preparation and training for, or active
pursuit of violence (constituting 68% of individuals or 63% of cases). These involved a
mix of domestic and overseas paramilitary-style training, joining violent factions abroad
and planning terrorist strikes on various targets. We will return to the focus of such
plots (overseas vs. domestic, target type, etc) below. The miscellaneous case refers to
Ruben Shumpert (case #40) who fled the US to avoid prosecution for criminal activity
and joined Islamist militants in Somalia where he was later killed in a missile strike.
Overall it should not be too surprising that the majority of US terrorism cases
involve preparation for, or pursuit of violence, since this is a primary concern of
terrorists. However, it does not sit too comfortably with the, until recently, prevailing
view that the US does not suffer from much of a ‘home-grown’ problem, or the
historical observation that it has primarily been a logistic support base. Furthermore,
dividing the sample into pre- vs. post-Iraq time periods lends support to a growing trend
in violence among America’s jihadis. 4 out of 6 cases concerned with
facilitating/fundraising began prior to 2004 (representing 20% of pre-2004 cases vs. 8%
of cases beginning in 2004-2008), while 12 of 18 cases concerned with actively
pursuing violence began in 2004 or later (equalling 30% of all pre-2004 cases vs. 46%
of cases beginning 2004-2008). The absolute numbers involved are relatively low and
the difference might also be a product of differences in how these cases are investigated
(given a tendency in the US towards ‘sting’ operations) but at face value they suggest
that Islamist terrorists who have lived in the US are now somewhat more focussed on
violence than on support activities. This makes sense, given that providing support
requires connections to militant networks (which may be less likely for individuals
growing up in post-9/11 America) while violence can be carried out more or less
independently.
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Domestic vs. Overseas Focus & Operation
Table 9.17. Domestic vs. overseas focus and country of operation of US Islamist terrorism cases (20012008) according to behavioural classification.

Focus:
Focus:
Focus:
Domestic Overseas Mixed
Promoting
jihad
Facilitating:
Top‐down

1

3

1

Country of
operation:
Domestic

Country of
operation:
Overseas

3

1

Country of
operation:
Mixed

Total
4

1

Facilitating:
Active support

2

Facilitating/
fundraising

6

1
1

1

2

6

6

Offering
services

4

5

2

7

1

3

11

Preparation
for violence

2

7

2

1

5

5

11

9

9

6

8

4

18

16

1
31

24

1
17

13

1
54*

Active pursuit
of violence
Misc.
Total

7

*Note that case totals exceed 46 since some individuals performed different roles within cases, bringing
the total to 54.

Table 9.17 shows numbers of US Islamist terrorism cases according to their
behavioural classification divided by whether they had a domestic, overseas or mixed
focus, and whether the individuals involved were based in the US, abroad or a
combination of the two. A domestic focus refers to a concern with affecting events
within the US (although there are almost always overtures to the foreign stage); an
overseas focus involves a primary concern with the global jihad abroad; and a mixed
focus is characterised by a general concern for the global jihad, i.e. definite concern for
international events, with some indication that domestic operations are also deemed
viable. Examining these variables gives an indication of what US Islamist terrorists
want to do and where they are based.
In order to illustrate how cases were classified we will first take a look at the top
category, ‘Promoting Jihad’, i.e. encouraging others to participate, in a little more detail.
Looking at the table we can see that this involved 4 cases. These were Ali al-Timimi,
the spiritual sanctioner in the ‘Virginia jihad’ network (case #7), Adam Gadahn, the
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American spokesman for al-Qaeda (case #11), Mohammad Radwan Obeid, the online
recruiter (case #30) and Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohammed, who distributed an
online instructional video for how to make a remote detonator (case #41). 1 of these
individuals (al-Timimi) maintained a primarily overseas focus in terms of encouraging
others to fight abroad while the other 3 promoted jihad in a more general sense that
could be applied overseas and/or in the US. 3 of them (al-Timimi, Obeid and
Mohammed) were based in the US while committing their offences, while Gadahn is
based overseas.
The single case of top-down facilitation (Kevin James) involved both a domestic
focus and base of operation. The 2 active support cases (Ali Asad Chandia –case #7- &
Mohammed Junaid Babar –case #14) were both focussed on jihad overseas and both
offended abroad, although Chandia was also active in the US. All 6 facilitation/
fundraising cases were also focussed on events overseas.
Cases where individuals offered their services to al-Qaeda or similar
organisations were quite evenly split between having a domestic or overseas focus, with
2 individuals (Ilyas Ali –case #12- and Syed Haris Ahmed –case #27) seemingly more
mixed in their outlook. The majority of ‘preparation for violence’ cases had overseas
aims; and those who actively pursued violence were split evenly between having a
domestic or overseas outlook (i.e. wanting to perpetrate attacks at home or abroad).
In general, the focus and the country of operation did not directly correspond.
For example all 6 facilitating/fundraising cases were aimed at supporting militants
overseas yet all 6 were based in the US. Similarly, for cases that involved offering of
services to Islamist militants 7 (64%) involved an overseas or mixed focus but only 4
(36%) involved any travel abroad. These figures make sense given that it is not always
necessary to travel abroad in order to provide funds, and if individuals believe they have
found ‘al-Qaeda’ at home, again there is less need to look overseas.
There was a greater correspondence in terms of ambitions and actions in cases of
preparation for violence:vii 9 cases (82%) involved some focus on overseas activities
and there was international travel and contact with organised foreign militants in 10
cases (91%). There was also a relatively high percentage of cases involving pursuit of

vii

Paul (case #1); al-Marri (case #4); Faris (case #6); Lindh (case #9); the Portland 7 (case #10); Ali (case
#13); Elshafay & Siraj (case #23); James et al (case #25); Batiste et al (case #33); Taheri-Azar (case #35);
Shareef (case #36); the Fort Dix plotters (case #37); Maldonado (case #38); Hammami (case #39); Vinas
(case #42); Ahmed & Hassan (case #43); Siddiqui (case #42); Maruf et al (case #46).
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violence in which there was international travel: these cases were split 50/50 in terms of
focus but 12 of them (67%) included some operation abroad. Again this makes sense,
given a pervasive desire to attend overseas jihadi training camps and take part in
conflict abroad.

Table 9.18. Domestic vs. overseas focus and country of operation (C.o.O) of US Islamist terrorism cases
(2001-2008) divided according to whether cases began before 2004 or 2004-2008. Percentages refer to
rows.

Focus:
Purely
Domestic

Focus:
Purely
Overseas

Focus:
Mixed

C.o.O:
Purely
Domestic

C.o.O:
Purely
Overseas

C.o.O:
Mixed

Overall
(46)

14 (30%)

25 (54%)

7 (15%)

21 (46%)

12 (26%)

13 (28%)

Pre 2004
(20)

5 (25%)

11 (55%)

4 (20%)

4 (20%)

4 (20%)

12 (60%)

2004‐2008
(26)

9 (35%)

14 (54%)

3 (12%)

17 (65%)

8 (31%)

1 (4%)

Turning to the pre- vs. post-Iraq divide, Table 9.18 shows how the focus and
operation of US Islamist terrorists has changed over time (note that ‘purely’
domestic/overseas refers to the fact that there was no within-group variation- thus all
group members were focussed on the same aims and all were based in the same country,
otherwise they were classed as mixed, which includes operations at home and abroad).
Overall there has been an overseas focus in 54% of cases (with a further 15%
mixed) and international travel by at least some group-members in 54% of cases. In the
pre-Iraq era just 5 (25%) of cases involved a purely domestic focus (these were Ali
Salah Kalah al-Marri –case #4- Iyman Faris –case #6- Ahmed Omar Abu Ali –case #13Uzair Paracha –case #16- and Yassin Aref and Mohammed Hossain–case #17).
Similarly only 4 cases were based entirely in the US, although they mostly do not
correspond with those with domestic ambitions (they are Enaam Arnout –case #2- Tarik
Shah et al –case #15- Aref & Hossain–case #17- and Saifullah Ranjha –case #20). This
shows that before the invasion of Iraq, more US Islamist terrorism cases were focussed
on activities overseas, most involved some international travel, and even when the US
was being targeted it was primarily by individuals from abroad.
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During the post-Iraq period, the number of cases with a purely domestic focus
has nearly doubled in absolute terms and represents a significantly higher percentage
(35%). Moreover, these casesviii all involved domestic-based plotters, none of whom
had been sent from abroad to carry out an operation. The desire to become involved in
activities overseas has remained high (seen in 54-65% of cases) but the ability to travel
and become involved in jihad abroad has decreased and is seen in only 9 casesix (35%)
and in fact in 1 of these cases (Ahmed and Sadequee) they were still ultimately
unsuccessful in their efforts. Thus there is a greater disparity between the ambitions and
capabilities of post-Iraq generation Islamist terrorists living in or from the US. This can
be explained by increased counter-terrorism measures making it more difficult to
connect with terrorists overseas and in turn may help explain the growing tendency to
see the US as a viable target and base of operations. The nature of international travel is
further illuminated by considering modus operandi.

viii

These cases are: Ahmed Hassan al-Uqaily (case #22); Elshafay & Siraj (case #23); Kevin James et al
(case #25); Ronald Grecula (case #29); Michael Reynolds (case #31); Narseale Batiste et al (case #33);
Taheri-Azar (case #35); Derrick Shareef (case #36); and the Fort Dix plotters (case #37).
ix
These were: Syed Hashmi (case #26); Syed Haris Ahmed & Ehsanul Islam Sadequee (case #27); Daniel
Maldonado (case #38); Omar Hammami (case #39); Ruben Shumpert (case #40); Bryant Vinas (case
#42); Abdifatah Isse et al (case #43); Aafia Siddiqui (case #45); and Jamal Sheikh Bana et al (case #46).
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Planned M.O. of Attacks
Table 9.19. Target type and weaponry in US Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008) for domestic and
overseas-based attacks/ planned attacks (excluding joining overseas conflict).

Target: Target: Target: Target:
Fire‐
Explosives
Other Mixed U/K
Civilian
Gov.
Mixed
U/K
arms
Domestic
target
Overseas
target

4

1

2

1

2

1

2

1

1

1

1

3

1

1

Of the 18 cases involving active pursuit of violence, 7 (39%) involved joining
overseas conflicts. These were: John Walker Lindh (case #9); Habis Abdulla al-Saoub
of the Portland 7 (case #10); Daniel Maldonado (case #38); Omar Hammami (case #39);
Bryant Vinas (case #42); Kamal Said Hassan and Shirwa Ahmed from Minnesota (case
#43); and Zakaria Maruf and Jamal Sheikh Banna (case #46- both killed in Somalia, the
former via suicide bombing). The remaining 11 (61%) of cases, shown in Table 9.19,
involved planned/perpetrated terrorist attacks in a more ‘traditional’ sense. None of
these attacks were successful. The closest, in the sense that it came to fruition, was
Taheri-Azar’s attack using a 4-wheel drive motor vehicle to run people over in North
Carolina, although no-one was killed. Second to that was Aafia Siddiqui’s impromptu
attempt to gun down her US interrogators in Afghanistan, although she missed and was
subdued. None of the rest made it past planning stages.
As shown in Table 9.19, just 3 of these planned attacks were aimed at, or
perpetrated against, overseas targets (Christopher Paul- case #1; Ahmed Omar Abu Alicase #13; and Aafia Siddiqui- case #45) which reflects the fact that overseas cases in the
sample tend to involve joining jihadi conflicts rather than carrying out urban terrorist
attacks. Also note the direct correlation between being based at home/abroad and
focussing attacks at home/abroad in all but 1 case- Abu Ali, who was convicted of
plotting to assassinate George W. Bush while based in Saudi Arabia in 2003.
The remaining 8 planned attacks were focussed domestically. Four were
exclusively aiming to attack civilians (Iyman Faris (case #6); Siraj and Elshafay (case
#23); Taheri-Azar (case #35); and Derrick Shareef- case #36). One plot was aimed
exclusively at a government target (the Fort Dix plot), 2 more showed signs of
considering both civilian and government targets (Kevin James’ JIS gang, and the Sears
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Tower plotters) and 1 case was ended too early for any concrete indications about where
he might attack (the case of al-Qaeda ‘sleeper agent’ Ali Saleh Kalah al-Marri- case #4).
Choice of weaponry was also very mixed. Neither domestically-based nor
overseas Islamist terrorists formerly of the US showed any preference for a particular
form of weaponry, demonstrating that it is most likely restricted by availability/
opportunity. Finally, as should be apparent from the cases cited above, there is no clear
pattern in terms of attack-types before and after the invasion of Iraq other than already
discussed (pp.204-205). Domestic plots did occur prior to the invasion of Iraq, and
overseas operations have taken place since.

9.2.7 International Dimensions and Associations
Table 9.20. Contact with foreign terrorists in US Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Individuals
Pre 2004
2004
onwards
Cases

Pre 2004
2004
onwards

Contact with

foreign terrorists

Yes
42
46% TOT
26

No
42
46% TOT
13

U/K
7
8% TOT
5

16

29

2

23

18

50% TOT

39% TOT

14

3

5
11%
TOT
3

9

15

2

A major area of interest in the post-9/11 era has been whether or not terrorists
active in the US are in contact with foreign terrorist organisations, and if so, what the
nature of that contact is. Table 9.20 shows that roughly half of all individuals and cases
have had contact with foreign terrorists, while approximately 10% of both could not be
reliably classified (although given the tendency to report these connections most
‘unknowns’ probably do not have well-established foreign connections).
By further examining the pre- vs. post-2004 divide, there is a notable difference.
59% of individuals (or 70% of cases) that began prior to 2004 had established contact
with foreign terrorists. Moreover, 62% of individuals (58% of cases) that began in 2004
or later did not have contact with foreign terrorists. This supports general observations
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that ‘home-grown’ terrorists are less likely to be in contact with foreign jihadis,
although it is not something that should be discounted altogether.

Table 9.21. Number of US Islamist terrorism cases in contact with foreign militants in different locations,
divided according to whether cases began prior to 2004 or 2004-2008.

Foreign terrorists' location

Pre
2004

2004
onwards

Global (S. Asia/ N. Africa/
Middle East/ Europe/ Balkans)

3

0

Pakistan/ Afghanistan
Germany
UK
Somalia
Saudi Arabia
Canada
Unconfirmed

12
1
2
0
1
1
0

2
0
2
5
0
1
1

Table 9.21 adds to the discussion by showing the whereabouts of foreign
terrorist contacts among US Islamist terrorism cases. Note that a number of cases had
contacts in multiple locations, hence the case-total in the pre- and post-Iraq categories is
increased from 14 to 20, and from 9 to 11, respectively (though this still accurately
reflects the number of cases in contact with similar others in each region of the world).
First, just 3 cases involved ‘global’ contacts: Christopher Paul (case #1) who
fought in Bosnia, trained in Afghanistan and colluded with militants in Germany;
Enaam Arnaout (case #2) who had links to Afghanistan and sent money to mujahedin
around the world; and Randall Todd Royer (case #7) who also fought in Bosnia and
trained in Pakistan. No cases in the post-2004 generation have rivalled these
connections.
Second, it is notable that Pakistan and Afghanistan appear to have become less
accessible over time (although they remain sought-after destinations and remain
hotspots of Islamist terrorist activity). The 2 cases where direct contact was made with
foreign terrorists in this region in 2004 or later help to clarify the situation. First, there is
Syed Haris Ahmed (case #27) who met with a group of Canadian ‘home-grown’
terrorists and also made contact online with a British jihadist –Aabid Khan (UK case
#25). Ahmed met with Khan in Pakistan in 2005 hoping that he would set him up in a
training camp with LeT, although things did not work out as Ahmed planned and he had
219

to return to the US. The other case is that of Bryant Neal Vinas (case #42) who travelled
to Pakistan in 2007 and joined al-Qaeda shortly afterwards. Few are able to do as Vinas
did without friends or family to vouch for them or provide letters of recommendation,
and that may be the difference between those who are able to connect with jihadis
overseas and those who fail to do so.
This same general rule seems to apply for people living in the US but
maintaining contact with terrorists abroad via phone, email, or other means of
communication. All 5 casesx based in the US involving contact with overseas jihadis in
the pre-2004 period had previously spent time in, or at least had links to Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Khalid Ouazzani (case #44), the only US-based case beginning after 2003
to involve contact with a foreign terrorist organisation, somehow knew a co-conspirator
in an unspecified location abroad who was connected to al-Qaeda. In the absence of
these sorts of personal connections it is far more difficult to get in touch with, and
establish credibility with overseas terrorists.
The last point to note in the above table is that, just as Pakistan and Afghanistan
have apparently become more difficult sites for American jihadis to make contact with
their foreign counterparts, Somalia has emerged as a new prime destination. All 5
Somali cases (Maldonado- case #38; Hammami- case #39; Shumpert- case #40; Isse et
al- case #43; Bana et al- case #46) occurred after 2004 and together involved a mix of
American-born and Somali individuals, none of whom seemed to encounter any great
difficulties in establishing first contact with violent Islamist factions. This of course is a
reflection of developments in that country, and the reactive nature of counter-terrorism
(failing to intervene before individuals could leave the US).
The nature of organisational contact is another important issue, but one that is
obscured by the lack of available data. However, the nature of individuals’ roles does
give some indication of their relationship to organised terrorists. Looking at the pre2004 cases involving foreign affiliationxi, many can be considered operatives of an
organisation, often provided with a service (training) and then offered, if not encouraged
or ordered to undertake missions on behalf of the organisation, for which they were
x

Enaam Arnaout (case #2); Ali Saleh Kalah al-Marri (case #4); Iyman Faris (case #6); Ali al-Timimi et al
(case #7); and Mohammed Warsame (case #8).
xi
Christopher Paul (case #1); Enaam Arnaout (case #2); Jose Padilla et al (case #3); Ali Saleh Kalah alMarri (case #4); Iyman Faris (case #6); Ali al-Timimi et al (case #7); Mohammed Abdulla Warsame (case
#8); John Walker Lindh (case #9); Habis Abdulla al-Saoub (case #10); Adam Gadahn (case #11); Ahmed
Omar Abu Ali (case #13); Mohammed Junaid Babar (case #14); Uzair Paracha (case #16); and Hamid
Hayat (case #18).
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sometimes given money and equipment to help them achieve their goals. On occasion
some (e.g. Jose Padilla) were even given money for personal reasons such as visiting
family, and international travel was frequently involved. At the same time, individuals
seem to have had a fair amount of autonomy once they had passed through trainingthey had considerable freedom as to exactly how they went about their duties, and they
could turn down tasks put to them or drop out of involvement altogether if they wished.
In cases that began from 2004 onwardsxii, only Bryant Vinas appears to have
played a similar role although he was not dispatched overseas to carry out any missions
before being apprehended. Syed Hashmi (case #26) played a less involved, logisticsupport type role and Syed Haris Ahmed made contact with organised jihadis but was
essentially rejected by them overseas. The remaining cases were all based in Somalia
and could be classed more as army volunteers rather than semi-autonomous operatives
(although at least 3 individuals were able to drop out and return home, there has been
speculation that at least 1 Somali-American was shot for refusing to obey an order).
This further raises the point that so far involvement with Somali Islamists –which has
increased in recent years- has been a matter of becoming engaged in a civil war. Even
though there are reports of explosives training and suicide bombing, there have not so
far been any examples of recruits being trained up and then dispatched back home to
strike against the US or elsewhere (however, at the time of writing attacks in Uganda,
which al-Shabab have claimed responsibility for, is a worrying indication that this may
be changing18).
Finally, before we consider domestic associations out-with the immediate group,
it is also informative to compare the cases that have not involved foreign affiliation. All
of the cases aimed at perpetrating domestic terrorist attacks, which did have foreign
affiliations began prior to the invasion of Iraq. By contrast, there was no contact with
foreign organised terrorists in any of the planned domestic terrorist attack cases which
began in 2004 or later.xiii Given the fact that people pay the most attention to planned
attacks as opposed to terrorism-financing or even joining conflicts abroad, this helps
explain the widespread perception that Islamist terrorists in the US tend to be
‘amateurs’, completely removed from global terror networks. Of course online jihadi
xii

Syed Hashmi (case #26); Syed Haris Ahmed (case #27); Daniel Maldonado (case #38); Omar
Hammami (case #39); Ruben Shumpert (case #40); Bryant Vinas (case #42); Abdifatah Isse et al (case
#43); Khalid Ouazzani (case #44); and Zakaria Maruf et al (case #46).
xiii
Siraj and Elshafay; Kevin James et al; the Sears Tower plotters; Taheri-Azar; Derrick Shareef; and the
Fort Dix group.
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chat-forums make it possible that individuals based in the US were in contact with
terrorists overseas but that it went undetected or un-reported. This is a possibility, but
given the eagerness of authorities in the US to track down anybody who is associated
with terrorists in any meaningful way, combined with the fact that foreign associations
do seem to be disclosed to the press when they are present, the likelihood seems that
undetected/unreported associations are generally lacking in significance.

Table 9.22. Numbers of US Islamist terrorism cases in the pre- vs. post-2004 periods with named
domestic and foreign terrorist associations.

Pre‐
2004
(n=20)
2004
onwards
(n=26)
Total
% TOT
(46)

Named
domestic
associations

Named foreign
associations

Both

Total

3

7

4

14
(70%)

7

2

1

10
(38%)

10

9

5

24

22%

20%

11%

46%

Interestingly, there have also been a number of domestic associations between
US-based Islamist militants. Table 9.22 shows that in the pre-Iraq period (including
2003) there were 3 cases with named domestic associations only (Nuradin Abdi (case
#5), who knew Christopher Paul and Iyman Faris- all based in Ohio; Tarik Shah (case
#15), based in New York, who knew Saifullah Chapman in Virginia; and Marwan
Othman El-Hindi (case #19) who was part of a group with Mohammed Zaki Amawi in
Ohio and knew Zubair and Khaleel Ahmed in Chicago). There were 7 cases with named
foreign associations only (4 of which were connected to senior al-Qaeda operatives such
as bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed) and 4 cases where both foreign and
domestic associations were named (Christopher Paul, Iyman Faris, the Virginia jihad
network and Mohammed Junaid Babar) although their foreign associations were far
more significant.
In the post-2003 period, the pattern of named associations is reversed. Only 2
cases (Bryant Neal Vinas and Aafia Siddiqui) have been reportedly connected to foreign
(accused) terrorists only, and only 1 more (Syed Haris Ahmed and Ehsanul Islam
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Sadequee) involved connections to both foreign and domestic terrorists. Meanwhile, 7
cases involved named domestic associations only (Syed Hashmi; Zubair and Khaleel
Ahmed; Derrick Shareef; Daniel Maldonado; Omar Hammami; Abdifatah Isse et al; and
Zakaria Maruf et al- the last 2 cases being essentially part of the same network).
These figures lend apparent support to the hypothesis that –in accordance with
general impressions about the nature of ‘home-grown’ Islamist terrorism (HGIT)substantial international associations with terrorists abroad have become less common.
This is further supported by Table 9.20 above, showing that there have been less cases
involving foreign organisational contact after 2003. However, it must also be
emphasised that Table 9.22 is depicting named associations. Increased security
measures and aggressive prosecution on the domestic stage increases the likelihood that
terrorists operating in the US will be known and openly named. At the same time,
certain groups have undoubtedly made foreign contacts but no names have been giventhis relates specifically to the cases based in Somalia and may be reflective of lower
levels of intelligence there as compared to Pakistan and Afghanistan. The numbers here,
as throughout this report, should thus be considered a set of indicators rather than
absolute figures. The picture will be further illuminated by examining the role of the
Internet.
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9.2.8 The Role of the Internet
Table 9.23. Use of the Internet in US Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Use of
Internet

U/K

Pre‐
2004

8

2004
13
onwards
Total
21
% TOT 46%

Comm.

Access
propa‐
ganda/
forums

Gather
intell/
research
attacks

8

1

2

1

0

1

0

7

7

3

3

3

0

0

15
33%

8
17%

5
11%

4
9%

3
7%

1
2%

0
0%

Create/
Misc.
Fund‐
Grp.
distribute
Comm. raising formation
materials

The Internet is thought to have revolutionised the global Sunni jihad. It has
dramatically increased the accessibility of Islamist propaganda and has facilitated truly
worldwide communication –and thereby recruitment. The credibility of these
possibilities is unquestionable, and numerous examples can be cited to demonstrate the
versatility of the world-wide web in the hands of today’s generation of jihadists. Yet
there has been no systematic examination of how it is used.
Table 9.23 shows how US Islamist terrorists have been reported to be using the
Internet (note that percentages are for the overall total of 46, but because in numerous
cases the Net was used in multiple ways, the total count comes to more than this). In
many cases (46%) the use of the Internet was not specifically reported (although often it
seemed likely that propaganda materials had at least been accessed or that
communication with associates via email may have occurred).
The most popular use, equally distributed before and after the invasion of Iraq
and occurring in 33% of all cases, was for communication with confederates (i.e.
sending specific messages) either by sending email, or by using the ‘drop-box’ method
of writing messages in draft folders and sharing account passwords.
The next most popular usage was for accessing jihadi propaganda/ materials or
online forums to share views, trade information and offer each other advice (explicitly
recorded in 17% of all cases). The 1 case out of a total of 8 that occurred prior to 2004
was that of Mohammed Zaki Amawi et al (case #19) and in fact Amawi was directly
inspired by the invasion of Iraq, travelling there in October 2003 in an unsuccessful
attempt to join the jihad. This does not invalidate using 2004 rather than 2003 as a cutoff point for assessing the impact of the Iraq war, but demonstrates that any division is
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essentially arbitrary and cannot be absolutely precise. Either way it is apparent that use
of online propaganda and forums has become more apparent over time, and that the
post-Iraq generation of Islamist militants have readily incorporated this into their
repertoire. Cases such as these where jihadi materials were downloaded and often
secure chat-rooms were accessed almost always involved use of the Internet to
communicate as well. This indicates that more advanced uses of the Net are likely to
incorporate more basic ones.
Gathering intelligence and information for researching attacks took place in 11%
of all cases, and was reported in both the pre- and post-Iraq generations. It appears to
have been quickly realised as a possible use of the Internet, and continues to be used in
this way. However, despite the ease of ‘virtual surveillance’ there have not so far been
any American cases where targets that were researched on the Net were then
successfully attacked, and online research tends to be backed up by physical
surveillance. Its chief function appears to be one of investigating (often multiple)
possibilities and preliminary scouting before more thorough preparation might take
place.19
Creation and distribution of jihadi materials was recorded in just 4 cases and
might initially be seen as the reserve of more committed, knowledgeable or higherstatus individuals. However, the evidence shows a rather mixed bunch in this category.
First there is Adam Gadahn, whose speeches are posted online by al-Qaeda. He does
seem to fit the role of someone who is well-entrenched and holds status by way of his
associations. Similarly, Omar Hammami has featured in propaganda videos for alShabaab and is presented in a leadership role. At the other end of the scale is Mark
Robert Walker (case #24), a student in Wyoming who allegedly started his own jihadi
website as he attempted to make contact with individuals who would be able to help
him join the jihad in Somalia. Finally, sitting somewhere in between these 2 cases is
that of Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohammed (case #41) who independently made an
instructional video on how to make a remote detonator and posted it on Youtube. These
cases demonstrate that jihadis’ use of the Internet is diverse and is probably related
more to their personal technological abilities (or those of their associates) with the
Internet itself rather than their personal standing in extremist networks.
The 3 recorded ‘miscellaneous communication’ cases are those of Omar
Hammami (case #39) and the interlinked Somali-Americans from Minnesota (cases #43
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& #46), all of whom joined the jihad in Somalia and all of whom used Facebook and
email to communicate- although it was to send messages to family and friends back
home. This serves as a reminder that not all terrorist communication takes place in
secure chat-rooms or involves code-words to disguise their meaning. Nor do they only
communicate with their counterparts, but also with friends and family who are not
fellow jihadists.
Perhaps surprisingly, there is only one reported instance of the Internet being
used to raise funds for jihad within the sample- this was in relation to Enaam Arnaout
who ran the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) from around 1992 to 2002.
BIF operated as a charity and as such solicited donations from people in the name of
assisting Muslims living in crisis zones and included a website for this purpose. The fact
that it was not disclosed that funds were also sent to armed mujahedin resulted in
Arnaout being convicted of fraud. This was a relatively high visibility organisation
openly presenting itself as a legitimate charity and was able to operate freely until after
9/11. Since then, numerous charities came under investigation and were subject to
sanctions for suspected ties to terrorism- therefore similar cases appear less likely to be
able to function in the post-2001 environment. This may help explain the absence of
such cases in the current sample, although at the same time it seems naive to suggest
that the Internet is not still used for terror-financing. Its precise role in this capacity in
the context of America clearly warrants further attention.
Finally, there were no recorded cases of the Internet forming the basis of group
formation (i.e. a sustained group coming together having met online) although certain
individuals did communicate online and then meet in person- e.g. Syed Haris Ahmed
and Ehsanul Islam Sadequee met with a group of Canadian jihadists led by Fahim
Ahmad; Sadequee went on to make arrangements to form a jihadi organisation in
Sweden, although was arrested before the plans were followed up; and Zubair and
Khaleel Ahmed (case #28) –who were also in communication with Syed Ahmed and
Sadequee- met with Marwan Othman El-Hindi to discuss possible training in the US. It
thus seems that close-knit groups are more likely to form in person –aside from
anything based on proximity- while the Internet is used more for networking and as a
means for reaching out to people outside of the immediate group to see what each party
can offer the other. As illustrated by individuals such as Ryan Anderson (case #21) or

226

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Ronald Grecula (case #29), these networking activities also place individuals and
groups at increased risk to detection by law enforcement.
Overall, the use of the Internet among Islamist terrorists from or living in the US
is varied and certainly not uncommon. Islamist extremists clearly use it as much of the
rest of the general population do (i.e. according to its availability and their own
abilities) and the presence of jihadis online has expanded in line with the general growth
of the Internet. The available evidence does not support a ‘virtualisation’ of jihad in
America though. As illustrated in the discussion on radicalisation (which revealed only
1 case where an individual’s radicalisation appeared to have taken place almost
exclusively online) the Internet has become an integral part of jihad but has not erased
the importance of face-to-face meetings, social interaction, or physical preparation and
training. Even communication –which seems the most widespread use of the Internetstill takes place over the telephone as well.
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9.2.9 Stated Motivations
Table 9.24. Stated motivations in US Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Stated
Motivations
Pre‐2004
2004
onwards
% TOT

U/K

Religious/
altruistic/
foreign
policy

Anti‐
US

Foreign
policy/
anti‐
Semitism

Anti‐US/
Self‐
serving

Anti‐US/
Personal
circumstance

16

4

0

0

0

0

3

16

2

1

3

1

41%

43%

4%

2%

7%

2%

Having looked at what US Islamist terrorists are doing, it is important to address
why they are doing it. Table 9.24 shows the distribution of stated motivations within
cases (although each individual may have more or less unique motivations, they tend to
express common themes within groups). Information that specifically documented
stated motivations or goals was henerally limited. For 41% of cases data was lacking to
the extent that they could not be accurately classified. Among those that could be, most
showed a predictable combination of motivations surrounding religious identification,
altruistic needs to defend fellow Muslims, and a profound dissatisfaction with American
foreign policy, in particular their involvement in conflict zones and other affairs
involving Muslims. The remaining cases showed evidence of some of these aspects,
such as a generalised contempt for America, in some cases combined with antiSemitism (Ahmed al-Uqaily- case #22), the desire for personal gain (Grecula- case #29;
Reynolds- case #31; and Alishtari- case #34) or personal circumstance (specifically the
need to avoid being imprisoned- Ruben Shumpert- case #40).
The fact that most pre-2004 cases could not be classified might appear striking
but is simply due to insufficient data and should not be interpreted as meaningful.
Overall, based on the available data there is little that can be learned about motivating
factors among the sample of US jihadis, except to say that they do not appear to exhibit
a unique motivational set that might distinguish them from other global jihadists around
the world. Moreover, there does not appear to be much difference in the motivations of
individuals involved in different kinds of activity. A common theme that was expressed
across numerous cases –albeit couched in terms of religion- was a desire for action and
violence that seemed to permeate much of what individuals talked about and did. This
desire for violence combined with social bravado may be a powerful mechanism in the
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lives of American jihadists (just as it may be with similar young men in other
countries).
Despite this generality there may well be differences in the degree or type of
commitment to violence. Individuals involved in logistic support activities condone the
violence of others but are seemingly less keen to become involved themselves.
Meanwhile those who choose to go overseas to fight in ongoing conflicts feel a personal
need to carry out violence with a specific aim in mind (usually to defend the oppressed
and to establish an idealistic Islamic state). Of course they sometimes return to the West
to carry out terrorist attacks, somehow believing it will help their cause. And then there
are those who choose from the outset to attack at home and appear to be motivated by a
nihilistic desire for violence without any particular expected benefits. Again, this is
nothing new though, it is simply an observation that stated motivations and rhetoric are
infused with powerful social motives.

9.2.10 Outcomes
Table 9.25. Outcomes in US Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Informants/
undercover
operatives

Attacks:
Thwarted

Attacks:
Failed/ semi‐
successful

Attacks:
Successful

Pre‐ 2004

6

4

0

0

2004 to
2008

12

5

2

0

Total

18

9

2

0

% TOT (46)

39%

20%

4%

0

The final variable of interest is how cases end. Table 9.25 shows that during the
investigation phase, 39% of all cases involved informants or undercover officers, and
the figure has doubled from the pre- to post-2004 period. Nine attacks were thwarted, 1
attack was completed but failed outright (the unplanned attack carried out by Aafia
Siddiqui in Afghanistan) and 1 was completed but failed to kill anyone (Taheri-Azar’s
attack in North Carolina). Percentages are expressed as a proportion of the total number
of cases in the sample, but looking at the ratio of thwarted vs. failed/semi-successful
attacks, overall the latter accounts for 22%. Both of these cases were of course atypical
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attacks with little or no pre-warning though, and this explains their ability to slip
through the counter-terrorism net. No planned attacks have been successful outright
since 9/11.

Table 9.26. Outcomes for individuals in US Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Arrested:
prosecuted

Deceased
overseas

At large
overseas

Average
sentence
in years

Life
Sentences

Pre‐ 2004

42

1

1

15.5

3

2004 to
2008

40

6

1

15.3

5

Total

82

7

2

15.4

8

% TOT (91)

90%

8%

2%

N/A

9%

Table 9.26 shows the outcomes in US Islamist terrorism cases for individuals.
Eighty-two out of 91 people in the sample was arrested and convicted or pleaded guilty.
Sixty-three individuals have been sentenced resulting in an average sentence of 15.4
years in jail (minimum 2 years, maximum 85). An additional 8 individuals were
sentenced to life in prison (3 of whom got life plus 30 years, although none are eligible
for parole anyway). 10 individuals have yet to be sentenced at the time of writing, and 1
(Mohammed Junaid Babar) entered into a plea agreement and is reported to be in
witness protection after prosecuting against his former associates.
In terms of charges applied, the vast majority involved charges of conspiracy,
usually to provide material support to terrorists and in some cases to kill US nationals.
Four individuals (Enaam Arnaout- case #2; Ahmed Hassan al-Uqaily- case #22;
Mohammed Radwan Obeid- case #30; and Kamal Said Hassan- case #43) were
prosecuted under ordinary criminal law only- they were convicted of fraud; unlawful or
unregistered firearms; visa violations and lying to the FBI, respectively. Several others
involved related ‘ordinary’ crimes in addition to terrorism offences. Most often these
involved firearms offences, including armed robbery (Levar Washington and Gregory
Patterson- case #25) but also included drug-trafficking (Ilyas Ali- case #12) and fraud
(Abdul Alishtari- case #34; and Khalid Ouazzani- case #44). Lastly, 7 individuals were
killed overseas and 2 are still at large (Adam Gadahn and Omar Hammami).
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9.3 Summary and Conclusions
Before summarising the current findings it should be re-emphasised that the
available data are of poor quality and often lacking. Nevertheless, a concerted effort has
been made to analyse what is available in a systematic manner focussing on predetermined variables of interest. The results should be viewed as sets of indications
rather than hard facts and they will be subject to change as new developments take
place.
In terms of geographical distribution of Islamist terrorism in the US, most
individuals have been based on or near the east coast. This may relate to the original
distribution of Islamist terrorists in America (showing some support for the social
transmission hypothesis) as well as the distribution of the Muslim population, plus
numerous other ‘random’ factors (among them, the Internet, which makes it possible for
new cases to ‘sprout up’ in areas with no previous history of Islamist militancy).
There is nothing particularly remarkable about the demographic background of
Islamist terrorists living in or from the US and nothing about them as a whole which
dramatically distinguishes them from samples in previous studies (aside from their
nationality or location). 76% of the sample held American nationality, either as a first or
second nationality; on average they were aged between 28 and 30 at the time of
offending; most had at least a basic level of education and were in mixed occupations
ranging from unskilled to highly qualified. Around half of the sample was married; 65%
were ‘born’ Muslims and 27% were converts. Finally, about a quarter of the sample had
a previous unrelated criminal record and very few seemed to be suffering from mental
health problems. In terms of theoretical explanations of terrorism, together these results
indicate that it is clearly more accurate to understand American involvement in Islamist
terrorism in terms of relative and vicarious, rather than absolute deprivation, and
certainly not in terms of psychopathology.
There were very few details available as to exactly how and why individuals
radicalised, but for most it appeared that even where propaganda or chat-rooms were
accessed online, face-to-face interactions with similar others in social settings were
especially important. Very few individuals might be classed as ‘self-radicalised’ and the
available evidence is congruent with social explanations of terrorism (see chapter 4).
The average offence-range was 2.59 years (although this does not capture
processes of radicalisation) and the most common range of offending was about a year.
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In terms of group characteristics, the average group size was 2.4 but many people were
prosecuted as individuals. However, both individuals and groups were often part of
wider networks and it was extremely rare for anyone to truly be acting alone. Specific
leaders within groups were difficult to identify, yet this seems a reflection of informal
social hierarchies rather than evidence that leadership is absent in the world of
American jihadis. Again this supports social explanations of terrorism which emphasise
mutual patterns of influence (both bottom-up and top-down processes).
There was not enough information available to ideologically classify
individuals, except to say that a minority of those involved in Islamist terrorism are
criminal opportunists, somehow ‘troubled’ individuals or adhere to some form of
ideological offshoot. The vast majority sit somewhere on a continuum ranging from
‘wannabes’ to ‘hardcore’ terrorists, but they are not easily distinguished and may
commit equally murderous acts.
Relatively few cases involved promoting or facilitating jihad, others involved
offering or agreeing to perform certain services, but most (63% of all cases) involved a
willingness or desire for violent activity either at home or abroad, either through
preparing for violence via physical and weapons training or actively pursuing violence
in the form of joining overseas conflict or planning domestic terrorist attacks.
Overall, a large proportion (around 54%) of US cases have maintained a strong
focus on overseas events and activities, with a further 15% showing mixed concern, i.e.
definite support for jihad abroad, with some indication of support for jihad at home.
These figures remain high in the post-Iraq generation of American jihadis, showing a
continued desire to train and fight overseas, but only 35% of these cases involved
international travel, which is evidence of a disparity in their desires and capabilities.
This may be a contributing factor behind the fact that the proportion of cases with a
primarily domestic focus to their activities has significantly increased (from 25 to 35%),
showing an increased willingness among US residents to perpetrate terrorist attacks at
home.
In planned attacks, targets and choice of weaponry were mixed and seemed to be
determined more by opportunity than by any specific preference.
Half of all cases involved contact with foreign terrorists, however this was more
common prior to 2004 than in the period 2004 onwards (used here to define the pre- vs.
post-Iraq war period, counting cases in 2003 as part of the pre-Iraq generation since
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most were radicalised at least a year before acting). These results support the
observation that ‘home-grown’ jihadis are less likely to be in contact with foreign
organised terrorist groups. As for the countries in which contact was made, prior to
2004 it was more often made in Pakistan/ Afghanistan, or involved individuals based in
the US. Since 2004 fewer individuals in either of these locations have had foreign jihadi
affiliations (indicating a truly home-grown pheonomenon), but more cases are occurring
in Somalia. Named domestic associations are becoming more common than
international ones in the post-2004 period, although many of the Islamists operating in
Somalia appear to be unknown and therefore go unnamed.
The use of the Internet is diverse and fairly widespread, although details are
often lacking in open access reports. Communication via email remains popular among
US Islamist terrorists. The same goes for researching attacks online. Meanwhile
accessing jihadi propaganda and chat-rooms has been more widely reported from 2004
onwards as a reflection of their growth on a global scale. Other examples of uses of the
Net are disseminating materials, communicating with family or friends outside of jihadi
circles, and fundraising, although the latter appears to have become less visible after
9/11. The Internet has not been used as the basis of group formation; however it is used
to network and reach out to other extremists, which increases vulnerability to detection.
As noted above, entirely virtual, ‘self-radicalisation’ is not common.
Regarding stated motivations –why individuals living in or from the US get
involved in Islamist terrorism- again the data are poor. Domestic concerns are generally
lacking (although they may play a predisposing role for some individuals). Most seem
to be motivated by the same sets of motivations which are commonly reported
worldwide and are reflective of the Islamist terrorist identity- notably a combination of
religious and altruistic motivations as well as contempt for US foreign policy. A
fascination with violence and sense of social bravado also permeate many cases, which
gives some credibility to Roy’s20 explanation of HGIT as a rebellious social movement.
Finally, many terror investigations in the US involve informants or undercover
agents who sometimes make considerable contributions to the way in which cases
progress. 90% of the current sample have been successfully prosecuted and have
received sentences ranging from 2 years to life in prison. 2 more individuals remain at
large and the rest have been killed overseas.
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Given claims that America has had little to worry about from home-grown
Islamist terrorists, the overall picture is surprising. A variety of people living in the US,
many of them born there, have demonstrated that Islamist militancy holds a persistent
appeal. Overseas conflicts remain one of the most important points of inspiration, but
affiliation with foreign terrorists does appear to be more difficult to achieve, and a
significant minority of those who are drawn to the Islamist cause are equally prepared to
carry out attacks on domestic soil. The picture is also constantly changing over time and
–worryingly- there have been numerous alleged cases involving Islamist terrorists in the
US in 2009 and more so far in 2010 (see chapter 8, Table 8.1). The exact nature of
terrorism in America over time is difficult to predict, but it certainly does not seem
likely to disappear any time soon. The results from this chapter are compared to the
results from the UK in chapter 11.
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Overview
The sample of UK cases –people from or living in the United Kingdom involved
in Islamist terrorism from 2001-2008- is analysed, focussing on the ten variables of
interest identified in chapter 2. This covers geographic distribution, demographic
profiles, offence ranges, radicalisation, group characteristics, operational activity,
international dimensions and associations, the role of the Internet, stated motivations,
and outcomes. The results are further discussed in chapter 11 in comparison to results
from the US.
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10. Case Study Analysis Part 2: Islamist Terrorism in the United Kingdom: 20012008

10.1 Statistical Summary
51 cases (including 112 individuals, 2 of whom offended twice) were included
in the sample of Islamist militants who were residents of the United Kingdom active
between 2001 and 2008. Appendix B (Part 1) lists these individuals in chronological
order according to the date range of offending behaviour. Appendix B (Part 2) gives a
summary of each case in the same chronological order. Finally, Appendix B (Part 3)
lists 55 cases (112 individuals) excluded from the sample and a brief description of the
reason for exclusion. Here, the statistical analysis of the included cases is presented.
Table 10.1 below shows the number of Islamist terrorism cases -also shown as
numbers of individuals- involving UK residents from 2001 to 2008 (pre-2001 cases are
those which began any time before then and also continued after 2001). The top two
rows show when cases/individuals began offending, while the bottom two rows show
when cases/individuals ceased offending (usually through being arrested). Note that the
total number of cases ended within this time-frame is less than the overall sample total
because 1 case ended after 2008. Figure 10.1 shows these numbers in graph form, minus
the pre-2001 cases since they span a six-year period, from 1995-2000, and their
inclusion is potentially visually misleading (since only those which continued after 2001
are included in the sample).

Table 10.1. Number of Islamist terrorism cases/individuals involving UK residents/citizens from 2001 to
2008.

Year

Pre‐
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
2001

Cases
began

5

6

2

2

6

6

11

7

6

51

Individuals
began

13

7

2

6

35

18

16

9

8

114

Cases
ended

3

3

4

4

7

11

9

9

50

Individuals
ended*

5

3

4

20

17

34

18

12

113

*1 case (Saeed Ghafoor) ended in 2009.
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Figure 10.1. Number of Islamist terrorism cases/individuals involving UK residents/citizens from 2001 to
2008.
40
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Based on the present sample, there have been 51 cases of Islamist terrorism
involving 112 individuals who were resident in the UK. The average number of cases
began each year is 5.75 (12.38 individuals) and the average number ended each year is
6.25. Among those offending in the period 2001-2008, 5 cases (13 individuals) began
prior to 2001, constituting 9.8% of the total sample of cases (11.6% of all individuals).
The slight dip in cases beginning in 2002 and 2003 can be interpreted as a
response to the heightened ‘war on terror’ after 9/11, perhaps making offenders more
cautious. The increase in 2004 is demonstrative of a renewed desire and resolve on the
part of Islamist extremists to take action after the 2003 invasion of Iraq (allowing time
for individuals to observe the Iraqi situation, make the decision to do something about it
and then come to the attention of security services). Since then the number of cases
beginning each year has risen until 2006 and stayed relatively high until 2008, which is
reflective of a sustained wave of militancy over a five year period. Of course cases that
we do not yet know about may have begun in 2007 and 2008, which would change the
shape of the graph but on the face of it (looking at alleged cases in 2009 and 2010 so
far) it appears that the post-Iraq wave of UK Islamist terrorism may have ‘burnt itself
out’ somewhat. The extent to which it is revitalised again in months/years to come
remains to be seen.
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As with the US, the UK sample will be examined according to the pre- vs. postIraq divide, defined as pre-2004 (inclusive of 2003) and 2004 to 2008. This allows time
for individuals to become radicalised or spurred on by the invasion of Iraq and assumes
that the majority of individuals who began offending in 2003 had radicalised before
then. Any instances where this is not the case will be drawn out in the discussion below.
In the UK sample, 10 cases (15 individuals) began from 2001-2003 inclusive,
compared to 36 cases (84 individuals) from 2004-2008. More than 3 times the number
of cases, and more than 5 times the number of individuals, began offending in relation
to Islamist terrorism within the latter 5 year period as compared to the former 3 year
period. Even if all pre-2004 cases in the sample are included for comparison (15 cases,
28 individuals spanning 9 years from 1995-2003) the number is still more than 2 times
higher (or 3 times for the number of individuals) in the post-Iraq period. Although this
excludes cases which began and ended before September 11th 2001 these figures offer
strong support for the hypothesis that the 2003 invasion of Iraq has inspired more
individuals living in, or from the West, to join the global Sunni jihad.
It should be borne in mind that when contrasting the pre- vs. post-Iraq
generations in this chapter, the UK sample is far more heavily weighted by the latter
generation (28 vs. 84 individuals) meaning that numerical comparisons require a little
more care in interpretation. Each of the variables of interest identified in chapter 2 will
now be dealt with.
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10.2 Analysis of Variables
10.2.1 Geographical Distribution
Figure 10.2. Geographical distribution of UK Islamist terrorism cases, 2001-2008.

Original map downloaded from:
http://media.photobucket.com/image/map%20of%20UK/pauljorg31/UK%20Maps/uk_counties_map.png

Figure 10.2 shows the geographic distribution of Islamist terrorism cases in the
UK from 2001-2008, with numbers of individuals involved in brackets. Because there is
a much smaller area of distribution compared to the US it has been possible to pinpoint
cases according to cities or towns rather than the less precise system of using counties
or states. As in the US, because not all individuals within groups live in the same town,
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the number of cases is inflated from 51 to 61, while the number of individuals remains
accurate at 112.
Several features are apparent from the above map of Islamist terrorist activity in
the United Kingdom. First, London has played host to the vast majority of Islamist
terrorists in the UK: 23 cases involving 57 individuals were primarily from or based
there, which expressed as a percentage represents 38% of all cases taking into account
within-group distribution (i.e. inflating the number of cases in absolute terms). But since
the activities of London-based groups with some members living elsewhere were indeed
mostly focussed within London, it is more accurate to use the actual case total of 51 in
these calculations, which means that 45% of all cases were situated in the capital. In
terms of individuals 51% of the entire sample was based there. 22 individuals (39%)
were based in East London; 19 (33%) were based in the North; 9 (16%) were located in
the South; and 5 (9%) lived in the West.
Second, Islamist terrorism in the UK can be divided into 3 main geographic
‘hotspots’, namely London and surrounding areas, the West Midlands (including
Birmingham), and the North West (including Manchester and Leeds). There have only
been 5 relatively isolated cases that have occurred anywhere much outside of these
areas.

Table 10.2. UK hotspots of Islamist terrorism ranked according to number of
cases/individuals hosted.

Area
London
North West
West Midlands
Scotland
South West

Cases
33
16
7
2
2

Individuals
70
22
14
3
2

Northern Ireland

1

1

TOTAL

61

112

Table 10.2 illustrates the division of cases and individuals according to the 3
main hotspots, plus outlying cases. London and surrounding areas account for 33 of 61
(54%) of cases or 70 of 112 (63%) of individuals; the North West area accounts for 16
(26%) of cases or 22 (20%) of individuals; the West Midlands area accounts for 7
(11%) of cases or 14 (13%) of individuals; and the remainder is widely distributed
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across Scotland, the South West and Northern Ireland, representing a combined total of
8% of cases and 5 % of individuals lying outside of the hotspots.
These findings support the social transmission hypothesis, which states that
areas where Islamist terrorists originally settled and became active (such as London,
Manchester and Birmingham) are more likely to show evidence of higher levels of
activity over time. It is also reflective of the general significance of certain major cities
in the UK, and of the symbolic importance of London for Islamist militants in particular
(hence individuals based in the North West and even Scotland have been willing to
travel to the capital to carry out attacks).
Turning to the geographic distribution of the UK Muslim population, there is a
strong correspondence in terms of hotspots of Islamist terrorist activity. According to a
2004 report from the Office for National Statistics using data collected in the 2001
national Census,i “Around two fifths of Muslims (38 per cent) lived in London. After
London, the regions with the next biggest share of the Muslim population were the West
Midlands (14 per cent), the North West (13 per cent), and Yorkshire and the Humber
(12 per cent). Even within these regions, Muslims were highly concentrated spatially.
Muslims made up 8 per cent of London’s population overall but 36 per cent of the
Tower Hamlets and 24 per cent of the Newham populations [both in East London]”.1
Of course these figures were recorded nearly 10 years ago but the main findings
are unlikely to have drastically changed. Given that the ‘North West’ area as defined in
the current report also includes the ‘Yorkshire and Humber’ area described by the
Office for National Statistics, the UK Islamist terrorism hotspots correspond exactly in
terms of rank order of Muslim population distribution and are similar in terms of
proportions (albeit with a heavier percentage of terrorists based in London). And within
the capital, East London represents both a high concentration of Muslims and a hotspot
for Islamist terrorism. These figures should not be surprising since Islamists tend to live
within Muslim communities but it must also be emphasised that this is a case of
correlation and should not be interpreted as causal in and of itself.

i

The next Census is due in 2011.
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10.2.2 Demographic Profiles

Gender, Nationality and Age
Table 10.3. Gender; nationality; time in the UK; legal status and average age at the start and end of
offending in UK Islamist terrorism cases, 2001-2008.

% Male
110/112
(98%
Total)

Entered UK
illegally

Av. age
at start
of
offence

Av. age
at end
of
offence

11.6 yrs

9/107

26.1

27.5

(n=35)

(8% n)

(n=112)

(n=112)

1st
nationality
British

2nd
nationality
British*

Av. years in US
(Non‐British 1st
nationality)

70/110

16/112

(64% n)

(14% Total)

*Includes legal permanent residents.

Table 10.3 confirms the fact that the vast majority of people actively involved in
Islamist terrorism are males. The 2 females included in the sample offended in 2007 and
2008 and both were relatively minor offenders (Shella Roma –case #44- had written and
distributed a leaflet encouraging people to take part in jihad, and Houria Chentouf –case
#49- simply possessed a large amount of jihadist material). Other females also played
minor supportive roles in the case of the 21/7 attempted bombers (case #18) but they
were excluded from the sample as their actual contribution was ad-hoc and after-thefact.
Turning to nationality, 63% of the total sample was confirmed as being British
by birth with a further 14% having this as their second nationality, or having been
granted indefinite leave to remain in the country. For those who did not have British as
their first nationality, the average length of time in the UK was 11.6 years. Among these
individuals the minimum time in the UK was less than a year (for Kafeel Ahmed –case
#41- who nevertheless had previously spent 3 years in Belfast and a year in Cambridgeand Chentouf, who was questioned as she entered the country from the Netherlands).
Several individuals had lived in the country in excess of 20 or even 40 years prior to
offending.
Twenty-four nationalities other than British were confirmed within the sample.ii
Among non-British first nationalities the top countries were Pakistani and Algerian
ii

These were: Pakistani; Algerian; Somali; Jamaican; Indian; Moroccan; Ugandan; Ethiopian; Jordanian;
Egyptian; Iraqi; Albanian; Bangladeshi; Eritrean; Gambian; Ghanaian; Syrian; Tanzanian; Trinidadian;
Dutch; Iranian; Malawian; West-Indian; and Turkish-Cypriot (plus one individual of unconfirmed
Sudanese heritage).

244

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
(each with 5 individuals or 5% of the overall known total- i.e. 110), Somali (4
individuals, or 4%), then Jamaican, Indian, Moroccan and Ugandan (each with 3
individuals, or 3%). These figures are not particularly revealing, however second
nationalities or ethnic heritage is rather more significant. 27 of 88 individuals for whom
there were data were of Pakistani heritage (plus another 26 individuals were of
unconfirmed South Asian heritage, judged on the basis of names). Therefore between
27 and 53 of 112 individuals (24 to 47%) in the sample are of Pakistani/ South Asian
heritage, plus another 5 individuals who are Pakistanis by first nationality (which comes
to 52% of the total). Note that this is probably more accurate than expressing these
numbers in terms of the percentage of people for whom there were data (‘% n’) because
many of those recorded as ‘unknown’ second nationality appear not to have had one. In
any case, the very large Pakistani contingent is extremely important for understanding
the cultural ties, and often established links to the ‘epicentre’ of global jihad, of
Britain’s Islamist terrorists. No other non-British nationalities are represented in any
more than a handful of cases.
Irrespective of origins, the vast majority of the sample was in the UK legally.
Only 9 out of 107 individuals (8%) for whom there were data had entered via illicit
means.iii The majority were either born and raised in the UK or entered using British
passports while the rest travelled on student visas or were asylum seekers.
Table 10.2 furthermore shows that the average age at the time of offending onset
was 26.1 and the average age when offending ended (mostly via arrest, or else by death)
was 27.5 years old. 90 of 112 (80%) were aged 30 or under when they began offending;
the youngest was 15 and the eldest was 65. By comparison Sageman reported an
average age for those ‘joining the jihad’ of 25.7 years based on a global sample of 172
individuals, and Bakker reported an average age of 27.3 at the time of arrest based on a
European sample of more than 200.2 The British average ‘joining’ age of 26.1 is slightly
higher than in Sageman’s study, although the average age of 27.5 at the time of arrest is
just below that reported by Bakker.
Finally, regarding Sageman’s contention3 that the average age of jihadis has
decreased since the invasion of Iraq, it makes sense to examine the sample (as we did
for the US) according to the pre- vs. post-Iraq time-periods (i.e. pre-2004 and 2004
iii

Brahim Benmerzouga & Baghdad Meziane (case #6); Abbas Boutrab (case #12); Kamel Bourgass (case
#13); Hussain Osman & Manfo Kwaku Asiedu (case #18); Omar Altimimi (case #31); Pa Modou Jobe
(case #36); and Krenar Lusha (case #47).
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onwards, allowing for ‘incubation’ time for individuals to respond to the 2003
invasion). The average age in the pre-Iraq period in the UK sample at the time that
offending began was 27.3 and in the post-Iraq period was 25.7. Consistent with the
direct of Sageman’s posited shift (though not the ‘dramatic’ scale) the data show a
decrease in average age of 1.6 years. As noted in the previous chapter though, it should
also be remembered that processes of radicalisation precede the onset of actual offence
behaviour and most individuals appear to have subscribed to Islamist ideology for at
least a year prior to taking illegal action.

Education
Table 10.4. Level of education completed in UK Islamist terrorism cases, 2001-2008.

Education
completed

Unknown

Did not
finish high
school

Number
% n (54)
% TOT

58
N/A
52%

3
6%
3%

High
school/
basic
college

University
degree

32
55%
29%

19
33%
17%

Table 10.4 shows levels of education completed in the sample (this means that
someone who is at university but has not finished their course is classed as only so far
having completed high school education). Among those for whom there were data, only
3 of 54 (6%) had not finished high-school, although for one of those –Hamaad Munshi,
case #25- he was still at school. For a further 32 individuals there was evidence that
they had completed high-school or some form of basic college qualification roughly
equivalent to ‘A-levels’ (certificates awarded at age 18). Within the high-school
category it is also possible to specify that 10 of those 32 had only completed basic high
school education, i.e. leaving at 16, and 9 had completed A-levels or equivalent either at
high school or college (and for the remainder exact attainment is unknown). Lastly, 19
individuals (33% of those for whom there were data) had completed a degree or higher.
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the principle of positive-reporting –the
tendency to report the presence of ‘interesting’ variables but not their absence- means
that in all likelihood the absolute numbers of individuals with completed degrees and
those who did not finish high school are reasonably accurate for the sample as a whole.
This is because these are interesting from a reporting perspective and are therefore more
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likely to be reported. Conversely, at least a basic high school education is generally
taken for granted in the UK –thus it is not reported- and therefore many of the
‘unknowns’ are likely to have achieved at least this.
Nevertheless, this cannot be used to accurately assess the education levels of the
current sample- it simply tells us that there is bias within the sample and gives a general
likelihood of where most of that bias can be found. As it stands, the figures here
indicate lower levels of basic educational achievement than those found by Bakker,
using a sample of European jihadis involved in plotting attacks (which would of course
be subject to the same biases to varying degrees). He reported that 42 individuals
representing 88% of those for whom there were data had completed secondary (high
school) education,4 compared to 32 individuals (55%) here. This could be a reflection
of lower attainment, but in all likelihood a large proportion of the ‘unknown’ group
would have completed this, which means 55% is very likely to be an underestimation.
Moreover, there is not a vast difference in terms of the absolute numbers for whom data
was available. In terms of tertiary education (something which does tend to be reported)
Bakker reported that 15/41 (31%) had completed a degree, compared to 33% here,
although in both cases it is probably more accurate to express these figures as
percentages of the total rather than %n.
Finally, there is Sageman’s hypothesis that educational attainment among
Islamist terrorist populations has dropped in the post-Iraq generation.5 The data here
shows that all 3 of those individuals who did not finish high school began offending in
2004 or later, possibly hinting at such a decline. However, 19 of 33 (58%) for whom
there were data in the post-Iraq era had completed high school and 11 (33%) had
completed a university education. These figures compare respectively to 12 (60%) and 8
(40%) of 20 individuals who began offending in the pre-Iraq time-period. The available
information thus indicates only a marginal decline in levels of educational attainment of
UK Islamist terrorists over time (although the low number of people with university
education in absolute terms, combined with the known tendency to report this variable
when present may be taken as a very tentative suggestion that the difference is bigger
than the data here permits us to believe).
Overall it must be concluded that Islamist terrorists from, or living in the UK
exhibit neither particularly low, nor particularly high levels of education- most appear to
have at least a basic level, a significant minority hold degrees, and very few seem to
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have dropped out of education before the age of 16. This seems roughly comparable to
the general population.

Occupation
Table 10.5. Occupation of individuals involved in UK Islamist terrorism cases, 2001-2008.

Occupation

High
school

Prisoner

Un‐
employed

Student

Unskilled

Semi‐
skilled

Skilled

Number

2

2

20

11

22

23

5

% n (85)

2%

2%

24%

13%

26%

27%

6%

% TOT

2%

2%

18%

10%

20%

21%

4%

Table 10.5 shows that there was information available on occupation at the time
of involvement for all but 27 individuals. Although a number of people ended their
employment or studies as they became more involved in terrorism, most seemingly did
not and very few could be considered ‘full-time’ terrorists somehow able to support
themselves through these activities. This applied to 4 individuals (Andrew Rowe –case
#2; Dhiren Barot –case #5; Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh –case #9; and Rangzieb Ahmed
–case #26).
A rather large proportion (between about a fifth and a quarter) of the UK sample
was unemployed immediately prior to offending. In some cases (e.g. Abdullah El-Faisal
–case #8- and Aabid Khan –case #25) this was because their jihadi activities took up
most of their time (although they had previously been employed); others were in receipt
of benefits (e.g. Parviz Khan –case #21); at least 1 (Omar Altimimi –case #31) appeared
to be supporting himself by criminal means; but overall there is no general answer that
explains the situation of these individuals (e.g. 4 of them, Nadeem Tarmohamed –case
#5- Abdulla Ahmed Ali –case #27- Umran Javed –case #30- and Hassan Tabbakh –case
#42- held university qualifications, therefore it is not simply a matter of low educational
achievements).
There was an almost equal amount of people in unskilled (26%) and semiskilled (27%) occupations. The former included such jobs as market traders, mobilephone salesmen and security guards; the latter included taxi-drivers, decorators and
shop managers plus 3 individuals (Abu Qatada –case #1- Abu Hamza –case #3- and
Abdullah El-Faisal –case #8) who worked as imams but were in receipt of state benefits.
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Only 10 individuals (11%) were students at the time that they began offending and just
5 (6%) were in skilled occupations, ranging from a plumber (Kazi Nurur Rahman –case
#24) to a doctor (Bilal Abdulla –case #41). There is little or no indication about the
occupations of the 27 individuals for whom data was lacking.
Comparing these figures to Bakker’s European study,6 the Islamist terrorists in
or from the UK are more often unemployed (23% vs. 15%); fewer were in unskilled
occupations (24% vs. 33%); more were in semi-skilled jobs (26% vs. 18%) and less
were in skilled occupations (6% vs. 12%). Overall this seems to show that the current
UK sample was slightly less well-off in terms of their professions than in Bakker’s
sample despite roughly comparable levels of educational attainment.
With respect to Sageman’s argument that more recent generations of jihadis are
more likely to be from lower social classes and to hold less skilled occupations, the data
again shows tentative support (see Table 10.6 below). Based on the percentages of
individuals for whom there were data in each category (25 in the pre-Iraq period and 60
in the post-Iraq period) the more recent generation of jihadis in the UK are more often
unemployed, less often students, more often in unskilled and less often in semi-skilled
jobs, although all 5 individuals in skilled occupations began offending in 2004 or later.

Table 10.6. Occupation of individuals involved in UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008) divided by
whether they began before or after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Percentages refer to rows.

Occupation

High
school

Prisoner

Un‐
employed

Student

Unskilled

Semi‐
skilled

Skilled

Number
(n=85)

2

2

20

11

22

23

5

Pre 2004

0

0

3 (12%)

6 (24%)

6 (24%)

2004‐2008

2 (3%)

2 (3%)

17 (28%)

5 (8%)

16 (27%)

10
(40%)
13
(22%)

0
5 (8%)

Two final points are worth noting. First, of the few full-time terrorists in the
sample, most began offending prior to 2004 and this may be indicative of greater
difficulties in making contact with and becoming part of an overseas terrorist
organisation in the post-9/11 environment. If we further consider the fact that Rangzieb
Ahmed (the post-2004 offender) seemingly actually began his jihadi career during the
1990’s (see case #26) then this conclusion is reinforced.
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Second, although relatively fewer individuals were students immediately prior to
offending they appear to be studying the same types of subjects. 6 out of 8 individuals
for whom there were data were studying engineering or some form of science,
illustrating that these topics, traditionally popular among jihadis worldwide,7 are also
favoured in the UK. Moreover, 4 of these individuals began offending after 2003
showing that this trend is continuing.

Faith
Table 10.7. Religious faith of individuals involved in UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Faith

Born
Muslim

Convert

Religious
offshoot

Non‐
Muslim

Number

81

16

0

2

% n (99)

82%

16%

0

2%

Table 10.7 shows the religious background of UK Islamist terrorists. The vast
majority appear to be ‘born’ Muslims by virtue of their ethnicity, although this does not
mean that they have practised Islam all of their lives. Although it is not possible to give
precise figures due to lacking data, it does not seem uncommon for individuals to have
gone through a process of ‘reversion’ to their inherited faith prior to involvement with
Islamists.
Many of those who were classed as ‘unknown’ also appeared to be ‘born
Muslims’ and almost all of the remainder were converts, constituting 16% of those for
whom there were data- or probably more accurately, 14% of the total sample (5 of
whom began offending before the invasion of Iraq and 11 who began after). There were
no religious offshoots or examples of people combining Islamism with any other
religion but 2 individuals were not Muslims. One is Hemant Lakhani (case #10) a Hindu
who got involved in an arms deal simply for profit, i.e. a criminal opportunist; the other
is Malcolm Hodges (case #29) a seemingly ‘troubled’ individual who attempted to
encourage others to commit acts of terrorism in furtherance of a personal grudge
(included in the sample because he is still relevant for understanding how Islamist
terrorism is being used in British society).
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Marital Status
Table 10.8. Marital status of individuals involved in UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Marital
Status

Unknown

Single

In
relationship

With
children
only

Number

39

19

3

3

% TOT

35%

17%

3%

3%

Marital
Status

Single
parent

Engaged

Married

Separated

Number

1

2

44

1

% TOT

1%

2%

39%

1%

Table 10.8 shows the rather diverse marital statuses in the sample. Percentages
are given as a function of the entire sample rather than %n since most of those whose
status was ‘unknown’ in fact appeared to be single or possibly in a non-married
relationship (this is again a product of positive-reporting).
Fourty-four individuals were married at the time that they began offending (just
under 40% of the overall sample) and among these, 33 had children, 2 were arranged
marriages and another 2 were on their second marriage. 2 more people were engaged; 1
was separated; 1person was a single parent; 3 were reported to have children but it was
not mentioned if they were married or with a partner; 3 were in a non-married
relationship; 19 people were single and for 39 individuals there was no information (but
as already mentioned most of these are likely to be unmarried).
Sageman and Bakker reported that 73% and 59% of their respective samples
were married,8 appearing to be much more than was found here. However, they
expressed their percentages as %n and if this is done here, the married figure appears to
be 60%, almost exactly the same as reported by Bakker. Regardless of the precise
figures it is clear that Islamist terrorists living in, or from the UK quite often have wives
and children and they are not by and large lone, socially isolated individuals. Looking at
relative percentages for the ‘before’ and ‘after’ Iraq generations, the proportion
confirmed as married has declined (from 13 of 28 total (46%) to 31 of 84 total (37%))
but still represents a significant amount of the sample, showing that this trend remains
quite strong.
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Criminal Record
Table 10.9. Criminal records of individuals involved in UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Criminal
record
Number
% n (18)
Criminal
record
Number
% n (18)

Visa violation
1
6%
Drug related
4
22%

Shop‐lifting/
theft
4
22%
Indecent
assault
1
6%

Deception
1
6%
Carrying a
weapon
2
11%

Criminal
damage
1
6%
Public order
offence
3
17%

Threatening
behaviour
1
6%
Violent
9
50%

Information on previous criminal records was scarce. 3 individuals had no prior
record, 1 person (Pa Modou Jobe –case #36) had been deported from the US for reasons
not specified, and information was not available for 90 others, leaving 18 people (16%
of the overall sample) who did have prior records. This is considerably less than in
Sageman and Bakker’s samples, in which about 25% of each had previous convictions.9
Table 10.9 shows that for those 18 individuals (some of whom had multiple
convictions, hence the numbers add to more than 18) quite a wide range of offences had
been committed. Having said that, 9 individuals (50% of those with a record) had a
conviction –or in 1case a caution- for a violent offence, mostly assault or robbery with 1
instance of attempted murder (Ali Beheshti- case #48). A further 3 individuals had
convictions –again 1 caution- for public order offences including affray; and 1 (failed
21/7 bomber Mukhtar Said Ibrahim- case #18) had a conviction for indecent assault.
These were all separate individuals so altogether 13 people, or 72% of those with
convictions, had committed acts of violence. Again though, the principle of positivereporting means that although some individuals for whom there was no data will have
had criminal records, most probably did not. Expressed as a percentage of the entire
sample, 13 individuals with violent criminal records equates to 12%. While this
undoubtedly underestimates previous violent offences within the sample it is
nevertheless a reasonable indication that Islamist terrorists living in or from the UK are
generally not long-term violent criminals prior to their involvement in terrorism.
The results here raise a further point in that individuals with previous records
often offended alongside those without records. In other words, the criminal histories of
terrorists within groups is mixed and there is no evidence of exclusively all-criminal, or
deliberately all ‘clean’, terrorist groups within the sample. By social circumstance or
coincidence criminals can sometimes be found in the same groups, for example, 3 of the
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4 7/7 bombers (case #17) had been cautioned for different offences and 2 of the more
prolific previous offenders in the sample (Mohammed Hamid and Mohammed alFigari- case #20) were part of the same group, but such occurrences are not widespread
and very different individuals can be found working together (most notably the shoebombers Richard Reid and Saajid Badat- case #4).
Finally, it must be noted that the focus here has been upon previous unrelated
offending behaviour. A number of individuals were simultaneously prosecuted for
related criminal behaviour common to terrorist activity: thus Brahim Benmerzouga and
Baghdad Meziane (case #6) were prosecuted for conspiracy to defraud in addition to
terror-financing; Hemant Lakhani (case #10) was prosecuted for money laundering and
arms dealing in addition to conspiring to provide material support to terrorists; and
Abbas Boutrab (case #12) was prosecuted for possession of false passports as well as
materials useful for terrorism.
There are also 2 individuals in the sample who are repeat-offenders for
terrorism-related offences. These are Abdul Rehman Saleem and Abdul Muhid who
offended together with others in 2004 (case #16) and 2006 (case #30). Their offences
occurred under similar circumstances –both protest-marches organised by former
members of al-Muhajiroun- and they were prosecuted for things that they said, resulting
in convictions between them for soliciting funds for terrorism, inciting terrorism
overseas, stirring up racial hatred and soliciting murder. These prosecutions were made
possible by changes in the law and a harder stance on Islamist militancy in the UK after
7/7. In fact they were prosecuted for the 2006 offences first and then prosecuted in
retrospect for the 2004 offences. Their case therefore does not tell us anything about
deterrence as a result of being prosecuted already, however it does indicate a degree of
‘specialism’ in 2 individuals in that the type of offences they engaged in were very
similar and were at the lower end of the spectrum of severity of terrorist behaviour.
Little more can be extrapolated from this except to say that lesser offences are more
likely to go undetected and therefore to have been going on for some time.
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Mental Health
Table 10.10. Mental health of individuals involved in UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Mental
Health

Unknown

No
issues

Low IQ

Questioned History of
at trial
illness

Number

101

0

1

4

6

% TOT

90%

0

1%

4%

5%

Mental health problems are not generally thought to play a role in terrorist
behaviour (see chapter 4). Table 10.10 shows that information was not available for 101
people in the sample, and in accordance with positive-reporting most of these
individuals are unlikely to have been suffering from mental disorder.
Looking at the rest of the table, nobody in the sample was explicitly stated to
have no mental health problems. Two individuals had low IQ (1 was Junade Feroze –
case #5- and the other was Nicky Reilly –case #50- who is counted under the ‘history of
illness’ category due to having multiple problemsiv). Four individuals had their mental
health called into question at trial, although the presence of an actual disorder was not
publicly confirmed (these were Malcolm Hodges –case #29- said to be suffering from a
serious mental disorder; Hassan Tabbakh –case #42- said to be suffering from PostTraumatic Stress Disorder as a result of being tortured in Syria; and both females in the
sample: Shella Roma –case #44- whose defence lawyer stated that she was in poor
mental health at the time of offending; and Houria Chentouf –case #49- who was said to
be suffering from an unspecified mental illness brought on by the death of a family
member).
Last, there were 6 individuals reported to have had more long-standing prior
mental health problems or at least some indication thereof. These were: Nadeem
Tarmohamed (case #5) who had suffered from depression; Feroz Abbasi (case #7) who
had previously attempted suicide and then tried again whilst held in Guantanamo;
Mohammed Shamin Uddin (case #27) who suffered impaired cognitive functioning
resulting from an assault; Kevin Gardner (case #34) who was a paranoid schizophrenic;
Andrew ‘Isa’ Ibrahim (case #45) who had a history of drug addiction; and Nicky Reilly
(case #50) who suffered from Asperger’s Syndrome and depression.

iv

This is also why the figures add to 113 rather than 112.
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Overall the number of individuals experiencing mental health issues in the UK
sample is still very small, but is actually higher than expected. The extent to which any
particular individual’s disorder contributed to their involvement in Islamist terrorism
can only be judged by mental health professionals with an in-depth understanding of
each specific case. However, with the major exception of Kevin Gardner who was
committed to a secure hospital for a period of indefinite detention, mental health issues
were not deemed to be major explanatory or mitigating factors in any of these cases.

10.2.3 Offence Date Range
Table 10.11. Offence date ranges in UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Offence
date range

Min

Max

Average

Mode

<1
week

8 years

1.44
years

1 year
or less

Offence ranges were recorded by the year rather than the exact dates since these
are extremely difficult to accurately assess. The minimum date range was, however, less
than a week, which applies to protesters prosecuted for soliciting support and inciting
acts of terrorism on single days in 2004 and 2006 (cases #16 & #30). The maximum
date range recorded was 8 years, which was for Andrew Rowe (case #2- arrested in
2003 but active since at least 1995 when he fought in Bosnia). But because offence
ranges recorded here do not capture previous radicalisation, unconfirmed prior
offending or general involvement in Islamist circles, time frames are undoubtedly
underestimated in a number of cases (a notable example is Abdullah El Faisal -case #8recorded as offending for 1 year, although he was delivering similar speeches to the
ones he was prosecuted for in 2002 since the mid-1990’s).
The average offence date range was 1.44 years and the most frequently
occurring was 1 year or less, which applies to 78% of all cases in the UK sample.
Dividing cases according to whether individuals began offending in the pre- vs. postIraq period (up to and including 2003, and 2004 to 2008) the average offence range in
the earlier time-frame is 2.9 years, compared to 0.8 years in the latter period. This seems
to indicate that the post-Iraq generation of Islamist terrorists living in or from the UK
has a shorter offending ‘life-expectancy’ before they are caught, which makes sense
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given that counter-terrorism surveillance has increased dramatically since 9/11. It could
also be an indication that individuals are progressing faster in terms of moving through
the process of radicalisation to ‘jihadisation’, i.e. the point where they choose to act on
their beliefs; however this remains a tentative speculation since reliable information
about individual radicalisation is generally lacking, as highlighted below.

10.2.4 Radicalisation
Table 10.12. Radicalisation classification for individuals involved in UK Islamist terrorism cases (20012008).

Radicalisation

Individual

Virtual

Social

Mixed

Number
% n (28)
% TOT

1
4%
1%

7
25%
6%

18
64%
16%

0
0
0

Not
radicalised
2
7%
2%

Unknown
84
N/A
75%

Overall there is very little information available on the radicalisation of
individuals who go on to commit terrorism offences, and where it is available it is
always collected in retrospect. These difficulties mean that it has only been possible to
classify 27 individuals in the sample with any degree of certainty. Among these, 1
person, schizophrenic prisoner Kevin Gardner (case #34) seemed to radicalise on an
individual, but not necessarily ‘virtual’ basis, as he was apparently influenced by
watching television and reading books whilst in prison.
Seven individuals were classed as having radicalised on a primarily virtual or
online basis. These included: 1. Mohammed Atif Siddique (case #15) a Scottish student
apparently ‘recruited’ online by Aabid Khan (case #25) and who became obsessed with
the jihadi image through material that he downloaded; 2. Aabid Khan himself (who has
a later defined offence period despite clearly being active before Siddique), widely
regarded as a virtual recruiter with established jihadi connections in Pakistan; 3.
Hammaad Munshi (case #25), a schoolboy from Dewsbury and another of Khan’s
recruits; 4. Nicholas Roddis (case #40) whose fascination with Islamist terrorism
material that he downloaded led him to place a hoax bomb on a bus; 5. Andrew ‘Isa’
Ibrahim (case #45) who became increasingly radicalised after looking up information on
Palestinian militants on the Internet and who was planning a suicide attack on a Bristol
mall; 6. Mohammed Abushamma (case #46) who tried to travel to Afghanistan to join
the jihad, having reportedly radicalised through a combination of rebelliousness against
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his father and spending time on jihadi websites; and lastly, 7. Nicky Reilly (case #50)
who was said to spend many hours on the Internet and who was actively encouraged
and assisted online in his attempt to build a suicide bomb (which prematurely detonated
in an Exeter restaurant in May 2008) by 2 individuals in Pakistan who met him via his
Youtube web-page.
It is noteworthy that the above ‘virtual’ cases primarily began after the 2003
invasion of Iraq. Aabid Khan may have begun his online radicalisation as early as the
late 1990’s and Mohammed Atif Siddique was charged with an offence period that
began in March 2003 (just as Iraq was being invaded) but all of the others began after
then at a time when al-Qaeda and affiliated organisations had become more adept at
producing their media campaigns and distributing images from Iraq and elsewhere
online. It is also striking that all of the ‘virtual’ cases are very young, their ages ranging
from 15 to 21 at the time they began to offend. Furthermore all except Khan can be
classed as ‘wannabe’ terrorists and both individuals who made genuine attempts at
making bombs in order to kill people (Ibrahim and Reilly) had mental health issues. The
numbers here are too few to be able to generalise beyond this handful of cases but at
face value they suggest that younger and ‘troubled’ individuals are more likely
susceptible to purely online radicalisation. With some exceptions, Aabid Khan being a
prime example, wannabe terrorists radicalised online may be less likely to establish
contact with organised Islamist terrorists overseas. However, as the cases of Ibrahim
and Reilly show, some may still develop the willingness and capability to carry out
attacks either by themselves or with limited online support.
Of the remaining individuals in the sample, most that could be categorised (18)
were classed as having radicalised primarily via face-to-face social interaction.v Two
individuals (Hemant Lakhani –case #10- and Malcolm Hodges –case #29) were classed
as not radicalised as they did not subscribe to Islamist ideology. And lastly, 84
individuals (75% of the sample) could not be reliably classified in terms of how they
had radicalised, although face-to-face interaction appears to have played a very
significant role in most cases. There was not enough information to reliably class
anyone as having radicalised through a combination of online and ‘real’ social

v

These were: Abu Qatada (case #1); Andrew Rowe (case #2); Abu Hamza (case #3); Richard Reid &
Saajid Badat (case #4); Dhiren Barot (case #5); Feroz Abbasi (case #7); the 7/7 bombers (case #17); the
21/7 attempted bombers (case #18); Abdulla Ahmed Ali (case #27); and Waheed Ali & Mohammed
Shakil (case #39).
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interaction but this is not to suggest that this does not happen- indeed online jihadist
propaganda, videos and instructional material are widely accessed and also play an
important role in helping nurture and sustain jihadi mindsets in the UK.

10.2.5 Group Characteristics

Immediate Group Size
Table 10.13. Immediate group size of UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Immediate
Group Size
Overall
(51)
Pre‐2004
(15)
2004‐2008
(36)

Min.

Max.

Average

Mode

1

10

2.3

1

8

2

1

10

2.4

1
63% TOT
1
80% n
1
56% n

Table 10.13 shows that overall, the minimum immediate group size was 1 lone
individual; the maximum was 10; the average was 2.3 and the most commonly
occurring ‘group’ size was again 1. However, group boundaries are by no means clearly
defined and even though many individuals were prosecuted by themselves they
nevertheless functioned as part of wider networks (as indeed did most of the larger
groups).
Rather than view the 32 ‘lone’ individuals in the sample as isolated actors, it is
more useful to group them according to their levels of ‘social embeddedness.’ 7 cases
(all post-Iraq) appear to have been acting entirely alone as far as the available data goes
(namely Abu Bakr Mansha –case #22; Malcolm Hodges –case #29; Kevin Gardner –
case #34; Pa Modou Jobe –case #36; Nicholas Roddis –case #40; Isa Ibrahim –case
#45; and Saeed Ghafoor –case #51). 3 more, Hemant Lakhani (case #10), Shella Roma
(case #44) and Mohammed Abushamma (case #46) were each partially assisted and
accompanied by at least 1 other individual –acquitted in the latter 2 cases- but did not
evidently have established militant associations.
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Thirteen othersvi were acting by themselves in terms of their actual offending but
were at least in communication with other like-minded individuals (which,
psychologically speaking, makes them distinct from those who are not). An example
within this group is Kazi Nurur Rahman (case #24) who had been part of militant
networks for several years and allegedly trained with Omar Khyam (case #14) and
others in Pakistan in 2003 before ultimately being jailed in the UK for attempting to buy
machine guns from undercover police officers. Another example is Krenar Lusha (case
#47) who downloaded large amounts of jihadi propaganda and instructional material
and had stockpiled more than 70 litres of petrol in his home- these things he did alone,
but he was also communicating online with fellow jihadis, including Ishaq Kanmi (case
#43).
Kamel Bourgass (case #13) was also ostensibly acting alone in his offence
behaviour. However, while this is true concerning the murder of DC Stephen Oake, it is
highly questionable regarding his attempts to develop ricin even though he was the only
person prosecuted.
The final 8 individuals prosecuted by themselves (all but 1 of whom are pre-Iraq
offenders) were nevertheless fully integrated into militant Islamist networks and their
offences can only be understood in these terms. This applies to Abu Qatada (case #1),
Andrew Rowe (case #2), Abu Hamza (case #3), Feroz Abbasi (case #7), Abdullah ElFaisal (case #8), Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh (case #9), Mohammed Ajmal Khan (case
#11) and Abdul Rahman (case #35).
All in all, 81 individuals (73% of the sample) were part of a group of at least 2
people and another 9 were definitely part of established terrorist networks. This means
that 90 of 112 people (80%) were very much part of groups or networks of Islamist
extremists and for them –as well 13 others acting alone but in communication with likeminded contacts- involvement in Islamist terrorism was a social activity to varying
degrees (and the statistics on group-size are thus by themselves misleading).
Looking at the pre- vs. post-Iraq divide, there were no genuinely isolated
individuals operating in 2003 or earlier- with the exception of Hemant Lakhani (who

vi

These were Abbas Boutrab (case #12); Mohammed Atif Siddique (case #15); Khalid Khaliq (case #23);
Kazi Nurur Rahman (case #24); Abdul Patel (case #28); Omar Altimimi (case #31); Yassin Nassari (case
#32); Sohail Qureshi (case #33); Hassan Tabbakh (case #42); Ishaq Kanmi (case #43); Krenar Lusha
(case #47); Houria Chentouf (case #49); Nicky Reilly (case #50).
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thought he was in contact with an Islamist militant) they all had at least some
connections to extremist networks. The fact that 80% of this category consisted of
‘groups’ of 1 is not useful for understanding their true circumstances and only 2
individuals (Boutrab and Siddique- cases #12 & #15) were acting alone regarding the
offences they were prosecuted for.
Most of the post-Iraq generation of Islamist terror-offenders were also at least in
communication with like-minded individuals if not part of larger groups or networks;
however 11 of these individuals were nevertheless acting alone and 9 others (see above)
were removed from such networks altogether. Put another way, only the actions of 1
‘lone’ individual in the post-2003 period (Abdul Rahman) can be understood as being
genuinely integrated with the actions of a network. This means that 20 of 36 cases were
acting alone, constituting 56% of cases or 24% of individuals. Most individuals are still
part of groups then but the number of lone terrorist actors has increased over time. This
can be explained by wider accessibility of Islamist ideology and propaganda and greater
difficulty in making contact with more formal networks of Islamist militants, as well as
the fact that heightened surveillance and changes in the law means that individuals are
more likely to be detected and prosecuted at an earlier stage of involvement and
offending.

Leadership
Table 10.14. Leadership in UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Unknown

None

Leader
only

Spiritual
sanctioner
only

13

21

10

3

1

Top‐down
influence
out‐with
group
1

25% TOT

41% TOT

20% TOT

6% TOT

2% TOT

2% TOT

Both/
mixed

Overseas
leaders/
sanctioners
5
10% TOT

*Note that 2 cases with overseas leaders/sanctioners also had within-group leadership, therefore the total
count comes to 54 (though percentages are still derived using the true total of 51 cases).

Detailed and reliable information on leadership is generally lacking; however it
has nevertheless been possible to at least identify the presence or absence of different
types of leaders in the majority of UK cases. Based on the available data, operational
leaders who did not necessarily demonstrate any specifically religious authority were
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identified in 10 casesvii equalling 20% of the total sample. 3 cases (Abu Qatada, Abu
Hamza & Abdullah El-Faisal) were classed as being spiritual sanctioners (rather than
having them). One case (that of Mohammed Hamid et al- case #20) showed evidence of
having both a sanctioner and leaders. One other case (Mohammed Atif Siddique- case
#15) was classed as coming under significant external top-down influence (from Aabid
Khan- case #25). And 5 cases referred to overseas militant authority figures to varying
degrees: these were Richard Reid and Saajid Badat (case #4); Dhiren Barot (case #5);
Feroz Abbasi (case #7); Rangzieb and Habib Ahmed (case #26); and Abdulla Ahmed
Ali et al (case #27). Twenty-one cases (all lone actors) seemingly did not involve any
leadership and another 13 could not be reliably classified.
These results indicate that leadership among groups of Islamist terrorists in the
UK is quite common but takes varying forms, likely to manifest according to the
specific composition of any particular group and the nature of its links to outsiders,
especially overseas militants. There is not enough information available to be able to
describe the exact nature of leadership in much detail. However it is worth noting that
except for figures such as the 3 sanctioners in the sample (Qatada, Hamza and El-Faisal)
whom others recognised in a more formal capacity, hierarchical systems on the whole
appear to be relatively informally organised and arrived at through mutual consensus
and recognised abilities. That said, it is a topic which warrants more in-depth study by
itself.

vii

These were: Dhiren Barot (case #5); Mohammed Ajmal Khan (case #11) who was a leader of others
out-with his immediate case; Omar Khyam (case #14); Mohammed Siddique Khan (case #17); Muktar
Said Ibrahim (case #18); Parviz Khan (case #21); Aabid Khan (case #25); Rangzieb Ahmed (case #26);
Abdulla Ahmed Ali (case #10); Ali Beheshti (case #48).
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10.2.6 Operational Activity

Ideological Commitment
Table 10.15. Ideological commitment of individuals involved in US Islamist terrorism cases (20012008).

Criminal
opportunists

Troubled/
criminal

Troubled
individuals
(Islamist)

Misc

Social
terrorists/
wannabes

Hardcore/
social

Hardcore

U/K

1

1

1

4

11

28

23

1% TOT

4% TOT

10% TOT

25% TOT

21% TOT

43
38%
TOT

1% TOT

1% TOT

As a prelude to examining what exactly people are doing to advance Islamist
terrorism in the UK it makes sense to develop an idea of levels of ideological
commitment. The classification of ideological commitment presented here is an attempt
at distinguishing between more and less committed individuals (which might potentially
help inform judgements about the prospect of rehabilitation) as well people who may be
involved for non-ideological reasons. ‘Social’/‘wannabe’ terrorists are defined as those
individuals driven primarily by such factors as belonging and self-esteem, who most
likely only have a limited grasp of Islamist ideology and religion and are more likely to
‘soften’ their political stance in the absence of social support. ‘Hardcore’ terrorists are
those individuals who are ideologically informed and committed, have demonstrated a
long-standing commitment to the cause and are less likely to relinquish their views.
Although people involved for non-ideological reasons are relatively easily
identified, judgements about whether someone is a social/wannabe terrorist as compared
to someone who is hardcore are based on very limited data and in the absence of
multiple researchers (in order to establish inter-rater reliability) are essentially
subjective. The levels of certainty in these judgements are further clouded by the fact
that even wannabe terrorists may say the most extreme things or commit the most
extreme acts of violence, thereby confusing the meaning which can be inferred from
these factors. These limitations must be borne in mind when evaluating this section of
the analysis and the reader is encouraged to evaluate for themselves whether the cases
cited have been accurately assessed.
One individual was classed as a criminal opportunist- this was Hemant Lakhani
(case #10) who was caught in an American sting operation trying to supply missiles to
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an undercover officer claiming to be an Islamist militant. Lakhani is a Hindu and was
not ideologically motivated- he was simply willing to negotiate a deal aimed at personal
profit.
One person was classed as a ‘troubled’/criminal individual. This was Malcolm
Hodges (case #29) who had nurtured a lingering grudge for more than a decade after
failing an accountant’s exam and in 2006 sent letters to mosques encouraging acts of
terrorism against accountancy institutions. He was thus not an Islamist himself but was
willing to try and use Islamist terrorists for his own ends.
A third individual, Kevin Gardner (case #34) was classed as ‘troubled’ but also a
subscriber to Islamist ideology. This is because Gardner did adhere to a self-taught
version of the ideology but was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.
Three of the 4 individuals classed as ‘miscellaneous’ together formed a group.
Ali Beheshti, Abrar Mirza and Abbas Taj (case #48) were included in the sample
because they attempted to burn down a publisher’s home for agreeing to release a book
deemed offensive to Muslims- they were thus clearly acting to intimidate and coerce an
individual for religious/political reasons and Beheshti was also involved with alMuhajiroun. The exact nature of their ideological convictions is unknown though and
they were essentially acting over a single (Islamist-related) issue. The fourth person in
this category was Saeed Ghafoor (case #51) who has repeatedly made threats to carry
out terrorist attacks in the name of Islam, thus receiving extended jail-time, but without
any demonstrable genuine intent or means to do so. He thus defies classification.
Moving on to the bulk of the sample, 11 individuals were classed as purely
social/wannabe terrorists.viii Examples include Saajid Badat who backed out of his role
in the shoe-bombing plot which Richard Reid went on to attempt, and Abbas and Ilyas
Iqbal who dubbed themselves the ‘Blackburn Resistance’ and spent their time posturing
with knives and fake guns and recording themselves in their local park in mock training
exercises.
Most of the rest of the sample (the ‘hardcore/social’ category and the 44
‘unknowns’) appear to adhere to militant Islamist ideology to varying degrees and they
all lie somewhere between ‘wannabe’ and ‘hardcore’. Examples of hardcore/social

viii

These were: Saajid Badat (case #4); Feroz Abbasi (case #7); Mohammed Atif Siddique (case #15);
Manfo Kwaku Asiedu (case #18); Abdul Patel (case #28); Abbas & Ilyas Iqbal (case #38); Nicholas
Roddis (case #40); Andrew Ibrahim (case #45); Mohammed Abushamma (case #46); Nicky Reilly (case
#50).
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terrorists -those who do seem strongly committed but for whom data was insufficient to
make more confident individual judgements- include: Omar Khyam’s affiliates in the
Operation Crevice plot (case #14); Abdul Rehman Saleem and other fellow alMuhajiroun activists (cases #16 & #30); Atilla Ahmet (case #20) who helped organise
domestic training camps; and Sohail Qureshi (case #33) who was preparing to train and
fight in Afghanistan and had apparently done so before. As already noted the
‘unknowns’ also appear to lie somewhere on this continuum but there is not enough
data to give any indication about which end of the spectrum they might occupy.
Examples of this are Tariq al-Daour and Waseem Mughal (case #19) who were Younis
Tsouli’s accomplices- they were clearly heavily involved but because Tsouli stole all of
the limelight there is practically no information available about them.
Twenty-three individuals (21% of the sample) were classed as hardcore
militants, strongly committed to the ideology and the cause. Examples include Abu
Hamza (case #3); Dhiren Barot (case #5); Omar Khyam (case #14); the 7/7 bombers
(case #17); Abdulla Ahmed Ali, Ali Assad Sarwar and Tanvir Hussain from the 2006
‘aircraft’ plot (case #27); and Bilal Abdulla and Kafeel Ahmed (case #41) who
attempted attacks in London and Glasgow in 2007. Unsurprisingly, those classed as
hardcore are often leaders of others and are also those willing to carry out mass-casualty
attacks- neither of these qualities may be a necessary or sufficient condition but they do
help identify more obvious hardcore terrorists.
Although more hardcore individuals numerically speaking were found among
the post-Iraq offenders, in relative terms they constitute 29% of the earlier and 18% of
the latter generation. On the face of it this suggests a decrease in commitment and
possibly the risk that Islamist militants in the UK present, but it may also relate to how
this variable was determined, taking into account such factors as duration of
involvement with other terrorists and the nature of their associations. At the same time a
greater number of less obviously hardcore offenders necessarily reduces the proportion
that they represent. And, in a related point, all of the non-Islamist-proper individuals
(except for Lakhani) began offending in 2004 or later. The sample is still
overwhelmingly dominated by individuals with some genuine degree of commitment to
Islamist ideology but a small number of individuals operating on the periphery of the
movement have also cropped up. The most likely explanation for this is one that plays
an important role in a number of areas- increased awareness. This exposes more people
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to Islamist ideology and activities and increases the chances that it will be adopted in
new and different ways.

Behavioural Classification
Table 10.16. Behavioural classification of UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008). The top two rows
refer to individuals; the bottom two rows refer to cases.*

Possession
of terrorist Promoting
articles/
jihad
propaganda
11
10% I
11
22% C

23
21% I
13
25% C

Facilitating:
Active
support**

Facilitating/
fundraising

Offering
services

9
8% I
6
12% C

10
9% I
4
8% C

1
1% I
1
2% C

Preparation
for violence

Active
pursuit
of
violence

Misc.

11
10% I
5
10% C

47
42% I
17
33% C

1
1% I
1
2% C

* Note that the case total is greater than 51 since some individuals performed different roles within cases,
bringing the total to 58. Case percentages are still derived using 51 as the total. All individuals except 1
(Parviz Khan- case #21) were categorised according to their primary role. Khan, however fulfilled 2 quite
distinct roles and is thus counted twice- individuals counts thus come to 113 although percentages are
calculated using 112.
**4 individuals within this category (Mohammed Ajmal Khan –case 11- Mohammed Hamid and Atilla
Ahmet –case #20- and Rangzieb Ahmed –case #26) are also classed as ‘top-down’ facilitators of jihad.

Behavioural classification is a direct indicator of operational activity and is one
of the main variables of interest because it tells us what exactly individuals from, or
living in, the UK are doing in furtherance of violent Islamist ideology. Like many of the
variables here it proved difficult to classify, given overlapping behaviours within groups
and individuals, and unclear boundaries between categories. Classification should thus
be considered a matter of emphasis rather than an absolute steadfast system of division.
Figures are shown both for individuals (the top two rows) and cases (the bottom
two rows) since individuals within the same case are not always fulfilling the same
function. In particular, individuals whose primary activity was promoting jihad were
often facilitators and fundraisers to some degree and almost the entire sample was in
possession of terrorist propaganda, oftentimes including instructional material such as
bomb-making manuals- those who were prosecuted for this offence only (see below)
can be considered cases of early intervention. The pursuit of violence obviously
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involved prior preparation but also demonstrated more determined, overt steps to
perpetrate violence against others (as opposed to engaging in training only).
Eleven individuals, all in separate cases, were prosecuted for possession of
terrorist propaganda and material useful for terrorismix- because they were arrested
before they could do anything in relation to this it is not possible to say how they might
have –or whether they would have- progressed further. These cases nevertheless sit on a
continuum ranging from no apparent intent to clearly increasing intent to carry out some
kind of action. For example, Khalid Khaliq (case #23), a former associate of
Mohammed Siddique Khan (case #17) was in possession of a censored al-Qaeda
manual downloaded from a US government website in 2005 and was prosecuted in
retrospect in 2007. He did not do anything else. In contrast, Krenar Lusha (case #47)
had been downloading a considerable amount of similar jihadi materials but had also
stockpiled more than 70 litres of petrol in his home, for which he was prosecuted. It
thus appears that Lusha was transgressing from ideation to action (and thus borders on
preparation for violence). All but 1 of these cases (Abbas Boutrab –case #12- who was
also bordering on preparation for violence) began offending after 2003.
Twenty-three individuals spread across 13 cases (21% of the former or 25% of
the latter) were primarily involved in promoting jihad, which may be thought of as
‘non-specific recruitment’ although again activities varied. At the lower end of the
spectrum were individuals such as Mohammed Atif Siddique (case #15), a student
barely out of school when he began setting up his own jihadi websites with links to
instructions on the use of firearms and explosives. Siddique’s case is essentially one of
bottom-up advertisement. Other cases involved more proactive encouragement from
more authoritative figures. The al-Muhajiroun-affiliated protesters (cases #16 and #30)
who were prosecuted for a variety of offences including soliciting funds for terrorism
and inciting murder fall into this category. Others include Younis Tsouli et al (case #19)
and Aabid Khan et al (case #25) who gained worldwide recognition through their online
promotional activities, which bordered on facilitation of jihad (Khan even met with a
US jihadi candidate in Pakistan –Syed Haris Ahmed, US case #27- in order to ‘vet’ him
for training although Ahmed did not train and there is no evidence that Khan actually

ix

These were: Abbas Boutrab (case #12); Mustapha Abdullah (case #20); Khalid Khaliq (case #23);
Mohammed Uddin (case #23); Abdul Patel (case #28); Omar Altimimi (case #31); Yassin Nassari (case
#32); Pa Modou Jobe (case #36); Bilal Mohammed (case #37); Krenar Lusha (case #47); Houria
Chentouf (case #49).
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arranged this for anyone else). Then at the most serious end of the spectrum were
individuals such as Abu Qatada (case #1), Abu Hamza (case #3) and Abdullah El-Faisal
(case #8) whose religious opinions were issued in a top-down fashion and have
influenced the actions of individuals and established terrorist organisations alike.
It should be noted that within the current sample these high-end cases of
promoting jihad all began prior to the invasion of Iraq and although individuals such as
Tsouli have been vigorous in their online efforts to encourage or facilitate violence they
have not achieved the same level of authority or social standing. Moreover, outlying
cases such as Malcolm Hodges (case #29) and Nicholas Roddis (case #40) have also
cropped up in more recent years. These are individuals who have essentially promoted
jihad –either for obscure personal reasons or out of an immature fascination- but are not
at all part of militant Islamist circles. Promoting jihad has thus changed somewhat
qualitatively speaking, seemingly becoming more of a ‘free-for-all’ activity as made
possible by wider public awareness and the Internet.
Active facilitation, i.e. where individuals have taken a hands-on approach in
making things happen within a network of militants, occurred in 6 (12%) of cases (9
individuals).x Almost all of these people, e.g. Andrew Rowe, Ahmed Omar Saeed
Sheikh, and Rangzieb Ahmed, had established links to foreign organised jihadis if not
formal membership in a terrorist organisation. They travelled frequently and were
involved in obtaining supplies and equipment for militants overseas, or else as in
Sheikh’s case, actively facilitated terrorist operations (the kidnap and murder of Daniel
Pearl). The exception within this category is Mohammed Hamid et al (case #20). Hamid
was a former follower of Abu Hamza who established his own following in London,
and assisted by Ahmet and to a lesser extent DaCosta, provided domestic paramilitarystyle training camps in rural areas of the UK with a view for preparing recruits either for
domestic terror attacks or for training and combat abroad. Because of their senior roles
in this case –providing training to others- Hamid, Ahmet and DaCosta are classed as
active facilitators- those who they trained are categorised under the heading of
preparation for violence.
The number of active facilitation cases has stayed consistent over time but
relative to the number of other cases it has become significantly less common (from
x

These were: Andrew Rowe (case #2); Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh (case #9); Mohammed Ajmal Khan
(case #11); Mohammed Hamid, Atilla Ahmet & Kibley Da-Costa (case #20); Parviz Khan (case #21);
Rangzieb & Habib Ahmed (case #26).
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20% in the pre-Iraq era to 8% since then). This is likely to be a reflection of the
difficulty of making contact with overseas terrorist organisations and the concomitant
increased difficulty for such organisations to continue their activities in countries such
as the UK.
Four individuals are also classed as ‘top-down’ facilitators (not shown in the
table simply for reasons of space). These include Hamid and Ahmet because they
orchestrated the activities of their own little group of followers. Although the other
active facilitator cases were undoubtedly more integrated into worldwide militant
networks, only 2 others are given that distinction (Mohammed Ajmal Khan –case #11regarded as a senior LeT operative and convicted for directing a terrorist organisation;
and Rangzieb Ahmed- case #26- convicted for the same offence). The reason for this is
that authority is relative and others do not appear to have occupied such positions within
their networks.
Four other cases (10 individuals) were classed as facilitators of jihad, but who
were slightly less directly or less consistently involved in the ‘leg-work’ of logistic
support. These included: Brahim Benmerzouga and Baghdad Meziane (case #6) who
ran a credit-card fraud/ terror-financing ring and have also been accused of recruitment
activities; Adel Yahya (case #18) who assisted the failed 21/7 bombers in researching
hair bleach needed to manufacture explosives; Parviz Khan’s 6 accomplices (case #21)
who helped him purchase and ship equipment to militants overseas; and Abdul Rahman
(case #35) who helped pay for a plane ticket for an associate to flee Britain and had put
together a small package of knives and other supplies to send over to Pakistan. With the
arguable exception of Benmerzouga and Meziane (the only pre-2004 case and one
which might arguably be classed as ‘active’ facilitation) these individuals appear to be
comparatively less integral to the networks they are part of.
Fifty-eight of 112 (52%) of individuals in the sample (43% of cases) were
devoted to preparing for, or more often, actively pursuing violence. Those who were
prosecuted for preparing for violence either engaged in domestic training exercises (e.g.
Hamid’s followers –case #20- and the Iqbal brothers –case #38) or else attempted to go
and/or had been overseas for training-proper (e.g. Sohail Qureshi –case #33- and
Mohammed Shakil and Waheed Ali –case #39). The one exception to this is Hassan
Tabbakh (case #42) who was caught at a very early stage of mixing chemicals to make
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explosives, with the apparent intention of passing on the instructions to others unknown
to actually make use of. All 5 of these cases began after 2003.
The largest proportion of both individuals and cases in the sample –in
accordance with common understanding of what terrorism entails- made overt steps to
carry out planned, violent attacks. This applied to 5/15 (33%) of cases in the pre-Iraq
era and to 12/36 (33%) of cases in the post-Iraq era. The extent to which these cases
were focussed at home or abroad –as well as what kind of targets have been chosenwill be considered below, but in terms of percentages of overall cases in each time
period they are the same. However, it is also worth noting that both time periods here
span 5 years (the first pre-2004 pursuit of violence case in the sample began in 1999)
and in absolute terms the number of planned attacks has more than doubled. The
relative proportion that this represents in the post-Iraq era is more indicative of a
proliferation of other offences (both in terms of what people are doing and what is
defined as illegal- e.g. possession of terrorist instruction manuals etc) combined with
increased detection rates. In short, the number of people planning attacks has increased.
Finally, 1 individual was classed as having offered his services to militants
(Hemant Lakhani, case #10) and 1 was classed as ‘miscellaneous’ (Saeed Ghafoor, case
#51). The former involved offering to supply arms for money and the latter involved a
rather bizarre series of threats issued from within prison to carry out terrorist attacks on
being released. Both of these cases are very much peripheral to genuine Islamist
terrorism but are still helpful for illustrating the diverse ways in which it can appeal to
different individuals.
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Domestic vs. Overseas Focus & Operation
Table 10.17. Domestic vs. overseas focus and country of operation of UK Islamist terrorism cases (20012008) according to behavioural classification.

Focus:
Focus:
Focus:
Domestic Overseas Mixed
Possession of
terror
materials
Promoting
jihad
Facilitating:
Top‐down

2

Facilitating:
Active support
Facilitating/
fundraising

1

Country of
operation:
Domestic

2

11

2

9

12

1

13

2

1

1

2

3

4

2

1

4

6

2

1

4

Preparation
for violence

2

3

5

3

2

9

29

1
42

1
16

Total

9

1

12

Country of
operation:
Mixed

11

Offering
services

Active pursuit
of violence
Misc.
Total

Country of
operation:
Overseas

16

1

4
1

1
5

1

2

7

17

17

1
61*

*Note that case totals exceed 51 since some individuals performed different roles within cases, bringing
the total to 61.

Table 10.17 shows numbers of UK Islamist terrorism cases according to their
behavioural classification divided by whether they had a domestic, overseas or mixed
focus, and whether the individuals involved were based in the UK, abroad or a
combination of the two. A domestic focus refers to a concern with affecting events
within the UK (although there are almost always overtures to the foreign stage); an
overseas focus involves a primary concern with the global jihad abroad; and a mixed
focus is characterised by a general concern for the global jihad, i.e. definite concern for
international events, with some indication that domestic operations are also deemed
viable. Examining these variables gives an indication of what UK Islamist terrorists
want to do and where they are based.
In terms of terrorist materials, it was not possible to classify whether the
individuals involved were more or less focussed on overseas or domestic affairs- it thus
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translates into a generalised interest in jihad. Most of these cases were based entirely in
the UK for the period of offending with just 2 (Yassin Nassari –case #32- and Houria
Chentouf –case #49) involving some relevant international travel.
As might be expected, cases involving promotion of jihad also mostly involved a
generalised outlook, although 2 cases (Malcolm Hodges –case #29- and Nicholas
Roddis- case #40) focussed their actions on affecting the domestic stage, while 2 others
(the al-Muhajiroun protestors in cases #16 and #30) maintained more of a specifically
overseas focus. There was thus considerable disparity between their focus and base of
operations in that all but 1 case (Aabid Khan, case #25) were based entirely in the UK.
The top-down facilitators in the sample showed greater correspondence in their
focus and operation. Mohammed Ajmal Khan (case #11) was focussed on LeT’s efforts
in Pakistan and elsewhere and travelled extensively, as did al-Qaeda operative Rangzieb
Ahmed (case #26). Meanwhile Mohammed Hamid and Atilla Ahmet (case #20) might
ultimately have aspired to contact with foreign terrorists but were content to organise
domestic training and viewed attacks at home as legitimate. Likewise Hamid’s group
represents the only purely domestic case of active facilitation of jihad, a situation that
was acceptable to them by maintaining a mixed focus. All of the other active facilitation
cases involved international travel and operations.
By contrast, the ‘less involved’ jihadi facilitators generally showed a difference
in their focus and operations- most were based in Britain but were involved in
supporting activities of militants overseas. Only 1 case (Adel Yahya, who helped the
21/7 bombers in finding out where they could buy high-concentration bleach- case #18)
was focussed on assisting a domestic operation, which he did before leaving the
country. The fact that such cases were based in Britain yet supporting activities abroad
should not be surprising since funds and other forms of support can be sent overseas
without much need for the organisers to travel.
All 5 preparation for violence cases had an overseas or mixed focus and (with
the possible exception of Hassan Tabbakh –case #42- whose intentions are unclear)
ultimately aspired to becoming involved in jihad overseas. At the same time all 5 were
domestically located, showing a degree of mismatch between their desires and actions
but a willingness to compromise and pursue their interests at home.
The pattern of aims and activity for those who pursued violence (i.e. planned or
carried out terrorist attacks or joined overseas conflicts) is an interesting one. 5 of these
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cases (Reid and Badat –case #4; Dhiren Barot et al –case #5; Feroz Abbasi- case #7;
Abdulla Ahmed Ali et al –case #27; and Mohammed Abushamma –case #46)
maintained an overseas or mixed focus and all 5 of them travelled abroad to fulfil these
aims. All but 1 of them (Abushamma) was successful in joining forces with organised
overseas militants. The other 12 casesxi were focussed on carrying out domestic
operations. Three of them (Omar Khyam’s group and members of the 7/7 and 21/7
cells) still travelled overseas and received explosives training. Another individual,
Kamel Bourgass (case #13) had also previously trained in Afghanistan, although the
offences he was prosecuted for occurred in Britain. Parviz Khan (case #21) also had
established links with overseas militants and travelled to Pakistan, although his plans to
personally commit violence were entirely focussed at home. Yet another, Kazi Rahman
(case #24) had previously trained at Omar Khyam’s camp in Malakand in 2003
although this was unrelated to his attempt to buy machine guns in Britain.
In summary, with the exception of Abushamma, all of the British cases
involving active pursuit of violence were able to operate in the countries that they
wanted to. Those who chose to operate abroad did so and many of those who chose to
attack at home had been in contact with terrorists abroad at some point prior to
offending. Only 2 cases (Bourgass and Abdulla and Ahmed) were recent immigrants,
with 1 more set of individuals (Ibrahim et al) having immigrated to Britain 5-10 years
earlier. Most were long-term if not life-long residents and citizens. Finally, it is
noteworthy that all 5 cases which were completely domestically confined, i.e. Britishborn individuals who did not engage in any related travel (Mansha; Gardner; Ibrahim;
Beheshti et al; and Reilly) each began in 2005 or later. Overall, these results indicate a
continued strong desire to establish contact with terrorist organisations abroad, even for
domestic operations, but also a willingness in the post-Iraq generation to carry out
attacks in the absence of such contact.

xi

These were: Kamel Bourgass- case #13; Omar Khyam et al- case #14; Mohammed Siddique Khan et alcase #17; Muktar Ibrahim et al- case #18; Parviz Khan- case #21; Abu Bakr Mansha- case #22; Kazi
Nurur Rahman- case #24; Kevin Gardner- #34; Bilal Abdulla & Kafeel Ahmed- case #41; Andrew
Ibrahim- case #45; Ali Beheshti et al- case #48; and Nicky Reilly- case #50.
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Table 10.18. Domestic vs. overseas focus and country of operation (C.o.O) of UK Islamist terrorism
cases (2001-2008) divided according to whether cases began before 2004 or 2004-2008. Percentages refer
to rows.

Focus:
Purely
Domestic

Focus:
Purely
Overseas

Focus:
Mixed

C.o.O:
Purely
Domestic

C.o.O:
Purely
Overseas

C.o.O:
Mixed

Overall
(51)

14 (27%)

13 (25%)

24 (47%)

34 (67%)

2 (4%)

15 (29%)

Pre 2004
(15)

2 (13%)

7 (47%)

6 (40%)

7 (47%)

2 (13%)

6 (40%)

2004‐2008
(36)

12 (33%)

6 (17%)

18 (50%)

27 (75%)

0

9 (25%)

Turning to the pre- vs. post-Iraq divide, Table 10.18 shows how the focus and
operation of UK Islamist terrorists has changed over time (note that ‘purely’
domestic/overseas refers to the fact that there was no within-group variation- thus all
group members were focussed on the same aims and all were based in the same country,
otherwise they were classed as mixed, which includes operations at home and abroad).
Overall there has been an overseas focus in 25% of cases (with a further 47%
mixed) and international travel by at least some group members in 33% of cases. Of
cases beginning in the pre-Iraq era, just 2 (13%) (Kamel Bourgass- case #13; and Omar
Khyam et al- case #14) had a purely domestic focus, while 7 (47%) were based entirely
in the UK.xii Most of these cases involved either promoting jihad and/or fundraising for
Islamist militants overseas and were deliberately based in Britain- i.e. it was not a case
of thwarted ambitions. The apparent disparity between domestic focus and country of
operation in the pre-Iraq era is thus misleading by itself. Individuals operating within
this period were primarily concerned with events overseas and were mostly able to
travel quite unrestricted when they chose to. It is also notable that even within this early
generation of jihadis, those who chose to attack the United Kingdom were mostly born
and raised there (the exception of course is Bourgass, though his true intentions and at
what point he may have formed them remain extremely murky).
In the post-Iraq period the number of cases involving a purely domestic focus is
6 times higher than before in absolute terms and represents more than double the
percentage of cases (from 13% to 33%). The desire to become involved in overseas
xii

These were: Abu Qatada (case #1); Abu Hamza (case #3); Benmerzouga & Meziane (case #6);
Abdullah El-Faisal (case #8); Abbas Boutrab (case #12); Kamel Bourgass (case #13); and Mohammed
Atif Siddique (case #15).
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operations only has significantly decreased over time (from 47% to 17%)xiii although
50% of cases have still involved a mixed or generalised focus on global jihad.
Conversely, 75% of post-Iraq generation cases have been operationally based in the UK,
with only 9 (25%) involving any relevant overseas travel.xiv Furthermore, of those 9, 1
(Abushamma) was unsuccessful in making contact with overseas militants. This means
that only 8 (22%) truly operated overseas in any meaningful kind of way.
In addition, 3 of 4 cases with an overseas focus who tried to go abroad (Qureshi;
Shakil and Ali; and Abushamma) failed in their most recent attempts. The evidence
therefore quite strongly supports the conclusion that fewer Islamist militants from, or
living in the UK in the post-Iraq era are travelling overseas for jihad and more are
beginning to view domestic operations as a legitimate exercise. In accordance with
‘given wisdom’ (see chapters 3 & 4) this is likely a result of increased security measures
and general difficulty in establishing contact with Islamist terrorist organisations since
9/11. This may help explain why out of the 12 post-Iraq cases involving planned
violence on the domestic stage, 7 did not even attempt to go overseas in relation to these
plans.

xiii

These cases are: the al-Muhajiroun protestors (cases #16 & #30); Rangzieb & Habib Ahmed (case
#26); Sohail Qureshi (case #33); Shakil & Ali (case #39); and Mohammed Abushamma (case #46).
xiv
These were: the 7/7 bombers (case #17); the 21/7 failed bombers (case #18); Parviz Khan et al (case
#21); Aabid Khan et al (case #25); Rangzieb & Habib Ahmed (case #26); Abdulla Ahmed Ali et al (case
#27); Yassin Nassari (case #32); Abushamma (case #46); and Houria Chentouf (case #49).
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Planned M.O. of Attacks
Table 10.19. Target type and weaponry in UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008) for domestic and
overseas-based attacks/ planned attacks (excluding joining overseas conflict).

Target: Target: Target: Target:
Fire‐
Explosives
Other Mixed U/K
Civilian
Gov.
Mixed
U/K
arms
Domestic
target

7

Overseas
target

2

3

2

1

8

2

2

1

2

Of 17 cases involving pursuit of violence 2 (12%) involved joining or
attempting to join overseas conflicts (Feroz Abbasi- case #7; and Mohammed
Abushamma- case #46). The remaining 15, shown in Table 10.19, involved planned
terrorist attacks in line with common understanding of what terrorists do. One of these
(the 7/7 attacks- case #17) was an outright success; 4 more essentially failed but
nevertheless came to fruition without any intervention taking place (Richard Reid’s
shoe-bombing attempt- case #4; the 21/7 attacks- case #18; the attempted London and
Glasgow attacks- case #41; and Nicky Reilly’s failed suicide bombing of an Exeter
restaurant- case #50); and in 1 case (Kamel Bourgass- case #13) plans for attack were
thwarted but a police officer was murdered as the main suspect was being apprehended.
Authorities intervened and successfully thwarted the remaining 11 plots.
Only 1 case (Richard Reid and Saajid Badat- case #4) was aimed at targets
entirely overseas, and another (Abdulla Ali et al- case #27) targeted North American
airlines flying out of Britain. Both used or intended to use explosives to attack civilian
passenger planes.
The other 13 cases (87%) intended to, or did, carry out strikes within the UK and
although there has been some variation in their choice of target and weaponry, most
opted for civilian targets and explosives. 7 (54%) chose exclusively civilian targets
(Barot et al- case #5; the 7/7 bombers; the 21/7 bombers; Abdulla & Ahmed- case #41;
Andrew Ibrahim- case #45; Beheshti et al- case #48; and Reilly- case #50); 3 were
aimed at governmental –all military- targets (Parviz Khan- case #21; Abu Bakr Manshacase #22; and Kevin Gardner- case #34); and in 1 case (Kazi Nurur Rahman- case #24)
the target was unknown.
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Most domestically-aimed plots (62%) used or intended to use explosives and
this may reflect both the fact that this is the weapon of choice for terrorists and that
other forms of weaponry –firearms in particular- are not readily available in Britain. Of
the 2 firearms cases, Mansha had a blank-firing handgun converted to fire live rounds
and was planning to shoot a British soldier; the other was Rahman, who was caught in a
sting operation trying to buy guns from undercover police. The ‘other’ category refers to
Parviz Khan’s plot to behead a British Muslim soldier (seen by him as betraying the
Islamic faith) and to the arson attempt by Beheshti et al. Finally, the ‘mixed’ weaponry
refers to Bourgass’s aspirations to use poisons and his impromptu use of a knife when
cornered to murder a British Detective Constable. What this demonstrates is that choice
of weaponry is pragmatic in that it is limited by aims and means. Those who want to
carry out ‘traditional’-style terrorist attacks will try to learn how to make improvised
explosives, while those whose plans are more targeted are more likely to be more
‘modest’ in their choice of weaponry.

10.2.7 International Dimensions and Associations
Table 10.20. Contact with foreign terrorists in UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Individuals
Pre 2004
2004
onwards
Cases
Pre 2004
2004
onwards

Contact with
Yes
34
30% TOT
18

foreign terrorists
No
37
33% TOT
2

U/K
41
37% TOT
8

16

35

33

22
43% TOT
12

21
41% TOT
2

8
16% TOT
1

10

19

7

An important question to address is whether Western-based Islamist terrorists
are in contact with their foreign counterparts, especially those who are more organised
and have greater resources at their disposable. Table 10.20 shows that 30% of
individuals in the sample (applying to 43% of overall cases) were in contact with
overseas terrorists. 37% of individuals and 16% of cases could not be classified,
however, there is a tendency for such connections to be reported when they are present
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and therefore the majority of these most likely did not have foreign contacts (one
possible exception is Houria Chentouf –case #49- who had connections with known, but
publicly unidentified Dutch ‘extremists’).
Looking at the pre- vs. post-Iraq divide (defined as up to and including 2003,
and 2004 to 2008) there is a significant difference. 18/24 (64%) of individuals (80% of
cases) in the pre-Iraq generation had established contacts with foreign Islamist terrorists,
compared to 16/84 (19%) of individuals (28% of cases) in the post-Iraq generation. In
addition, a number of those with foreign connections who began offending in 2004 or
later actually established their contacts several years previously (e.g. Mohammed
Siddique Khan- case #17; and Rangzieb Ahmed- case #26), hence the trend appears to
be even stronger. The general assumption that ‘home-grown’ terrorists are less likely to
be in contact with foreign terrorists is thus clearly supported, although it is something
that still persists in a minority of cases and is indicative of greater levels of threat where
it has occurred.
Table 10.21. Number of UK Islamist terrorism cases in contact with foreign organised terrorists in
different locations, divided according to whether cases began prior to 2004 or 2004-2008.

Foreign terrorists' location

Pre
2004

2004
onwards

Global (S. Asia/ N. Africa/
Middle East/ Europe/ Balkans)

6

2

Pakistan/ Afghanistan

11

9

Canada
US

2
3

3
4

Table 10.21 adds to the discussion by showing the whereabouts of foreign
terrorist contacts among UK cases. Note that certain cases had multiple contacts and are
thus counted in more than 1 category- this artificially represents the number of pre-2004
cases as 22 (real number 12) and the post-2003 cases as 18 (real number 10) but
accurately reflects the number of cases with specific links to each region of the world.
One of the most striking things about the pre-Iraq period compared to cases
beginning in 2004 or later is the number of cases with ‘global’ terrorist connections
(50% vs. 18%). 4 cases in particular (Qatada- case #1; Rowe- case #2; Hamza- case #3;
and Reid- case #4) had travelled extensively and were in contact with Islamist terrorists
on a worldwide scale, and another 2 (Benmerzouga and Meziane- case #6; and
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Bourgass- case #13) had links to militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as
Algeria and Europe. In the post-2004 period only 2 cases (Younis Tsouli- case #19; and
Aabid Khan- case #25) were classed as having global connections- both are also
counted under Canada and the US, and Khan is included under Pakistan/Afghanistan.
Khan did travel and spent considerable time in Pakistan, however for both him and
Tsouli it was their online activities that played a more important role in establishing and
maintaining their global contacts. By contrast the earlier global cases played far more
hands-on, integrated roles in established terrorist organisations.
Connections with terrorists in Pakistan and/or Afghanistan have remained by far
the most dominant and are found in 11 (92%)xv of pre-Iraq, and 9 (90%)xvi of post-Iraq
cases with foreign connections. The continued popularity of these countries is hardly
surprising given their long-standing significance in the global Sunni jihad; however the
continued ability of UK Islamists to make contact with militants there is still striking. It
is undoubtedly facilitated by the fact many have family ties in Pakistan and in fact
Afghanistan specifically has become less commonly cited as a training destination for
British jihadis.
Connections with other Western-based militants have also occurred in a number
of cases both before and after the Iraq time-divide. Taking into account European
connections among the globally connected UK terrorists and removing ‘double-counts’
of cases, 9 out of 12 (75%) of pre-Iraq cases have involved communication and
collusion with other Western-based jihadists, compared to 4 out of 10 (40%) from 2004
to 2008. The nature of this contact has also changed somewhat over time. The earlier
generation of Islamist militants seemed to perform more integrated roles within the
same overall network, and new connections were made by virtue of physically meeting
in the same places- for example at camps in Pakistan or Afghanistan, at Finsbury Park
mosque in London or somewhere else facilitated by mutual acquaintances. This does
apply to post-Iraq offenders Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer (case
#17) who met with Mohammed Junaid Babar and Mohammed Momin Khawaja –from
the US and Canada respectively- and also to Kazi Nurur Rahman (case #24) who had
also met with Babar. However, British and other Western jihadis now seem more
xv

Qatada (case #1); Rowe (case #2); Hamza (case #3); Reid & Badat (case #4); Barot (case #5);
Benmerzouga & Meziane (case #6); Abbasi (case #7); Sheikh (case #9); Ajmal Khan (case #11);
Bourgass (case #13); & Khyam et al (case #14).
xvi
7/7 (case #17); 21/7 (case #18); Parviz Khan (case #21); Kazi Rahman (case #24); Aabid Khan (case
#25); Ahmed (case #26); Ali et al (case #27); Abdul Rahman (case #35); & Shakil & Ali (case #39).

278

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
disparate and their connections with each other are more the result of effortful,
deliberate reaching out, usually initiated online. This is exemplified by Tsouli and
Aabid Khan’s liaisons with now-convicted Canadian and American terrorists who they
met on the Internet.xvii Moreover, in earlier generations many European-based Islamist
terrorists in particular, with whom Britons were in contact, were themselves part of
terrorist organisations such as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the al-Qaeda
network. More recent Western-based contacts of British terrorists in the post-Iraq era
have not been part of proper terrorist organisations and have looked to their UK
associates for assistance.
Detailed information about the nature of contact with overseas Islamist terrorists
is lacking, however the roles that individuals played reveals something about their
standing in relation to their foreign associates. In the pre-Iraq generation (several of
whom had been involved with Islamist militants since at least the mid-1990’s) there
were 2 major jihadi ideologues –Qatada and Hamza- plus Abdullah El-Faisal who also
commanded significant influence in a similar role. These individuals were highly
respected by Islamists on a global scale and interacted with others from a position of
religious authority. Several others in this period were operatives of terrorist
organisations including al-Qaeda and Lashkar e-Taiba (e.g. Andrew Rowe, Ahmed
Omar Saeed Sheikh and Mohammed Ajmal Khan) and in that capacity were assisted
financially and logistically in fulfilling organisational assignments in collaboration with
foreign contacts. Training in Afghanistan was common, after which individuals found a
place within a loosely defined hierarchy according to their abilities- e.g. Richard Reid
and Saajid Badat (case #4) were ‘foot-soldiers’ carrying out the plans of more senior
figures in al-Qaeda, whereas Mohammed Ajmal Khan (case #11) was himself a member
of LeT with considerable standing and freedom to orchestrate his own and others’
activities. Regardless of their levels of authority and autonomy, earlier UK Islamist
terrorism cases were organisationally integrated to varying degrees and often travelled
extensively. This especially applies to those who became active before 2001, which was
a key turning point in terms of the ‘war on terror’ (see chapters 3 and 4).

xvii

Note that the ‘pre-Iraq’ case with links to Canada, Mohammed Atif Siddique (case #15) was in reality
introduced to Islamist militancy by Aabid Khan (case #25), and began offending as far as the courts were
concerned just as Iraq was being invaded. He shared Tsouli and Khan’s links to the same group in
Canada.
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Later cases within the pre-Iraq period as defined here are indicative of
qualitative changes beginning to take place in the nature of foreign associations. Thus
Omar Khyam et al (case #14), although able to make contact with and receive
explosives training from Pakistani terrorists (having previously been involved in a UKbased support network) were not members of any specific overseas terrorist
organisation and were following their own plans. Lastly, Mohammed Atif Siddique
(case #15) had only virtual links to other Islamist terrorists, who in his case were based
in Canada and were an autonomous ‘home-grown’ group.
In the post-2003 era, only 1 case (Rangzieb Ahmed- case #26) can be considered
an operative of an organisation on a comparable level to the earlier generation, and of
course his journey into Islamist militancy appears to have begun several years
previously to the offences for which he was incarcerated. Parviz Khan (case #21) also
had significant connections to Islamist terrorists in Pakistan and seemed to defer to their
authority, although he was largely self-organised within Britain and his plans to behead
a British Muslim soldier were at odds with his foreign associates’ advice to maintain a
purely supportive role. Moreover, Khan was not apparently part of a wider network
outside of Britain and Pakistan and there is no evidence to suggest that he was funded
from overseas.
Most of the rest of the post-Iraq cases with foreign connections knew militants
in Pakistan and were able to arrange for training camps there (practice with firearms and
explosives) but, like Khyam’s group, did not appear to be carrying out missions on their
behalf or to be taking direction from them, and were largely autonomous in their
activities. That said, the airliner plot disrupted in 2006 led by Abdulla Ahmed Ali (case
#27) was described by the sentencing judge as having been directed from Pakistan
where key members of the plot are alleged to have conferred with senior al-Qaeda
operatives. There have also been unproven allegations that a number of Pakistani
nationals came to the UK with the specific intention of carrying out attacks for al-Qaeda
in April 2009 (investigated under ‘Operation Pathway’) and the individuals involved
have since been linked to accused Islamist terrorists plotting attacks in the US and in
Norway as well as individuals arrested in Belgium.10 All of these cases (including Ali’s
airline plot) shared a common link in Pakistan- the alleged al-Qaeda affiliate and since
deceased British national Rashid Rauf.
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Although there is still much to be established in terms of legal standards of
proof, these examples indicate that there has been a deliberate resurgence of effort from
organised militants in Pakistan to actively facilitate terrorist attacks in the UK and other
Western countries, i.e. there is greater effort originating from Pakistan as opposed to
simply obliging the wishes of Westerners who travel there seeking assistance in their
own plans. The question that remains is the extent to which elements of the network
behind this renewed wave of effort remain functioning since plotters in the West have
been arrested and a number of their ‘handlers’ in Pakistan have been killed.11 Certainly
no British plots since 2006 have rivalled the scale or sophistication of Ali’s plans to
bring down transatlantic airliners. However, given a persistent desire to strike against
the UK on home soil, combined with resilient militant networks in Pakistan and
persistent home-grown elements with ties to that country, it seems only a matter of time
before such a plot is uncovered.

Table 10.22. Numbers of UK Islamist terrorism cases in the pre- vs. post-2004 periods with named
domestic and foreign terrorist associations.

Named
domestic
associations

Named foreign
associations

Both

Total

Pre‐
2004
(n=15)

0

2

8

10
(67%)

2004
onwards
(n‐36)

9

0

7

16
(44%)

9

2

15

26

18%

4%

29%

51%

Total
% TOT
(51)

Table 10.22 shows the number of cases with named foreign and/or domestic
terrorist associations. Overall, among these cases it has been most common for both
foreign and domestic associations to be named (applying to 29% of the sample as a
whole). Next most common were named domestic associations only (18%) and then
named foreign associations only (4%). These results seem to imply that where contact
exists with foreign terrorists, there is most likely contact with similar others on the
domestic stage too.
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Looking at the pre- vs. post-Iraq generations there are similar numbers in
absolute terms of cases with both foreign and domestic named associations, although
relatively speaking this accounts for 53% of all pre-Iraqxviii and 19% of all post-Iraqxix
cases. Two more cases in the pre-Iraq era also involved named foreign terrorist
associations only: Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh (case #9) who knew the founder of JeM,
Maulana Azhar Masood among others; and Mohammed Ajmal Khan (case #11) who
knew Ali Asad Chandia and several other members of the US ‘Virginia jihad network’
(US case #7) whom he met through LeT in Pakistan. Meanwhile no post-Iraq cases have
involved foreign-only named terrorist associations but 9 (25%) have involved named
domestic-only links. Most of these cases (e.g. the Iqbal brothers –case #38; Ishaq
Kanmi- case #43; and Krenar Lusha- case #47- who were all tied together through
Kanmi) did not appear to be in contact with foreign terrorists. The notable exception
with meaningful overseas links was Muktar Ibrahim (case #18) who learned to make
explosives in Pakistan at the end of 2004, but whose specific contacts are unknown.
The figures presented in Table 10.22 are less meaningful than the specific
associations themselves (since these numbers do not tell us who knew who else, and do
not account for unnamed contacts). However it does highlight the fact that domestic
associations are also common among Islamist terrorists living in or from the UK. In
particular the pre-Iraq cases were highly interconnected- Abu Qatada (case #1) taught
Abu Hamza (case #3) who oversaw affairs at Finsbury Park mosque, which was the
centre of a sprawling network of militants from the late 1990s through to 2003;
Benmerzouga and Meziane (case #6) were followers of Qatada and linked to Finsbury
Park; Reid and Badat (case #4) and also Abbasi (case #7) each worshipped at Hamza’s
mosque (as did Kamel Bourgass –case #13- although it is not clear who exactly he knew
outside of individuals acquitted of terrorism offences) and numerous individuals from
around the world later convicted for terrorism offences also passed through (see chapter
7).
Other individuals’ associations bridge the pre- vs. post-Iraq generations.
Specifically, Omar Khyam (case #14) met with Mohammed Siddique Khan (case #17)
in Pakistan in 2003 and then met several more times with Khan and Shehzad Tanweer
xviii

Abu Qatada (case #1); Abu Hamza (case #3); Reid & Badat (case #4); Barot et al (case #5);
Benmerzouga & Meziane (case #6); Abbasi (case #7); Khyam et al (case #14) & Atif Siddique (case
#15).
xix
Siddique Khan et al (case #17); Tsouli (case #19); Kazi Rahman (case #24); Aabid Khan (case #25);
Rangzieb Ahmed (case #26); Ali et al (case #27); Abdul Rahman (case #35).
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in Britain. Also in attendance at the camp in 2003 was Kazi Nurur Rahman (case #24)
and Waheed Ali (case #39). Ali’s associate Mohammed Shakil also separately trained
with Khan in Pakistan, and another acquaintance of Khan and Tanweer’s, Khalid Khaliq
(case #23) is also included in the sample.
Similarly, Mohammed Atif Siddique (case #15) had been influenced by Aabid
Khan (case #25) and together they were in contact online with Younis Tsouli (case
#19). Their websites were frequented by untold numbers of others, among them Yassin
Nassari (case #32) who is reported to have been in touch with one of Tsouli’s
associates, Tariq al-Daour.
Ultimately what these examples demonstrate is that Islamist terrorism in the UK
both in earlier and more recent generations remains an interconnected social
phenomenon, and even though foreign affiliation with organised terrorists has become
more difficult to achieve, terrorists at home are still quite often in communication with
one another.
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10.2.8 The Role of the Internet
Table 10.23. Use of the Internet in UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Use of
Internet

U/K

Pre‐
2004

4

2004
15
onwards
Total
19
% TOT 37%

Gather
Access
Create/
intell/
Group
Fund‐
Other
propaganda/ Comm.
distribute
research
formation raising research
forums
materials
attacks
2

6

3

4

0

0

1

17

12

8

2

2

1

0

19
37%

18
35%

11
22%

6
12%

2
4%

1
2%

1
2%

Table 10.23 shows how Islamist terrorists living in or from the UK have been
reported to be using the Internet. In 19 cases (37%) there was no specific usage reported
although it should be noted that at least communication or accessing jihadi websites
seems likely in some of these cases (this is inferred based upon a) the ubiquitous use of
the Internet in modern society for communication and pursuing personal interests, b) the
widely documented popularity of jihadi websites,12 and c) the fact that it will not always
be known about or reported). In cases where Internet use was reported there were often
multiple uses, therefore the case total adds to more than 51 (although this figure is still
used to derive percentages).
The most popular reported use of the Internet overall was to access jihadi
websites, download written and visual material and participate in extremist (often
password-protected) chat forums. There was a big difference between the pre- vs. postIraq generations and only 2 earlier cases (Abbas Boutrab- case #12; and Mohammed
Atif Siddique- case #15) were specifically reported to have done this –and Siddique is
really more of the latter generation. Meanwhile 17 cases beginning in 2004 or later
utilised the Internet in this way and this is likely a reflection of increased availability of
violent Islamist websites and propaganda such as videos of beheadings and attacks on
collation troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is also likely a reflection of changes in the
law which have made it an offence to possess items such as bomb-making manuals that
can be used for terrorist purposes and can be found most readily online.
Almost as common and far more equally divided across the two generations was
use of the Net to communicate via email, often sent using codes to disguise the nature of
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their content. This is such a widely used system of communication, especially
internationally, that it should hardly be surprising to find terrorists also use it. However,
it is also noteworthy that despite coded conversations, emails continue to be a point of
vulnerability for jihadists and an opportunity for security services to scrutinise their
activities. It is perhaps for this reason that Rangzieb Ahmed (who did also use email)
was in possession of diaries with the numbers of key al-Qaeda contacts written in
invisible ink.
Gathering intelligence or information to assist in carrying out attacks was
reported in 22% of cases overall, representing about the same proportion of both the
pre- and post-Iraq generations. This demonstrates the eagerness of UK Islamist
terrorists to utilise the potential of the Internet from an early stage although it should be
noted that online research was generally complemented by other methods as well. Thus
e.g. Dhiren Barot et al (case #5) also borrowed books from libraries and engaged in
physical surveillance of potential targets, and Abrar Mirza (case #40) drove past the
intended target’s home in addition to using Google Earth to view routes to and from the
property. In general, online research methods for Islamist terrorists are supplemental to
other methods of acquiring knowledge and skills, at least for those who follow through
on plans to carry out attacks. Possible exceptions to this generality are cases where they
have not established either foreign or domestic associations of any use and therefore
must rely on the Internet- this applies to varying extents to Bilal Abdulla and Kafeel
Ahmed (case #41), Andrew Ibrahim (case #45) and Nicky Reilly (case #50). Ibrahim
was detained before he had the chance to complete his experiments with explosives and
the other 2 ultimately failed to construct working bombs. As might be expected,
although the Internet presents possibilities, they may remain beyond the grasp of most
individuals unless assisted.
Another reported use of the Internet was to create and disseminate propaganda.
Surprisingly this was recorded in more early than later cases, but again this reflects the
speed at which Islamists ventured into the online world. Thus the jihadi ideologues Abu
Qatada, Abu Hamza and Abdulla El-Faisal spread their message and distributed copies
of their speeches online, and Hamza even had his own website for his Supporters of
Shariah group. The fourth pre-2004 case, Mohammed Atif Siddique, set up his own
websites featuring instructions on firearms and explosives and this is similar to the
rather more significant websites set up by Younis Tsouli (case #19) and Aabid Khan
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(case #25). Tsouli’s online activities in particular raised his status to the level of gaining
recognition from senior figures in Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s organisation in Iraq and are
testament to the potential for the Internet to close distance between jihadis and for
otherwise unknowns to establish credibility with organised terrorists. That said, despite
ever-increasing access to the Internet along with ever-improving capabilities no other
cases have matched Tsouli’s achievements.
Among the final uses of the Internet was for group formation and this applies
again to Tsouli and Khan. Tsouli set up and operated extremist websites assisted by 2
other individuals, Wassim Mughal and Tariq al-Daour and in fact it seems that he had
never met al-Daour, who financed the operation by stealing people’s credit card details
online (the only specific example of online fundraising). How exactly they made contact
and reached such an agreement is unknown but clearly there is potential for likeminded
individuals to come together following virtual exchanges. Aabid Khan’s case is another
example. He is reported to have been active in recruiting others online, among them
Hamaad Munshi, a schoolboy who would spend hours on the Web researching such
items as suicide vests and then send what he downloaded to Khan. What his and
Tsouli’s cases demonstrate is that the Internet can be used to find other people of use,
whose abilities or willingness to perform certain tasks can strengthen individual’s or
existing group’s abilities. Again though this is rarely reported and face-to-face
interaction seems far more important to group dynamics.
As already mentioned the case of Tsouli et al was the only specifically reported
instance of online fundraising for terrorism and utilised criminal means to do so- i.e.
they did not openly solicit funds for Islamists. Moreover, it is not clear how they spent
the £1.8 million that they raised but there is no indication that money was being donated
to militant organisations or to charitable front organisations as might be expected,
although they are reported to have purchased a range of operational resources such as
global positioning satellite devices, plane tickets and mobile phones.13 There are clearly
more opportunities for online fundraising but given that it is not a common dedicated
activity among UK Islamist terrorists, it follows that it has been underutilised (at least in
cases that we know about so far).
Lastly, 1 case was classed as miscellaneous research in that it did not
specifically involve planning attacks. This was Mohammed Ajmal Khan’s (case #11)
use of the Internet to find equipment and supplies for LeT in Pakistan. This
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demonstrates simply that the Internet can of course be used as a supplementary tool for
all manner of logistic support in addition to attack planning. It has become an integral
part of terrorists’ lives just as it has with the general population.

10.2.9 Stated Motivations
Table 10.24. Stated motivations in UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Stated
Motivations
Pre‐2004
2004
onwards
% TOT

U/K

Religious/
altruistic/
foreign policy

Religious
only

Personal/
Anti‐Britain

Anti‐US/
Self‐serving

4

10

0

0

1

10

24

1

1

0

27%

67%

2%

2%

2%

Motivations behind the actions of people from of living in the UK convicted for
terrorism offences were classified based on reports of things that they had said, written
or in some cases recorded on video. They are grouped according to cases rather than
individuals because the same sorts of motivation tended to be expressed within groups.
Table 10.24 shows that information was lacking for a relatively large proportion
of the sample, precluding reliable judgement. Yet most of the ‘unknown’ cases seemed
to share the majority motivations, which involved an unsurprising mix of religious
rhetoric, altruistic feelings and a strong distaste for UK foreign policy, especially their
support for the American led war on terror and their involvement in Afghanistan and
Iraq (found in 67% of cases overall).
Cases which showed slightly different motivational sets tended to be outliers in
the sample. Thus the ‘religious only’ case refers to Beheshti et al (case #48) who tried to
burn down a publisher’s home for releasing a book deemed offensive to Muslims; the
‘personal/ anti-Britain’ case refers to Malcolm Hodges (case #29) who tried to
encourage terrorism against British accountants for a personal grudge; and the ‘antiUS/self-serving’ case refers to Hemant Lakhani (case #10) who was caught in an
American sting operation where he tried to sell missiles to someone he believed was an
Islamist terrorist. In this way motivations to some extent parallel ideological
commitment (see above).
While the findings here are not particularly informative, it is however notable
that domestic grievances about life in the UK did not form a significant part of stated
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motivations. This does not of course rule out entirely the fact that dissatisfaction with
British life (separate to foreign policy) may play some role in terms of predisposing
certain individuals to find appeal in Islamist rhetoric, but it clearly is not a direct
motivation behind acts of terrorism. This also seems to apply both across case types
(e.g. planning attacks, possession of articles useful for terrorism etc) and across
generations of jihadis. Obviously individuals acting before the Iraq war were not
motivated by this, but they saw Bosnia, Chechnya and Palestine as evidence of Western
indifference or antipathy towards Muslims during the 1990’s, and from 2001 onwards
Afghanistan became the main source of inspiration. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 proved
‘the last straw’ or catalyst in a number of pre-Iraq cases (e.g. Omar Khyam et al) who
had nevertheless been moving towards violence already. It is also thought to be the
driving force behind the post-2003 generation of jihadis but is still combined with other
symbolic struggles and should be viewed as one of several icons of jihad, which revolve
around the same themes of occupied land and injustice.
Finally, there was also a pervasive fascination with violence in the UK sample
as evidenced by the propensity for individuals to have collected videos of beheadings,
military operations and propaganda videos depicting death and destruction. Moreover, a
number of individuals specifically talked about other terrorist attacks, which they
wished to emulate. For example, Waheed Mahmood (one of Khyam’s associates- case
#14) was recorded commenting on the 2004 attacks in Madrid, which killed close to 200
people: “Spain was a beautiful job weren't it? Absolutely beautiful, man, so much
impact”.14 Similarly, Mohammed Hamid (case #20) was covertly recorded stating that
the 7/7 attacks which killed 52 people were “not even breakfast for [him]”15 and part of
the training he organised included practising the technique for beheading someone using
a melon (as the head, not the knife!).16 The glamorisation of violence and the tendency
for individuals to encourage one another confirms the importance of social motives
identified in chapter 4, and it should be remembered that they are infused with and
amplify more formalised religious and political ideological rhetoric.
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10.2.10 Outcomes
Table 10.25. Outcomes in UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Informants/
undercover
operatives

Attacks:
Thwarted

Attacks:
Failed/ semi‐
successful

Attacks:
Successful

Pre‐
2004

0

2

2

1

2004 to
2008

2

6

3

1

Total

2

8

5

2

% TOT
(51)

4%

16%

10%

4%

Table 10.25 shows the outcomes in Islamist terrorism cases involving people
from or living in the UK from 2001-2008. Just 2 cases in the entire sample (Hamid et
al- case #20; and Kazi Rahman- case #24) are reported to have involved undercover
officers or informants during the investigation phase, demonstrating that this was not
apparently a commonly used tactic. Focussing on terrorist attacks (excluding joining
overseas conflicts) in the pre-Iraq generation 2 were thwarted, 2 were failed/ semisuccessful (Richard Reid -case #4- who went undetected up until the point of actually
trying to ignite explosives onboard a plane and Kamel Bourgass -case #13- who
murdered a police officer in an impromptu strike) and 1 attack, the kidnap and murder
of Daniel Pearl organised by Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheik (case #9) was successful. By
comparison, of 10 planned attacks beginning in the post-Iraq era, 6 were thwarted
altogether, 3 were followed to completion but were unsuccessful (the 21/7 attacks –case
#18; the London and Glasgow bombings- case #41; and Nicky Reilly’s failed suicide
bombing- case #50) and 1 was an outright success (7/7- case #17). The percentages
shown are for the sample as a whole, but looking at the ratios of attacks only, 3 out of 5
(60%) in the pre-Iraq generation were able to run to completion whether or not they
were successful, compared to 4 of 10 (40%) in the post-Iraq generation. Given increased
counter-terrorism measures since 9/11 it is not surprising that the UK authorities’
success rate has improved.
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Table 10.26. Outcomes for individuals in UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Deceased

Detained
without
charge

Released
without
charge

Arrested:
prosecuted

Average
Life
Death
sentence
Sentences sentences
in years

Pre‐
2004

0

1

1

26

15.6

8

1

2004 to
2008

5

0

0

81

5

18

0

Total

5

1

1

107

7.4

26

1

% TOT
(114)

4%

1%

1%

94%

N/A

23%

1%

Table 10.26 shows the outcomes for individuals in the sample (note that 114 is
used as the total since both outcomes for the 2 repeat offenders are relevant). 107 of 114
offenders were arrested and prosecuted; 4 killed themselves in the 2005 London
bombings; 1 (Abu Qatada- case #1) is detained without charge pending deportation
proceedings and 1 other (Feroz Abbasi- case #7) was ultimately released from
Guantanamo without charge, although he did admit joining the Afghan jihad. Excluding
life sentences the overall average sentence is 7.4 years, although it has decreased from
15.6 down to 5 from the pre- to post-Iraq generations, which is a reflection of increased
legal powers to prosecute lesser crimes such as possession of articles useful for
terrorism, without actually plotting violence. There have also been 8 life sentences in
the earlier period compared to 18 in the latter, accounting for 53% vs. 21% in each
respective era. Life sentences were handed out almost exclusively for planned violence,
although in 2 instances (Mohammed Hamid- case #20; and Rangzieb Ahmed- case #26)
they were given for providing terrorism training and membership of al-Qaeda,
respectively. Life sentences do vary considerably in Britain though and include a
minimum stipulated sentence- Hamid received the lowest of these at 7.5 years, while the
maximum was 40 (Richard Reid, who was tried in the US received life plus 110 years).
In addition, 1 person (Omar Sheikh) was given a death sentence in Pakistan; 1
other (Kevin Gardner- case #34) was given an indefinite secure hospital order and
Shella Roma (case #44) was given a 3 year community order for distributing a leaflet
she had written encouraging people to take part in violent jihad.
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The specific charges varied considerably but among the most serious were
conspiracy to murder and cause explosions, and preparing for acts of terrorism,
followed by soliciting others to undertake such acts, stirring up racial hatred, and at the
lowest end of the spectrum collecting or possessing articles or documents likely to be of
use to terrorists (which formed the main basis of prosecution for 20 individuals all in
different cases and was also applied as a secondary charge for numerous others). 3
individuals all in the same group (Beheshti et al- case # 48) were not charged under
terrorism or related legislation and were instead prosecuted for arson (which also
highlights this as a borderline case for inclusion in the sample). Finally, there were few
simultaneous convictions for related criminal behaviour. Among them were fraud (Tariq
al-Daour- case #19) money laundering (Baghdad and Meziane- case #6; Hemant
Lakhani- case #10) and breach of the peace (Mohammed Atif Siddique- case #15).

10.3 Summary and Conclusions
Before summarising the current findings it should be re-emphasised that the
available data are of poor quality and often lacking. Nevertheless, a concerted effort has
been made to analyse what is available in a systematic manner focussing on predetermined variables of interest. The results should be viewed as sets of indications
rather than hard facts and they will be subject to change as new developments take place
(although at the time of writing, very similar figures have been reported on several
variables in a comparable study of Islamist terrorism in the UK, thus lending support to
the current project17).
In terms of geographical distribution of Islamist terrorism in the UK, there are 3
main hotspots of activity. In descending order these are London and surrounding areas,
the North West and the West Midlands. The fact that the same areas have tended to
produce the UK’s Islamist terrorism cases over time offers support to the social
transmission hypothesis, which emphasises the importance of localised interaction and
social proximity to sustain Islamist terrorism as a counter-cultural movement. The
terrorism hotspots also correspond with the distribution of the British Muslim
population, which should not be surprising given that Islamist terrorists will of course
choose to live among Muslims.
There is nothing particularly remarkable about the demographic background of
Islamist terrorists living in or from the UK and nothing about them as a whole which
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dramatically distinguishes them from samples in previous studies (aside from their
nationality or location). 78% of the sample held British nationality either as a first or
second nationality and many were of Pakistani or South Asian descent. Individuals were
aged between 26 and 27.5 at the time of offending; most had at least a basic level of
education although occupation-wise a sizeable proportion (around a fifth) was
unemployed immediately prior to offending and most were in unskilled or semi-skilled
jobs. About 40% of the sample was married; 82% were ‘born’ Muslims and 16% were
converts. Another 16% of the sample was reported to have prior, unrelated criminal
records and only a very small proportion had mental health issues (although it was
slightly higher than expected). Together these results strengthen the view that
psychopathology is irrelevant to understanding terrorism, and support explanations
based upon vicarious and relative, as opposed to absolute deprivation.
There was not enough reliable information to be able to make confident
judgements about processes of radicalisation in the sample, but overall face-to-face
interaction seemed to play the most significant role, quite often complemented by
accessing jihadi videos and other materials online. Few individuals were classed as
having radicalised entirely online and among those that were, most were part of the
post-Iraq generation of Islamist militants and were young and impressionable. On the
whole, social explanations of terrorism focussing upon group dynamics are supported.
The overall average offence-range was 1.44 years, although this does not include
previous radicalisation. Moreover, offence ranges have shortened over time and the
average in the post-Iraq generation is less than a year. Average group size was 2.3 and
whilst a large proportion of the sample was prosecuted as ‘lone’ individuals, in reality
both groups and individuals were often situated in wider networks of like-minded
Islamists. However, more genuinely lone actors have offended in the post-2004 period,
which is likely a reflection of wider accessibility of Islamist propaganda. Leadership
within groups was extremely difficult to identify or characterise but appears to be
largely based on informal consensus and abilities rather than formalised hierarchies.
Again, this supports mutual patterns if influence and social competition as drivers of
terrorist behaviour.
Available data was insufficient to establish a reliable system of classification
for ideological commitment except to say that most individuals unsurprisingly lie on a
continuum somewhere between ‘wannabes’ and ‘hardcore’. Although hardly
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conclusive, this adds some support to the observation that involvement in terrorism is
not simply a matter of absorbing ideology. A minority of others sit on the periphery of
genuine Islamist terrorism and can be classed as criminal opportunists, or somehow
‘troubled’ individuals or social misfits.
Behaviourally, active pursuit of violence formed the single largest category of
cases, accounting for 33% of the sample and most of these involved planned
‘traditional’ terrorist attacks with just 2 involving the desire to join overseas conflicts.
Combined, possession of terrorist propaganda and instructional material plus promotion
of jihad (which in the post-Iraq era often involved online distribution of such materials)
applied to 47% of cases. The remainder mostly consisted of a handful of cases involving
preparation for violence through training at home or abroad plus active facilitation of
jihad. Fundraising for terrorism was extremely rare.
Overall, a mixed focus of activities (i.e. allegiance to global jihad with some
indication that domestic operations are also viable) has been the most common among
UK Islamist terrorists, seen in 47% of cases. This has remained strong over time but in
the post-Iraq generation a focus on jihad at home has become increasingly prevalent,
from 13% to 33% of cases, and at the same time related international travel has
decreased from 63% to 25% of cases. This reflects the increased difficulty in making
connections with organised terrorists overseas and greater willingness to conduct
operations on the domestic stage.
In planned terrorist attacks the most popular choice of weaponry was explosives
and there was a general acceptance among UK militants that civilians present a
legitimate target. Choice of weaponry appears to be limited to availability and the
demands of the operation- those conducting more targeted or smaller-scale attacks also
showed a willingness to use readily available weapons such as knives or fire.
43% of all cases involved contact with foreign terrorists, although this decreased
significantly from the pre-Iraq to post-Iraq generation (defined here as cases beginning
prior to 2004 and 2004-2008, thus counting 2003 in the earlier generation to allow time
for individuals to radicalise and act). This lends considerable support to the general
observation that ‘home-grown’ jihadis are less likely to have links to their foreign
counterparts. As for the location of such links, Afghanistan and Pakistan in particular
are by far the most common both before and after the invasion of Iraq and this has been
facilitated by the ethnic heritage of many of those involved in Islamist militancy in
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Britain. More individuals had global terrorist connections as part of multi-national
militant networks in the earlier generation and those that have such links in more recent
years tend to be virtual in nature. Domestic terrorist associations remain popular.
The most often reported use of the Internet has been accessing jihadi websites
and downloading material, although this applies primarily to the post-Iraq generation
which is congruent with the proliferation of online activity of Islamist militants
worldwide. Other uses which show stronger use over time include communication,
researching information to assist in attacks and distribution of jihadi material. Online
fundraising has been extremely rare and as noted above, so has entirely online ‘selfradicalisation’ (again verifying the importance of social interaction).
The available information on stated motivations is generally poor, however the
vast majority of Islamist terrorists from or living in the UK seem to be most directly
motivated by the same generic factors as similar others around the world- namely what
they perceive to be a Western conspiracy against Muslims and in particular the presence
of UK and US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. In accordance with explanations of
terrorism which emphasise rebellion and revenge,18 social motives and a fascination
with violence also permeate these direct motivators.
Finally, very few British terrorism investigations have involved informants or
undercover police officers and individuals under surveillance have thus independently
progressed in their ideology and conspiracies. 94% of the sample has been successfully
prosecuted and have received sentences ranging from a 3 year community order to life
in prison.
Given that Britain has been touted as one of the main centres of Islamist
terrorism in the Western world it is not surprising to find that there have been 51 active
cases between 2001 and 2008. However, many of these cases –especially more recentlyhave involved relatively minor offences such as possession of articles useful for
terrorism without further plans being alleged. This is important for understanding the
counter-culture of Islamist terrorism which seems to have built up in certain parts of
Britain as well as the way in which authorities control it- preferring early intervention in
most cases rather than allowing individuals to progress further towards violence.
A significant proportion of cases are still concerned with perpetrating violence at
home (indeed, a focus on domestic operations has increased over time and joining
overseas conflicts is notable by its absence) plus a minority of recent cases have
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involved support from organised terrorists in Pakistan, making them a severe threat to
national security. However, it must be recognised that these are the minority and that
the context within Britain has changed significantly since the hey-days of
‘Londonistan’. On the one hand there have been hints of resurgent British-Pakistani
organised networks while on the other, 2009 and 2010 have so far been quiet on the
counter-terrorism front. It seems that for the foreseeable future low-level terrorism
offences will simmer away, occasionally punctuated by amateur attempts at domestic
attacks or even rarer high-profile large-scale conspiracies with links to Pakistan.
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Overview
In this, the final chapter, the results from the US and UK are systematically
compared. Overall there are more similarities than differences in demographic profiles,
offence date ranges, group characteristics, processes of radicalisation, use of the Internet
and stated motivations. There are tentative indications that there may be differences in
degree of ideological commitment, and there are more certain behavioural differences in
terms of what individuals from each country are doing in furtherance of Islamist
terrorism and whether they are focussed more on overseas or domestic jihad. There are
also important investigative differences that have an important effect on terrorism in the
US and UK. These results are discussed in detail and implications for counter-terrorism
are considered.
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11. Comparative Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the US and UK, 2001-2008
This study began by outlining the research questions and variables of interest
and introduced the reader to the history of Islamist terrorism and how it has developed
in Western countries (chapters 1-5). Chapters 6 and 7 presented historical overviews of
Islamist terrorism in the US and UK and in chapter 8 these countries were compared
based on existing current accounts of the ‘home-grown’ problems that they both face,
and the differences that are posited to exist between the two. In chapters 9 and 10
Islamist terrorism cases occurring in each country between 2001 and 2008 were
systematically analysed using pre-determined variables listed in chapter 2. Here these
results are compared in order to clarify any differences that may exist and any
implications these might have for counter-terrorism. The ‘messy’ nature of the data
(relatively small samples with frequently missing information and bias created by
positive reporting) combined with the need for qualitative elaboration for many of the
variables does not support the use of formal statistical tests for assessing the statistical
significance of any differences. Such tests were thus not employed and the discussion is
focussed upon noticeable, manifest differences from a pragmatic standpoint- this
enables a flexible and qualified approach, which is appropriate to the data.

11.1 Statistical Summaries
The US sample consisted of 46 cases (91 individuals) compared to 51 cases (112
individuals) in the UK. In absolute terms there have thus been 5 more cases and 21
more individuals involved in Islamist terrorism in the UK from 2001-2008, given the
sampling criteria defined in chapter 2. If the numbers of individuals are expressed as
figures relative to overall population sizes of 300 million for the US and 61 million for
the UK (see chapter 8) this results in a UK rate that is 6.1 times higher than in the US.1
If expressed as rates relative to respective Muslim population sizes of 2.35 million in
the US and 2 million in the UK, the latter is still 1.5 times higher (and very similar rates
are found using case numbers instead of individuals).2 The given wisdom that there has
been more Islamist terrorism in the UK than in the US is thus confirmed regardless of
how it is measured and, since a wide range of cases are included in the sample in an
effort to be as thorough as possible (rather than merely considering cases involving
active pursuit of violence, as in chapter 8) these figures can be considered a more
accurate reflection of the size of that difference for the defined period.
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Figure 11.1. Number of Islamist terrorism cases/individuals beginning each year in the US and UK.
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Figure 11.1 shows the numbers of individuals and cases beginning offending
each year in the US and UK (translating into average yearly case-rates of 4.75 vs. 5.75
respectively). It is interesting to note that there were more US cases beginning prior to
2001 which continued over past September 11th of that year3 and the US case-rate was
actually higher than the UK’s in absolute terms up until 2005-2006. It has only been in
the last 3 years from 2006 to 2008 that the UK clearly overtook America in sheer
numbers of cases, although the large increase in numbers of individuals becoming
active around the invasion of Iraq from 2003 to 2004 is also significant (matched to a
lesser degree in the US). The graph also reveals that in both countries there was a slight
increase in the number of terrorism cases beginning after a successful attack took place
at home- thus the US shows a slight increase from 2001-2002 and the UK shows a
similar increase from 2005 to 2006. Of course a multitude of factors are at play but it is
possible that high-profile successful attacks act to directly spur on other Islamist
militants within the same country, hence offering support to the ‘contagion hypothesis’
of terrorism.4 Finally it is important to note that the apparent decline from 2007 to 2008
in both countries is to an extent artificial since reliable data on all cases potentially
starting in 2008 is not yet available, pending legal outcomes. Looking at alleged cases it
seems that there has been a spike in activity in the US in 2009 into 2010, while the UK
has been comparatively quiet.
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11.2 Geographical Distribution
Figure 11.2. Location of Islamist terrorism cases in the US and UK (2001-2008).

Islamist terrorism has been a primarily East coast phenomenon in the US, and in
the UK it has been mostly limited to 3 hotspots of activity centred around London, the
North West and the West Midlands. The ‘capitals’ of Islamist terrorism in both
countries are located in key cities with symbolic value in terms of places to attacknamely New York City and London. These are the main cities where Islamist terrorists
from overseas originally ‘set up shop’ and this offers some support for the social
transmission hypothesis, which states that the presence of greater numbers of (or highly
influential) Islamist terrorists in a given location increases the likelihood of similar
individuals being found nearby over time as a function of localised (often face-to-face)
social interaction creating a subculture of militancy.
Yet this trend has been much stronger in the UK than in the US. London
(excluding surrounding counties) accounts for 57 individuals of 112 (51%) of the UK
sample, compared to New York, which accounts for 10 of 91 (11%) of the US sample5.
Indeed, Islamist terrorism in the US has spread across 21 different states compared to
the 3 main areas in the UK.
The distribution of Islamist terrorists in both countries parallels the distribution
of their Muslim populations to varying degrees- this appears to be stronger in the UK
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but this may be a product of the fact that more reliable information on the Muslim
population is available and because the smaller geographical area involved necessarily
limits available alternative locations. In either case it should not be surprising, given
that Islamist terrorists are themselves Muslims.

11.3 Demographic Profiles

Gender, Nationality and Age
Table 11.1. Gender, nationality, legal status and average age of Islamist terrorists in the US and UK
(2001-2008).

% Male

% Home
% Home
Average
1st
2nd
years in
nationality nationality country*

Illegal
entry

Average
age at
start of
offence

Average
age at
end of
offence

US

98%

46%

30%

10.3

6%

27.9

30.1

UK

98%

64%

14%

11.6

8%

26.1

27.5

*Applies to those who do not have American/British as 1st nationality.

Table 11.1 shows that in both countries those becoming involved in Islamist
terrorism were overwhelmingly males. The percentage of each sample holding ‘home’
nationality (American or British) either as a first or second nationality was 76% in the
US compared to 78% in the UK, however there was a stronger tendency in the UK for
this to be their first nationality, i.e. for people to have been born there. The larger
proportion of individuals in the US sample who are immigrants (albeit naturalised or
with permanent residency status) may contribute to persistent perceptions that terrorist
in the US ‘come from abroad’ rather than developing at home. Looking at the pre- vs.
post-Iraq dividei 19/44 (43%) of all individuals in the US in the earlier period were
specifically confirmed to have been born there, compared to 21/47 (45%) in the latter
period. The corresponding figures in the UK are 13/28 (46%) and 46/84 (55%). The
tendency for Islamist terrorists in each country to have been born there is clearly not
new, although it has increased over time (more so in the UK).
i

Defined here as cases beginning prior to 2004, and those beginning in 2004 to 2008 inclusive- thus

counting 2003 itself as an ‘incubation period’ allowing time for individuals to react and take action.
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Among those who were not American or British by birth, the average time spent
in each country was 10.3 and 11.6 years- thus showing high levels of familiarity with
the ‘host’ country in both cases. Given that radicalisation did not often apparently begin
as far back as a decade prior to offending, it appears that this generally occurred whilst
individuals were living in the US or UK.
A diverse range of national identities were represented in both samples but
Pakistanis were predominant among first and second other nationalities. However, this
was far more pronounced in the UK where at least a quarter –and seemingly closer to
half6- of the overall sample had roots in Pakistan, compared to about a fifth of the US.
This difference may be a contributing factor behind differential rates of Islamist
terrorism in the US and UK and also helps explain the continued ability of British
militants to make contact with their counterparts at the epicentre of global Islamist
terrorism.
Table 11.1 also shows that the vast majority of both samples had entered the
country by legal means and that average ages were also very similar, although the UK
sample was younger overall by a couple of years. Compared to Bakker’s7 European
study in which the average age at the time of arrest was 27.3, the UK age is somewhat
closer than in the US. Finally, average age has decreased by about 2 years in both cases
from the pre- to post-Iraq generation.

Education
Table 11.2. Education completed of Islamist terrorists living in or from the US and UK (2001-2008).
Percentages shown refer to totals.

Education
completed

Unknown

Did not finish
high school

High school

University

US

43%

4%

27%

25%

UK

52%

3%

29%

17%

Levels of completed education in the US and UK among each sample appear to
be roughly comparable overall, with slightly more individuals in the US having
completed university education. It should be reiterated that most of the ‘unknown’
categories in each most likely do have at least a basic level of education (high school)
but this generally goes un-reported because it is of little interest. It should also be noted
that there is a fair amount of variation within categories in terms of levels of high school
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and university education and the data here provides only a rough basis for comparison.
With that in mind, educational attainment in both countries has been lower in the postIraq generation although (with the exception of university education in the US, which
has dropped from 36% to 15% of all individuals in each period) this decrease has been
small. Ultimately, neither sample is vastly different in terms of educational ‘profile’ in
comparison with one another or as compared to Bakker’s sample of European Islamist
terrorists.8

Occupation
Table 11.3. Occupation of Islamist terrorists living in or from the US and UK (2001-2008).

Occupation

High
Un‐
Prisoner
School
employed

Student

Unskilled

Semi‐
Skilled

Skilled

US
(n=81)

1%

1%

1%

22%

23%

37%

14%

UK
(n=85)

2%

2%

24%

13%

26%

27%

6%

Table 11.3 shows the occupational distribution of each sample, expressed as
percentages of people for whom there were data. The results indicate a sizeable
difference in that more people in the UK were unemployed immediately prior to
offending, less people were students and fewer were in semi-skilled or skilled
occupations. Both samples showed a slight overall decline in occupational standing
from the pre- to post-Iraq generation of offenders and the differences between the two
have persisted, except regarding skilled occupation, which dropped in the US from 9 to
2 (5%n) but rose from 0 to 5 (8%n) in the UK. Overall we can conclude that Islamist
terrorists from or living in the UK are generally slightly worse off than their American
counterparts in terms of their jobs, while Bakker’s European sample lies somewhere in
between. Recalling the fact that levels of educational achievement were not hugely
different, this points to greater levels of underachievement and social disadvantage in
the British sample, although if the trend towards fewer students becoming involved in
the UK continues then both educational and occupational differences may be expected
to widen. While these issues do not of course fully explain why people turn to Islamist
terrorism, they may nevertheless contribute as predisposing risk factors and form part of
the reason for higher levels of militancy in Britain.
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Finally, of the few individuals in each sample who could be classed as ‘fulltime’ terrorists seemingly garnering an income through their activities, almost all
officially began offending prior to 2004 except Rangzieb Ahmed (UK case #26) who
nevertheless had been involved with Islamist terrorists well before then. Paid operatives
of foreign terrorist organisations from or living in the US and UK are clearly a rarity.

Faith
Table 11.4. Religious faith of individuals involved in US and UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Faith

Born
Muslim

Convert

Religious
offshoot

Non‐
Muslim

US
(n=89)

65%

27%

11%

2%

UK
(n=99)

82%

16%

0

2%

Table 11.4 shows the religious background of each sample. Based on the
available information there were more converts in the American sample and also more
individuals who subscribed to a ‘religious offshoot’ ideology, blending violent Sunni
Islam with some other form of religion or ideology yet pursuing similar goals. In the
UK the vast majority were ‘born Muslims’ by way of ethnic heritage although the
degree that they –or their counterparts in the US- were practising Muslims throughout
their lives varied immensely. There was not enough data to reliably quantify, but it was
certainly not uncommon for it to be reported that individuals became increasingly
religiously observant prior to offending, but as pointed out by Sageman9 this is not so
much of a cause of involvement in Islamist terrorism but a consequence, i.e. an
indicator of radicalisation in these individuals.
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Marital Status
Table 11.5. Marital status of individuals involved in US and UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).
Percentages shown refer to totals.

Marital
Status

Unknown

Single

Married/
engaged

Separated/
divorced

Otherii

US

33%

15%

43%

9%

0

UK

35%

17%

41%

2%

6%

Marital status in the 2 samples, as depicted in Table 11.5 above, is overall very
similar, with just over 40% of the total being confirmed as being married at the time of
offending, and taking into account differences in the way percentages were reported,
these figures are comparable to those found by Sageman and Bakker.10 Given the
tendency towards positive-reporting, i.e. reporting the presence but not the absence of
interesting information, it is likely that most of the rest of the ‘unknowns’ are ‘single’ or
unmarried. In line with Sageman’s posited changes in the post-Iraq generation of
jihadis, the proportion of married individuals in both samples has declined. However,
this has been more dramatic in the US, dropping from 63% of all individuals in the preIraq era to 23% since then. This compares to shifts in the UK from 46% of all pre-Iraq
individuals to 37% of all since then. There is no clear explanation for this difference,
although increasing numbers of young Somali-American refugees joining the jihad back
home, none of whom in the sample seem to be married, may be a contributory factor.

Criminal Record
Table 11.6. Criminal records of individuals involved in US and UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Criminal
records

% Total

Theft/
Dishonesty

Violent

Other

US

27%

4%

28%

68%

UK

16%

33%

72%

44%

There was little available information on previous unrelated criminal records.
Table 11.6 shows that these were reported in 27% of the US sample vs. 16% of the UK
sample. Breaking down the offences for which individuals were convicted, the

ii

Note that the ‘other’ category refers to 1 individual who was a single parent and 3 whose children were
mentioned but there was no further information on family status.
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individuals in the US were convicted for the same types of crime although some were
multiple offenders- hence the percentages on the right hand side of the table add to 100,
while in the UK there was more variation within individuals, with some having been
convicted of different types of offences. The most common types of offence in the US
were traffic offences, applying to 36% of those with convictions (included under
‘other’) while only 28% had a criminal record for a violent offence/s. This contrasts
with the British sample, where 72% of those with convictions had such a record
(including 1 for indecent assault). Overall these results carry little meaning, except to
say that they add support to similar findings from other studies,11 and that a large
majority of Islamist terrorists in the US and UK are not previously convicted criminals.
Among those that do have convictions there is no unique criminal profile that might
distinguish them from other criminals.
Finally, no-one in the US and just 2 people in the UK had previous terrorismrelated convictions, although the repeat offences in the UK should be viewed in relation
to the type of offence (making public speeches in favour of terrorism) and the fact that
the individuals involved were prosecuted first for the most recent crime and then in
retrospect for their earlier crimes. It was thus not a case of being punished for one
offence, getting out and re-offending. Terrorism (thanks in no small part to the lengthy
sentences involved and strict conditions on release) has so far proven to be a one-time
venture up until the point of prosecution.

Mental Health
Table 11.7. Mental health of individuals involved in US and UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Mental
Health

Unknown

No
Issues

Low IQ

Questioned
at trial

History of
illness

US

87%

7%

1%

2%

2%

UK

90%

0

1%

4%

5%

Only a few individuals in either sample was confirmed to have any kind of
mental health problems, confirming the findings from other studies, which conclude that
this is not a driving factor behind the actions of Islamist terrorists. It is worth noting that
the percentage of people with established or at least questionable mental health
problems in the UK is double that of the US, but the samples are too small for this to be
statistically significant and again neither sample should be understood in these terms.
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11.4 Offence Date Range
Table 11.8. Offence date ranges in US and UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Offence
date range

Minimum

Maximum

Average

Mode

US

<1 week

17 years

2.59
years

1 year
or less

UK

<1 week

8 years

1.44
years

1 year
or less

Exact offending ranges are very difficult to classify and often rely on officially
defined ranges as dictated in the courts, which of course rely on evidential standards of
proof. They also do not capture earlier periods of radicalisation, which are even more
difficult to classify- and it should be emphasised that individuals’ involvement in
militant Islamism (e.g. attending particular mosques, associating with like-minded
others) is not confined within the defined offence range.
Looking at Table 11.8, the data indicates that while the offence period for the
majority of both samples was about a year or less, the US cases on average had a longer
time-span and the maximum range was also considerably higher. It should be noted,
however, that the offence ranges of Abu Qatada (UK case #1) and Abu Hamza (UK
case #3) are rather conservatively defined and in all likelihood rival the longest case in
the US (Christopher Paul- US case #1). Moreover, in both samples it was the earlier
cases which preceded the ‘war on terror’ that involved the longest offence ranges and
they have shortened considerably in the post-Iraq era. Thus the average offence range in
the US has shortened from 3.95 to 1.4 years and in the UK it has reduced from 2.9 to
0.8 years. To reiterate, these figures are indications rather than exact statistics but
nevertheless demonstrate a clear reduction in the offending ‘life expectancy’ of Islamist
terrorists in the US and UK, which can be attributed to heightened counter-terrorism
measures since 2001. There are likely multiple reasons why the offence range is even
shorter in the UK; however chief among them may be that a considerable number of
people convicted for Islamist terrorism offences there are arrested at an early stage and
prosecuted for minor ‘possession’ offences. By contrast, American authorities often
dispatch undercover officers or informers to collude with identified suspects and nurture
their growing extremism over time to see exactly how far people will go.
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11.5 Radicalisation
Table 11.9. Radicalisation classification for individuals involved in US and UK Islamist terrorism cases
(2001-2008).

Radicalisation

Unknown

Individual

Virtual

Social

Mixed

Not
radicalised

US

82%

1%

1%

8%

5%

2%

UK

75%

1%

6%

16%

0

2%

The most striking finding with regards to radicalisation is that reliable
information is lacking for the vast majority of individuals. This is unfortunate given a
general interest in this phase of Islamist terrorists’ lives and the potential that this
information might hold for informing counter-terrorism strategies. But given that
individuals mostly do not attract any attention until they begin (or rather cease)
offending it should not be surprising. Because of the extent of this limitation in the data
any apparent differences between the two samples cannot be considered meaningful.
At present the indications are that face-to-face social interaction is the most
prevalent –and perhaps most powerful- mechanism of radicalisation but that it is often
supplemented by reference to online propaganda and downloaded materials such as
video-footage from conflict zones etc. Over time and as jihadis have become more
internet-savvy, such material has become increasingly widespread but it is still rare for
anyone to be radicalised entirely online without some form of interaction, and even
where this appears to be the case there is still often ‘virtual’ social support via chatrooms and secure forums.12 Those that are radicalised primarily online appear to mostly
be relatively young and immature or slightly ‘troubled’, socially awkward individuals,
although this does not preclude them from establishing contacts with other militants or
from advancing to stages of ‘jihadisation’.
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11.6 Group Characteristics

Immediate Group Size
Table 11.10. Immediate group size in US and UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Immediate
Group Size

Minimum Maximum

Average

Mode

Change in
Average

US

1

11

2.4

1

Decrease
by 1.3

UK

1

10

2.3

1

Increase
by 0.4

Table 11.10 shows that overall, the two samples are remarkably similar in terms
of group size, the most frequent being 1 (which applies to 57% of the US sample,
compared to 63% in the UK). As discussed in the previous chapters though, the
majority of ‘lone’ individuals in both cases were in fact part of wider militant networks
either at home and/or abroad. Group size as defined here is thus more of a measure of
how people have been prosecuted rather than an accurate portrayal of their social
situation with regard to offending.
There is also a notable difference between the US and UK in that the former has
shown a decrease in average immediate group size from the pre- to post-Iraq
generations, from 3.1 to 1.8, while in the UK it has increased slightly from 2 to 2.4. Part
of the reason for this may be that given the smaller geographical area that Islamist
militants occupy in the UK it is more likely that individuals there are going to interact
and form co-offending groups with like-minded others on the domestic stage (indeed
there has been an increase in named domestic terrorist associations in Britain- see
below). Despite this difference it has still been far more common in both countries for
genuinely lone actors, i.e. those who are not part of any wider network, and those acting
alone with regards to offending behaviour, to be found in the post-Iraq generation.
Among the likely contributory factors are wider public awareness exposing more people
to the Islamist cause, shared sympathies (e.g. disagreement with foreign policy) and a
difficulty for some –especially those who are socially awkward- to entreaty others to
join them in such risky behaviour in light of consistent successes for security services.
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Leadership
Table 11.11. Leadership in US and UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Spiritual
sanctioner
only

Both/
mixed

Top‐down
influence
out‐with
group

Overseas
leaders/
sanctioners

Leadership

Unknown

None

Leader
only

US

39%

22%

0

0

9%

4%

26%

UK

25%

41%

20%

6%

2%

2%

10%

There was not enough information available to reliably identify and classify
leadership for quite large proportions of each sample. Leadership also appeared to be
lacking altogether in 22% of the US sample and 41% of the UK, which largely referred
to individuals acting alone. It was identified in different forms in 41% of US cases and
40% of the UK while the remainder could not be classified due to lacking information.
Where leadership was present within groups the comparative tendency in the US
(4 cases) was for one or more individuals to fulfil both operational leadership and
religious sanctioning roles, while in the UK (10 cases) within group leaders were
primarily operational. In part this may be because the sanctioners in the UK sample
(Qatada, Hamza and El-Faisal) were jihadi ideologues who effectively performed this
function on a global scale without necessarily directly interacting with people whom
they influenced. In essence, this suggests that British jihadis could more easily find
religious justification for their actions from individuals who held very prominent
positions in Islamist subcultures –e.g. by attending a sermon or public lecture- without
those individuals being part of their group. Many in the US would of course be aware of
such iconic figures (indeed, Americans such as Earnest Ujaama came to the UK to
follow Abu Hamza13) but it may ultimately be more compelling to hear such messages
if they are consistently delivered at a more personal level. In fact, the leader-sanctioners
in the US (Altimimi and Royer; al-Saoub; Kevin James and Levar Washington; and
Narseale Batiste) were terrorist ‘entrepreneurs’,14 responsible for their own groups
appearing in the first place. It is quite possible that Islamist terrorists in general in both
of these countries draw religious justification for their actions in a remote way via
books or the Internet and thus it cannot always be attributed to particular group
members.
Another interesting difference was that overseas leadership was more common
in the US (12 cases vs. 5). The nature of overseas leadership was also slightly different
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in that in US cases it was more often a case of individuals joining overseas conflicts and
thus being absorbed into militant hierarchies abroad, while in the UK it was more often
‘remote’ leadership from abroad, directing operatives in the UK or elsewhere. In part
this seems due to a greater desire within the American sample to join overseas conflicts
(more below) but to some extent is also related to the stage at which individuals are
arrested, or whether or not they come home. If they go overseas and die or are arrested
there then leadership doesn’t get the chance to extend to the remote stage, i.e. where
individuals return home but maintain contact and still defer to overseas ‘handlers’.
Hence the exact relationship between any set of individuals is subject to change
according to developing circumstance and opportunity and should not be visualised as
being rigid.
It may be tempting to place greater emphasis on the fact that leadership was
apparently absent from many cases since this questions assertions by Silber and Bhatt15
and Petter Nesser16 that this is a vital component of Islamist terrorism. The evidence
here certainly does refute the notion that leaders are necessary for Islamist terrorism to
occur but it should also be noted that they are very difficult to reliably identify and may
be more common than the data here suggests. Leadership among American and British
jihadis is not formally structured and overtly obvious, but is more often manifest
through informally arrived at consensus and naturally occurring social order dictated by
individual associations, personalities and abilities.
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11.7 Operational Activity

Ideological Commitment
Table 11.12. Ideological commitment of individuals involved in US and UK Islamist terrorism cases
(2001-2008).

Other

Troubled
individuals
(Islamist)

Social
terrorists/
wannabes

US

17%

2%

29%

14%

16%

21%

UK

6%

1%

10%

25%

21%

38%

Ideological
commitment

Hardcore/
Hardcore Unknown
Social

The classification of individuals who can be regarded as peripheral to Islamist
terrorism-proper (shown above under the heading of ‘other’) was relatively easy and the
distinction between these individuals and the majority of each sample, who varied in
their commitment from ‘wannabes’ to ‘hardcore’, carries the greatest level of certainty.
In the US, peripheral individuals included ideological offshoots (Kevin James’ JIS gang
–US case #25- and the ‘Liberty City’ plotters- US case #33), criminal opportunists and
seemingly ‘troubled’ criminals motivated by a combination of monetary and personal
concerns. In the UK there were no ideological innovators to speak of but there were
comparable criminal elements plus individuals who were involved with Islamists but
focussed on a single issue (attempted arson of a publisher’s home for releasing a book
deemed offensive to Muslims- UK case # 48) as well as one person who defied
classification. All of the ‘troubled’, usually lone individuals with a history of personal
problems (whether Islamists or not) were found in the post-Iraq generation in both
countries, again demonstrating the wider variety of people attracted to terrorism as a
result of greater public awareness.
As for the bulk of each sample who adhered to ‘traditional’ Islamist terrorist
ideology to varying degrees, the dividing lines between image-conscious or largely
socially-motivated individuals and those who were more ideologically committed,
‘hardcore’ militants are more difficult to discern. Factors which were taken into
consideration were things that people said, the nature of their offending, length of time
involved in militancy and known associations. Examples of wannabes include Syed
Haris Ahmed and Ehsanul Islam Sadequee (US case #27) and the Iqbal brothers (UK
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case #38). Examples of hardcore terrorists include Christopher Paul (US case #1) and
Mohammed Siddique Khan (UK case #17). Placing individuals in either category
should be considered an indication that they lie towards a particular end of the
continuum from less to more extreme in their beliefs and commitment to Islamist
ideology. Those who were classed as ‘hardcore/social’ lay somewhere in the middle of
these two extremes, while there was not enough information to classify the ‘unknowns’.
More people in the US seemed to be wannabe or social terrorists compared to
the UK but the reasons for why this might be are not immediately obvious. A plausible
explanation might be to do with there being fewer connections with foreign terrorists in
the US but in fact this is not the case (see below). Alternative possibilities are that it
reflects a qualitative difference in the way that people from or living in America and
Britain approach Islamist terrorism, or that (in the absence of multiple assessors) it is an
artefact of subjective judgement since the system of classification here is only loosely
defined. Similarly, there is little obvious reason as to why the proportion of individuals
in the US in the medium category of ideological commitment is slightly fewer, other
than these possibilities.
While the distribution of the low-to-medium ideological categories is thus
somewhat confused, the percentage of hardcore militants in each sample is a little closer
(16% vs. 21%). As already acknowledged, it is far from a steadfast system of
categorisation, however the fact that a minority were classed as hardcore is at least
congruent with Nesser’s assertion that the majority of jihadists are ‘drifters’ who find
themselves involved in terrorism through circumstance and social ties rather than
ingrained dedication to ideological tenets.17 The findings here further correspond with
general observations about the nature of ‘home-grown’ terrorism, which tend to
emphasise ‘amateur’ qualities, in that there has been a relative reduction in the
proportion of hardcore terrorists in both countries over time. In the US 30% of pre-Iraq
offenders were classed as hardcore compared to 4% of post-Iraq offenders while the
respective figures in the UK were 29% vs. 18%. The fact that both samples have moved
in the same direction can be taken as limited support for the reliability of judgements on
this particular category while the fact that the reduction has been larger in the US again
suggests a possible qualitative difference between the two countries. In assessing
whether or not this is the case it will help to examine behavioural differences in
offending.
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Behavioural Classification
Table 11.13. Behavioural classification of US and UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).*

Behavioural
classification

Possession of
terrorist
articles/
propaganda

Promoting
jihad

Facilitating:
Active
support**

Facilitating/
fundraising

US
UK

0
22%

9%
25%

6%
12%

13%
8%

Behavioural
classification

Offering
services

Preparation
for violence

Active
pursuit of
violence

Miscellaneous

US
UK

24%
2%

24%
10%

39%
33%

2%
2%

*Percentages add to more than 100 due to multiple functions within groups.
**1 US case (2%) within this category was classed as a top-down facilitator only. 3 UK cases (6%) were
classed as top-down and active facilitators.

One of the main points of interest in this study is what exactly people are doing
to pursue Islamist terrorism, and whether or not there any differences between the US
and UK. Table 11.13 goes some way towards answering this by showing the percentage
of cases in each sample according to different behavioural classifications and
(notwithstanding overlap between categories) straight away there are apparent
dissimilarities. Although almost every individual in both samples had articles or
documents relating to terrorism in their possession, the ‘possession’ category here refers
to cases where this was the only offence, and this accounts for a fifth of the UK sample
(11 cases) but none in the US. The reason for this is that British authorities make use of
provisions in the law that enable early intervention and prosecution of lesser offences
while the Americans tend to seek to identify specific conspiracies and often dispatch
informants and undercover officers to facilitate this (hence the average sentence in the
US is also longer- see below).
The second difference is that there have been proportionally more cases of
promoting jihad in the UK than the US (13 cases involving 23 individuals vs. 4 cases, 4
individuals). There was a range of different promotional activities represented, from
‘wannabes’ like Mohammed Atif Siddique (UK case #15) making their own websites to
hardcore Islamist militants like Adam Gadahn (US case #11) or Abu Hamza (UK case
315

#3) speaking on behalf of terrorist organisations or issuing fatwas. There was even one
case of promoting jihad for personal, non-ideological reasons (Malcolm Hodges- UK
case #29). However, the vast majority of ‘promoters’ in both countries did show a
significant level of ideological commitment (3 individuals in the US and 21 in the UK).
These results therefore add an element of support to the ideological distinction
discussed above, whereby fewer individuals in the US were classed as hardcore/social
or hardcore terrorists, since promoting the jihadi cause (‘generalised recruitment’)
generally involves a degree of ideological commitment.
Active facilitation of jihad –a ‘hands on’ approach to fulfilling organisational
tasks and goals- was also more prevalent in the UK, occurring in 6 cases there (3 of
which also involved a top-down element) compared to just 2 in the US (plus 1
additional case of ‘remote’ top-down facilitation (Kevin James, US case #25)). All of
these cases involved established links to overseas terrorist organisations except for
James in the US and Hamid et al (UK case #20) in Britain, both of whom directed their
own domestic groups. Not only were there more of these terrorist operatives in the UK
but they also tended to occupy more senior positions. Thus, Chandia (US case #7) and
Babar (US case #14) were low to mid-level operatives and in fact both played
subsidiary roles in British cases (those of Mohammed Ajmal Khan –UK case #11- and
Omar Khyam et al- UK case #14- respectively). Meanwhile in the UK, in addition to
mid-level active facilitators, there were also figures who were close to senior
organisational representatives and/or commanded some degree of authority themselves,
including Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh (UK case #9), Mohammed Ajmal Khan (UK case
#11) and Rangzieb Ahmed (UK case #26). All of these British cases who could be
classified were designated as either hardcore or ‘hardcore/social’, again contributing to
the ideological differences between the two samples.
It is important to observe then, that there have been more cases of
facilitation/fundraising in the US (6 cases vs. 4), which also often involved
organisational connections although the individuals concerned could be more accurately
described as behind-the-scenes benefactors rather than operatives or agents. In both
countries there was again variation in the specifics of this, from sending money to a
husband abroad (October Martinque Lewis- US case #10) or looking into buying hair
bleach (Adel Yahya- UK case #18) to running dedicated, long-term financing operations
(Enaam Arnaout- US case #2- and Benmerzouga and Meziane- UK case #6).
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Discounting the very minor cases there were 4 in the US and 3 in the UK, and the
proportional difference is thus even smaller. It can be concluded that differences in this
type of case are minimal and that it represents a minority of detected cases in each
country (excluding the numerous charities and non-governmental organisations in both
America and Britain which have been accused of terrorist financing but not specifically
charged with it, or else have had their assets frozen under executive powers not
requiring a legal process).
Another notable difference is the number of cases classed as offering their
services by attempting to reach out to organised militants (or in a few cases being asked
to perform a service) and offering/agreeing to fulfil such functions as money laundering,
training or bomb-construction. This applied to 11 casesiii (24%) of the US sample
compared to just 1 (2%) in the UK. And in fact the UK case (Hemant Lakhani- UK case
#10) actually took place as part of a US sting operation, which also applies to 7 of the
US cases (often set up in response to individuals making it known that they wished to
make contact with al-Qaeda). Ideologically speaking this category of offenders
consisted of 5 criminal opportunists (2 of whom –Grecula and Reynolds- were
‘troubled’), 3 social/wannabe terrorists (Anderson, Walker and Ahmed) with just 2
considered to be ideologically hardcore (Shah and Hashmi). Hence this combines with
the fewer jihadi promoters and active facilitators in the US sample to produce an
apparently larger number of social/wannabe terrorists. The fact that this form of
behaviour is occurring in the US but not the UK seems to be a combination of two
factors: 1. Given more significant ties to Pakistan among British jihadists, for those who
wish to make contact with organised militants, there are more often family-related or
other social avenues that they can explore, which do not necessitate ‘advertising’ their
desires on the Internet, and 2. The fact that US investigators actively patrol online
forums looking for these individuals and then investing in setting up sting operations in
order to elicit the maximum extent of their willingness to offend.
A higher percentage of US cases were also found to be preparing for violence in
that the scope of their activities involved training for violent jihad either domestically or
overseas and then returning home (in some cases alleged but not proven to be planning

iii

These were: Ilyas Ali (US case #12); Tarik Shah et al (US case #15); Uzair Paracha (US case #16);
Aref & Hossain (case #17); Saifullah Ranjha (US case #20); Ryan Anderson (US case #21); Mark Walker
(US case #24); Syed Hashmi (US case #26); Ahmed & Sadequee (US case #27); Ronald Grecula (US
case #29); Michael Reynolds (US case #31)
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attacks). This applied to 11 casesiv (24%) of the US sample and 5 cases (10%) in the
UK.v In the US this was split fairly evenly according to the pre- and post-Iraq divide
while in the UK all of these cases began in the post-Iraq generation (although some had
engaged in earlier training for which they were not prosecuted). Given that preparatory
training is an important component of jihadism it should not be surprising that this
activity spans across generations and indeed, it is also incorporated within cases that
had the opportunity to further progress into active pursuit of violence.
In both countries a fair proportion of individuals involved in these cases were
classed as hardcore/social or hardcore and there are no obvious ideological differences
that underpin differential rates of preparation for violence. One possible explanation
links back to the fact that many British cases have involved early intervention (those
prosecuted for possession offences) before they had a chance to progress towards
preparatory action. It could also be that domestic training is more often chosen in the
US since there is access to firearms that help make it a more ‘fulfilling’ experience,
however there have also been cases of domestic and overseas training in the UK in the
past, which were allowed to take place without legal intervention (e.g. a training camp
attended by Mohammed Siddique Khan in Britain in 200118, and a number of overseas
training expeditions by associates of his, Mohammed Shakil, Waheed Ali and Sadeer
Saleem19).
Despite differences in a number of behavioural categories the largest proportion
of cases in both the US and UK involved the active pursuit of violence (18 cases (39%)
in the former and 17 (33%) in the latter. The number of these cases has increased in
absolute terms from the pre- to post-Iraq generation in the US from 6 cases to 12 and in
the UK from 5 to 12, showing remarkable similarity. Relative to the number of other
cases in each period this represents an increase in the US from 30% to 46%, while in the
UK it holds steady at a third.
A question which arises from this is that if proportionally more US cases involve
pursuit of violence (arguably the most extreme expression of ideological commitment)
does this not contradict the notion that more individuals within this sample are located

iv

Padilla (US case #3); Abdi (US case #5); Warsame (US case #8); Hayat (US case #18); Amawi et al
(US case #19); al-Uquaily (US case #22); Ahmed & Sadequee (US case #27); Ahmed and Ahmed (US
case #28); Williams et al (US case #32); Sherif Mohamed (US case #41); and Isse and Ahmed (US case
#43).
v
Hamid’s trainees (UK case #20); Qureshi (UK case #33); the Iqbal brothers (UK case #38); Shakil &
Ali (UK case #39); and Tabbakh (UK case #42).
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toward the lower end of the spectrum of ideological commitment? First, not all those
engaged in the pursuit of violence are classed as hardcore- e.g. John Walker Lindh (US
case #9) was classed as being socially motivated as he was driven by feelings of
religious kinship rather than hardcore commitment to Islamist ideology, and he seemed
genuinely repentant in declaring at his trial “had I realized then what I know now about
the Taliban I would never have joined them”.20 Still others (e.g. Derrick Shareef- US
case #36) were not driven by any deep ideological understanding but more by social
bravado and a fascination with violence. Second, and more important to understanding
the relative percentages, is the simple fact that it depends on the number and nature of
other cases. It is thus not by itself contradictory to the above discussion relating
differential ideological and behavioural differences between the two samples.
In a related observation, the figures from both countries still represent an
increasing occurrence of (planned) violent Islamist terrorism given twice as many such
cases from one period to the next, irrespective of the occurrence of other types of case.
The active pursuit of violence represents a sizeable minority of all Islamist terrorism
cases in the US and UK and has become more common in the period 2004-2008
(although it should not be assumed that this trend will continue indefinitely). Since
these cases lie at the more advanced end of a continuum formed directly with cases
involving preparation for violence, it also makes sense to view these case-types
together. Preparation and pursuit of violence combined accounts for 63% of US cases
vs. 43% in the UK. This is a substantial difference that again relates to early
intervention plus lack of prosecution of some earlier training cases in the UK.
Nevertheless, it also suggests that Islamist terrorists from or living in the US are on the
whole more narrowly focussed on personal involvement in violent activity (but to
reiterate, this does not necessarily imply any great understanding or commitment to
Islamist ideology).
Finally, each sample involved 1 miscellaneous case, demonstrating that
behavioural ‘outliers’, although rare, will sometimes occur. In the US this was more
straightforward to understand as Ruben Shumpert (US case #40), a Seattle-based
Islamist, originally fled the country to avoid being prosecuted for non-terrorism
offences only to join the Somali jihad (thus in essence adding to the American tally of
cases actively pursuing violence); while in the UK Saeed Ghafoor (UK case #51) made
repeated yet insubstantial threats to carry out al-Qaeda-style terrorist attacks in an
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apparent deliberate –and successful- attempt to gain more jail time. These cases along
with a few other more unusual cases illustrate that people can sometimes adopt Islamist
terrorism for unanticipated reasons and in both samples such cases have occurred in the
post-2004 period.

Domestic vs. Overseas Focus & Operation
In addition to what Islamist militants in each country are doing it is important to
know what their focus of activities is (i.e. domestic vs. overseas aims) and whether they
are based at home, abroad or a combination of the two. This will be examined here
according to each offence type, with the exceptions of possession of jihadi materials
which occurred only in the UK; offering of services to organised militants, which only
occurred once in the UK (see chapters 9 and 10); and the miscellaneous category since
the two cases involved are not comparable.

Table 11.14. Domestic vs. overseas focus and country of operation of US and UK Islamist terrorism
cases involving promotion of jihad (2001-2008).

Promoting
jihad
US
UK

Focus:
Focus:
Focus:
Domestic Overseas Mixed
‐
2

1
2

3
9

Country of
operation:
Domestic

Country of
operation:
Overseas

Country of
operation:
Mixed

Total

3
12

1
‐

‐
1

4
13

Table 11.14 shows the focus and operation of cases involving the promotion of
jihad. There is considerable similarity here- promoting jihad in both countries tends to
involve a mixed focus (i.e. definite concern for events overseas, with some indication
that domestic operations are also seen as viable). They are also similar in their
operation, most being based domestically, with some travel in a minority of cases.
Despite a quantitative difference in this behaviour, there is qualitative similarity in
terms of focus and operation.
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Table 11.15. Domestic vs. overseas focus and country of operation of US and UK Islamist terrorism
cases involving top-down facilitation (2001-2008).

Facilitating
jihad: Top‐
down
US
UK

Focus:
Focus:
Focus:
Domestic Overseas Mixed
1
‐

‐
2

Country of
operation:
Domestic

Country of
operation:
Overseas

Country of
operation:
Mixed

Total

1
1

‐
‐

‐
2

1
3

‐
1

Table 11.15 shows that the few top-down facilitation cases have been somewhat
different. The single case in the US (Kevin James- US case #25) was domestically
focussed and based. Those in the UK sample have maintained overseas or mixed focus
and have more often travelled (the exception being Hamid and Ahmet –UK case #20who are closer to James in this regard). This is in keeping with the fact that they were
operatives of terrorist organisations.

Table 11.16. Domestic vs. overseas focus and country of operation of US and UK Islamist terrorism
cases involving active facilitation (2001-2008).

Facilitating:
Active
support
US
UK

Focus:
Focus:
Focus:
Domestic Overseas Mixed
‐
‐

2
4

Country of
operation:
Domestic

Country of
operation:
Overseas

Country of
operation:
Mixed

Total

‐
1

1
1

1
4

2
6

‐
2

Table 11.16 illustrates the focus and operation of active facilitation cases and
shows considerable similarity in that both tended to be focussed on events overseas and
most involved related international travel. Again this is a function of most of these
individuals acting as organisational operatives.

Table 11.17. Domestic vs. overseas focus and country of operation of US and UK Islamist terrorism
cases involving facilitating/fundraising (2001-2008).

Facilitating/
fundraising
US
UK

Focus:
Focus:
Focus:
Domestic Overseas Mixed
‐
1

6
2

‐
1

Country of
operation:
Domestic

Country of
operation:
Overseas

6
4

‐
‐

Country of
operation: Total
Mixed
‐
‐

6
4

Table 11.17 shows that in cases involving facilitating/fundraising for jihad there
was again loose correspondence between the two countries in that most cases involved
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an overseas or mixed focus and all were domestically based. The fact that there was
greater variation in the focus of UK cases does however, indicate some focus on
domestic operations which wasn’t seen in the US. Larger-scale, more organised efforts
in both countries were focussed abroad though, so it seems that the variation here has so
far occurred in smaller-scale operations (specifically Adel Yahya –UK case #18- and
Abdul Rahman –UK case #35).

Table 11.18. Domestic vs. overseas focus and country of operation of US and UK Islamist terrorism
cases involving preparation for violence (2001-2008).

Preparation
for violence
US
UK

Focus:
Focus:
Focus:
Domestic Overseas Mixed
2
‐

7
2

Country of
operation:
Domestic

Country of
operation:
Overseas

1
5

5
‐

2
3

Country of
operation: Total
Mixed
5
‐

11
5

Table 11.18 depicts the distribution of cases involving preparation for violence.
In the US this involved a primarily overseas focus and correspondingly often included
international travel. In the UK there was more evidence of a mixed focus and all of the
cases were based at home. On the face of it this suggests that the US and UK lie on
opposite ends of the spectrum for this type of activity and indeed this is congruent with
more individuals from the US joining overseas conflicts (see below). However, as
mentioned above this is not the whole picture either, since domestic and overseas
training in the UK –and most likely some cases in the US also- have gone unprosecuted.

Table 11.19. Domestic vs. overseas focus and country of operation of US and UK Islamist terrorism
cases involving active pursuit of violence (2001-2008).

Pursuit of
violence
US
UK

Focus:
Focus:
Focus:
Domestic Overseas Mixed
9
12

9
3

‐
2

Country of
operation:
Domestic

Country of
operation:
Overseas

Country of
operation:
Mixed

Total

6
9

8
1

4
7

18
17

Table 11.19 shows that in cases involving the active pursuit of violence the US
was split 50/50 in terms of domestic vs. overseas focus, while in the UK most cases
were focussed on carrying out domestic operations. In both countries there was a
general correspondence between groups’ intentions and actions and there was related
322

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
international travel in 67% of US cases vs. 47% of UK cases. The most notable
difference, which fittingly carries on from the above discussion on preparation for
violence, is that 8 US cases (44%) were based purely overseas in that they joined
overseas conflicts or were otherwise seemingly involved in militant networks (Aafia
Siddiqui –US case #45) while there was only 1 such case in the UK and 1 other who
tried and failed to join militants abroad (together totalling just 12%). Moreover, the
tendency to aspire to overseas conflict in the US sample has remained strong over time,
as evidenced by groups of Somali-Americans leaving the US for jihad in 2007 and
2008.

Table 11.20. Domestic vs. overseas focus and country of operation (C.o.O) of US and UK Islamist
terrorism cases (2001-2008) divided according to whether cases began before 2004 or 2004-2008.
Percentages refer to rows.

Focus:
Purely
Domestic

Focus:
Purely
Overseas

Focus:
Mixed

C.o.O:
Purely
Domestic

C.o.O:
Purely
Overseas

C.o.O:
Mixed

US
UK

30%
27%

54%
25%

15%
47%

46%
67%

26%
4%

28%
29%

US: Pre‐
2004

25%

55%

20%

20%

20%

60%

US: 2004‐
2008

35%

54%

12%

65%

31%

4%

UK: Pre‐
2004

13%

47%

40%

47%

13%

40%

UK: 2004‐
2008

33%

17%

50%

75%

0

25%

Table 11.20 shows the focus and operation of cases for each overall sample
distinguishing those which were ‘purely’ domestic/overseas in focus and operation, i.e.
where groups were unified (so if there was any variation within groups they are counted
as ‘mixed’ rather than artificially inflating the overall count).
It is clear that there are differences in the focus and operation of Islamist
terrorists from or living in the US and UK. More than half of the US sample was
focussed on jihad overseas and a corresponding percentage engaged in overseas or
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mixed operations. By comparison only a quarter of the UK sample was singularly
focussed on events abroad and only a third travelled in relation to their jihadi activities.
Looking at the changes that have taken place over time it is important to note
that the percentage of cases maintaining a purely domestic focus has increased moving
into the post-Iraq generation, representing about a third of each sample. At the same
time the percentage of cases based purely at home has increased in the US from 20% to
65% and in the UK from 47% to 75%. These findings are congruent with the posited
rise in home-grown Islamist terrorism in Western countries (partly explained by
increased difficulty in making contact with foreign organised terrorists) and also helps
explain why this has been viewed as somewhat less of a problem in America.
The stronger tendency towards domestic jihad in the UK is also evidenced by
the relatively large drop in purely overseas focussed cases and the total lack of purely
overseas operations in the post-Iraq era. Meanwhile the percentage of purely overseas
focussed US cases has stayed consistent and the proportion of purely overseas
operations has actually increased from 20% to 31%. This should be viewed alongside
the fact that ‘mixed’ operations have, however, decreased, which is a reflection of the
fact that travelling abroad for US militants now has become more a case of joining a
conflict and staying there operationally speaking, as opposed to becoming an
international operative sent back home to conduct attacksvi. Mixed operations have
endured among a higher percentage of UK cases and this is likely to be because many
individuals are able to utilise ties to Pakistan to gain some form of training before
returning home. These differences are also reflected in different international
destinations of Islamists from the US and UK (see below).

vi

The attempted bombings of the New York subway by Najibullah Zazi et al in 2009 and of Times
Square by Faisal Shahzad in 2010 are recent examples of operatives who have been sent back to the US
as al-Qaeda operatives.
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Planned M.O. of Attacks
Table 11.21. Target type and weaponry in US and UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008) for domestic
and overseas-based attacks/ planned attacks (excluding joining overseas conflicts).

Target: Target: Target: Target:
Fire‐
Explosives
Other Mixed U/K
Civilian
Gov.
Mixed
U/K
arms
US
Domestic
target

4

1

2

4

2

1

1

3

UK
Domestic
target

7

3

2

1

8

2

2

1

1

2

1

1

US
Overseas
target
UK
Overseas
target

2

1

1

2

Table 11.2 shows the target choice and weaponry in US and UK planned
terrorist attacks –pursuit of violence- on the domestic and international stage (excluding
7 US cases and 2 UK cases of joining overseas conflicts). In terms of target choice,
militants from the UK both at home and abroad appear to have shown a stronger
inclination to attack civilians. In the US sample civilian targets were still popular on the
domestic stage but it was a less pronounced preference (and in several cases the target
could not be identified). There is no immediately obvious explanation for this difference
and in fact the missing data and small numbers involved mean that it cannot be
considered a meaningful difference.
The UK sample also showed a stronger preference in choice of weaponry (about
which we can be more confident), opting for explosives in the majority of cases while in
the US it was more mixed, seemingly because of the wider availability of firearms.
Thus in both countries there is an interaction between the demands of the chosen task
and the available tools. Explosives are not more available in Britain but in the absence
of more readily available firearms they are the terrorist’s weapon of choice and can be
made from household chemicals. At the same time the British-Pakistani connection may
contribute here since Pakistan has repeatedly emerged as the location of explosives
training
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11.8 International Dimensions and Associations
Table 11.22. Contact with foreign terrorists in US and UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

US Overall
UK Overall

Contact with
Yes
50%
43%

foreign terrorists
No
39%
41%

Unknown
11%
16%

US Pre‐ 2004
US 2004‐2008

70%
35%

15%
58%

15%
8%

UK Pre‐2004
UK 2004‐2008

80%
28%

13%
53%

7%
19%

Table 11.22 shows the percentage of cases involving contact with foreign
terrorists. Overall the figures are quite similar although slightly more US cases did
make such contact (in actual numbers it was 23 vs. 22). Moreover, both samples have
changed in the same direction from the pre- to post-2004 generations, with marked
decreases in the proportion of cases in contact with foreign terrorists. Having said that,
in absolute terms the change here in the US has been from 14 to 9 cases while in the UK
it has increased from 10 cases to 12, plus the 5 year period from 2004 to 2008 is shorter
than the previous period for the US and equal for the UK (remembering that some cases
began before 2001). The reason why the percentage appears to be less in the UK is thus
because of a greater proliferation of cases not involving foreign contact. Percentages
alone can be misleading and for both countries it is more accurate to state that there
have been more cases over time that have failed –or not even tried- to make contact with
foreign terrorists.
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Table 11.23. Number of US and UK Islamist terrorism cases in contact with foreign militants in different
locations, divided according to whether cases began prior to 2004 or 2004-2008.

Foreign terrorists' location

US: Pre‐
2004

US: 2004‐
2008

UK: Pre‐
2004

UK: 2004‐
2008

Global (S. Asia/ N. Africa/
Middle East/ Europe/ Balkans)

3

0

6

2

Pakistan/ Afghanistan
Somalia
Germany
Saudi Arabia
UK
US
Canada
Unconfirmed
True case total

12
0
1
1
2
‐
1
0
14

2
5
0
0
2
‐
1
1
9

11
‐
‐
‐
‐
3
2
‐
12

9
‐
‐
‐
‐
4
3
‐
10

Turning our attention to the location of foreign terrorists whom individuals in
each sample were in contact with, the first noticeable difference between the US and
UK is the greater number of UK cases with ‘global’ connections. The comparatively
large number of these cases in the pre-2004 era is reflective of the historically key role
that the UK and London especially played as a host to Islamist terrorists from around
the world (see chapter 7). The 3 US cases were also part of the thriving militant
networks of the 1990’s but America played a less prominent role. Such connections
have decreased in both countries and the 2 cases that are left in the UK (Tsouli and
Khan –UK cases #19 and #25) established their links primarily online.
The most interesting patterns of international association are those surrounding
Pakistan/Afghanistan and Somalia. The former represented the primary point of contact
with foreign terrorists for both the US and UK in the pre-2004 period; however it seems
to have become far less accessible over time for the Americans while the British
continue to liaise with Islamist militants in Pakistan with greater regularity. This is
undoubtedly due to the more prevalent ties among the British sample and that country.
Meanwhile in the US, Somalia has emerged as a new jihadi hotspot, visited in the postIraq era by converts and Somali-Americans alike. Despite the involvement in terrorism
of a handful of Somalis in Britain, there have so far been only limited reports of anyone
from the UK going there for jihad. One unnamed British-Somali was reported in 2009
to have blown himself up plus around 20 others in October 2007, and security officials
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have been quoted confirming that individuals are travelling there,21 but open source
material at present does not permit more accurate assessment. Suffice to say that despite
Pakistani dominance of jihad in Britain, it would be naive to think that (given these
indications plus an estimated Somali diaspora population of 100,00022 compared to
84,000 in the US23) Somalia is not a factor among UK jihadists. Indeed, Somalia
appears to be gaining in significance for jihad on a worldwide scale, as evidenced by
allegations made against an Australian-based group said to have been seeking approval
in Somalia for an attack in Australia.24 As more information emerges the picture will be
clarified, but at present it is reasonable to say that American Islamists were more swiftly
drawn to Somalia, or at least that this was more heavily publicised than in Britain. Such
differences may be down to the presence of individual entrepreneurs who play active
roles in encouraging and facilitating others’ travel abroad.
In a related issue, it is important to note that Iraq is absent from the table of
foreign destinations of jihadis from both the US and UK, despite the emphasis which
has been placed on the conflict there as a source of inspiration for involvement in
terrorism of Westerners. Indeed, it is somewhat puzzling that very few individuals in
either sample made any effort to go there. The most ‘concrete’ example is Mohammed
Zaki Amawi (US case #19) who unsuccessfully tried to enter Iraq via Jordan in 2003
(the most established route used by militants has been via Syria25). The only other case
of note is that of Bilal Abdulla (UK case #41) who was an Iraqi but chose to pursue
terrorism in Britain rather than attempt to join the insurgency in Iraq. To some extent,
lower numbers of Westerners managing to join the Iraqi jihad may be indicative of
heightened vigilance to prevent this from happening, combined with the fact that very
few Iraqis are found in the samples, meaning that there is a general lack of ties to that
country which might facilitate entry. However, it is also a reflection of available open
source data. For example, a “senior security source” in Britain was reported in 2006 to
have confirmed that between 120 and 150 Britons had travelled to Iraq for jihad, and
that there was concern that the flow was increasing26 (although more recent reports state
that the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq has decreased over time27). Corresponding
estimates for the United States could not be found as studies of foreign jihadis in Iraq
tend to focus on the main contributors, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya and other Muslim
countries rather than the West.28 The conclusion therefore has to be that there is not
enough available information at present to be able to accurately assess American and
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British efforts to support the Iraqi insurgency. As new information is made available
this will hopefully be clarified, as will the role of other potential jihadi hostspots such as
Yemen, which is thought to have been the point of contact between Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab (the Nigerian student educated in the UK who attempted to bring down a
plane over Detroit on December 25th, 2009) and organised Islamist militants.29
Another point worth addressing from Table 11.23 is that the numbers of cases
from each sample in contact with terrorists in the US and UK do not add up. The reason
for this is that Abu Hamza (UK case #3) was in touch with Earnest Ujaama from the
US, who is excluded from the sample because he ceased offending before September
11th 2001. In addition, Mohammed Junaid Babar (US case #14) had met with multiple
UK cases –some in Pakistan and some in Britain also (these were Omar Khyam et al –
UK case #14- Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer –UK case #17- and
Kazi Nurur Rahman –UK case #24).
Finally, more UK cases were seemingly in contact with fellow militants in
Canada, which questions the assumption that international liaisons might be dictated by
proximity. To an extent this is true although the nature of those contacts should also be
understood. In the pre-2004 era Babar was in touch with the Canadian Mohammed
Momin Khawaja- together they knew Khyam and colleagues as well as Mohammed
Siddique Khan from time spent together in Pakistan and also visited them in the UK. In
a similar fashion Mohammed Atif Siddique (UK case #15), Younis Tsouli (UK case
#19) and Aabid Khan (UK case #25) were all in communication with each other and
with a group of budding Canadian terrorists led by Fahim Ahmad, and together shared
contact with two Americans, Syed Haris Ahmed and Ehsanul Islam Sadequee (US case
#27). The first set of contacts (Babar et al) were made in Pakistan, while the second
(Khan et al) were primarily forged online. But in both instances they formed triangles
between the US, Canada and the UK through sharing contacts and in both cases they
cross over and confuse the 2004 dividing line according to when individuals ‘officially’
began offending, thus serving as a reminder that it is an analytical imposition rather than
a reflection of clear-cut divisions in ‘real-life’. They are nevertheless quite striking
examples of a propensity for international social networking among Western Islamist
terrorists that has changed qualitatively over time (becoming more ‘virtualised’) but has
not disappeared.
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Table 11.24. Percentage of US and UK Islamist terrorism cases in the pre- vs. post-2004 periods with
named domestic and foreign terrorist associations.

US Overall
UK Overall

Named Domestic
Associations
22%
18%

Named Foreign
Associations
20%
4%

US Pre‐ 2004
US 2004‐2008

15%
27%

35%
10%

20%
4%

UK Pre‐2004
UK 2004‐2008

0
25%

13%
0

53%
19%

Both
11%
29%

Table 11.24 shows the percentage of US and UK cases with named domestic
only, named foreign only, and both types of named terrorist associations. Bearing in
mind these are named associations, i.e. where it is known specifically whom they were
in contact with, the results are in line with the above discussion. Both countries are
fairly close in terms of overall domestic-only associations, the US has more foreignonly but more in the UK sample have both types, and this was particularly the case in
the pre-2004 generation when there were more globally connected militants active in
Britain. Similar changes have also occurred in both countries, with an increase in the
proportion of domestic-only associations to around a quarter of the sample, and a
decrease in foreign-only and both kinds of association combined. Named foreign-only
associations remain higher in the US while combined foreign and domestic associations
are higher in the UK. This may relate to both the fact that US Islamist terrorists appear
to maintain a greater focus overall on overseas events, and the fact that British jihadists
operate within a more confined geographical area and have a stronger domestic focus
overall.
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11.9 The Role of the Internet
Table 11.25. Use of the Internet in US and UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008). Percentages are for
total case numbers for each defined period.

Gather
Access
Create/
intell/
Group
Fund‐
Other
propaganda/ Comm.
distribute
research
formation raising research
forums
materials
attacks

Use of
Internet

U/K

US
Overall

46%

17%

33%

11%

9%

0

2%

0

UK
Overall

37%

37%

35%

22%

12%

4%

2%

2%

40%

5%

40%

10%

5%

0

5%

0

50%

27%

27%

12%

12%

0

0

0

27%

13%

40%

20%

27%

0

0

7%

42%

47%

33%

22%

6%

6%

3%

0

US Pre‐
2004
US
2004‐
2008
UK Pre‐
2004
UK
2004‐
2008

How individuals made use of the Internet was often not reported (as reflected in
the large proportions of ‘unknown’ cases) and when it was, it was often in an incidental
rather than in-depth manner. The results here therefore only provide tentative
indications about jihadists’ use of the Internet in America and Britain. The reported
overall differences are mostly minimal with the exception of accessing propaganda etc
and gathering information and intelligence for attacks. With regards to the former, the
higher percentage in the UK is likely a reflection of the British propensity to prosecute
individuals for this offence, which invites more reporting on it. By contrast in the US
where conspiracies are more often deliberately nurtured such details are less likely to be
of interest.
An explanation for the difference in use of the Internet in relation to planning
attacks is somewhat puzzling, although it is important to remember that there has been a
greater focus on domestic attacks in the UK vs. a more overseas focus in the US. The
Internet lends itself rather well to scouting out domestic targets or similar activities but
where individuals join overseas conflicts there is often not much information about
what they do there, nor does the Internet seem as relevant in such contexts.
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More significant than the exact percentages themselves are how they stand
relative to one another and how they have changed over time. The top three uses in both
countries have been accessing propaganda/forums, communication, and researching
attacks, followed by creation and distribution of materials. Group formation via the
Internet has not been common, occurring in just 2 cases in the UK, and online
fundraising in either sample has been scarce. The Internet is used to communicate and
network with other groups and individuals around the world (as per the links between
Aabid Khan –UK case #25- Syed Haris Ahmed –US case #27- and others) but it is not
particularly surprising that it rarely forms the basis of long-lasting proximal relations
since this depends on geographical closeness and not just shared values. Moreover it is
not surprising that group formation via the Internet has only occurred in the more recent
generation of jihadis for whom the Internet has become a more prevalent part of
everyday life.
As for online fundraising this undoubtedly takes place but has not resulted in
many prosecutions according to the sampling criteria for this study. It is useful,
however, to contrast the two cases included where this did take place. One was Enaam
Arnaout’s (US case #2) Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), a charity-front
organisation set up in America in the early 1990s (at a time when most of the Western
world did not recognise the mujahedin as a threat). This was a well-organised, relatively
large-scale operation sending hundreds of thousands of dollars to overseas militants and
of which online fundraising was just one component.30 Even more notably, BIF
operated quite openly and until investigators dug deeper after 9/11 it appeared to be
legitimate. By comparison the other case in the sample refers to Younis Tsouli’s
accomplice (UK case #19) Tariq al-Daour who set up a fairly sophisticated online credit
card fraud scheme and managed to raise £1.8 million.31 Al-Daour’s scheme was covert,
criminal and purely online. The amounts raised are likely to depend on individual skills
and strategies but what is more interesting is the change from open ‘charities’ to purely
online criminal means. There are not enough cases of this kind to make any conclusions
about this type of activity here but a move from one strategy to the next makes sense in
light of heightened counter-terrorism measures since 2001. In this way the findings
from different countries can complement one another and add additional pieces to the
overall jigsaw.
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Moving on to the relative changes which have taken place, accessing
propaganda and jihadi chat forums has increased in both countries just as they have
proliferated on the Web. Use of the Internet for communication remains high but has
apparently dropped over time, perhaps in relation to there being more cases not making
contact with foreign terrorists (since email lends itself so readily to long-distance
communication). Gathering information online for attacks has remained constant in
each country and finally, creation and distribution of jihadi materials remains a
relatively rare activity among both samples (relatively speaking it has increased in the
US and decreased in the UK but in absolute terms this represents a shift from just 1 case
to 3 in the former, and from 4 to 2 in the latter). Ultimately, when the results here are
examined both quantitatively and qualitatively there are more similarities than
differences between the US and UK in terms of Internet use.

11.10 Stated Motivations
Table 11.26. Stated motivations in US and UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Stated
Motivations

U/K

Religious/
Altruistic/
Foreign policy

US
UK

41%
27%

43%
67%

Foreign
policy/
Anti‐
Semitism
2%
0

Religious
only

Anti‐
American
(various)

Anti‐
British

0
2%

13%
2%

0
2%

Although specific information about motivations was often lacking, the
available data indicates very similar and predictable references to religion, the desire to
defend Muslims and resentment and distrust for the foreign policy of the US and its
allies. All of the remaining categories are really just variations on these same themes,
only with a narrower emphasis on certain issues and occasionally interspersed with
personal motives (and in both countries most of these cases involved criminal
opportunists or ‘troubled’ individuals). Specific anti-Americanism appears to be more
common than specific anti-Britishness but this is hardly surprising given the US’s
leading position in the war on terror. Overall, American and British Islamist terrorists
appear to be motivated by the same international symbols of jihad (Afghanistan, Iraq,
Israel etc) and aside from specific developments such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003 or
the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 these have not changed over time. There is
also an apparent undercurrent of social bravado which permeates group interaction in
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both countries and a general fascination with violence. Whether or not these factors vary
in comparative importance to ideological concerns between the two samples is open to
debate. The above findings on ideological commitment suggest that social motives and
violence might play slightly more significant roles in the US, but the data on which this
is based is too unreliable to make confident judgements about this without more indepth study.

11.11 Outcomes
Table 11.27. Outcomes in US and UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Informants/
undercover
operatives

Attacks:
Thwarted

Attacks:
Failed/ semi‐
successful

Attacks:
Successful

US Overall
(%TOT)

39%

20%

4%

0

UK Overall
(%TOT)

4%

16%

10%

4%

US Pre‐2004
US 2004‐2008

6
12

4
5

0
2

0
0

UK Pre‐2004

0

0

2

1

UK 2004‐2008

2

6

3

1

Table 11.27 shows the use of informants or undercover officers in all cases, plus
the outcomes of planned attacks, expressed as percentages of the overall number of
cases and as numerical counts for the pre- and post-Iraq time-periods. There has been a
major difference in the use of informants and undercover agents, which have been
deployed in a large proportion of investigations in the US (46% of post-Iraq cases) but
have rarely been reported in the UK (6% of post-Iraq cases). This is discussed more
below in addressing the implications for counter-terrorism.
Another difference (which may be related) is that more cases involving planned
attacks have run to completion without being thwarted in the UK. In the US the overall
ratio of thwarted to completed attacks is 9:2 while in the UK it is 6:7 (although both
samples include attacks abroad, which are harder to thwart- Siddiqui –US case #45;
Reid- UK case #4; and Sheikh –UK case #9). Ultimately the US has been more
successful in detecting planned attacks before they can be attempted (82% vs. 46%).
There may be several reasons for this but chief among them are that a) Islamist militants
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in Britain operate within three main hotspots and are often part of wider Islamist
communities, therefore making it difficult to identify individuals with genuine intent
(‘finding the needle in the haystack’); meanwhile militants in the US are more
geographically dispersed, less ‘insulated’ and therefore easier to spot, and b) Because
American investigators often infiltrate groups as soon as they become aware of them
and actually contribute to plans for violence from the start, they can intervene at will- in
other words there are fewer planned attacks in the US where the individuals involved
have developed their plans independently.

Table 11.28. Outcomes for individuals in US and UK Islamist terrorism cases (2001-2008).

Individual
Not
Deceased
outcomes
charged

At large
overseas

Average
Arrested:
Life
Death
sentence
prosecuted
Sentences sentences
in years

US
Overall

8%

0

2%

90%

15.4

9%

0

UK
Overall

4%

2%

0

94%

7.4

23%

1%

US Pre‐
2004

1

0

1

42

15.5

3

0

US 2004‐
2008

6

0

1

40

15.3

5

0

UK Pre‐
2004

0

1

1

26

15.6

8

1

UK 2004‐
2008

5

0

0

81

5

18

0

Table 11.28 shows individual outcomes for both samples, showing overall
percentages plus numerical counts for the pre- vs. post-Iraq time-periods. The main
points of interest are first, that (unsurprisingly given the sampling criteria) the vast
majority of both samples have been arrested and prosecuted, and second, there are
substantial differences in the average prison sentences. In the pre-Iraq generation they
are very close at 15.5 and 15.6 years, but from 2004 to 2008 the US figure has stayed
relatively steady at 15.3 years, compared to a drop in the UK to just 5 years. This is a
product of two main factors: 1) It is a reflection of legal changes in the UK enabling
early intervention and prosecution of lesser offences, which does not seem to have been
paralleled in the US; 2) Life sentences were not incorporated in the average sentence but
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have substantially increased in the UK (constituting 21% of the post-Iraq generation
sentences vs. 11% in the US); however, life sentences also have different meanings in
each country- under the US federal system there is no possibility of parole with a life
sentence while in the UK a minimum sentence is stipulated, ranging in the sample from
7.5 to 40 years (average 24.7 years). Average sentence in the UK for non-life sentences
is thus lower as a reflection of prosecuting lesser offences; there have been more life
sentences in Britain but most of those individuals will eventually be released.
Finally, to address minor points, the single death sentence was issued in
Pakistan; 1 out of 2 individuals not charged in Britain is still detained; and other
punishments not shown (both in the UK) are a 3-year community order (again a minor
penalty for a minor offence) and an indefinite hospital order (which is in line with the
higher rates of mental disorder in the UK sample).
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11.12 Comparative Summary
Table 11.29a. Comparative summary of findings for the US and UK (2001-2008) part 1.

United States

United Kingdom

Statistical summary

4.75 cases per year

5.75 cases per year; UK rate is
6.1 x the US for overall
population size or 1.5 x the US
for Muslim population size

Geographic
distribution

Mainly East coast but
dispersed over 21 states;
Capital: New York City (11% of
individuals)

3 main hotspots; Capital:
London (51% of individuals)

Demographic profiles

Young males; 76% US
citizenship (46% by birth);
diverse ethnic heritage; at least
basic education; mostly semi‐
skilled jobs; 1% unemployed;
27% converts; marriage
common; 27% criminal
records; 2% confirmed history
of mental illness

Young males; 78% UK
citizenship (64% by birth); large
contingent with Pakistani
heritage; at least basic
education; mostly semi/un‐
skilled jobs; 24% unemployed;
16% converts; marriage
common; 16% criminal records;
5% confirmed history of mental
illness

Offence date range

Average: 2.59 years; Mode: 1
year or less

Average: 1.44 years; Mode: 1
year or less

Radicalisation

Face‐to‐face interaction most
common, supplemented by
online activities

Face‐to‐face interaction most
common, supplemented by
online activities

Group characteristics

Average size: 2.4; Mode: 1;
Overall informal leadership;
evidence of leaders &
sanctioners within groups; 26%
overseas leadership

Average size: 2.3; Mode: 1;
Overall informal leadership;
operational leaders more
common than sanctioners; 10%
overseas leadership

...Continued...
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Table 11.29b. Comparative summary of findings for the US and UK (2001-2008) part 2.

United States

United Kingdom

Ideological
commitment

29% social/wannabe; 14%
hardcore/social; 16% hardcore;
remainder unknown

10% social/wannabe; 25%
hardcore/social; 21% hardcore;
remainder unknown

Behavioural
classification

63% preparing for/pursuing
violence; 24% offering services;
13% fundraising; 6% active
support; 9% promoting jihad;
54% overall overseas focus &
54% involving international
travel; mixed choice of targets
and weaponry

43% preparing for/pursuing
violence; 25% promoting jihad;
22% possession of jihadi
materials; 12% active support;
8% fundraising; 25% overall
overseas focus & 67% based in
UK; majority preference for
civilian targets and explosives

International
dimensions &
associations

50% overall in contact with
foreign terrorists; key
locations: Pakistan/Afghanistan
& more recently Somalia; more
named domestic associations
only over time

43% overall in contact with
foreign terrorists; global
connections common in earlier
generation, Pakistan remains
significant; more named
domestic associations over
time

The role of the
Internet

Top 4 uses: communication;
accessing propaganda &
forums; gathering intell. for
attacks; distributing materials

Top 4 uses: accessing
propaganda & forums;
communication; gathering
intell. for attacks; distributing
materials

Stated motivations

Religious/ altruistic/ foreign
policy

Religious/ altruistic/ foreign
policy

Outcomes

Widespread infiltration of
groups; few completed attacks;
90% prosecuted; average
sentence: 15.4 years; 9% life
sentences

Infiltration of groups rare;
several completed attacks; 94%
prosecuted; average sentence:
7.4 years; 23% life sentences

Tables 11.29a and 11.29b summarise the findings for each variable for both
countries. There has been a higher rate of Islamist terrorism in the UK from 2001-2008
(although the current samples are not presumed to be 100% exhaustive, the figures here
indicate a rate in the UK that is 1.5 times that of the US in relation to respective Muslim
population sizes). Geographically they are also dissimilar in that the US cases have been
far more dispersed, although in both countries they are grouped according to certain
regions- in America they have occurred along the East coast and nearby while in the UK
there are 3 main hotspots (London, the North West and the West Midlands). Both show
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some correspondence with the distribution of the Muslim population although this is
more pronounced in the UK. There has also been a stronger tendency in the UK for
cases to occur in the historical capital of Islamist militancy in that country- hence 51%
of all individuals in the British sample were based in London, compared to just 11% of
the US sample in New York City.
Overall, demographic profiles are very similar, with a majority of individuals in
both countries holding citizenship or having permanent residency rights (although more
in the UK were born there) and the vast majority being males aged 30 or younger. The
UK sample was slightly worse off in terms of educational achievement and
occupational standing (in particular more were unemployed immediately prior to
offending) but by far the most important difference has been the large contingent of
individuals of Pakistani heritage compared to the situation in the US, which has not
been dominated by any other nationality to the same extent. Age, educational attainment
and occupation have all declined in the post-Iraq generation, but not by much (these and
other changes are generally in line with suggestions made by Sageman32 and with
‘given wisdom’ about home-grown Islamist terrorism (HGIT) in the West33).
In terms of offence date ranges, the US has a higher average at 2.59 years
compared to 1.44 in the UK but most cases in both countries lasted for about a year or
less, not counting previous activities or processes of radicalisation. Average offence
range has shortened over time thanks to increased powers of detection.
As for radicalisation, there was very little available information for most
individuals, but face-to-face interaction still seems to be the primary mechanism, albeit
frequently supplemented by downloading videos and other online activity. ‘Virtual’
radicalisation by itself was rare in both the US and UK.
The two samples were very similar overall in terms of group size, averaging at
2.4 and 2.3, but most often individuals were prosecuted by themselves. In both countries
‘lone’ actors were, however, more often part of wider networks so this reflects more the
way that cases are prosecuted rather than social reality. As for leadership, there was
again not much reliable information available but what there is suggests a largely
informal system of authority among American and British Islamist terrorists. Leaders
and ‘spiritual sanctioners’ were more often found in the US, while in the UK
operational leaders were more common in the absence of within-group religious figures
(seemingly because groups can obtain Islamist justification from well-known
339

ideologues without much need for contact between them, or else because it is often
taken for granted). Lastly, overseas leadership occurred more frequently among US
cases by virtue of the fact that more individuals from the US have gone abroad to join
foreign jihadi conflicts (and are thus absorbed into existing organisational hierarchies).
Overseas leadership in UK cases was more often a case of ‘remote’ direction of
activities in Britain and elsewhere following previous contact in Pakistan.
Classification of ideological commitment here was based on extremely limited
information and is a concept that requires additional work in terms of more systematic
specification of criteria on which to make judgements. As it stands it is useful for
classifying the extremes, in particular outlying or unusual cases but cannot be
considered a reliable analytical tool in its current form. With that in mind the findings
here are in accordance with general observations about the nature of HGIT in Western
countries in that there was a reduction in the proportion of ‘hardcore’ terrorists in both
the US and UK from the pre- to post-Iraq eras. In terms of differences between the two,
the US sample is posited to consist of proportionally more ‘social/wannabe’ terrorists
while there were more ideologically committed (‘hardcore/social’ and ‘hardcore’)
terrorists in the UK. The reasons for this difference are in accordance with the social
transmission hypothesis in that the presence of influential jihadi ideologues in the UK –
combined with a more integral role in foreign terrorist organisations during the 1990smay have created a stronger sub-culture of Islamist militancy that has persisted in
Britain over time. In turn it may also relate to behavioural differences between the two
samples.
Behaviourally speaking, 63% of the US sample was located on a continuum
from preparation and training for violence to active pursuit of violence, compared to
43% in the UK. This difference is based largely on fewer individuals being prosecuted
in Britain at a stage of preparation for violence and this may relate to the fact that many
individuals are prosecuted at an earlier point in their jihadi careers, simply for
possession of terrorist materials such as bomb-making manuals. There was also a
sizeable percentage (24%) in the US who were classed as offering their services to
Islamist terrorists, either through reaching out and advertising this desire or by being
asked to perform particular tasks. There was only 1 such case among the British sample
but instead 25% of UK cases (and only 9% in the US) were engaged in promoting or
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encouraging jihad, and these differences seem to relate to the variation in ideological
commitment.
Overall, 54% in the US compared to just 25% in the UK were focussed
primarily on activities and events overseas and, correspondingly, there was at least
some related international travel in 54% of US vs. 33% of UK cases. Domestic aims
have increased in both countries moving into the post-Iraq generation and this may be
reflective of ideological endorsement of such operations but also simple displacement,
given increased difficulty in making contact with terrorist organisations abroad.
In relation to planned attacks there was no clear preference of target and
weaponry in the US while in the UK civilian targets and explosives were most often
chosen, a difference which seemingly reflects differential availability of weapons and
explosives training.
50% of US cases and 43% of the UK cases were in contact with foreign
terrorists and in both countries these relative proportions have decreased over time.
Pakistan and Afghanistan were the most frequent locations of contact with foreign
terrorists in the pre-Iraq (mostly pre-2001) generation but over time this has become
less accessible for Islamists from the US while it has remained the most popular
destination for those from the UK. More militants from the UK have had ‘global’
terrorist contacts as a function of the highly significant role that London played
throughout the 1990s into the new millennium, and the few individuals that have shown
evidence of such links in the post-Iraq era have established them primarily online. There
is more reliable evidence that Somalia has emerged as a primary destination for jihadis
from the US in recent years but information also indicates that British Islamists are
beginning to go there as well. In both the US and UK there has been a decrease over
time in named foreign terrorist associations and an increase in named domestic ones.
Reliable data on use of the Internet was generally lacking but there is more
similarity than difference between the two countries and the same top four uses were
reported for each, albeit in a marginally different order: communication, accessing
propaganda and jihadi forums, gathering intelligence for attacks and distributing
terrorist materials. Online fundraising was very rare but the available evidence suggests
that such operations may have become deliberately more covert over time in response to
improved counter-terrorism. Lastly, group formation via the Internet has also been rare,
although when it has occurred it has been in the more recent generation. This does not
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negate the fact that disparate groups still communicate and network with one another
online and sometimes meet as a result (the distinction between networking and lasting
group formation).
Turning to stated motivations, information was again often lacking. It seems that
there is little to distinguish the US and UK on this dimension, as the most commonly
expressed motives involved a predictable combination of religious and political rhetoric
and desire to defend fellow Muslims. There is also a general sense that both samples
were driven by social bravado and a fascination with violence and this is in line with
theory and research by Sageman34 and Roy35 among others (see chapter 4).
Finally, another major difference that has played a role in the manifestation of
HGIT in the US is the fact that informants and undercover agents are often used to
infiltrate groups of suspected militants and actively collude with them in planning
violence. This is chosen over and above opportunities for early intervention and has
likely contributed to the frequency of cases in the sample classed as ‘pursuit of
violence’ rather than lesser offences. This –and the UK’s contrasting preference for
early intervention without infiltration- helps explain the overall difference in average
sentences, which are more than twice as long in the US. There have been more life
sentences in the UK but some of these involve much shorter actual sentences than might
be expected while those in the US federal system do not include the possibility of
parole.

11.13 Theoretical Implications
Having discussed explanations and patterns of terrorism at length in chapters 4
and 5, it is important to consider the extent to which results from the US and UK fit
with, or contradict, those explanations. In terms of individual explanations,
psychopathology was clearly not supported as being relevant in either sample.
Personally experienced trauma was not evident, although ‘moral shocks’ from being
exposed to images of Muslim suffering were not uncommon. Some individuals also
seemed to experience personal difficulties in their social or working lives, but it was not
apparent that either sample might be distinguished from general populations in this way.
Moreover, neither sample could be considered dramatically deprived and there was a
wide range of educational and occupational attainment represented.
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Taken together, results from the US and UK both lend support to social
explanations for terrorism (see chapter 4). Personal difficulties, ‘crises’ of identity and
dissatisfaction with life in America or Britain may all act as predisposing risk factors
where present, but they are not by themselves direct motivators of terrorism.
Behavioural participation and social interaction with like-minded others characterised
the situation of most of those included within this study and it is the resultant processes
of social support, comparison and competition that drive terrorist behaviour. At the
heart of individual and group participation in this kind of activity is the sociallysupported adoption of the Islamist terrorist identity, which is defined by way of
reference to propaganda and ideology. Even ‘lone wolves’, unless involved for
mercenary reasons, see themselves in terms of this collective identity and act in
accordance with related values and behavioural norms.
Crucially, Islamist militant identities and ideology are defined in terms of
religion, yet centred around political concerns and feelings of injustice –specifically
regarding Western foreign policy and occupation of Muslim lands- which have both a
strong rational and emotive appeal. This is further strengthened by the power of violent
imagery, which clearly permeated the psyches of individuals in both countries.
Ultimately, the results from this study support the argument that the bottom line
or necessary condition for becoming an Islamist terrorist in the US and UK is a
combination of social and ideological exposure36- these are the key components to
shaping identity and behaviour and are best understood from a social-psychological
perspective.

11.14 Implications for Counter-Terrorism

General
There are a number of implications for CT from the findings in this study, some
of which are generalised in nature and confirm existing knowledge, others which are
more specific to each country. First, since foreign policy -in particular military
operations overseas- is such a widespread source of motivation for Islamists in both the
US and UK, this is an area which presents opportunities to combat terrorism at its roots.
It would be naive to assume that there is any quick-fix to Western involvement in
seemingly intractable conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, or even to believe that military
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strategies in each country can necessarily be adapted to appease the sense of outrage
that Islamist militants (and others) feel at these situations. However, there is room for
creative thinking about how best to minimise the ‘side-effects’ that such operations
spawn, both at home and around the world. As Foster puts it “the US [aided and abetted
by the UK] is, and has been, wandering mindlessly and aimlessly, blinded by its own
arrogance and hypocrisy, through an uncharted global minefield of highly disruptive, if
not potentially deadly, challenges to its well-being”.37
One way of beginning to minimise harm that is more realistic than a
fundamental restructuring of government and military is to encourage a culture of
accountability, both in global relations and specifically to domestic populations. A
greater emphasis on explaining military operations, competing commitments and
injustices (such as civilian deaths) as well promoting positive achievements can
contribute to more widespread nuanced understanding and balanced perceptions about
events in Afghanistan and Iraq. By contrast, a lack of effort to cultivate public
appreciation of such topics leaves the door open for Islamist propaganda to shape
individual perceptions unchallenged. Recent emphasis on the ‘war of ideas’ in
countering Islamist terrorism tends to focus on differential interpretations of the
Quran,38 which is certainly important within certain contexts. However, it is not reading
–or being taught- the Quran in the first place which ignites people’s emotions and sense
of injustice, impotence and desire for revenge- it is political events, wars and images of
people dying, which are manipulated to create global conspiracies. Reaching out to
communities or individuals who are potentially susceptible to radicalisation and
attempting to address their understanding of world politics (not to be confused with
simply promoting democracy) rather than just their religion may be a potentially
effective element of counter-terrorism in the US and UK.
Other, less specific tactics such as improving efforts to deal with inequalities in
society –specifically addressing the concerns of disadvantaged Muslim communitiesmay be helpful for reducing an element of predisposing risk for radicalisation.
Moreover, this does apply to the US as well as the UK, since despite a more affluent
Muslim population on the whole in America (see chapter 8) there was not a vast
difference in demographic backgrounds of the two samples. However, these are
supplementary measures only as far as counter-terrorism is concerned- domestic
improvements for Muslim populations do not directly combat terrorism as an issue and
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the fact that there is a wide variation in educational and occupational standing of
Islamist terrorists in both the US and UK is testament to the fact that material concerns
and opportunities in life are by no means the whole answer. Indeed, the UK effort to
combat Islamist terrorism under the heading of the ‘Prevent’ strategy, which has tried to
address both religious beliefs and material disadvantages, has come under marked
criticism, being described as “a textbook example of how to alienate absolutely
everybody”.39
Another aspect of Islamist terrorism in the US and UK that requires more
research is the deliberate counter-cultural side, which appeals to young men’s desire for
a ‘hard-man’ image and their attraction to images of violence. In other words –as with
the need to address foreign policy- there is the need to examine other non-ideological
aspects that may be equally important for understanding how and why people become
involved in terrorism. Given the findings here in relation to ideological commitment,
the US especially may stand to benefit from such an approach but it is by no means
absent in the UK and even in seemingly more ideologically informed groups there is
still very often an obsession with imitating the violence which others have committed.
More ‘traditional’ and direct tactics such as intelligence-led community policing
for identifying at-risk or dangerous individuals remain the most reliable approaches,
which still facilitate a proactive rather than reactive approach to counter-terrorism, and
such measures are in place already in both the US and UK. Continuous assessment of
policing strategies and of developments in each country will help to ensure that these
efforts continue to be effective, and one way of doing that is to maintain current
empirical records of cases similar to the current study.

The US
Implications for counter-terrorism which apply more specifically to the US first
and foremost include the need to relinquish the idea that Islamist terrorists only come
from abroad and that the ‘home-grown’ problem is essentially minimal. In light of a
multitude of alleged cases in 2009 and 2010 it does seem that this is being realised,40
however it is not enough to simply say that it is because of continued military presence
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although these are key issues, the danger is that a subculture of
Islamist militancy is developing in America in a distinct but not entirely dissimilar way
to that which developed in the UK during the 1990s. In this regard the rising
345

prominence of the Yemen-based American jihadi ideologue, Anwar al-Awlaki is cause
for concern41 and perhaps even more importantly Cruikshank has observed that two alMuhajiroun affiliated groups in New York (The Islamic Thinkers Society and
Revolution Muslim) appear to be gaining influence and have been linked to 7 of 23 US
terrorism cases occurring between mid-2009 and August 2010.42
Attempting to combat the development of such a culture will be greatly assisted
by identifying hotspots of radicalism within specific areas of cities or towns and
adapting intervention approaches according to the specific context (e.g. better
understanding of Somali-Americans in Minnesota)43. In addition, given a strong focus
on jihad overseas and the desire among American Islamists to join foreign conflicts, it
seems prudent to address these particular issues. Tactics might include improved
communication about the reality of these conflicts- possibly enlisting former fighters to
talk to groups about their negative experiences- as well as communicating legal
penalties and the reasons why they are in place. It might also be productive to make a
distinction between those who fight overseas and do not seek terrorism at home and
those who do. If labelling theory has any validity, wider application of ‘terrorist’ labels
will only produce more terrorists.
Lastly, American authorities should consider strategies of early intervention for
lesser offences rather than encouraging groups of individuals to proceed to the
maximum levels of radicalisation. From a social-psychological point of view,
informants or agents who often assume considerable status within the groups that they
operate (e.g. via claiming connections to al-Qaeda or by providing training or weapons)
are undoubtedly altering the social reality and influencing the behaviour of those around
them, even if they offer individuals the chance to back out. Early intervention avoids
influencing people in this way and has the potential to minimise costs for individuals,
their families and for wider society (since there is no evidence that long sentences
imposed are effectual as a deterrent and there is considerable economic cost associated
with imprisonment). Even more importantly, early intervention would free up muchneeded police resources amidst a dramatic increase in home-grown terrorism cases in
2009-2010, and by limiting –rather than encouraging- individual radicalisation, this
would also prevent these individuals from contributing to the growing jihadi subculture
in America. Of course each situation must be individually assessed, and the US also has
the advantage that it can observe how the UK situation progresses as more minor
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terrorist offenders are released. Added to this, growing comprehension of possibilities
for rehabilitation of Islamist extremists presents an alternative to indiscriminate lengthy
prison sentences (and again if there is any validity to the classification of ideological
commitment within this study then the prospects of behavioural reform among many
US militants are potentially promising).

The UK
As mentioned above, the proactive national strategy in the UK has come under
heavy criticism and in particular is seen as failing to directly address the problem.44
Specific issues within the UK include the need to better understand why and how young
British Pakistanis in particular are drawn to extremism within certain communities. At
the same time it is necessary to guard against a blinkered view of Islamist terrorism in
Britain that ignores the involvement of other nationalities and other relevant
international developments such as the conflict in Somalia. Improved understanding of
specific communities, even of specific individuals within communities, combined with
an informed comprehension of the nature of ties back to the country of origin and of
how constantly changing international developments are likely to affect situations
abroad and at home are necessary for informing a dynamic and pro-active approach to
counter-terrorism.
The front line of counter-terrorism in Britain, as in the US and around the world,
is fought by the security services and police. The most important strategy then is to
ensure that these institutions have enough resources at their disposal (a point that is
worth reiterating, given that budget cuts for the security services were considered as part
of wider cuts to the UK defence budget- although ultimately British security services
were allotted an additional £650m)45 and that they are appropriately informed about the
developing threat to be able to effectively cope with Islamist terrorism as it fluctuates
over time. British authorities have been effective since 2005 in identifying and
thwarting major plots with overseas links, however smaller, mostly domestically
contained operations, which have occurred out-with the main hotspots of activity have
managed to slip through the net. So far these have been ineffectual but there is still
potential for significant damage to occur. A key challenge then is also the ability to
detect such isolated plotters and to be able to correctly assess the threat that they pose.
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There is no simple answer for how this can be achieved, although improved monitoring
of online ‘chatter’ is one possibility. Another innovation would be to learn from the
Americans’ use of paid informants as a means of improving community-level
intelligence, since this has largely proven successful in containing the more dispersed
threat on the other side of the Atlantic (although as the above comments make clear it is
an approach which requires a great deal of care in application). Ultimately, of course,
there is unlikely to be a 100% success rate in preventing terrorism in either the UK, the
US, or elsewhere- learning from these experiences and improving preparations for
responding to attacks are thus also vitally important. The currently ongoing inquest into
the events surrounding 7/7 may help in this regard.

11.15 Concluding Remarks
This study has examined two representative samples of Islamist terrorism cases
involving people living in or from the US and UK who were actively offending between
September 12th 2001 and December 31st 2008. The research questions identified in
chapter 2 have been answered by way of systematically examining and comparing the
cases in each country using pre-defined variables. The results represent an empirical
record and evaluation of modern Islamist terrorism in the United States and Great
Britain and will hopefully contribute to understanding and reducing the threat of
violence. It is nevertheless important to remember that the available open-source data
on which this report was based was often lacking considerable amounts of information
and is of questionable reliability. Those who read this report are encouraged to bear this
in mind as well as the fact that as new information emerges and as new cases are added
over time the picture will change. The threat is dynamic and so must be the response.

348

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW

Chapter 11 Endnotes
1

Workings: US = 91/ 300,000,000 = 0.0000003; UK = 112/ 61,000,000 = 0.00000184. UK/ US = 6.13.
Workings: US = 91/ 2,350,000 = 0.00003872; UK = 0.000056. UK/ US = 1.45.
3
Note that this does not contradict the descriptions given of each country in chapters 6 and 7, which
highlighted the UK as a hub of Islamist terrorist activity. This is because many of the terrorists who
visited the UK were prosecuted abroad and because others within the UK were not prosecuted for their
actions.
4
See Brigitte Nacos, “Revisiting the Contagion Hypothesis: Terrorism, News Coverage, and Copycat
Attacks” (2009) Perspectives on Terrorism, 3:3, 3-13.
5
One other case (Alishtari- US case #34) occurred in Ardsley, in Westchester county in New York state
to the north of NYC.
6
Using names of individuals as a guideline where explicit information on ethnic background was lacking.
7
Edwin Bakker, Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which They
Joined the Jihad: An Exploratory Study (2006) The Hague: Clingendael Institute.
8
Ibid.
9
Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (2004) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
10
Bakker, Jihadi Terrorists in Europe, 42; Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 78-80.
11
Ibid; ibid; Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (2008)
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
12
Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 109-124.
13
Sean O’Neill & Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque
(2006) London: HarperCollins, 185-200.
14
Petter Nesser, “How Does Radicalization Occur in Europe?” (2006) Presented at the Second InterAgency Radicalization Conference, hosted by U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington DC,
July 10, 2006 <http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00080/DHS_foredrag_80480a.pdf> at February
18, 2008.
15
Mitchell Silber, & Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (2007) New York:
New York City Police Department.
16
Nesser, “How Does Radicalization Occur in Europe?”.
17
Ibid.
18
Kim Howells, Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist
Attacks on 7 July 2005 (2009) London: Intelligence and Security Committee, 17
<http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/210852/20090519_77review.pdf > at May 20, 2010.
19
“7/7 Trial: How Acquitted Trio Came to Embrace Radical Cause” The Times, April 29, 2009
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article6188667.ece> at July 4, 2010.
20
Susan Candiotti, “Walker Lindh Sentenced to 20 Years” CNN, October 4, 2002
<http://edition.cnn.com/2002/LAW/10/04/lindh.statement/> at June 3, 2010.
21
Duncan Gardham, “Growing Number of British Men Joining Islamic Radicals in Somalia” The
Telegraph, February 16, 2009
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/lawandorder/4638987/Growing-number-ofBritish-men-joining-Islamic-radicals-in-Somalia.html> at July 24, 2010.
22
Ibid.
23
Stevan Weine, John Horgan, Cheryl Robertson, Sana Loue, Amin Mohamed & Sahra Noor
“Community and Family Approaches to Combating the Radicalization and Recruitment of SomaliAmerican Youth and Young Adults: A Psycho-Social Perspective” (2009) Dynamics of Asymmetric
Conflict, 2:3, 181-200.
24
Raffaello Pantucci, “Did Somalia’s al-Shabaab Plan to Attack the Australian Military?” (2009)
Terrorism Monitor, 7:27, 4-6.
25
Joseph Felter & Brian Fishman, Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar
Records (2007) New York: Combatting Terrorism Center at Westpoint
<http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf> at June 25, 2010.
26
David Leppard, “British Brigade of Islamists Join Al-Qaeda Foreign Legion in Iraq” The Times, June 4,
2006 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article671510.ece> at June 25, 2010.
27
“U.S. Commander Sees Fewer Foreign Fighters in Iraq” Reuters, June 16, 2009 <http://www.militaryworld.net/Iraq/1613.html> at June 25, 2010.
2

349

28

For example, Christopher Hewitt & Jessica Kelley-Moore, “Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A Cross-National
Analaysis of Jihadism” (2009) Terrorism and Political Violence, 21:2, 211-220.
29
Adam Nossiter, “Lonely Trek to Radicalism for Terror Suspect” New York Times, January 16, 2010
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/world/africa/17abdulmutallab.html?tntemail1=y&emc=tnt&pagew
anted=all> at June 1, 2010.
30
United States v. Enaam Arnaout, Indictment, United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, Case No. 02 CR 892, April 2002
<http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/usarnaout10902ind.pdf> at June 1, 2010.
31
Nicola Woolcock, “Three Students Jailed for Inciting Terrorism on ‘Holy War’ Websites” The Times,
July 6, 2007 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article2034011.ece> at June 25, 2010.
32
Sageman, Leaderless Jihad.
33
See Sam Mullins, “Home-Grown Islamist Terrorism: Issues and Implications” (2007) Perspectives on
Terrorism, 1:3
<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=12> at January
10, 2009.
34
Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks.
35
Olivier Roy, Al Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement: The Power of a Narrative (2008) Microcon
Policy Working Paper 2, Brighton: Microcon.
36
Sam Mullins, “Iraq Versus Lack of Integration: Understanding the Motivations of Contemporary
Islamist Terrorists in Western Countries” (2010) Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political
Aggression, First published on October 19 2010 (iFirst).
37
Gregory Foster, “Transforming US National Security: A Call for Strategic Idealism” (2010) Defense
and Security Analysis, 26:2, 129-142, p.130.
38
Mohamed bin Ali, “Ideological Response to Terrorism and Extremism” (2008) International Centre for
Political Violence and Terrorism Research, January 2008
<http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Ideology%20Response/Ideological%20Response%20to%20Terrorism%20and
%20Extremism.pdf> at July 27, 2010.
39
Douglas Murray, “The Prevent Strategy: A Textbook Example of How to Alienate Just About
Everybody” The Telegraph, March 31, 2010 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-theuk/7540456/The-Prevent-strategy-a-textbook-example-of-how-to-alienate-just-about-everybody.html> at
July 27, 2010.
40
“Obama Security Strategy Highlights Domestic Terrorism” BBC News, May 27, 2010
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/us_and_canada/10169144.stm> at July 27, 2010; Scott Shane, “New
Incidents Test Immunity to Terrorism on U.S. Soil” New York Times, December 11, 2009
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/12/us/12assess.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all> at May 22, 2010.
41
“Prosecutions Show Awlaki's Continuing Influence in the United States” Investigative Project on
Terrorism, July 21, 2010 <http://www.investigativeproject.org/2072/prosecutions-show-awlakiscontinuing-influence-in> at July 27, 2010.
42
Paul Cruikshank, “The Growing Danger from Radical Islamist Groups in the United States” (2010)
CTC Sentinel, 3:8, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss8.pdf> at September 5, 2010.
43
Weine, Horgan, Robertson, Loue, Mohamed & Noor “Community and Family Approaches to
Combating the Radicalization and Recruitment of Somali-American Youth and Young Adults: A PsychoSocial Perspective”.
44
Murray, “The Prevent Strategy: A Textbook Example of How to Alienate Just About Everybody”.
45
Duncan Gardham, “Britain Facing a New Wave of Terrorist Attacks, MI5 Warns” The Telegraph,
September 16, 2010 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8008033/Britainfacing-a-new-wave-of-terrorist-attacks-MI5-warns.html> at September 17, 2010; Duncan Gardham,
“Security and Intelligence Services Get Funding to Counter New Threats” The Telegraph, October 19,
2010 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/8074441/Security-and-Intelligenceservices-get-funding-to-counter-new-threats.html> at October 20, 2010; “UK Unveils National Security
Strategy Before Review” Jane’s Country Risk Daily Report, October 19, 2010.

350

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Bibliography
“3 Terror Conspirators Receive Prison Terms, One for Life” New York Times, June 16, 2004
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/16/national/16paintball.html?scp=1&sq=Seifullah%20Chap
man&st=cse> at June 4, 2010.
“7/7 Trial: How Acquitted Trio Came to Embrace Radical Cause” The Times, April 29, 2009
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article6188667.ece> at July 4, 2010.
“18 Muslims Convicted in Belgian Terror Trial” USA Today, September 30, 2003
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2003-09-30-belguim-suspect_x.htm> at June 21, 2010.
“35 Year Sentence for Grenade Mall Plotter” CBS News, September 30, 2008
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/09/30/national/main4490504.shtml> at June 10, 2010
“36 Islamic Militants Sentenced in France” New York Times, February 19, 1998
<http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/19/world/36-islamic-militants-sentencedinfrance.html?pagewanted=1> at September 20, 2009.
“Aafia Siddiqui Indicted for Attempting to Kill United States Nationals in Afghanistan and Six
Additional Charges” United States Department of Justice, September 2, 2008
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/US_v_Siddiqui_inddojpr.pdf> at
June 14, 2010.
Abbas, Zaffar, “Pakistan Body ‘May be al-Qaeda Man’” BBC News, October 17, 2003
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3201600.stm> at June 1, 2010.
“Abdul Patel” Crown Prosecution Service, undated
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2007.html#a13> at June 30, 2010.
“Abdul Rahman (Op BAGUETTE)” Crown Prosecution Service, undated
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2007.html#a15> at July 2, 2010.
“Abdullahu Sentenced to 20 Months in Prison for Supplying Guns and Ammunition to Illegal Aliens” US
Department of Justice, March 31, 2008
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Abdullahu_dojpr_sentenc
ing.pdf> at June 11, 2010.
“Abu Hamza Extradition Halted by EU Judges” The Telegraph, July 8, 2010
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/7878690/Abu-Hamzaextradition-halted-by-EU-judges.html> at July 9, 2010.
“Abu Hamza Loses Extradition Fight” BBC News, July 23, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7521108.stm> at June 21, 2010.

351

“Accused Admits Larger Plan” BBC News, June 11, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7448798.stm> at July 1, 2010
“Accused Helper of Al Qaeda Pleads Guilty” New York Times, April 15, 2003
<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/15/us/a-nation-at-war-the-money-trail-accused-helper-of-alqaeda-pleads-guilty.html?scp=1&sq=Ujaama%20guilty&st=cse> at May 20, 2010.
“Activist Held under Terrorism Act” BBC News, February 8, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6343109.stm> at June 25, 2010.
“Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to Terrorists” US
Federal News Service, June 18, 2008, via Highbeam Research
<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1496987541.html> at June 12, 2010.
“Airline Plot Trio Get Life Terms” BBC News, September 14, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8254156.stm> at July 1, 2010.
“‘Airliners Plot’: The Allegations” BBC News, April 3, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7329221.stm> at July 1, 2010.
“Airport Woman Hid Terror Manual” BBC News, November 2, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/manchester/8337754.stm> at July 6, 2010.
AIVD, Recruitment for Jihad in the Netherlands: From Incident to Trend (2002) The Hague: General
Intelligence and Security Service.
AIVD, Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current Trends in the Islamist Terrorist Threat (2006) The
Hague: General Intelligence and Security Service.
Akers, Ronald, Deviant Behaviour: A Social Learning Approach, 2nd ed. (1977) Belmont: Wadsworth.
Alderson, Andrew, Leach, Ben, & Gardham, Duncan, “Bilal Abdulla: Doctor by Day, Terrorist by
Night- the Secret Life of a New Breed of Terrorist” The Telegraph, December 20, 2008
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/3867334/Bilal-Abdulla-Doctor-byday-terrorist-by-night-the-secret-life-of-a-new-breed-of-terrorist.html> at July 5, 2010.
Al-Hindi, Esa, The Army of Madinah in Kashmir (1999) Birmingham: Maktabah Al Ansaar.
Alleyne, Richard, “Shoe Bomber Sentenced to 110 Years” The Telegraph, January 31, 2003
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1420702/Shoe-bombersentenced-to-110-years.html> at June 21, 2010.

352

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Alleyne, Richard, Savill, Richard, & Edwards, Richard, “Airport Attack Doctor was Known Extremist”
The Telegraph, July 5, 2007
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1556552/Airport-attack-doctor-was-knownextremist.html> at July 5, 2010.
Allingod, Kris, “Last Enemy Combatant In U.S. Soil, Al-Marri Sentenced To 8 Years” All Headline
News, October 30, 2009
<http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7016850296?Last%20Enemy%20Combatant%20In%
20U.S.%20Soil,%20Al-Marri%20Sentenced%20To%208%20Years> at June 3, 2010.
“Ali al-Marri Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to al-Qaeda” US Department of
Justice, April 30, 2009 <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/845.pdf> at
June 2, 2010.
“Ali Al-Timimi” Investigative Project.org Profile, undated,
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/profile/104> at October 15, 2009.
“Al Qaeda Briton Planned Dirty Bomb Attacks” London Evening Standard, November 7, 2006
<http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-23373534-al-qaeda-briton-planned-dirty-bombattacks.do> at June 22, 2010.
“‘Al-Qaeda Tape at Suspect’s Home’” BBC News, September 7, 2005
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/4222582.stm> at June 21, 2010.
“Al-Qaeda Terror Suspect Convicted” BBC News, November 24, 2005
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4467640.stm> at June 23, 2010.
“Al-Qaeda Terror Suspect is Jailed” BBC News, December 20, 2005
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4545692.stm> at June 23, 2010.
Al-Shafi’i, Muhammad, “Incendiary Device Thrown at Military Barracks in West London:
Fundamentalists Demonstrate Opposite British Prime Minister's Office in Support of Iraq” Al
Sharq al-Awsat, December 18, 1998, via Newsbank
<http://nl.newsbank.com/nlsearch/we/Archives?p_action=doc&p_docid=0F98E7F869EC7555&
p_docnum=1&s_accountid=AC0110042402001809614&s_orderid=NB0110042401565929033
&s_dlid=DL0110042402003509652&s_ecproduct=DOC&s_ecprodtype=&s_trackval=GoogleP
M&s_siteloc=&s_referrer=&s_username=smullins&s_accountid=AC0110042402001809614&s
_upgradeable=no> at May 19, 2010.

353

“Al Qaeda Supporter, Organizer of Jihad Training Camp in Oregon Sentenced in Manhattan Federal
Court to Life in Prison” US Federal News Service, September 16th, 2009, via Highbeam
Research <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1860371401.html> at May 20, 2010.
“Al-Qaeda Terrorist Jailed for 10 Years” The Telegraph, December 19, 2008
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/lawandorder/3850118/Al-Qaeda-terroristjailed-for-10-years.html> at June 29, 2010.
“Altimimi and Abdullah (Op BRACCO)” Crown Prosecution Service, undated
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2007.html#a09> at July 2, 2010.
Al-Zawahiri, Ayman, cited in Anonymous, Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror
(2004) Alexandria, VA: Brassey’s, xxi; cited in Hoffman, “The Changing Face of Al-Qaeda”.
Anderson, Sean, & Sloan, Stephen, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism, 2nd edition (2002) Lanham,
Maryland: Scarecrow Press.
“Atlanta Defendant Found Guilty of Supporting Terrorists” US Department of Justice, August 12, 2009
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1041.pdf > at June 8, 2010.
Arena, Michael, & Arrigo, Bruce, The Terrorist Identity: Explaining the Terrorist Threat (2006) New
York: New York University Press.
Arkes, Hal, & Blumer, Catherine, “The Psychology of Sunk Cost” (1985) Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 35:1, 124-140.
Aslanian, Sasha & Yuen, Laura, “Phone Calls from Missing Somalis Send Mixed Messages” Minnesota
Public Radio, April 15, 2009
<http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/04/14/friends_of_the_missing/?refid=0> at
June 11, 2010
Baker, Al & Rashbaum, William “Police Find Car Bomb in Times Square” New York Times, May 1, 2010
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/nyregion/02timessquare.html?th=&emc=th&pagewanted
=all> at May 20, 2010.
Baker, Peter, “Obama Says Al Qaeda in Yemen Planned Bombing Plot, and He Vows Retribution” New
York Times, January 2, 2010
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/03/us/politics/03address.html?emc=tnt&tntemail1=y> at
January 2, 2010.

354

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Bakier, Abdul Hameed, “Al-Qaeda Outlines its Strategy Seven Years After 9/11” (2008) Terrorism
Focus, 5:35.
Bakker, Edwin, “Jihadi Terrorist in Europe and Global Salafi Jihadis” (2008) in Coolsaet (ed.) Jihadi
Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe, 69-84.
Bakker, Edwin, Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which They
Joined the Jihad: An Exploratory Study (2006) The Hague: Clingendael Institute.
Bannerman, Lucy, & O’Neill, Sean, “Osama bin London, Trainer of 21/7 Plotters, is Convicted” The
Times, February 27, 2008 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article3441588.ece>
at June 27, 2010.
Barakat, Matthew, “Lawyers: Teacher Supported Terror Group” Associated Press Online, June 6, 2006
via Highbeam Research <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-124737656.html> at June 23,
2010.
“Barot and Others (Op RHYME)” Crown Prosecution Service, undated
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2007.html#a02> at May 20, 2010.
Baxter, Kylie, “From Migrants to Citizens: Muslims in Britain 1950’s-1990’s” (2006) Immigrants and
Minorities, 24:2, 164-192.
Becker, Howard, “Becoming a Marihuana User” (1953) The American Journal of Sociology, 59:3,
235-242.
Becker, Howard, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (1963) New York: Free, cited in
Matsueda “Differential Social Organization, Collective Action and Crime”.
“Behind the London-Glasgow Plot” BBC News, December 16, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7772925.stm> at May 20, 2010.
Bell, Stewart, The Martyr’s Oath: The Apprenticeship of a Homegrown Terrorist (2005) Toronto: John
Wiley & Sons .
Bem, Daryl, “Self-Perception: An Alternative Interpretation of Cognitive Dissonance Phenomena” (1967)
Psychological Review, 74:3, 183-200.
Bennett, Richard, “Presidential Address: Comparative Criminology and Criminal Justice Research: The
State of our Knowledge” (2004) Justice Quarterly, 21:1, 1-22.
Bennetto, Jason & Morris, Nigel, “From Baghdad to Birmingham? Nine Held over ‘Plot’ to Kidnap
British Muslim Soldier” The Independent, February 1, 2007

355

<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/from-baghdad-to-birmingham-nine-held-overplot-to-kidnap-british-muslim-soldier-434576.html> at June 28, 2010.
Bennetto, Jason, & Sengupta, Kim, “The Conspiracy: How a Group of Suicide Bombers Planned to Blow
up 10 Planes” The Independent, August 11, 2006
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/the-conspiracy-how-a-group-of-suicidebombers-planned-to-blow-up-10-planes-411408.html> at July 1, 2010.
Berkowitz, Leonard, “Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis: Examination and Reformulation” (1989)
Psychological Bulletin, 106:1, 59-73.
Bernton, Hal, Carter, Mike, Heath, David, & Neff, James “The Terrorist Within: The Story Behind One
Man’s Holy War Against America” The Seattle Times, June 23-July 7, 2002
<http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/nation-world/terroristwithin/> at March 13, 2008.
“Bilal Mohammed (Op CALAMARI)” Crown Prosecution Service, undated
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2008.html#a01> at July 3, 2010.
Bird, Steve, “Quiet Existence in Leicester Suburb Masked Complex Terrorist Network” The Times, April
2, 2003 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article1125944.ece> at June 22, 2010.
Bird, Steve, de Bruxelles, Simon & Tendler, Simon, “Four Appear in Court on Chemical Weapon
Charge”The Times, January 14, 2003
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article812066.ece> at June23, 2010.
“Birmingham Man Jailed for Preparing Terrorist Attack” Birmingham Post, July 30, 2008
<http://www.birminghampost.net/news/west-midlands-news/2008/07/30/birmingham-manjailed-for-preparing-terrorist-attack-65233-21436124/> at July 5, 2010.
Bisset, Susan, & Hastings, Chris, “Briton Trained by bin Laden recruits in London” The Telegraph,
September 23, 2001
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1341363/Briton-trained-by-bin-Laden-recruits-inLondon.html> at June 25, 2010.
“Bluewater Bomb Threat Man Jailed” BBC News, June 20, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/7465593.stm> at July 7, 2010.
“British Arms Dealer Sentenced to Maximum Sentence -47 Years- for Attempting to Aid Terrorists” US
Department of Justice, September 12, 2005

356

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Lakhani_DOJPR_Sentenc
ing.pdf> at June 22, 2010.
“British Cleric Resists Extradition” BBC News, January 25, 1999
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/262556.stm> at May 20, 2010.
“British Man Jailed Nine Years for Terrorism” Metropolitan Police Service, March 17, 2006
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/MetPolice_KhanSentenced.pdf>
at June 23, 2010.
Bin Ali, Mohamed, “Ideological Response to Terrorism and Extremism” (2008) International Centre for
Political Violence and Terrorism Research, January 2008
<http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Ideology%20Response/Ideological%20Response%20to%20Terrorism
%20and%20Extremism.pdf> at July 27, 2010.
Bin Laden, Osama, “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Lands of the Two Holy
Places” (1996) reproduced in “Bin Laden’s Fatwa” (undated) PBS Online NewsHour,
<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html> at November 20, 2008.
Bin Laden, Osama, al-Zawahiri, Ayman, Taha, Abu-Yasir Rifa’I, Hamza, Sheikh Mir, & Rahman, Fazlur
“Jihad against Jews and Crusaders” World Islamic Front Statement, February 23, 1998.
Bird, Steve, Fresco, Adam, Ford, Richard, & Luck, Adam, “The Benefit Bombers who Repaid Help with
Hatred” The Times, July 27, 2005
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article548441.ece?print=yes&randnum=1270010712
986> at June 27, 2010.
Black, Michael, “Bradford Men Challenge Sentences” Bradford Telegraph and Argus, October 9, 2009
<http://www.thetelegraphandargus.co.uk/news/4673486.Extremist_sees_jail_term_cut/> at June
29, 2010.
“Blackburn Man Jailed for 5 Years for Terrorism Offences” Lancashire Police, undated
<http://www.lancashire.police.uk/news/blackburn-man-jailed-for-5-years-for-terrorismoffences> at July 3, 2010.
Blanchard, Christopher, The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya (2008) CRS Report for
Congress <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21695.pdf> at January 21, 2008.
“Blast Suspect was Radicalised” BBC News, May 23, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/devon/7415831.stm> at July 6, 2010.

357

Blumenthal, Ralph, Hanley, Robert, Mitchell, Alison, Treaster, Joseph & Tabor, Mary, “The Bombing:
Retracing the Steps –A Special Report; Fitting the Pieces of Terrorism- Accounts Reconstruct
Planning of Trade Center Explosion” New York Times, May 26, 1993.
“Bomb Britons Appear on Hamas Tape” BBC News, March 8, 2004
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3543269.stm> at May 19, 2010.
“Bomb Plot Doctor Jailed for Life” BBC News, December 17, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7786884.stm> at July 5, 2010.
“‘Bomb Threats’ Accused in Court” BBC News, September 25, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/leicestershire/8274774.stm> at July 7, 2010.
“Bomber’s Action Stuns Community” BBC News, October 15, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/devon/7672458.stm> at July 6, 2010.
Booth, Jenny, “British Police Arrest Abu Hamza on Terrorism Charges” The Times, August 26, 2004
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article474822.ece> at June 21, 2010.
Borger, Borger & Paton Walsh, Nick, “Amateurish Blusterer Whose Deal of a Lifetime was Doomed
from the Start” The Guardian, August 14, 2003
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2003/aug/14/armstrade.usa> at June 22, 2010.
Bowcott, Owen, “Algerian Guilty of Downloading Bomb Data” The Guardian, November 25, 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/nov/25/terrorism.northernireland> at June 23, 2010.
Bowen, Shannan, “Pit Attack Leaves Wake” Daily Tar Heel, September 18, 1006
<http://media.collegepublisher.com/media/paper885/documents/v749cytw.pdf> at June 10,
2010.
Boyle, Jon, “France Convicts Algerian of Paris Bombings” The Herald Sun (Australia) October 27,
2007 <http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,22657149-5005961,00.html> at June
13, 2008.
Brewer, Marilynn, “The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time” (1991)
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17:5, 475-482.
Bright, Martin & Alam, Fareena “Making of a Martyr: From Passivism to Jihad” May 4, 2003, The
Guardian <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/may/04/terrorism.religion> at May 19, 2010.
“British-Born Muslims Supplied Equipment to al-Qaeda” The Telegraph, March 9, 2009

358

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/4962802/British-born-Muslimssupplied-equipment-to-al-Qaeda.html> at June 28, 2010.
“British ‘Cyber Groomer’ Jailed for Recruiting UK’s Youngest Terrorist” Daily Mail, August 19, 2008
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1046916/British-cyber-groomer-jailed-recruitingUKs-youngest-terrorist.html> at June 29, 2010.
“British Muslim Gets Life over Terror Attack Plot” BBC News, December 10, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8406051.stm> at July 1, 2010.
“British National Indicted for Conspiring with ‘Shoe Bomber’ Richard Reid” US Department of Justice,
October 4, 2004
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/shoebomb/U.S._v_Badat_DOJPRIndictment.pdf> at
June 21, 2010.
“British Police Arrest Muslim Cleric” BBC News, March 15, 1999
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/297229.stm> at June 21, 2010.
“Briton Sentenced to 47 Years in Missile-Smuggling Plot” North County Times, September 13, 2005
<http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/military/article_993b2bac-93b3-5773-ba2bf8c41a4e890a.html> at June 22, 2010
“Britons Convicted of Yemen Bomb Plot” BBC News, August 9, 1999
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/415522.stm> at May 20, 2010.
Britten, Nick, & Gardham, Duncan, “Judge Warns Muslim Extremists: ‘If You Live in this Country, You
Live by its Rules’” The Telegraph, July 8, 2009
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/5769692/Judge-warns-Muslimextremists-If-you-choose-to-live-in-this-country-you-live-by-its-rules..html> at July 6, 2010.
Britton, Jeremy, “Babar: The Jihadi Supergrass” BBC News, April 30, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6242483.stm> at June 5, 2010.
Britton, Jeremy, “Rowe ‘Bore al-Qaeda Hallmarks’” BBC News, September 23, 2005
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4271368.stm> at June 21, 2010.
Bromund, Ted and Roach, Morgan, Islamist Terrorist Plots in Great Britain: Uncovering the Global
Network (2009) Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation
<http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2009/pdf/bg2329.pdf> at May 20, 2010.

359

Brooke, Chris, “U.S. Government Website Provided Terror Tips to Friend of 7/7 Bomber” The Daily
Mail, March 11, 2008
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-531091/U-S-government-website-provided-terrortips-friend-7-7-bomber.html> at July 4, 2010.
“Brooklyn Man Sentenced to 13 Years in Prison for Conspiring to Provide Funds to Overseas Jihadists
and for Making False Statements in Connection with a Terrorism Investigation” United States
Attorney, Southern District of New York, April 16, 2007
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/387.pdf> at June 4, 2010.
“Bronx Martial Arts Instructor Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for Conspiring to Provide Material
Support to Al Qaeda” United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, November 7, 2007
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_TShah_DOJPR_Sentencing.pdf
> at June 4, 2010.
Bruguière, Jean-Louis “Terrorism: Threat and Responses” Occasional Paper Series, No.31, October 2001.
Buncombe, Andrew, Davison, John & Waugh, Paul “New Terror Link to Briton Held Prisoner in Yemen”
BBCNews, January 12, 1999 <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/new-terror-link-to-britonheld-prisoner-in-yemen-1046473.html> at May 20, 2010.
Burdman, Daphne, “Education, Indoctrination, and Incitement: Palestinian Children on their Way to
Martyrdom” (2003) Terrorism and Political Violence, 15:1, 96-123.
Burns, John, “3 Britons Convicted in Plot to Blow Up Airliners” New York Times, July 8, 2010
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/world/europe/09britain.html?emc=tnt&tntemail1=y> at
July 8, 2010.
Burns, John, “3 Sentenced in London for Airline Plot” New York Times, July 12, 2010
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/world/europe/13britain.html?_r=1&emc=tnt&tntemail1=
y> at July 12, 2010.
Burns, John “UK Releases 2nd Suspect Linked to bin Laden” International Herald Tribune, July 3, 2008
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/07/03/europe/terror.php> at January 5, 2009.
Burrell, Ian & Orr, David “Islamic Militant Backs ‘Martyred’ Suicide Bomber” The Independent,
December 29, 2000, via HighBeam Research
<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-5115479.html> at May 19, 2010.

360

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Candiotti, Susan, “Walker Lindh Sentenced to 20 Years” CNN, October 4, 2002
<http://edition.cnn.com/2002/LAW/10/04/lindh.statement/> at June 3, 2010.
Carley, Kathleen, “Group Stability: A Socio-Cognitive Approach” (1999) Advances in Group Processes,
7, 1 44.
Carlisle, David, “Dhiren Barot: Was He an Al Qaeda Mastermind or Merely a Hapless Plotter?” (2007)
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 30:12, 1057-1071.
Carter, Sara, “Somalis in U.S. Draw FBI Attention” Washington Times, December 29, 2008
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/dec/29/somalis-in-us-draw-fbi-attention/print/>
at June 12, 2010.
“Cartoon Protesters’ Jail Term Cut” BBC News, October 30, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/7070191.stm> at July 2, 2010.
Caruso, David, “Detainee’s Ties to Al Qaeda Called into Question at Trial: He Maintains he Didn’t Know
they Were Terrorists” Boston Globe, November 21, 2005
<http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2005/11/21/detainees_ties_to_al_qaeda_called_int
o_question_at_trial/> at June 5, 2010.
Casciani, Dominic, “21/7: Was it Linked to 7/7?” BBC News, July 11, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6249118.stm> at June 27, 2010.
Casciani, Dominic, “Q & A: Islamist Groups Face Ban” BBC News, July 18, 2006
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/5190938.stm> at April 1, 2009.
Casciani, Dominic, “The Jihadi and the Beheading Plot” BBC News, February 18, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7241778.stm> at June 28, 2010.
Casciani, Dominic, “Trio Cleared over 7/7 Attacks: Two Jailed” BBC News, April 29, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8025325.stm> at July 4, 2010.
Cave, Damien, & Almanzar, Yolanne, “Immigration Judge Clears Egyptian Student Previously Acquitted
in Terrorism Case” New York Times, August 21, 2009
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/22/us/22deport.html?scp=2&sq=Youseff%20Samir%20Meg
ahed&st=cse> at June 12, 2010.
Cave, Damien & Gentile, Carmen, “Five Convicted in Plot to Blow up Sears Tower” New York Times,
May 12, 2009

361

<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/13/us/13miami.html?scp=4&sq=Lyglenson+Lemorin&st=ny
t> at June 9, 2010.
Chaliand, Gérard & Blin, Arnaud (eds) The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al-Qaeda (2007)
Translated by Edward Schneider, Kathryn Pulver & Jesse Browner; Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Chaliand, Gérard & Blin, Arnaud, ‘From 1968 to Radical Islam’ in Chaliand & Blin (eds) The History of
Terrorism, 221-254.
“Charity Head Linked to Bin Laden, Arrested” ABC News, April 30, 2002
<http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=91699> at June 1, 2010.
“Chechnya ‘Angered’ Terror Accused” BBC News, July 16, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7510499.stm> at June 29, 2010.
“Chicago Cousins Plead Guilty to Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists” US Department
of Justice, January 15, 2009
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/762.pdf> at June 5, 2010.
“Chief Kidnap Suspect Arrested” Cincinnati Post, February 12, 2002 via Highbeam Research
<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-82798122.html> at June 23, 2010.
“‘City Link to Suicide Bombers’” Leicester Mercury, April 11, 2003
<http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-22981714_ITM> at June 22, 2010.
“Cleric Charged with Inciting Murder” BBC News, February 21, 2002
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/1832159.stm> at June 23, 2010.
Clough, Sue, “British Muslim Planned Second Show Bombing” The Telegraph, March 1, 2005
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1484652/British-Muslim-planned-second-shoebombing.html> at June 21, 2010
Cole, Matthew, “American Jihadist Attacks Obama in Extremist Audio Tape” ABC News, July 9, 2009
<http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=8041575&page=1> at July 11, 2010.
“Computer ‘Geek’ and Thai Boxing Champion- Members of the ‘Dirty Bomb’ Plot Gang” Daily Mail,
June 15, 2007
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-462282/Computer-geek-Thai-boxing-champion-members-dirty-bomb-plot-gang.html> at June 22, 2010.

362

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Connor, Kylie, ““Islamism” in the West? The Life-Span of the Al-Muhajiroun in the United Kingdom”
(2005) Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 25:1, 117-133.
Cooper, Jon, “Psychotic Ex-Cadet Plotted to Bomb TA Base in Chesterfield” The Derbyshire Times, July
29, 2009
<http://www.derbyshiretimes.co.uk/chesterfield/Psychotic-excadet-plotted-to-bomb.5506480.jp>
at June 29, 2010.
Corera, Gordon, “Al-Qaeda’s 007” The Times, January 16, 2008
<http://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/women/the_way_we_live/article3191517.ec
e> at June 25, 2010.
Corera, Gordon, “The World’s Most Wanted Cyber Jihadist” BBC News, January 16, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7191248.stm> at June 25, 2010.
Cowan, Rosie & Campbell, Duncan, “Detective Murdered by an Obsessive Loner” The Guardian, April
14, 2005 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/apr/14/terrorism.world> at June 23, 2010.
Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets in the UK (2010) London: HM Treasury
<http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/sanctionsconlist.pdf> at May 20, 2010.
Coolsaet, Rik (ed.) Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe (2008) Aldershot:
Ashgate.
Corera, Gordon, “Al-Qaeda’s 007” The Times, January 16, 2008
<http://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/women/the_way_we_live/article3191517.ec
e> at June 25, 2010.
Corera, Gordon, “Bomb Plot: The al-Qaeda Connection” BBC News, September 9, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7606107.stm> at July 1, 2010.
Cramb, Auslan, “Glasgow Student ‘Planned to Join Canada Plot’” The Telegraph, September 17, 2007
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1563364/Glasgow-student-planned-to-join-Canadaplot.html > at June 24, 2010.
Cruikshank, Paul, “The Growing Danger from Radical Islamist Groups in the United States” (2010) CTC
Sentinel, 3:8, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss8.pdf> at September 5,
2010.
“Dad Says Son’s Trip to Jordan was for Business, Not Terror” Associated Press, May 29, 2008
<http://abclocal.go.com/wtvg/story?section=news/local&id=6172240> at June 5, 2010.

363

Dao, James “3 American Muslims Convicted of Helping Wage Jihad” New York Times, March 5, 2004
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/05/us/3-american-muslims-convicted-of-helping-wagejihad.html?scp=2&sq=Seifullah%20Chapman&st=cse> at June 4, 2010.
De Quetteville, Harry “All Terrorist Acts ‘Approved by Taliban’” The Telegraph, October 20, 2001
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1360027/All-terrorist-actsapproved-by-Taliban.html> at May 19, 2010.
Dedeoglu, Beril, “Bermuda Triangle: Comparing Official Definitions of Terrorist Activity” (2003)
Terrorism and Political Violence, 15:3, 81-110.
“Defendant Found Guilty of Conspiring to Support Terrorists” US Department of Justice, June 10, 2009
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1000.pdf> at June 8, 2010.
Della Porta, Donatella, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State (1995) New York: Cambridge
University Press.
“Department of Justice Examples of Terrorism Convictions Since Sept. 11, 2001” US Department of
Justice, June 23, 2006 <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/June/06_crm_389.html> at June 5,
2010.
“Derby Man Jailed for Terrorism Offences” The Derby Telegraph, December 15, 2009
<http://www.thisisderbyshire.co.uk/news/Derby-man-jailed-terrorism-offences/article-1610611detail/article.html> at July 6, 2010.
Doward, Jamie & Wander, Andrew, “The Network” The Guardian, May 6, 2007
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/06/terrorism.jamiedoward> at June 5, 2010.
Drew, Christopher & Lichtblau, Eric, “Two Views of Terror Suspects: Die-Hards or Dupes” New York
Times, July 1, 2006
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/01/us/01terror.html?sq=Ali alTimimi&st=cse&scp=23&pagewanted=all> at June 9, 2010.
Durodié, Bill, “Home-grown Nihilism – The Clash within Civilisations” (2007) in Phil Cornish, (Ed.)
Britain and Security, London: The Smith Institute.
Eddy, Christen, & Rojas, Eric, “Analysis: Officials Eradicate Domestic Terrorist Sleeper Cell” Center for
Policing Terrorism, undated <www.cpt-mi.org> at July 19, 2008.
Edwards, Richard, & Gardham, Duncan, “‘Airline Bomb Plot Chief Flew in to Britain under False
Passport’” The Telegraph, April 8, 2008

364

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1584357/Airline-bomb-plot-chief-flew-in-to-Britainunder-false-passport.html> at July 1, 2010.
Eggen, Dan & DeYoung, Karen, “U.S. Supporter of Al-Qaeda Is Indicted on Treason Charge”
Washington Post, October 12, 2006
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/10/11/AR2006101101121.html>
at June 1, 2010.
“Egyptian Student Gets 15 Years for Aiding Terrorists” Fox News, December 18, 2008
<http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,469804,00.html> at June 12, 2010.
“Eight Men to Face Terror Charges” BBC News, November 23, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7109983.stm> at June 25, 2010.
Ellemers, Naomi, Spears, Russell, & Doosje, Bertjan, “Self and Social Identity” (2002) Annual Review of
Psychology, 53: 161-186.
Elliott, Andrea, “A Call to Jihad, Answered in America” New York Times, July 11, 2009
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/us/12somalis.html?pagewanted=all> at June 11, 2010.
Elliott, Andrea, “Charges Detail Road to Terror for 20 in U.S.” New York Times, November 23, 2009
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/24/us/24terror.html?_r=1&sudsredirect=true> at June 11,
2010.
Elliott, Andrea, “The Jihadist Next Door” New York Times, January 27, 2010
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/magazine/31Jihadistt.html?tntemail1=y&emc=tnt&pagewanted=all> at June 11, 2010.
Emerson, Steven, American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us (2002) New York: Free Press.
Emerson, Steven, “An Investigation into the Modus Operandi of Terrorist Networks in the United States:
The Structure of Osama Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and other Jihadist Organizations in the
United States” Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, DOJ Oversight: Preserving
our Freedoms while Defending against Terrorism, December 4, 2001
<http://www.steveemerson.com/docs/testimony/2001-10-11%20Testimony.pdf> at August 11,
2008.
Emerson, Steven, Jihad Incorporated: A Guide to Militant Islam in the US (2006) New York: Prometheus
Books.

365

Europol, TE-SAT: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2008 (2008) The Hague: European Police
Office
<http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and_Trend_Report_TESAT/TESAT2008.pdf> at April 28, 2009.
Europol, TE-SAT: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2009 (2009) The Hague: European Police
Office
<http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and_Trend_Report_TESAT/TESAT2009.pdf> at April 28, 2009.
“Explosion Plot of ‘Walking Angel’” BBC News, April 22, 2005
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/gloucestershire/4305161.stm> at June 21, 2010.
“Explosives Manual Teenager Jailed” BBC News, October 26, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7063727.stm> at June 30, 2010.
Faheem, Karim & Elliott, Andrea, “Religion Guided 3 Held in Fort Dix Plot” New York Times, May 10,
2007 <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/nyregion/10plot.html?pagewanted=print> at June
11, 2010.
FBI Interview Transcript, December 1, 2006
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Abujihaad_FBIInvus.pdf> at
June 10, 2010.
“Feds Charge 11 Men with Conspiracy in Overseas Jihad” CNN, June 28, 2003
<http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/06/27/terror.arrests/> at June 4, 2010
“Feds Charge Seventh Person in Terror Plot” Associated Press, April 28, 2003, via Highbeam Research
<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-73564763.html> at June 1, 2010.
“Feds Say Calif. Man Wanted to Wage Jihad” Fox News, September 22, 2005
<http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,170197,00.html> at June 6, 2010.
“Feds Taped Calif. Terror Suspects for 3 Years” Fox News, August 5, 2004
<http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,164926,00.html> at June 5, 2010.
“Feds Tie Expired Visa to Associate of 'Dirty Bomb' Suspect: In U.S. 6 Years Without Visa, Police Say”
CNN, June 16, 2002, <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/06/16/padilla.associate/index.html> at
June 1, 2010.

366

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Felter, Joseph, & Fishman, Brian, Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar
Records (2007) New York: Combatting Terrorism Center at Westpoint
<http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf> at June 25, 2010.
“Fertiliser Bomb Trial: Bugged Talk” BBC News, April 30, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6466817.stm> at June 24, 2010.
Fielding, Nick, “Terror Links of the Tottenham Ayatollah” The Sunday Times, July 24, 2005
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article547466.ece?print=yes&randnum=1151003209
000> at May 19, 2010.
“Fifth Man Found Guilty in Plane Bomb Plot Trial” The Guardian, December 9, 2009
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/dec/09/man-guilty-terrorism-bomb-plot> at July 1, 2010.
“Financing Islamist Terrorism” (2003) Strategic Comments, 9:10: 1-2.
Fisher, Ann, “One of Our Own Stands Accused of Unthinkable” Columbus Dispatch, April 13, 2007
<http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/local_news/stories/2007/04/13/ann13.ART_ART_04-1307_B1_J06879C.html> at June 1, 2010.
“Five Get Life Over UK Bomb Plot” BBC News, April 30, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6195914.stm> at June 24, 2010.
“Five Indicted in Plot to Kill Soldiers at Fort Dix; Sixth Charged with Aiding the Possession of
Weapons” US Department of Justice, June 5 2007
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Duka_DOJPR_Indictment.pdf>
at June 11, 2010.
“Florida Doctor Sentenced to 25 Years for Conspiring and Attempting to Support Al Qaeda” United
States Attorney Southern District of New York, November 28, 2007
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Sabir_DOJPR_Sent.pdf> at
February 23, 2010.
Focus on Religion (2004) Office for National Statistics, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office
<http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_compendia/for2004/FocusonReligion.pdf> at
July 9, 2010.
Ford, Richard “Militant Islamist Groups Banned Under Terror Law” The Times, July 18, 2006
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article689084.ece> at May 20, 2010.

367

Ford, Richard, & Byers, David, “Judges Award Abu Qatada £2,500 for ‘Unfair’ Detention” The Times,
February 20, 2009 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article5765126.ece> at
June 21, 2010.
Forliti, Amy, “U.S. to Deport Canadian Guilty of Aiding Al Qaeda” Toronto Star, July 9, 2009
<http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/663715> at June 5, 2010.
“Former Officers of a Muslim Charity, Care International, Inc., Convicted” US Department of Justice
press release, January 11, 2008
<http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ma/Press%20Office%20%20Press%20Release%20Files/Jan2008/MuntasserPressRelease.html> at October 14, 2009.
“Fort Dix Terror Tapes: Plotter Called for 'Suicide Attack' on Buildings” Fox News, October 30, 2008
<http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,445392,00.html> at June 11, 2010.
Foster, Gregory, “Transforming US National Security: A Call for Strategic Idealism” (2010) Defense and
Security Analysis, 26:2, 129-142.
“Four Men Jailed on Terror Charges” BBC News, March 9, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7932719.stm> at June 28, 2010.
Franklin, Stephen, Cohen, Laurie and Ahmed-Ullah, Noreen, “Arnaout Insists he had no Personal
Relationship with Bin Laden” Chicago Tribune, October 12, 2002 via Highbeam Research
<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-120058548.html> at June 1, 2010.
Fraser, Nick, “How to Kill an Arab” (1998) Critical Quarterly, 40:3, 2-19.
Freedman, Jonathan & Fraser, Scott, “Compliance without Pressure: The Foot-in-the-Door Technique”
(1966) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4:2, 195-202.
Freeman, Simon “Abu Hamza Jailed for Seven Years for Inciting Murder” The Times,
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article728117.ece> at May 20, 2010.
Fresco, Adam, “Bomber Nicky Reilly was Brainwashed Online by Pakistani Extremists” The Times,
October 16, 2008 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article4951616.ece> at July
6, 2010.
Fresco, Adam, “How Radical Islam Turned a Schoolboy into a Terrorist” The Times, November 7, 2006
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article628497.ece> at June 22, 2010.

368

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Fresco, Adam “Nicky Reilly, Muslim Convert, Jailed for 18 Years for Exeter Bomb Attack” The Times,
January 31, 2009 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article5619151.ece> at May
20, 2010.
Fried, Joseph, “Sheik Sentenced to Life in Prison in Bombing Plot” The New York Times (New York)
January 18, 1996
<http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/18/nyregion/sheik-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-in-bombingplot.html?pagewanted=all> at June 20, 2008.
“From Student to Terror Suspect” BBC News, January 21, 2002
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/1773477.stm> at June 22, 2010.
“From Tearaway to Terrorist- The Story of Richard Reid” The Telegraph, December 30, 2001
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1366666/From-tearaway-to-terrorist-The-story-ofRichard-Reid.html> at June 21, 2010
Futty, John, “Worthington Man Gets 20 Years in Terrorist Plot” Columbus Dispatch, February 26, 2009
<http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/local_news/stories/2009/02/26/apaul.html?sid=101> at
June 1, 2010.
Gadher, Dipesh, “From Croydon to Kandahar: A ‘Martyr’s’ Story” The Times, November 21, 2004
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article393619.ece?print=yes&randnum=1267606050
088> at June 22, 2010.
Gambetta, Diego, & Hertog, Steffen, Engineers of Jihad (2007) Oxford: University of Oxford
<www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/gambetta/engineers%20of%20jihad.pdf> at June 16, 2010.
Gamson, W., Strategy of Social Protest, 2nd Edition (1990) Belmont, California: Wadsworth; cited in
Matsueda, Ross, “Differential Social Organization, Collective Action and Crime”.
Gardham, Duncan, “Abu Hamza Inspired Four to Become Suicide Bombers” The Telegraph, July 11,
2007
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1557109/Abu-Hamza-inspired-four-to-be-suicidebombers.html> at June 27, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “Albanian “Terrorist” Caught with Bomb-Making Material in his Home, Court Hears”
The Telegraph, November 17, 2009
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/6591313/Albanian-terroristcaught-with-bomb-making-materials-in-his-home-court-hears.html> at July 6, 2010.

369

Gardham, Duncan, “‘Blackburn Resistance’ Guilty of Terrorism” The Telegraph, March 19, 2010
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/7482696/Blackburn-resistanceguilty-of-terrorism.html> at July 3, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “‘Bomb-Maker Caught in the Act’” The Telegraph, July 17, 2008
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/2421222/Bomb-maker-caught-in-the-act.html> at
July 5, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “Boy ‘Made Suicide Vests after Watching Abu Hamza on the Internet’” The
Telegraph, June 4, 2009
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/lawandorder/5444543/Boy-made-suicidevests-after-watching-Abu-Hamza-on-internet.html> at July 6, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “Britain Facing a New Wave of Terrorist Attacks, MI5 Warns” The Telegraph,
September 16, 2010 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-theuk/8008033/Britain-facing-a-new-wave-of-terrorist-attacks-MI5-warns.html> at September 17,
2010.
Gardham, Duncan “Extremist who came to UK on Fake Passport” The Telegraph, February 26, 2007
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1543869/Extremist-who-came-to-UK-on-fakepassport.html> at May 19, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “Fanatic ‘Hoped to Spread Fear with Beheading’” The Telegraph, January 29, 2008
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1576916/Fanatic-hoped-to-spread-fear-withbeheading.html> at June 28, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “Fanatic ‘Made Four Shipments to Terrorists’” The Telegraph, January 28, 2008
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1576917/Fanatic-made-four-shipments-toterrorists.html> at June 28, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “Former Public School Boy Accidentally Blew Himself up Planning Suicide
Bombing” The Telegraph, June 5, 2009
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/5452881/Former-public-school-boy-accidentallyblew-himself-up-planning-suicide-bombing.html> at July 6, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “Glasgow Bomb Plot: Profile of Airport Terrorist Bilal Abdulla” The Telegraph,
December 16, 2008

370

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/3689244/Glasgow-bomb-plot-Profile-of-airportterrorist-Bilal-Abdulla.html> at July 5, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “Glasgow Bomb Plot: Profile of Airport Terrorist Kafeel Ahmed” The Telegraph,
December 16, 2008
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/3689248/Glasgow-bomb-plot-Profile-of-airportterrorist-Kafeel-Ahmed.html> at July 5, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “Growing Number of British Men Joining Islamic Radicals in Somalia” The
Telegraph, February 16, 2009
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/lawandorder/4638987/Growing-numberof-British-men-joining-Islamic-radicals-in-Somalia.html> at July 24, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “‘Islamic’ Bomb Hoaxer Nicholas Roddis Jailed” The Telegraph, July 18, 2008
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/2435842/Islamic-bomb-hoaxer-Nicholas-Roddisjailed.html> at July 3, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “July 7 Trial: The Defendants” The Telegraph, April 28, 2009
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/5236082/July-7-trial-the-defendants.html> at July 4,
2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “July 21 Bombers ‘Trained at Cumbria Camp’” The Telegraph, October 16, 2007
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1566281/July-21-bombers-trained-at-Cumbriacamp.html> at June 28, 2010
Gardham, Duncan, “Man Guilty over Muslim Soldier Beheading Plot” The Telegraph, February 15, 2008
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1578754/Man-guilty-over-Muslim-soldierbeheading-plot.html> at June 28, 2010.
Gardham, Gardham, “Men who Groomed Exeter Bomber Still on the Loose” The Telegraph, January 31,
2009
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/4401968/Men-who-groomed-Exeter-bomber-still-onthe-loose.html> at July 6, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “Mohammed Hamid is ‘Evil Personified’” The Telegraph, February 26, 2008
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1579915/Mohammed-Hamid-is-evilpersonified.html> at June 28, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “Muslim Extremist Firebombed Home of Man who Published Book on Prophet

371

Mohammed” The Telegraph, May 16, 2009 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-andorder/5330042/Muslim-extremist-firebombed-home-of-man-who-published-book-on-ProphetMohammed.html> at July 6, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “‘Osama bin London’ Groomed 21/7 Bombers” The Telegraph, February 26, 2008
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1579918/Osama-bin-London-groomed-217bombers.html>

at June 28, 2010.

Gardham, Duncan, “Parviz Khan: Promising Footballer to Terrorist” The Telegraph, February 18, 2008
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1579021/Parviz-Khan-Promising-footballer-toterrorist.html> at June 28, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “Security and Intelligence Services Get Funding to Counter New Threats” The
Telegraph, October 19, 2010
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/8074441/Security-andIntelligence-services-get-funding-to-counter-new-threats.html> at October 20, 2010
Gardham, Duncan, “‘Suicide Bomb Plot’ Schoolboy Learned about Explosives at 12 ‘to Feel Cool’” The
Telegraph, June 22, 2009
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/lawandorder/5603393/Suicide-bombplot-schoolboy-learned-about-explosives-at-12-to-feel-cool.html> at July 6, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “Suspect ‘Dubbed Himself Osama bin London’” The Telegraph, October 10, 2007
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1565744/Suspect-dubbed-himself-Osama-binLondon.html> at June 28, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “Terrorist Bomb Maker Hassan Tabbakh Jailed for Seven Years” The Telegraph, July
30, 2008
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/2475249/Terrorist-bomb-maker-Hassan-Tabbakhjailed-for-seven-years.html> at July 5, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “Terrorist Jailed over Failed July 21 Bomb Plot” The Telegraph, November 6, 2007
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1568502/Terrorist-jailed-over-failed-July-21-bombplot.html > at June 27, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan, “Wife of Trans-Atlantic Airlines Bomber Cleared” The Telegraph, March 5, 2010
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/7377431/Wife-of-trans-Atlanticairlines-bomber-cleared.html> at July 1, 2010.

372

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Gardham, Duncan, & Bedi, Rahul, “Car Bomb Suspect Visited al-Qa’eda’s Heartland” The Telegraph
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1556905/Car-bomb-suspect-visited-al-Qaedasheartland.html> at July 5, 2010.
Gardham, Duncan & Rayner, Gordon “Airliner Bomb Trial: How MI5 Uncovered the Terror Pot” The
Telegraph, September 9, 2008
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/2709379/Airliner-bomb-trial-How-MI5-uncoveredthe-terror-plot.html> at May 20, 2010.
“Generation Jihad: Episode 1” BBC Television (2010) aired BBC2, February 8, 2010.
“Generation Jihad: Episode 2” BBC Television (2010) aired BBC2, February 15, 2010.
George, Alexander & Bennett, Andrew, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences
(2005) Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
George, Cindy, “Houston Man Gets 10 Years for al-Qaida Training” Houston Chronicle, July 20, 2007
<http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/4985181.html> at June 11, 2010.
“Georgia: Terror Video Sentencing” New York Times, December 14, 2009
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/us/15brfsTERRORVIDEOS_BRF.html?emc=tnt&tntemail1=y> at June 8, 2010.
“Glasgow Airport Bomb Trial: Timeline of Events” The Scotsman, December 16, 2008
<http://news.scotsman.com/latestnews/Glasgow-Airport-bomb-trial-Timeline.4797416.jp> at
July 5, 2010.
Glendinning, Lee, “Muslim Cleric ‘Devoid of Remorse’ Gets 4½ Years for Terrorism Offences” The
Guardian, April 19, 2008 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/apr/19/uksecurity.ukcrime> at
June 25, 2010.
Global Terrorism Database, Great Britain, START
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?country=216> at May 18, 2010.
Global Terrorism Database, Northern Ireland, START
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?country=233> at May 18, 2010.
Global Terrorism Database, United States, START
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?country=217> at May 17, 2010.
Granovetter, Mark, “The Strength of Weak Ties” (1973) The American Journal of Sociology, 78:6,
1360-1380.

373

Granovetter, Mark, “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited” (1983) Sociological
Theory, 1, 201-233.
Greenberg, Jeff, Pyszczynski, Tom, & Solomon, Sheldon “The Causes and Consequences of a Need for
Self-esteem: A Terror Management Theory” (1986) In Roy Baumeister (Ed.), Public and Private
Self, New York: Springer-Verlag, 189-212; cited in Navarette, “Death Concerns and Other
Adaptive Challenges: The Effects of Coalition-Relevant Challenges on Worldview Defense in
the US and Costa Rica”.
Greenberg, Karen, & Grossman, Jeff (Eds) Terrorist Trial Report Card, September 11th 2008 (2008) New
York: The Center on Law and Security.
Greenberg, Karen, & Grossman, Jeff (Eds) Terrorist Trial Report Card, September 11th 2008: Appendix B
(2008) New York: The Center on Law and Security.
<http://www.lawandsecurity.org/publications/TTRC_US_2006_Appendix_B.pdf> at April 17,
2010.
Greenberg, Richard, Cruikshank, Paul, & Hansen, Chris, “Inside the Terror Plot that ‘Rivalled 9/11’”
MSNBC News, September 14, 2009 <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26726987> at July 1, 2010.
Greenwood, Chris, “Terror Police ‘A Road Away from Stopping Bombers’” The Independent, December
16, 2008
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/terror-police-a-road-away-from-stoppingbombers-1145074.html> at July 5, 2010.
Greenwood, Christopher, “International Law and the ‘War on Terrorism’” (2002) International Affairs,
78:2, 301-317.
Grignard, Alain “The Islamist Networks in Belgium: Between Nationalism and Globalisation” in
Coolsaet (ed.) Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe, 85-93.
Grossman, Dave, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (1995) New
York: Little, Brown & Company.
Guimond, Serge, “Group Socialization and Prejudice: The Social Transmission of Intergroup Attitudes
and Beliefs” (2000) European Journal of Social Psychology, 30; 335-354.
Gupta, Dipak, “Toward an Integrated Behavioral Framework for Analyzing Terrorism: Individual
Motivations to Group Dynamics” Democracy and Security, 1, 5-31.
Gunaratna, Rohan, Inside Al Qaeda, Global Network of Terror (2002) Carlton North: Scribe Publications.

374

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Haahr, Kathryn, “New Reports Allege Foreign Fighters in Iraq Returning to Europe” (2006) Terrorism
Focus, 3:20, 2-3.
“‘Hair Bleach Used to Make July 7 Bombs’” The Guardian, August 4, 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/aug/04/july7.uksecurity6> at June 25, 2010.
“Hamid, Ahmet and Others (Op OVERAMP)” Crown Prosecution Service, undated
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2008.html#a03> at June 28, 2010.
“Hamid Hayat Sentenced to 24 Years in Connection with Terrorism Charges” US Department of Justice,
September 10, 2007 <http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/September/07_nsd_700.html> at June
5, 2010.
Hamilton, Graeme “Passport Order Infringes Rights of Former Terrorist: Court” National Post (Canada)
March 13, 2008.
Hanlon, Laraine, “UK Anti-Terrorism Legislation: Still Disproportionate?” (2007) The International
Journal of Human Rights, 11:4, 481-515.
Hannaford, Alex, “‘The Toughest Boy in School’” The Guardian, February 23, 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/feb/23/alqaida.usa> at June 23, 2010.
Harris, Rob, “Kevin James and the JIS Conspiracy” Frontline, October 10, 2006
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/enemywithin/reality/james.html> at June 7, 2010.
Hartocollis, Anemona & Baker, Al, “U.S. Citizen is Accused of Helping Al Qaeda” New York Times,
June 8, 2006
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/08/nyregion/08terror.html?hp&ex=1149739200&en=01430d
cb8ee6c443&ei=5094&partner=homepage> at June 6, 2010.
Haslam, Alexander “Stereotyping and Social Influence: Foundations of Stereotype Consensus” (1997)
In Spears, Russell, Penelope Oakes, Ellemers, Naomi, & Alexander Haslam (eds). The Social
Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life, Blackwell: Oxford, 119-143, cited in Guimond,
Serge, “Group Socialization and Prejudice: The Social Transmission of Intergroup Attitudes and
Beliefs” 349.
“Hassan Tabbakh” Crown Prosecution Service, November 2, 2009
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2009.html> at July 5, 2010.
Henfield, Sally, “Blackburn Man ‘Posted Terror Message on US Website” Lancashire Telegraph, July
18, 2009

375

<http://www.lancashiretelegraph.co.uk/news/4445648.Blackburn_man____posted_terror_messa
ge_on_US_website___/> at July 3, 2010.
Hewitt, Christopher, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda (2003) Oxon,
Routledge.
Hewitt, Christopher, & Kelley-Moore, Jessica, “Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A Cross-National Analaysis of
Jihadism” (2009) Terrorism and Political Violence, 21:2, 211-220.
Hewstone, Miles, Rubin, Mark, & Willis, Hazel, “Intergroup Bias” (2002) Annual Review of Psychology,
53, 575-604.
Hill, Michael, “Mosque Leaders Sentenced in Terror Sting” Washington Post, March 8, 2007
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/08/AR2007030800806.html>
at June 5, 2010.
Hines, Nico, “Scottish ‘Wannabe Suicide Bomber’ Guilty of Terror Offences” The Times, September 17,
2007 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article2476324.ece> at June 24, 2010.
“Hoax Bomb Left on Maltby Bus as ‘Practical Joke’” Dinnington Today, July 15, 2008
<http://www.dinningtontoday.co.uk/news/Hoax-bomb-left-on-Maltby.4289230.jp> at July 3,
2010.
“Hoax Bomb Suspect Blames Boredom” BBC News, July 11, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7502548.stm> at July 3, 2010.
“Hodges” Crown Prosecution Service, undated
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2008.html#a03> at July 1, 2010.
Hogg, Michael, Abrams, Dominic, Otten, Sabine & Hinkle, Steve, “The Social Identity Perspective:
Intergroup Relations, Self-Conception, and Small Groups” (2004) Small Group Research, 35:3,
246-276.
Hoffman, Bruce, “The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism” (2004) Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, 27: 549-560.
Hoffman, Bruce, “The Global Terrorist Threat: Is Al-Qaeda on the Run or on the March?” (2007) Middle
East Policy, 14:2, 44-58.
Hollingsworth, Mark, and Fielding, Nick, Defending the Realm: Inside MI5 and the War on Terrorism
(2003) London: André Deutsch.
Holt, Richard, “July 21 Bombers Sentenced to Life” The Telegraph, July 12, 2007

376

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
<http://web.archive.org/web/20070714024250/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml;jses
sionid=XQ24U2Z4ORIJFQFIQMGSFFWAVCBQWIV0?xml=/news/2007/07/11/nterrortrial111
.xml> at June 27, 2010.
“Homegrown: Islam in Prison: Levar Haney Washington” PBS, April 2007
<http://www.pbs.org/weta/crossroads/about/show_homegrown_film.html> at June 7, 2010.
Home Office, Statistics on Terrorism: Arrests and Outcomes, Great Britain: 11 September 2001 to 31
March 2008, London: Home Office <http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs09/hosb0409.pdf> at
May 20, 2010.
Honigsbaum, Mark, & Dodd, Vikram, “From Gloucester to Afghanistan: The Making of a Shoe Bomber”
The Guardian, March 5, 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/mar/05/afghanistan.terrorism> at June 21, 2010.
Hood, Jeff, “Final Witness Testifies: Pakistani Expert: Men are Victims of Misunderstanding” Stockton
Record (California) April 12, 2006, via Highbeam Research
<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-144412332.html> at June 6, 2010.
Horgan, John, “From Profiles to Pathways: The Road to Recruitment” (2007) Foreign Policy Agenda,
12:5, 24 27 <http://www.america.gov/media/pdf/ejs/ijpe0507.pdf> at February 18, 2009.
Horgan, John, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on
Radicalization into Terrorism” (2008) The Annals of the American Academy of Social and
Political Science, 618, 80-94.
Horgan, John, The Psychology of Terrorism (2005) New York: Routledge.
“Houria Chentouf” Crown Prosecution Service, November 2, 2009
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2009.html> at July 6, 2010.
House of Commons, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 (2006)
London: The Stationery Office.
Howard, Paul (Ed) Hard Won Lessons: How Police Fight Terrorism in the United Kingdom (2004) New
York: Manhattan Institute <http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/scr_01.pdf> at May 25,
2010.
Howells, Kim, Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist
Attacks on 7 July 2005 (2009) London: Intelligence and Security Committee
<http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/210852/20090519_77review.pdf > at May 20, 2010.

377

Hudson, Rex, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why? (1999)
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.
Hughes, C.J. “Pakistani Scientist Found Guilty of Shootings” New York Times, February 3, 2010
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/04/nyregion/04siddiqui.html> at June 14, 2010.
Husain, Ed, The Islamist: Why I Became an Islamic Fundamentalist, What I Saw Inside, and Why I Left
(2009) New York: Penguin Books.
“‘I am a Peace-Loving Hindu” Rediff.com, May 3, 2005
<http://in.rediff.com/news/2005/may/03specb.htm> at June 22, 2010.
“I May Sue, Says Cleared Terrorism Case Man” Coventry Evening Telegraph, March 10, 2006
<http://www.thefreelibrary.com/I+may+sue,+says+cleared+terrorism+case+man.(News)a0143070140> at June 23, 2010.
International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism (2005) International Crisis Group Report No. 37
<http://ics01.ds.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2325/understanding_islamism.pdf> at October
21, 2010.
“Isa Ibrahim (Op VULCANISE)” Crown Prosecution Service, November 2, 2009
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2009.html> at July 6, 2010.
“Iraqi Sentenced for Attempting to Buy Grenade, Guns” Fox News, October 24, 2005
<http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,173303,00.html> at June 7, 2010.
“Islamic Scholar Charged in Holy War Plot” New York Times, September 24, 2004
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A0CE2D61139F937A1575AC0A9629C8B63
> at June 4, 2010
“Iyman Faris Sentenced for Providing Material Support to al-Qaeda” US Department of Justice, October
28, 2003 <http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/October/03_crm_589.htm> at June 3, 2010.
Jamal Ben Miloud Amar Ajouaou and Secretary of State for the Home Department, Special Immigration
Appeals Commission, Appeal No. SC/10/2002, October 29, 2003
<http://www.siac.tribunals.gov.uk/Documents/outcomes/documents/sc102002ajouaou.pdf> at
May 19, 2010.
“Jail for Terror Document Cousins” BBC News, August 19, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7570134.stm> at June 29, 2010.

378

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Jameel, Muzamil, “For this College Kid from UK, Mission Kashmir was Suicide Carbomb” Indian
Express, December 30, 2000
<http://www.indianexpress.com/ie/daily/20001230/ina30058.html> at May 19, 2010.
Jeffery, Simon, “Omar Sheikh” The Guardian, July 15, 2002
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jul/15/pakistan.simonjeffery> at June 23, 2010.
Jenkins, Russell, “British Muslim, Rangzieb Ahmed, Convicted of Being al-Qaeda Mastermind in
Landmark Trial” The Times, December 19, 2008
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article5365911.ece> at June 29, 2010.
Jenkins, Russell, “Failed Asylum-Seeker ‘Had Jihad Files on PC’” The Times, June 6, 2007
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article1890384.ece> at July 2, 2010.
Jenkins, Russell, “Mother of Six Houria Chentouf Hid Terror Manual in Burka” The Times, November 3,
2009 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article6899548.ece> at July 6, 2010.
Jenkins, Russell, “Student Faces Jail for Acting as a Scout for Jihadist Cell” The Times, November 22,
2007 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article2917719.ece> at July 2, 2010.
“Jihad for Kids!” Videocassette produced by and available from Peace for Generations (P.O.Box 55,
Union, N.J. 07083-0055, USA, peace4gen@aol.com), cited in Burdman, “Education,
Indoctrination, and Incitement: Palestinian Children on their Way to Martyrdom”.
“‘Jihad on Accountants’ Man Jailed” BBC News, February 19, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/7253780.stm> at July 1, 2010.
“John Walker Lindh Profile: The Case of the American Taliban” CNN, n.d.
<http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/people/shows/walker/profile.html> at June 2, 2010.
Johnson, Zachary, “Chronology: The Plots” Frontline
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/cron.html> at June 18, 2008.
Johnston, Philip, “July 7 Preacher Abdullah Al-Faisal Deported” The Telegraph, May 25, 2007
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1552580/July-7-preacher-Abdullah-El-Faisaldeported.html> at June 23, 2010.
Johnstone, Lauren, “Formal Charges In Al Qaeda GI Case” CBS News, February 19, 2004
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/08/30/terror/main639418.shtml> at June 7, 2010.
Jones, Sidney, “The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah” (2005) Australian Journal of International
Affairs, 59:2, 169-178.

379

Jordan, Javier, Mañas, Fernando, & Horsburgh, Nicola, “Strengths and Weaknesses of Grassroots Jihadist
Networks: The Madrid Bombings” (2008) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 31:1, 17-39.
Jordan, Mary, “British Physician is Convicted of 2007 Car-Bomb Plot” Washington Post, December 17,
2008
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/16/AR2008121602845.html>
at July 5, 2010.
“Jose Padilla and Co-Defendants Convicted of Conspiracy to Murder Individuals Overseas, Providing
Material Support to Terrorists” US Department of Justice, August 16, 2007
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Padilla_DOJPR_Convicti
ons.pdf> at June 1, 2010.
“Jose Padilla and Co-defendants Sentenced on Terrorism Charges” US Department of Justice, January 22,
2008 <http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Padilla_dojprconv.pdf> at
June 1, 2010.
“Judge Sentences 3 to Prison for Roles in a Jihad Network” New York Times, November 8, 2003
<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/08/us/judge-sentences-3-to-prison-for-roles-in-a-jihadnetwork.html?pagewanted=1> at June 4, 2010.
“Justice and John Walker Lindh” New York Times, July 16, 2002
<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/16/opinion/justice-and-john-walker-lindh.html> at June 3,
2010.
Kane, David, “Affidavit in Support of Application for a Search Warrant” United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, March 13, 2002
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/800.pdf> at October 29, 2008.
Kay, Jon, “Bomber who Brought Panic to Devon City” BBC News, October 15, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7669897.stm> at July 6, 2010.
Kearney, Christine, “US Holds Terror Suspect in Harsh Conditions- Lawyer” Reuters, October 21, 2008
<http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N21319530.htm> at June 6, 2010.
Kearney, Christine, “U.S. Suspect in London Terrorism Case Refused Bail” Reuters, June 1, 2007
<http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN0136022120070601> at June 6, 2010
Kepel, Gilles, Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe (1997) Stanford: Stanford
University Press.

380

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
“Khan, Muhammed, Munshi and Sulieman (Op PRALINE)” Crown Prosecution Service, undated
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2008.html#a03> at June 29, 2010.
Khatchadourian, Raffi, “Azzam the American: The Making of an Al Qaeda Homegrown” The New
Yorker, January 22, 2007
<http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/01/22/070122fa_fact_khatchadourian?currentPage=
all> at October 15, 2009.
“Khawaja Was at Training Camp With Plot Leader, Court Told” CBC News, June 24, 2008
<http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/06/24/khawaja-trial.html> at June 5, 2010.
Kennedy, Tony, “Friends Say Detainee is Regular Guy” Star Tribune (Minneapolis), December 14, 2003,
via Highbeam Research <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-111285071.html> at June 5, 2010.
Kenney, Michael, “From Pablo to Osama: Counter-terrorism Lessons from the War on Drugs” (2003)
Survival,45:3, 187-206.
“Kevin Gardner” Crown Prosecution Service, November 2, 2009
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2009.html> at June 29, 2010.
“Key Figures in Ricin Case” BBC News, April 13, 2005
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4433649.stm> at June 23, 2010.
“Khalid Khaliq (K)” Crown Prosecution Service, undated
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2008.html#a03> at July 4, 2010.
“Killer Jailed Over Poison Plot” BBC News, April 13, 2005
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4433709.stm> at June 23, 2010.
Kirby, Aidan, “The London Bombers as “Self Starters”: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and
the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques” (2007) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 30:5, 415
428.
Knapton, Sarah, “Anatomy of a Bomb Plot” The Ottawa Citizen, May 1, 2007
<http://www2.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=84af78eb-e854-4abf-b6b6683c4f6a799e > at June 24, 2010
Koelbl, Susanne & Steingart, Gabor, “Tribal Areas and Terrorists: The Battle for Control of Pakistan”
Spiegel Online International, May 4, 2009
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,622759,00.html> at May 9, 2009.
Kohlmann, Evan, Al Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network (2004) Oxford: Berg.

381

Kohlmann, Evan, “Anatomy of a Modern Homegrown Terror Cell: Aabid Khan et al (Operation Praline)”
(2008) NEFA Foundation
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefaaabidkhan0908.pdf> at June 29, 2010.
Kohlmann, Evan, “Expert Report on the ~AQCORPO Website” NEFA Foundation, August 2006
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/ekirhaby0108.pdf> at June 25, 2010.
Kohlmann, Evan, “The Real Online Terrorist Threat” (2006) Foreign Affairs, 85:5, 115-124.
Kramer, Andrew, “2 Sentenced for Trying to Join Taliban” Associated Press, November 24, 2003, via
Highbeam Research, <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-87675832.html> at June 2, 2010.
Kramer, Andrew, “FBI Arrests Four on Terror Charges” Berkley Daily Planet, October 5, 2002
<http://www.berkeleydailyplanet.com/issue/2002-10-05/article/15103?headline=FBI-arrestsfour-on-terror-charges> at June 2, 2010.
Krebs, Brian, “Terrorism’s Hook into Your Inbox” Washington Post, July 5, 2007
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/07/05/AR2007070501153_pf.html> at June 25, 2010.
Krebs, Brian, “Three Worked the Web to Help Terrorists” Washington Post, July 6, 2007
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/05/AR2007070501945.html>
at June 25, 2010.
Krilic, Samir, “Bosnian Police Arrest Terror Suspect in Sarajevo” Associated Press Worldstream,
November 25, 2005, via Highbeam Research
<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-115631854.html> at June 25, 2010.
Kron, Josh, and Ibrahim, Mohammed, “Islamists Claim Attack in Uganda” New York Times, July 12,
2010
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/world/africa/13uganda.html?_r=1&emc=tnt&tntemail1=y
> at July 12, 2010.
Krueger, Alan, and Maleckova, Jitka, Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a
Causal Connection? (2002) National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 9074
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w9074> at December 17, 2008.
Kruglanski, Arie, & Fishman, Shira, “The Psychology of Terrorism: ‘Syndrome’ versus ‘Tool’
Perspectives” (2006) Terrorism and Political Violence, 18, 193-215.

382

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
“KSM’s Brooklyn Bridge Plot” NEFA Foundation, August 2007
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/BklynBridge_Plot.pdf > at June 3, 2010.
“KSM’s Transatlantic Show Bomb Plot” NEFA Foundation, September 2007
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/shoebombplot.pdf> at June 21, 2010.
LaFree, Gary & Dugan, Laura “How Does Studying Terrorism Compare to Studying Crime?” in Mathieu
Deflem (ed.) Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Criminological Perspectives, Sociology of
Crime, Law and Deviance Volume 5 (2004), Oxford: Elsevier, 53-74.
Laqueur, Walter, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (2003) New York, Continuum
International Publishing Group Ltd.
“Last Defendant Sentenced in Calif. Terrorist Plot” ABC News, August 18, 2009
<http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=8350628> at June 7, 2010
Laville, Sandra “Banned Groups with Roots in UK Appeal to Disaffected Young Muslims” The
Guardian, August 6, 2005 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/aug/06/uk.terrorism3> at
May 19, 2010.
Laville, Sandra, “Explosives Traces ‘Found in Suspect’s Luggage’” The Guardian, September 7, 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/sep/07/terrorism.world> at June 21, 2010.
LaVille, Sandra, “Refugee Children who Turned Against Britain” The Guardian, July 9, 2007
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/jul/09/terrorism.world1> at June 27, 2010.
“Leicestershire: Annual Report 2002-2003” Crown Prosecution Service, undated
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/areas/2003/ar2003leicestershire.pdf> at June 22,
2010.
Leiken, Robert, Bearers of Global Jihad? Immigration and National Security after 9/11 (2004)
Washington: The Nixon Centre.
Leiken, Robert, Europe’s Mujahideen: Where Mass Immigration Meets Global Terrorism (2005) Center
for Immigration Studies <http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back405.html> at May 4, 2009.
Leiken, Robert, & Brooke, Steven, “The Quantitative Analysis of Terrorism and Immigration: An Initial
Exploration” (2006) Terrorism and Political Violence, 18:4, 503-521.
Leppard, David, “British Brigade of Islamists Join Al-Qaeda Foreign Legion in Iraq” The Times, June 4,
2006 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article671510.ece> at June 25, 2010.

383

Leppard, David, “Fixer for 21/7 Plot Free in London” The Times, July 15, 2007
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article2076241.ece> at June 27, 2010.
Levine, Mike, “Al Qaeda-Linked American Terrorist Unveiled, as Charges Await Him in U.S.” Fox
News, September 4, 2009
<http://www.foxnews.com/us/2009/09/04/al-qaeda-linked-american-terrorist-unveiled-chargesawait/> at June 11, 2010.
Lia, Brynjar, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri (2008) New
York: Columbia University Press.
‘Liberation Army Fifth Battalion’ MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base
<http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4113> at December 26, 2007 [Database no longer in
operation].
Lichtblau, Eric, “Scholar is Given Life Sentence in ‘Virginia Jihad’ Case” New York Times, July 14, 2005
<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/14/national/14cleric.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=Ali%20alTimimi&st=cse> at June 4, 2010.
Lichtblau, Eric, “Trucker Sentenced to 20 Years in Plot Against Brooklyn Bridge” New York Times,
October 29, 2003
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9801E6DD1630F93AA15753C1A9659C8B63
> at February 23, 2010.
Lichtblau, Eric & Davey, Monica “Suspect in Plot On Bridge Drew Interest Earlier” New York Times,
June 21, 2003
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980DE0D9163BF932A15755C0A9659C8B63
> at June 3, 2010.
“Links to Global Terror Network” Manchester Evening News, December 18, 2008
<http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/s/1086321_links_to_global_terror_network>
at June 29, 2010.
“Liquid Bomb Plot: What Happened” BBC News, September 9, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7564184.stm > at July 1, 2010.
Loch, Dietmar, ‘Boyhood of a Terror Suspect’ Guardian, October 11, 1995; cited in Lorenzo Vidino, Al
Qaeda in Europe.

384

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
“London Bomber Video Aired on TV” BBC News, September 2, 2005
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4206708.stm> at June 25, 2010.
“Loner that Became a Terrorist” Manchester Evening News, December 18, 2008
<http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/s/1086320_loner_that_became_a_terrorist> at
June 29, 2010.
“Longer Sentences for al-Qaeda Men” BBC News, December 18, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7150641.stm> at June 25, 2010.
Lowen, Mark “Algerian Jailed for Paris Blasts” BBC News, October 26, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7064911.stm> at May 20, 2010.
Lusher, Adam, & Copping, Jasper, “Islamic Charity Linked to Car Bomb Suspect” The Telegraph, July 8,
2007 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1556813/Islamic-charity-linked-to-car-bombsuspect.html> at July 5, 2010.
Madigan, Nick, “Global Sting Nets 16 in Md.: 39 are Indicted in Bribery and Money Laundering”
Baltimore Sun, September 21, 2007 via Highbeam Research
<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-168915619.html> at June 6, 2010.
Mahoney, Rebecca, “Terrorism Links Charged for Charity’s Ex-Leaders” The Boston Globe, at May 13,
2005,
<http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2005/05/13/terrorism_links_charged
_for_charitys_ex_leaders/> at February 21, 2010.
Maley, William, The Afghanistan Wars (2002) Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Malik, Shiv, “Special Investigation: Are 'Muslim Boys' Using Profits of Crime to Fund Terrorist
Attacks? The Independent, 14 August, 2005
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/special-investigation-are-muslim-boys-usingprofits-of-crime-to-fund-terrorist-attacks-502831.html> at March 23, 2009.
“Man Accused in Plot to Kill President not Tortured, Feds Say” USA Today, February 23, 2005
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-02-23-plot_x.htm> at June 3, 2010.
“Man Admits Restaurant Bomb Attack” BBC News, October 15, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7671138.stm> at July 6, 2010.
“Man Convicted of Attempting to Provide Material Support to Al Qaeda Sentenced to 30 Years’
Imprisonment” US Department of Justice, November 6, 2007

385

<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Reynolds_DOJPRSentencing.p
df> at June 9, 2010.
“Man ‘Had Bomb-Making Documents’” BBC News, June 5, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6723047.stm> at July 2, 2010.
“Man in Court on Terrorism Charge” BBC News, February 6, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6333667.stm> at July 2, 2010.
“Man Jailed for Terrorism Offences (North Manchester)” Greater Manchester Police, November 21,
2007
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/GMP_AbdulRahmanGuiltyPlea.pdf> at
July 2, 2010.
“Man Jailed over Terror Blueprints” BBC News, July 17, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6902942.stm> at July 2, 2010.
“Man Jailed over Terrorism Charges” BBC News, January 8, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7176832.stm> at July 2, 2010.
“Man Jailed over Terrorism Charges” BBC News, April 20, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/west_midlands/8009217.stm> at July 3, 2010.
“Man ‘Urged Muslims to Murder PM’” BBC News, June 4, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8083916.stm> at July 3, 2010.
“Man Urged Terror Attacks on Accountancy Institutes- 10 Years after Failing Professional Exams” Daily
Mail,
February 19, 2008 <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-516448/Man-urged-terror-attacksaccountancy-institutes--10-years-failing-professional-exams.html> at July 1, 2010.
“Man Who Formed Terrorist Group that Plotted Attacks on Military and Jewish Facilities Sentenced to 16
Years in Federal Prison” United States Attorney’s Office, Central District of California, March
6, 2009
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/US_v_James_dojprsent.pdf> at
June 7, 2010.
“Manhattan: Man Gets Five Years in Plot to Bomb Subway” Associated Press, March 3, 2007
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/03/nyregion/03mbrfsbomb.html?scp=2&sq=James+Elshafay&st=nyt> at June 7, 2010.

386

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
“Market Terror Plotter Extradited” BBC News, June 23, 2006
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5109372.stm> at May 20, 2010.
Markon, Jerry, “Falls Church Man's Sentence in Terror Plot Is Increased to Life” Washington Post, July
28, 2009 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/07/27/AR2009072701384.html> at June 3, 2010.
Markon, Jerry, “Final Defendant Guilty in ‘Va. Jihad’” Washington Post, June 7, 2006
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/06/AR2006060601142.html>
at July 13, 2008.
Marshall, Kendrick, “North Chicagoan Charged with Terrorist Conspiracy” The News Sun (Illinois),
February 22, 2007 via Highbeam Research <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1N11183891843746258.html> at June 5, 2010.
“Maryland Man Arrested on Charges of Providing Material Support to Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Designated
Foreign Terrorist Organization” US Department of Justice, September 16, 2005
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Chandia_DOJPRIndictment.pdf
> at June 5, 2010
“Maryland Man Sentenced to 15 Years for Providing Material Support to Terror Group” United States
Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Virginia, August 25, 2006
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Chandia_DOJPRSentencing.pdf
> at June 4, 2010.
Marquez, Jeremiah, “Southern California Terrorism Probe Yields Third Arrest” Associated Press
Worldstream, August 17, 2005, via Highbeam Research <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1112220384.html> at June 7, 2010.
“Martyr Note Found under Bed of Bomb Accused” The Birmingham Post, February 14, 2002, via
HighBeam Research <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-82838170.html> at May 20, 2010.
Masood, Salman, & Gall, Carlotta, “U.S. Sees a Terror Threat: Pakistanis See a Heroine” New York
Times, March 5, 2010 <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/06/world/asia/06pstan.html> at June
14, 2010.
“Mastermind from Barking who Set Up Training Camp in Pakistan” The Evening Standard, May 1, 2007,
via HighBeam Research <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-5893962.html> at May 19, 2010.

387

Mathieu, John, Heffner, Tonia, Goodwin, Gerald, Salas, Eduardo, & Cannon-Bowers, Janis, “The
Influence of Shared Mental Models on Team Process and Performance” (2008) Journal of
Applied Psychology, 85:2, 273-283.
Matsueda, Ross, “Differential Social Organization, Collective Action and Crime” (2006) Crime, Law and
Social Change, 46, 3-33.
Mazzetti, Mark, Tavernise, Sabrina & Healy, Jack, “Suspect Charged, Said to Admit Role in Plot” New
York Times, May 4, 2010
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/nyregion/05bomb.html?tntemail1=y&emc=tnt&pagewant
ed=all> at May 5, 2010
McAllister, Brad, “Al Qaeda and the Innovative Firm: Demythologising the Network” (2004) Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, 27, 297-319.
McCall, George & Simmons, J., Identities and Interactions (1966) New York: Free Press. Cited in
Stryker, Sheldon & Burke, Peter, “The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory.”
McCann, Joseph, Terrorism on American Soil: A Concise History of Plots and Perpetrators from the
Famous to the Forgotten (2006) Boulder, Colorado: Sentient Publications.
McCarthy, Ross, “Illegal Immigrant Working in Birmingham Jailed for Terrorism Offence” Birmingham
Post, April 21, 2009
<http://www.birminghampost.net/news/west-midlands-news/2009/04/21/illegal-immigrantworking-in-birmingham-jailed-for-terrorism-offence-65233-23430498/> at July 3, 2010.
McCauley, Clark, & Moskalenko, Sophia, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward
Terrorism” (2008) Terrorism and Political Violence, 20, 415-433.
McCauley, Clark & Scheckter, Sarah, “What’s Special about U.S. Muslims? The War on Terrorism as
Seen by Muslims in the United States, Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia” (2008) Studies
in Conflict and Terrorism, 31:11, 973-980.
McDonald, Henry, “Al Qaeda’s Airport Bomb Plot” The Observer, November 19, 2006
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/nov/19/northernireland.terrorism> at June 23, 2010.
Mears, Bill, “Alleged Terrorist Charged with Conspiracy” CNN, February 27, 2009
<http://edition.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/02/27/enemy.combatant.almarri/index.html> at June 3,
2010.
Melman, Yossi, The Master Terrorist: The True Story of Abu-Nidal (1986) New York: Adama Books.

388

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
“Men Remanded over Terror Offences” BBC News, November 4, 2005
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4406864.stm> at June 25, 2010.
Mendick, Robert, “Trio to Face Third Trial over Airline Terror Plot” The Telegraph, September 12, 2009
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/6179350/Trio-to-face-third-trialover-airline-terror-plot.html> at July 1, 2010.
Meo, Nick, “Disaffected Youth Seduced by Notion of Holy War” San Francisco Chronicle, July 17, 2005
<http://articles.sfgate.com/2005-07-17/news/17383407_1_holy-war-islamic-state-islamicgroup> at May 19, 2010.
Merari, Ariel, “Social, Organizational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism” (2005) In Tore
Bjørgo (Ed.) Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward, New York, Routledge,
70-86.
Meryhew, Richard, “5th Twin Cities Somali Man is Killed in War-Torn Homeland ” Minneapolis Star
Tribune, September 5, 2009 <http://www.startribune.com/local/57448212.html?page=3&c=y> at
June 11, 2010.
Meryhew, Richard, & Shah, Allie, “Somali President, in Minn., Meets with Grieving Families”
Minneapolis Star-Tribune, October 4, 2009
<http://www.startribune.com/local/63489787.html?elr=KArksi8cyaiUjc8LDyiUiD3aPc:_Yyc:a
UU> at June 15, 2010.
Meryhew, Richard, & Shah, Allie, “Tormented Mother Grieves Son who Heeded a Fatal Call”
Minneapolis Star Tribune, July 13, 2009
<http://www.startribune.com/local/50544432.html?elr=KArksi8D3PE7_8yc+D3aiUo8D3PE7_e
yc+D3aiUiD3aPc:_Yyc:aUUr> at June 11, 2010.
Meryhew, Richard & Walsh, James, “Young Men: ‘Searching for Something Better’” Minneapolis Star
Tribune, September 13, 2009
<http://www.startribune.com/local/59087767.html?elr=KArks:DCiUHc3E7_V_nDaycUiD3aPc:
_Yyc:aUU> at June 11, 2010.
“MI5 Followed UK Suicide Bomber” BBC News, April 30, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6417353.stm > at June 25, 2010.
Mickolus, Edward, Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979 (1980) Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

389

Mickolus, Edward, & Simmons, Susan, Terrorism, 1996-2001: A Chronology, Vol.1 (2002) Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
Mickolus, Edward, & Simmons, Susan, Terrorism, 2002-2004: A Chronology, Vol. 1 (2006) Westport,
Connecticut: Praeger Security International.
Mickolus, Edward, & Simmons, Susan, Terrorism, 2002-2004: A Chronology, Vol. 2 (2006) Westport,
Connecticut: Praeger Security International.
Migaux, Philippe, “Al Qaeda” in Gérard Chaliand & Arnaud Blin (eds) The History of Terrorism: From
Antiquity to Al-Qaeda (2007) Berkeley: University of California Press, 314-348.
Migaux, Philippe, “The Roots of Islamic Radicalism” in Chaliand & Blin (eds) The History of Terrorism,
255-313.
Mili, Hayder, “Jihad Without Rules: The Evolution of al-Takfir wa al-Hijra” (2006) Terrorism Monitor,
4:13.
“Militant Camp was ‘Like Bungee’” BBC News, June 17, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7459167.stm> at July 4, 2010.
“Military Jury Convicts Soldier of Trying to Help Al Qaeda” USA Today, September 3, 2004
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-09-03-anderson_x.htm> at June 7, 2010.
Miller, Judith, “Dissecting a Terror Plot from Boston to Amman” New York Times, January 15, 2001
<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/15/world/dissecting-a-terror-plot-from-bostontoamman.html?pagewanted=all> at October 14, 2009.
“Minneapolis Man Sentenced for Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Al-Qaeda” US Department
of Justice, July 9, 2009
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/US_v_Warsame_dojprsentencing.pdf> at June 4,
2010.
Mintz, John, “Man Charged with Aiding Terrorists” Washington Post, November 10, 2004
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37993-2004Nov9.html> at June 7, 2010.
Mintz, John, “U.S. Indicts Oregon Charity Linked to Saudis” Washington Post, February 19, 2005,
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A36678-2005Feb18.html> at February 20,
2010.
Mishal, Shaul, & Rosenthal, Maoz, “Al Qaeda as a Dune Organisation: Toward A Typology of Islamic
Terrorist Organisations” (2005) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 28, 275-293.

390

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
“Missile Plot Briton Sent to Jail” BBC News, April 30, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6206886.stm> at May 19, 2010.
Mitchell, Alison, ‘Letter Explained Motive in Bombing, Officials Now Say’ The New York Times, (New
York) March 28, 1993.
Modic, Rob, “Jordanian Faces More Time in Jail: Deportation Man Sentenced for Lying to FBI Agents
About an Email Account He Had” Dayton Daily News, July 8, 2006 via Highbeam Research
<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-11976278.html> at June 9, 2010.
“Mohammed Abushamma (Op TURNOVER)” Crown Prosecution Service, November 2, 2009
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2009.html> at July 7, 2010
“Mohammed Saeed Alim aka Nicky Reilly (Op BASTEN)” Crown Prosecution Service, undated
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2008.html#a03> at July 6, 2010.
“Mom by Day, Terrorist Hunter by Night” ABC News, June 5, 2006
<http://abcnews.go.com/http://abcnews.go.com/> at June 7, 2010.
“Mom of Rockford Terror Suspect Talks” ABC News, December 10, 2006
<http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=4839483> at June 10, 2010.
“Money Remitter Pleads Guilty to Money Laundering Conspiracy and Concealing Terrorist Financing”
US Department of Justice, August 22, 2008
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/US_v_Ranjha_dojpguiltyplea.pdf
> at June 7, 2010.
“Money Remitter Sentenced to Over 9 Years for Money Laundering Conspiracy and Concealing Terrorist
Financing” US Department of Justice, November 4, 2008
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/US_v_Ranjha_dojprsent.pdf> at
June 7, 2010.
Moore, Cerwyn & Tumelty, Paul, “Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment”
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 31:5, 412-433.
Morris, Mark & Rizzo, Tony, “In Federal Court, Kansas City Man Admits Sending Money to al-Qaida”
Kansas City Star, May 19, 2010
<http://www.kansascity.com/2010/05/19/1957858/kc-man-admits-sending-money-to.html> at
June 14, 2010.

391

Morris, Steven, “‘Bomb Factory’ Muslim Jailed for 20 years” The Guardian, February 28, 2002
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2002/feb/28/stevenmorris> at May 20, 2010.
“Mosque’s Terror Connections” BBC News, February 8, 2006
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4693804.stmv> at May 20, 2010.
Moynihan, Colin, “U.S. Man Draws 15 Years for Plot to Supply Al Qaeda” New York Times, June 9,
2010 <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/nyregion/10hashmi.html?emc=tnt&tntemail1=y> at
June 9, 2010.
Muhumed, Malkhadir, “Seattle FBI Investigating Somali Suicide Bombing” ABC News, September 25,
2009 <http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=8672009> at June 11, 2010.
Mulaj, Kejda, “Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army” (2008) Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, 31:12, 1103-1119.
Mullins, Sam, “Home-Grown Islamist Terrorism: Issues and Implications” (2007) Perspectives on
Terrorism, 1:3
<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=12> at
January 10, 2009.
Mullins, Sam, “Iraq Versus Lack of Integration: Understanding the Motivations of Contemporary Islamist
Terrorists in Western Countries” (2010) Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political
Aggression, First published on October 19 2010 (iFirst).
Mullins, Sam, “Islamist Terrorism and Australia: An Empirical Examination of the Home-Grown Threat”
Forthcoming.
Mullins, Sam, “Parallels between Crime & Terrorism: A Social-Psychological Perspective” (2009)
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 32:9, 811-830.
Mullins, Sam & Dolnik, Adam, “An Exploratory, Dynamic Application of Social Network Analysis for
Modeling the Development of Islamist Terror-Cells in the West” (2009) Behavioral Sciences of
Terrorism and Political Aggression, 2:1, 3-29.
Mulvihill, Geoff “4 Life Terms, 1 33-Year Sentence In Fort Dix Case” The Guardian, April 29, 2009
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8481281> at June 11, 2010
Mulvihill, Geoff, “Informant: Fort Dix Suspects Trained for ‘Jihad’” Fox News, December 1, 2008
<http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2008Dec01/0,4670,FortDixPlot,00.html> at June 11, 2010.

392

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Mulvihill, Geoff, “Map of NJ Army Base Becomes Focus in Fort Dix Case” Fox News, November 3,
2008 <http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2008Nov03/0,4670,FortDixPlot,00.html> at June 11,
2010.
Murray, Douglas, “The Prevent Strategy: A Textbook Example of How to Alienate Just About
Everybody” The Telegraph, March 31, 2010
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/7540456/The-Prevent-strategy-atextbook-example-of-how-to-alienate-just-about-everybody.html> at July 27, 2010.
“Muslim Guilty of Inciting Racial Hatred” BBC News, May 30, 2002
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/1966839.stm> at May 19, 2010.
“Muslim Man who Sold DVDs Glorifying the 9/11 Atrocities Jailed under New Terror Laws” The Daily
Mail, March 20, 2008
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-540470/Muslim-man-sold-DVDs-glorifying-9-11atrocities-jailed-new-terror-laws.html> at July 3, 2010
“Muslim Suspect Committed After Allegedly Driving SUV Into Crowd” Fox News, March 5, 2007
<http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,256681,00.html> at June 10, 2010.
“Muslims Call for ‘Holy War’ Investigation” BBC News, January 4, 2001
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1100799.stm> at May 19, 2010.
“My Son the Suicide Bomber” Exeter Express & Echo, January 31, 2009
<http://www.thisisexeter.co.uk/news/son-suicide-bomber/article-660032-detail/article.html> at
July 6, 2010.
Nacos, Brigitte, “Revisiting the Contagion Hypothesis: Terrorism, News Coverage, and Copycat Attacks”
(2009) Perspectives on Terrorism, 3:3, 3-13.
“Nashville Resident Arrested on Charges of Possessing Machine Guns in Plan for Jihad Attack” US
Department of Justice, October 8, 2004
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/US_v_Al-Uqaily_dojprarrest.pdf>
at June 7, 2010.
“Nation In Brief: Seattle” Washington Post, September 4, 2004
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A60809-2004Sep3.html> at June 7, 2010.
National Statistics Website, Population (2008) <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=6> at
September 3, 2008.

393

National Statistics Website, Religion (2004) <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=954> at
September 3, 2008.
Navarette, Carlos, “Death Concerns and Other Adaptive Challenges: The Effects of Coalition-Relevant
Challenges on Worldview Defense in the US and Costa Rica” (2005) Group Processes and
Intergroup Relations, 8:4, 411-427.
Nesser, Petter, “Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994-2007: Planned, Prepared, and Executed
Terrorist Attacks” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (2008) 31:10, 924-926.
Nesser, Petter, “How did Europe’s Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes?” (2008)
Terrorism and Political Violence, 20:2, 234-256.
Nesser, Petter, “How Does Radicalization Occur in Europe?” (2006) Presented at the Second
Inter-Agency Radicalization Conference, hosted by U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Washington DC, July 10, 2006
<http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00080/DHS_foredrag_80480a.pdf> at February 18,
2008.
Nesser, Petter, “Jihad in Europe: Recruitment for Terrorist Cells in Europe” (2006) in Paths to Global
Jihad: Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terror Networks (Proceedings from a Norwegian
Defence Research Establishment seminar, Oslo, 15 March 2006) 2-21
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/41.pdf> at May 26, 2009.
Nesser, Petter, “Jihadism in Western Europe after the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences
from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe” (2006) Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 29: 323-342.
“New Group Replaces al-Muhajiroun” BBC News, November 18, 2005
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4449714.stm> at June 25, 2010.
“New Sentence for Charity Director” New York Times, February 18, 2006
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A01E6D7103EF93BA25751C0A9609C8B63
> at June 1, 2010.
“News Release” US Department of Justice, April 26, 2005
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_AlTimimi_DOJPRConviction.pdf> at June 4, 2010.

394

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Newton Dunn, Tom, “Iraq Hero in Line for Bravery” The Sun, December 8, 2004
<http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/article99268.ece> at June 29, 2010.
“New Yorker Admits Helping Arms Dealer” MSNBC.com, March 30, 2004
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4633888/> at June 22, 2010.
“Nicholas Roddis” Crown Prosecution Service, undated
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2008.html#a03> at July 3, 2010.
“Nigerian Accused of Attacking US Passenger Jet” BBC News, December 26, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8430699.stm> at December 26, 2009.
Nishikawa, Maya, “Mpls. Mother Says Her Son Was Killed in Somalia” WCCO.com, July 12,
2009<http://wcco.com/national/somali.teen.killed.2.1082705.html> at June 11, 2010.
Norfolk, Andrew, & O’Neill, Sean, “Bomber’s Widow is Held in Anti-Terror Raid” The Times, May 10,
2007 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article1769382.ece> at July 4, 2010.
“Norfolk Police Officer Says Terrorists Eyed Him” Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk, VA) January 20, 2006, via
Highbeam Research <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-141132621.html> at June 9, 2010.
Nossiter, Adam, “Lonely Trek to Radicalism for Terror Suspect” New York Times, January 16, 2010
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/world/africa/17abdulmutallab.html?tntemail1=y&emc=tn
t&pagewanted=all> at June 1, 2010.
“NRI Teen Held in Terror Plot Link” The Times of India, August 14, 2006
<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1891077.cms> at June 30, 2010.
“Obama Security Strategy Highlights Domestic Terrorism” BBC News, May 27, 2010
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/us_and_canada/10169144.stm> at July 27, 2010.
Office for National Statistics, Focus on Religion (2004)
<http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_compendia/for2004/FocusonReligion.pdf> at
May 5, 2009.
Office for National Statistics, Focus on Religion Data: 02_Age&SexDistribution (2004)
<http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/Product.asp?vlnk=13209> at May 5, 2009.
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005 (2006) United States
Department of State publication 11324, April, 2006.
O’Hara, Kate, “Bradford Man Had ‘Terrorist Encyclopaedia’, Court Told” Yorkshire Post, June 9, 2008

395

<http://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/Bradford-man-had-39terroristencyclopaedia39.4165964.jp> at

June 29, 2010.

“Ohio Man Indicted for Providing Material Support to al-Qaeda, Falsely Obtaining and Using Travel
Documents” US Department of Justice, June 14, 2004
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Abdi_DOJPRIndictment.pdf>
at June 3, 2010.
“Ohio Man Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists” US Department of
Justice, July 31, 2007 <http://cincinnati.fbi.gov/doj/pressrel/2007/ci073107.htm> at June 2,
2010.
“Ohio Man Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Bomb Targets in Europe and the United States” US
Department of Justice, June 3, 2008
<http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-nsd-492.html> at June 1, 2010.
“Ohio Man Sentenced to Ten Years Imprisonment for Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to
Terrorists” US Department of Justice, November 27, 2007
<http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/November/07_nsd_944.html> at February 23, 2010.
Oliver, Mark “Radical Cleric Banned from Britain” The Guardian, August 12, 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/aug/12/politics.syria> at May 19, 2010.
Omar Othman aka Abu Qatada and Secretary of State for the Home Department, Special Immigration
Appeals Commission, Appeal No. SC/15/2005, February 26, 2007
<http://www.icj.org/IMG/QATADA.pdf> at May 19, 2010.
O’Neill, Sean “£180,000 is Discovered in Account of Radical” The Telegraph, October 18, 2001
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1359770/180000-is-discovered-in-account-ofradical.html> at May 19, 2010.
O’Neill, Sean “Architect of Terror Held in British Jail Cell” The Telegraph (London) January 9, 2003.
O’Neill, Sean, “Two Men in Court on Al Qa’eda Charges” The Telegraph, January 18, 2002
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1381893/Two-men-in-court-on-al-Qaedacharges.html> at June 22, 2010.
O’Neill, Sean, “Friend of ‘Lyrical Terrorist’ Caught at Airport with Military Equipment” The Times,
January 9, 2008 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article3156032.ece> at July 2,
2010.

396

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
O’Neill, Sean, “How High Street Poison Plot Ended in a Bedsit Bloodbath” The Times, April 14, 2005
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article380805.ece?print=yes&randnum=1269315705
105> at June 23, 2010.
O’Neill, Sean, “Lyrical Terrorist Samina Malik has her Conviction Overturned” The Times, July 18, 2008
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article4157834.ece> at July 3, 2010.
O’Neill, Sean, “Man Jailed for Life over Transatlantic Bomb Plot” The Times, December 11, 2009
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article6952018.ece> at July 1, 2010.
O’Neill, Sean, “Muktar Said Ibrahim: From Robbery and Indecent Assault to Bomb Plot Leader” The
Times, July 10, 2007 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article2051428.ece> at
June 27, 2010.
O’Neill, Sean, “Public Schoolboy Who Turned to Terror” The Telegraph, July 16, 2002
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1401571/Public-schoolboywho-turned-to-terror.html> at June 23, 2010.
O’Neill, Sean, “Teenager Had Bomb-Making Manual” The Times, September 27, 2007
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article2540111.ece> at June 30, 2010.
O’Neill, Sean, & Evans, Michael, “Analysis: How the Plan was Put Together” The Times, September 9,
2008
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article4708700.ece?print=yes&randnum=127
3807387456> at July 1, 2010.
O’Neill, Sean & Johnston, Philip, “Terrorist Suspect Held in London” The Telegraph, October 25, 2002
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1411198/Terrorist-suspect-held-in-London.html> at
June 21, 2010.
O’Neill, Sean & McGrory, Daniel, The Suicide Factory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque
(2006) London: HarperCollins.
O’Neill, Sean, & Quinn, Ben, “‘Bin Laden Lieutenant’ Abu Qatada Freed on Bail” The Times, June 18,
2008
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article4158282.ece?print=yes&randnum=126
9659239929> at June 21, 2010.
O’Neill, Sean, Steele, John, & Alleyne, Richard, “Raid on the Court of Abu Hamza” The Telegraph,

397

January 21, 2003 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1419529/Raid-on-the-court-ofAbu-Hamza.html> at June 21, 2010.
O’Neill, Sean and Whittell, Giles, “Al-Qaeda ‘Groomed Abdulmutallab in London’” The Times,
December 30, 2009 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6971098.ece> at April 17,
2010.
“Operation Crevice: Timeline and Facts and Figures” Metropolitan Police Service, undated
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/MPS_OpCreviceTimeline.pdf > at June
24, 2010.
“Operation Overamp: Hassan Mutegombwa” Metropolitan Police Service, undated
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/MetPolice_Mutegombwa.pdf> at June
28, 2010.
“Operation Rhyme Defendants: Abdul Aziz Jalil” Metropolitan Police Service, undated
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/JalilFactSheet.pdf> at June 22, 2010.
“Operation Rhyme Defendants: Junade Feroz” Metropolitan Police Service, undated
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/FerozeFactSheet.pdf> at June 22, 2010.
“Operation Rhyme Defendants: Mohammed Naveed Bhatti” Metropolitan Police Service, undated
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/BhattiFactSheet.pdf> at June 22, 2010.
“Operation Rhyme Defendants: Nadeem Tarmohamed” Metropolitan Police Service, undated
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/TarmohamedFactSheet.pdf> at June 22,
2010.
“Operation Rhyme Defendants: Omar Abdur Rehman” Metropolitan Police Service, undated
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/RehmanFactSheet.pdf> at June 22,
2010.
“Operation Rhyme Defendants: Qaisar Shaffi” Metropolitan Police Service, undated
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/ShaffiFactSheet.pdf> at June 22, 2010.
“Operation Rhyme Defendants: Zia Ul Haq” Metropolitan Police Service, undated
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/UlHaqFactSheet.pdf> at June 22, 2010.
“Oregon: Sentence in Taliban Case” New York Times, December 2, 2003
<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/02/national/02BRFS1.html?scp=3&sq=%22October%20Mar
tinique%20Lewis%22&st=cse> at June 2, 2010.

398

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
“Pa Modou Jobe” Crown Prosecution Service, undated
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2009.html> at July 3, 2010.
“Padilla Convicted in Terrorism Case” ABC News, August 16, 2007
http://abcnews.go.com/US/WireStory?id=3488260&page=1 at 18 October, 2009.
“Pair Remanded on Terror Charges” BBC News, January 30, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6311823.stm> at July 3, 2010.
“Pakistani Convicted of Conspiring to Aid Taliban” Associated Press Worldstream, May 28, 2010 via
Highbeam Research <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1A1-D9FVJKSG0.html> at June 9, 2010.
“Pakistani Gets 18 Years for Plot to Sell Missiles” New York Times, September 26, 2006
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/26/world/americas/26iht-briefs.2938919.html> at June 5,
2010.
“Pakistani Man Convicted of Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda Sentenced to 30 Years in Federal
Prison” US Department of Justice, June 20, 2006
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Paracha_DOJPRSentencing.pdf
> at June 5, 2010.
Pallister, David, “Three Jailed for Urging Murder at Cartoon Protest” The Guardian, July 19, 2007
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2007/jul/19/pressandpublishing.cartoonprotests> at June 25,
2010.
Pantucci, Rafaello, “Did Somalia’s al-Shabaab Plan to Attack the Australian Military?” (2009) Terrorism
Monitor, 7:27, 4-6.
Pantucci, Pantucci, “Operation Praline: The Realization of Al-Suri’s Nizam, la Tanzim?” (2008)
Perspectives on Terrorism, 2:12
<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=67> at
June 24, 2010.
Pantucci, Rafaello, “Rashid Rauf and the New York Subway Bombing Plot” (2010) Terrorism Monitor,
8:18.
Pantucci, Rafaello “The Tottenham Ayatollah and The Hook-Handed Cleric: An Examination of All
Their Jihadi Children” (2010) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33:3, 226-245.

399

Parachini, John, “The World Trade Center Bombers (1993)” in Jonathan Tucker, (ed.) Toxic Terror:
Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (2000) MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA, 185-206.
Pargeter, Alison, The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe (2008) Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press.
Pederson, Brian, “Message on Wall is a Spiritual Remnant” The America’s Intelligence Wire, July 6,
2009 <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-38340686_ITM> at March 24,
2010.
Pedroncelli, Rich, “Prisoners Plead Guilty in Plot on Jewish Targets” USA Today, December 14, 2007
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-12-14-terror-probe_N.htm> at June 7, 2010
Peretz, Don, The Arab-Israel Dispute (1996) New York, Facts On File, Inc.
Pew Research Center, Europe’s Muslims More Moderate: The Great Divide: How Westerners and
Muslims View Each Other (2006) Pew Research Center
<http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/253.pdf> at May 4, 2009.
Pew Research Center, Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream (2007) Pew Research
Center <http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf> at April 29, 2009.
Pilling, Kim, “‘Kill Blair’ Extremist was a ‘Lonely Young Man’” The Independent, June 23, 2010
<http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/features/kill-blair-extremist-was-a-lonelyyoung-man-2008392.html> at July 3, 2010.
Pipes, Daniel, “L.A. Terrorists Threaten American Jewry” New York Sun, September 6, 2005
<http://www.nysun.com/foreign/la-terrorists-threaten-american-jewry/19624/> at June 7, 2010.
Pipes, Daniel, “Which Has More Islamist Terrorism, Europe or America?” The Jerusalem Post, July 2,
2008 <http://www.danielpipes.org/article/5723> at September 3, 2008.
“‘PM Terror Threat’ Three Charged” BBC News, August 28, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/ukfs_news/hi/newsid_7580000/newsid_7586800/7586801.stm> at
July 3, 2010.
“Police Review Lockerbie Bomb Case” BBC News, October 25, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/8324512.stm> at May 18, 2010.
“Police Warned about Exeter Bomber in 2003” BBC News, February 8, 2010
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/devon/8505209.stm> at July 6, 2010.

400

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Porter, Louise, & Alison, Laurence, “Behavioural Coherence in Group Robbery: A Circumplex Model of
Offender and Victim Interactions” (2006) Aggressive Behaviour, 32:4, 330-342.
Porter, Louise, & Alison, Laurence, “The Primacy of Decision-Action as an Influence Strategy of Violent
Gang Leaders” (2005) Small Group Research, 36:2, 188-207.
Post, Jerrold, “Rewarding Fire with Fire? Effects of Retaliation on Terrorist Group Dynamics” (1987) in
A. Kurz (Ed.), Contemporary Trends in World Terrorism, New York: Praeger, 103-115 cited in
Weatherston & Moran, “Terrorism and Mental Illness: Is There a Relationship?”.
Post, Jerrold, “When Hatred is Bred in the Bone: Psycho-cultural Foundations of Contemporary
Terrorism” (2005) Political Psychology, 26:4, 615-636.
Precht, Tomas, Home Grown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalisation in Europe: From Conversion to
Terrorism (2007) Danish Ministry of Justice: Copenhagen
<http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/fileadmin/downloads/Forskning_og_dokumentation/Home_gro
wn_terrorism_and_Islamist_radicalisation_in_Europe__an_assessment_of_influencing_factors__2_.pdf> at April 14, 2009.
Preusch, Matthew, “Oregon: Sentencing For 3 In Taliban Case” New York Times, February 10, 2004
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/10/us/national-briefing-northwest-oregon-sentencing-for-3in-taliban-case.html?scp=10&sq=Mike%20Hawash&st=cse> at June 2, 2010.
Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005) HM Government, UK, London: The Stationery Office
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/en/ukpgaen_20050002_en_1.htm> at December 9, 2007.
“Prisoner Jailed for Bomb Threat” BBC News, March 6, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/hampshire/7928388.stm> at July 7, 2010.
“Profile: Adel Yahya” BBC News, November 13, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634965.stm > at June 27, 2010.
“Profile: Anthony Garcia” BBC News, April 30, 2007 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149798.stm>
at June 24, 2010.
“Profile: Anwar al-Awlaki” BBC News, January 3, 2010
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8438635.stm> at April 17, 2010.
“Profile: Germaine Lindsay” BBC News, May 11, 2006
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4762591.stm> at June 25, 2010.

401

“Profile: Hassib Mir Hussain” BBC News, May 11, 2006
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4762263.stm> at June 25, 2010.
“Profile: Hussain Osman” BBC News, July 9, 2007 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634923.stm >
at June 27, 2010.
“Profile: Jawad Akbar” BBC News, April 24, 2010 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149788.stm> at
June 24, 2010.
“Profile: John Walker Lindh” BBC News, January 24, 2002
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1779455.stm> at June 3, 2010.
“Profile: Jose Padilla” BBC News, August 16, 2007 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2037444.stm>
at July 4, 2008.
“Profile: Manfo Kwako Asiedu” BBC News, November 9, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634913.stm> at June 27, 2010.
“Profile: Mohammad Sidique Khan” BBC News, April 30, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4762209.stm> at June 25, 2010.
“Profile: Muktar Ibrahim” BBC News, July 11, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/email_news/6634901.stm> at June 27, 2010.
“Profile: Omar Khyam” BBC News, April 30, 2007 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149794.stm>
at June 24, 2010.
“Profile: Omar Saeed Sheikh” BBC News, July 16, 2002
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1804710.stm> at June 23, 2010.
“Profile: Ramzi Mohammed” BBC News, July 9, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634955.stm> at June 27, 2010.
“Profile: Salahuddin Amin” BBC News, April 30, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149790.stm> at June 24, 2010.
“Profile: Shehzad Tanweer” BBC News, July 6, 2006 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4762313.stm>
at June 25, 2010.
“Profile: Sheikh Abdullah El-Faisal” BBC News, May 25, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6692243.stm> at June 23, 2010.
“Profile: Waheed Mahmood” BBC News, April 30, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149800.stm> at June 24, 2010.

402

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
“Profile: Yassin Omar” BBC News, July 9, 2007 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634917.stm> at
June 27, 2010.
“Profiles: Airline Plot Accused” BBC News, September 7, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7604808.stm> at July 1, 2010.
“Profiles: The Terror Gang Members” The Independent, February 26, 2008
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/profiles-the-terror-gang-members-787469.html>
at June 28, 2010.
“Prosecutions Show Awlaki's Continuing Influence in the United States” Investigative Project on
Terrorism, July 21, 2010 <http://www.investigativeproject.org/2072/prosecutions-show-awlakiscontinuing-influence-in> at July 27, 2010.
“Prosecutors Say Man Arrested in London had Computer File on Making Weapon” Associated Press
Worldstream, June 6, 2006, via Highbeam Research <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1124757583.html> at July 2, 2010.
“Protester ‘Called for Beheadings’” BBC News, November 3, 2006
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6113874.stm> at July 2, 2010.
“‘Qatada’s Key UK al-Qaeda Role’” BBC News, March 23, 2004
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3562695.stm> at June 21, 2010.
“Qureshi” Crown Prosecution Service, undated
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2008.html#a03> at July 2, 2010.
Quereshi, Yakub & Dowling, Nicola, “Leading UK Terrorist Guilty” Manchester Evening News,
December 18, 2008
<http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/s/1086302_leading_uk_terrorist_guilty> at
June 29, 2010.
“Radical Preacher Back in Prison” BBC News, July 7 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8138312.stm> at June 25, 2010.
Radin, Charles, “From N.H. to Somalia: Recalling a Suspect’s Zeal” Boston Globe, February 17, 2007
<http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/02/17/from_nh_to_somalia_recalling_a_suspe
cts_zeal/?page=2> at June 11, 2010.

403

“Randall Todd Royer and Ibrahim Ahmed al-Hamdi Sentenced for Participation in Virginia Jihad
Network” US Department of Justice, April 9, 2004
<http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/April/04_crm_225.htm> at June 4, 2010.
Rankin, Bill, “The Case of Syed Haris Ahmed: Suspect Coveted Jihad Life” Atlanta Journal
Constitution, January 20, 2008, via Newsbank.com <www.newsbank.com> at June 8, 2010.
Ranstorp, Magnus, Hizb’Allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis (1997)
Houndmills: MacMillan Press Ltd.
Rashbaum, William, “Terror Case May Offer Clues into Police Use of Informants” New York Times,
April 4, 2006
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/24/nyregion/24herald.html?scp=4&sq=James+Elshafay&st=
nyt> at June 7, 2010.
Redford, Sarah, “Terror Training Ringleaders Jailed” The Telegraph, March 7, 2008
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1581023/Terror-training-ringleaders-jailed.html> at
June 28, 2010.
Redman, Justin, “Former School Official Faces Terrorism Charges” CNN, April 1, 2005,
<http://edition.cnn.com/2005/LAW/03/31/terror.suspect.arrest/> at June 1, 2010.
“Regina vs Khyam et al Opening Statement: Prepared Text of the Crown's Opening Statement in the Trial
of Seven Men Alleged to Have Plotted to Bomb London” Canada.com, March 23, 2006
<http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=408dc2ed-d950-4ee5-a4b7392eb5faaf34&k=75162> at June 24, 2010
Reicher, Stephen, Stott, Clifford, Cronin, Patrick, & Adang, Otto, “An Integrated Approach to Crowd
Psychology and Public Order Policing” (2004) Policing: An International Journal of Police
Strategies and Management, 27:4, 558-572.
Reiss Jr, Albert, “Co-Offending and Criminal Careers” (1988) Crime and Justice, 10, 117-170.
“Remarks of Deputy Attorney General James Comey Regarding Jose Padilla” US Department of Justice,
June 1, 2004
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/DOJ_Padilla_Shukrijumah.pdf>
at June 1, 2010.
“Report of American al-Qaeda Spokesman's Arrest Questioned” CNN, March 8, 2010

404

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
<http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/world/03/07/10/report-american-al-qaeda-spokesmans-arrestquestioned> at June 1, 2010.
Reynolds, Paul “Guantanamo: Anatomy of a Hearing” BBC News, March 4, 2006
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4774566.stm> at May 20, 2010.
Rice, Harvey, “Man, 68, Charged in Houston in Bid to Sell Bomb to Terrorists” Houston Chronicle, May
24, 2005 <http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/3195163.html> at June 8, 2010.
Richards, Anthony, “The Domestic Threat: The Cases of Northern Ireland and Animal Rights
Extremism” in Paul Wilkinson (ed) Homeland Security in the UK: Future Preparedness for
Terrorists Attack Since 9/11 (2007) Oxon: Routledge, pp.81-114.
Riding, Alan, “French Court Sentences 2 for Role in 1995 Bombings That Killed 8” The New York Times
(New York) November 1, 2002.
“Rizwan Ditta (Op CALAMARI)” Crown Prosecution Service, undated
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2007.html#a14> at July 3, 2010.
Roberts, Chris, “Terror Suspect Faces New Charges” Trib.com (Wyoming) November 13, 2004
<http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/article_fde285a7-fe6c-5823-aae8-d07167097b52.html>
at June 7, 2010.
Robinson, Mike, “Charity Chief Linked to Bin Laden Gets 11-Year Sentence” Deseret News, August 19,
2003 via Highbeam Research <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-7104800.html> at June 1,
2010.
Rocha, Jessica, “Outburst Reveals ‘Other’ Taheri-Azar’” News Observer.com, March 6, 2007
<http://www.newsobserver.com/2007/03/06/89540/outburst-reveals-other-taheri.html> at June
10, 2010.
Rohde, David, “Pakistani Detainee Enjoyed Deep U.S. Roots” New York Times, August 18, 2003
<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/18/world/pakistani-detainee-enjoyed-deep-usroots.html?pagewanted=all> at June 5, 2010.
“Rockford Man Pleads Guilty in Foiled Plan to Set off Grenades in Rockford Shopping Mall” US
Department of Justice, November 28, 2007
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Shareef_DOJPR_GuiltyPlea.pdf
> at June 10, 2010
“Ronald Grecula Sentenced to Prison in Plot Sell Bomb to Terrorists” US Federal News Service,

405

February 9, 2007, via Highbeam Research <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P31225601011.html> at June 8, 2010.
Rose, Max, “Pit Saga Capped with Guilty Plea” Daily Tar Heel, August 18, 2008
<http://www.dailytarheel.com/content/pit-saga-capped-guilty-plea> at June 10, 2010.
Rosenblatt, Abram, Greenberg, Jeff, Solomon, Sheldon, Pyszczynski, Tom, & Lyon, Deborah, “Evidence
for Terror Management Theory I: The Effects of Mortality Salience on Reactions to Those Who
Violate or Uphold Cultural Values” (1989) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57:4,
681-690.
Rotella, Sebastian & Meyer, Josh, “A Young American’s Journey into Al Qaeda” LA Times, July 24,
2009 <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/24/nation/na-american-jihadi24> at June 13, 2010.
Rotella, Sebastian, & Meyer, Josh, “U.S.-Born Militant Who Fought for Al Qaeda is in Custody” LA
Times, July 23, 2009 <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/23/nation/na-american-jihad23> at
June 13, 2010.
Roy, Olivier, Al Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement: The Power of a Narrative (2008) Microcon
Policy Working Paper 2, Brighton: Microcon.
Roy, Olivier, “EuroIslam: The Jihad Within” National Interest, March 22, 2003.
Roy, Olivier, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (2004) New York: Colombia University
Press.
Ruby, Charles, “Are Terrorists Mentally Deranged?” (2002) Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy,
15-16.
Rucker, Beth “Iraqi Pleads Guilty in Weapons Buying Case in Nashville, Tennessee” Associated Press
Worldstream, May 31, 2005, via Highbeam Research
<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-109270426.html >at June 7, 2010.
R v. Ibrahim, Omar, Osman & Mohamed, Approved Judgement, Supreme Court of Judicature Court of
Appeal, Case No. 2007/04146/B5, April 23, 2008
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/judgments_guidance/r_v_ibrahim_and_others.pdf> at June
27, 2010.
“Sadeer Saleem, Waheed Ali and Mohammed Shakil, Cleared of 7/7-Linked Reconnaissance Mission”

406

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
The London Paper, April 28, 2009
<http://www.thelondonpaper.com/thelondonpaper/news/sadeer-saleem-waheed-ali-andmohammed-shakil-cleared-of-77-linked-reconnaissance> at July 4, 2010.
“Saeede Ghafoor” Crown Prosecution Service, undated
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2008.html#a03> at July 7, 2010.
Sageman, Marc, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (2008) Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks (2004) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Sandler, James, “A Profile of Kamal Derwish, a Recruiter of the Lackawanna Cell - And a Casualty of the
U.S. War against Terrorism” Frontline,
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/inside/derwish.html> at October 14,
2009.
Santora, Marc & Elliott, Andrea, “A Seemingly Ordinary Friendship Hid a Conspiracy, Authorities Say”
New York Times, May 31, 2005
<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/31/nyregion/31suspects.html?scp=8&sq=Tarik+Shah&st=ny
t> at June 4, 2010.
“Saudi Arabia Hands Over Terror Suspects” Associated Press, October 14, 2003, via Highbeam Research
<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-85729724.html> at June 4, 2010.
“Shahawar Matin Siraj Sentenced to Thirty Years of Imprisonment for Conspiring to Place Explosives at
the 34th Street Subway Station in New York” US Department of Justice, January 8, 2007
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Siraj_DOJPRSentencing.pdf>
at June 7, 2010.
Scheuer, Michael, “The New York Plot: The Impact of Bin Laden’s Campaign to Inspire Jihad” (2006)
Terrorism Focus, 3:28
<http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=846&tx_ttnews%
5BbackPid%5D=239&no_cache=1> at April 17, 2009.
Schmid, Alex & Jongman, Albert, Political Terrorism (1988) New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books,
cited in Weinberg, Pedahzur & Hirsch-Hoefler, “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism”.
Schmidt, Susan, “Trail of an ‘Enemy Combatant’: From Desert to U.S. Heartland” Washington Post, July

407

20, 2007 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/07/19/AR2007071902662_pf.html> at June 3, 2010.
Schmitt, Eric & Landler, Mark “U.S. to Press Pakistan on Bomb Plot Inquiry” New York Times, May 17,
2010 <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/world/asia/18pstan.html?emc=tnt&tntemail1=y> at
May 20, 2010.
Seale, Patrick, Abu Nidal: A Gun For Hire (1992) New York: Random House.
“Sears Tower Bomb Plot Leader Narseal Batiste Jailed” BBC News, November 20, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8371671.stm> at June 9, 2010.
Seewer, John, “Prosecutor: Terror Plot Caught on Tape” Fox News, April 1, 2008
<http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2008Apr01/0,4670,MilitaryPlotTrial,00.html> at June 5, 2010
“Sentence for Pakistani Who Helped Muslim Extremists” New York Times, December 18, 2003
<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/18/us/national-briefing-national-security-sentence-forpakistani-who-helped-muslim.html?pagewanted=1> at June 4, 2010.
“Sentences Come Down in ‘Virginia Jihad’ Case: Maryland in Paintball Training Sentenced to Life in
Prison” MSNBC News, June 15, 2004 <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5218311/> at July 13,
2008.
“Sentences For 3 ‘US Taleban’” BBC News, February 10, 2004
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3475885.stm> at June 2, 2010.
“Sentencing Hearings Held in CARE International Case” Bureau of International Narcotics and
Enforcement Affairs 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) February
27, 2009 <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2009/vol2/116549.htm> at October 14, 2009.
“Seven Convicted of Terror Offences” Metropolitan Police Service, February 27, 2008
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/MPS_OsamaBinLondonConv.pdf> at
June 28, 2010.
“Seven Held on Suspicion of Being a Threat to National Security” Hull Daily Mail, September 15, 2005
<http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-136287261/seven-men-held-suspicion.html> at
June 23, 2010
Shane, Scott, “New Incidents Test Immunity to Terrorism on U.S. Soil” New York Times, December 11,
2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/12/us/12assess.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all> at May
22, 2010.

408

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Shane, Scott & Schmitt, Eric, “Norway Announces Three Arrests in Terrorist Plot” New York Times, July
9, 2010
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/world/europe/09norway.html?_r=2&emc=tnt&tntemail1=
y> at July 17, 2010.
Shapiro, Jeremy, & Suzan, Bénédicte, “The French Experience of Counter-Terrorism” (2003) Survival,
45:1, 67-98.
Sheridan, Mary Beth, Murphy, Carlyle, & Markon, Jerry, “Va. 'Jihad' Suspects: 11 Men, Two Views;
U.S. Sees Conspiracy; They Proclaim Piety” Washington Post, August 8, 2003, via ProQuest
Archiver <www.pqarchiver.com> at June 4, 2010.
Shover, Neal, “The Social Organization of Burglary” (1973) Social Problems, 20:4, 499-514.
Shukovsky, Paul, “14 Arrested in Raids by Terror Task Force” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, November 19,
2004 <http://www.seattlepi.com/local/200337_raid19.html> at June 12, 2010.
“‘Sick’ Bomb Planner is Locked Up” BBC News, July 28, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8172933.stm> at June 29, 2010.
Siddique, Haroon, “'Enemy Combatant' Receives 17-Year US Jail Term” The Guardian, January 22, 2008
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jan/22/usa.alqaida> at June 1, 2010.
“Siddique Released after Terror Conviction Quashed” BBC News, February 9, 2010
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/tayside_and_central/8504952.stm> at June 24,
2010.
“Siddique Terrorism Charges in Detail” BBC News, February 9, 2010
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/tayside_and_central/8506062.stm> at June 24,
2010.
Silber, Mitchell, & Bhatt, Arvin, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (2007) New York:
New York City Police Department.
Silke, Andrew, “Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization”
European Journal of Criminology, 5:1 (2008) 99-123.
Silke, Andrew, “The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism” (2001)
Terrorism & Political Violence, 13:4, 1-14.
Simcox, Robin, Stuart, Hannah, & Ahmed, Houria, Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections (2010)
London: The Centre for Social Cohesion.

409

“Six Guilty of Terrorism Support” BBC News, April 17, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7352969.stm> at June 25, 2010.
Smith, Craig, “6 French-Algerians Get Prison for U.S. Embassy Plot” New York Times, March 17, 2005
<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/16/world/europe/16iht-france.html> at June 22, 2010.
Smith, Craig, “French Weekly Cleared of Charges Over Cartoon of Prophet Muhammad” New York
Times, March 22, 2007 <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/22/world/europe/22ihtfrance.4995852.html> at June 21, 2010.
“Soldier Kidnap Plotter Given Life” BBC News, February 18, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7250697.stm> at June 28, 2010.
“Somali Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charge” MSNBC News, July 15, 2009
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31930835/ns/world_news-terrorism/> at June 11, 2010.
Spaaij, Ramón, “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment” (2010) Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 33:9, 854-870.
“Spain Jails 18 al-Qaeda Operatives” The Age, September 27, 2005
<http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/spain-jails-18-alqaedaoperatives/2005/09/27/1127586828047.html> at May 19, 2010.
Speckhard, Anne, & Ahkmedova, Khapta, “The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism” (2006)
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 29: 429-492.
Steele, John, “13 Years for Shoe Bomb Plotter” The Telegraph, April 23, 2005
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1488454/13-years-for-shoe-bomb-plotter.html> at
June 21, 2010.
Steinberg, Giodo, & Werenfels, Isabelle, ‘Between the ‘Near’ and the ‘Far’ Enemy: Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb’ Mediterranean Politics, 12:3, 407-413.
Stets, Jan, & Burke, Peter, “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory” (2000) Social Psychology
Quarterly, 63:3, 224-237.
Stevens, Michael, ‘What is Terrorism and Can Psychology Do Anything to Prevent It?’ (2005)
Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 23, 507-526.
Stevens, Tim, & Neumann, Peter, Countering Online Radicalisation: A Strategy for Action (2009)
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence
<http://www.thecst.org.uk/docs/countering_online_radicalisation1.pdf> at April 16, 2009.

410

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Stryker, Sheldon, “Identity Salience and Role Performance: The Relevance of Symbolic Interaction
Theory for Family Research” (1968) Journal of Marriage and the Family, 30:4, 558-564.
Stryker, Sheldon & Burke, Peter, “The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory” (2000) Social
Psychology Quarterly, 63:4, 284-297.
Stroink, Mirella “Processes and Preconditions Underlying Terrorism in Second-Generation Immigrants”
(2007) Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 13:3, 293-312.
“Student Admits Terror Bid” BBC News, November 28, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7754602.stm> at July 7, 2010.
“Student Sentenced over Terror Bid” BBC News, June 17, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/8106092.stm> at July 6, 2010.
“Student Terrorism Trial Date Set” BBC News, April 4, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/glasgow_and_west/6525961.stm> at June 24,
2010.
“‘Suicide-Videos’: What They Said” BBC News, April 4, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7330367.stm> at July 1, 2010.
Sullivan, Julie, Long, James, & Oppel, Shelby, “A Parking Garage Attendant, a Bagel-Maker, a Devoted
Mother, a Student of International Affairs, a Restaurant Manager. and a Guy who Used to Sell
Mary Kay Cosmetics: As New Details Emerge, They Look More Like Amateurs than
Terrorists... Is It Possible They Are Both?” The Oregonian, October 13, 2002, via News
Library.com <www.newslibrary.com> at June 2, 2010.
“Supergrass Tells of Connection to Alleged Bomb Plot” The Guardian, March 24, 2006
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/mar/24/terrorism.world> at May 19, 2010.
“Supergrass Tells of Terror Fight” BBC News, March 24, 2006
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4835666.stm> at June 5, 2010.
“Suspect ‘Threw Bomb from Vehicle’” BBC News, October 17, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7676091.stm> at July 5, 2010.
Sutherland, Edwin, Principles of Criminology, 4th ed. (1947) Philadelphia: Lippincott, cited in Matsueda
“Differential Social Organization, Collective Action and Crime”.
Sutherly, Ben “Two Tell of Fears About Email: Jordanian Faces Jail, Deportation on Giving False Info”
Dayton Daily News, January 19, 2006 via Highbeam research

411

<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-11960431.html> at June 9, 2010.
Swann, Steve, “Aabid Khan and his Global Jihad” BBC News, August 18, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7549447.stm> at June 24, 2010.
Swann, Steve, “How British Muslim Adam Khatib Became a Bomb Plotter” BBC News, December 9,
2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8381192.stm> at July 1, 2010.
Swann, Steve, “The Web-War Waged from a Bedroom” BBC News, January 16, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7191597.stm> at July 2, 2010.
Swarns, Rachel, “U.S. Deports Charity Leader in Visa Dispute” New York Times, July 16, 2003
<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/16/us/threats-and-responses-a-michigan-case-us-deportscharity-leader-in-visa-dispute.html> at April 17, 2010.
Taarnby Jensen, Michael, Jihad in Denmark: An Overview and Analysis of Jihadi Activity in Denmark
1990-2006 (2006) Danish Institute for International Studies: Copenhagen.
Taarnby, Michael, Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives (2005) Danish
Ministry of Justice.
“Taheri-Azar Writes to Eyewitness News” ABC News, March 14, 2006
<http://abclocal.go.com/wtvd/story?section=news/local&id=3992674> at June 10, 2010.
Tajfel, Henry, & Turner, John, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict” (1979) In W. G. Austin &
S. Worchel (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole,
33-47.
Tawil, Camille “Libyan Islamists Back Away from al-Qaeda Merger in Reconciliation with Qaddafi
Regime” (2009) Terrorism Monitor, 7:17
<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35147> at May
25, 2010.
Taylor, Peter, “Young British Muslim Ex-Prisoners Unrepentant on Views” BBC News, February 8, 2010
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8500782.stm> at July 3, 2010.
Temple-Raston, Dina, “Enemy Within? Not Quite” The Washington Post, September 9, 2007
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/07/AR2007090702049.html>
at October 29, 2007.
Teotonio, Isabel, “Toronto 18 Ringleader Pleads Guilty in Terror Trial” Toronto Star, May 10, 2010
<http://www.thestar.com/breakingnews/article/807202--toronto-18-ringleader-pleads-guilty-toterror-offences?bn=1> at June 8, 2010.

412

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
“Terror Accused Appear in Court” BBC News, March 7, 2005
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4321941.stm> at June 23, 2010.
“Terror Accused ‘Storing Petrol’” BBC News, November 30, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/derbyshire/8387428.stm> at July 6, 2010.
“Terror Accused ‘Tortured in Past’” BBC News, July 18, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7514364.stm> at July 5, 2010.
“Terror Charge Briton Called for Murder of Gordon Brown” BBC News, May 10, 2010
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8672819.stm> at July 6, 2010.
“Terror Charge Briton was ‘Lonely’, Court Told” BBC News, June 23, 2010
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/10397018.stm> at July 3, 2010.
“Terror Charge Woman Due in Court” BBC News, September 26, 2006
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5380484.stm> at June 29, 2010.
“Terror Charges Unsealed In Minnesota Against Eight Defendants, Justice Department Announces” US
Department of Justice, November 23, 2009
<http://www.justice.gov/usao/mn/major/major0459.pdf> at

June 11, 2010.

“Terror Code Man Gets 15-Year Term” BBC News, September 23, 2005
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4275054.stm> at June 21, 2010.
“Terror Supplier Gets Nine Years” BBC News, March 17, 2006
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/coventry_warwickshire/4817432.stm> at June 23,
2010.
“Terror Suspect Abid Naseer Held on US Warrant” BBC News, July 8, 2010
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/10543048.stm> at July 17, 2010.
“Terror Suspect Video ‘A Mistake’” BBC News, July 1, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7483685.stm> at July 1, 2010.
“Terror Trial Hears Threat Claims” BBC News, August 23, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/tayside_and_central/6960285.stm> at June 24,
2010.
Terrorism Act (2000) HM Government, UK, London: The Stationery Office
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/pdf/ukpga_20000011_en.pdf> at December 9, 2007.
Terrorism and the Law (2008) UK Home Office

413

<http://web.archive.org/web/20080214085329/http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism
-and-the-law/> at April 28, 2009.
“‘Terrorist Manual’ Found in House” BBC News, November 6, 2003
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/3247919.stm> at June 23, 2010.
“Terrorist Planned to ‘Kill Many’” The Herald, January 9, 2008
<http://www.heraldscotland.com/terrorist-planned-to-kill-many-1.872265> at July 2, 2010.
“Terrorist Organization Profile: al-Qaeda” (2008) START website
<http://www.start.umd.edu/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=6> at February 19,
2009.
“Terrorist Organization Profile: al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula” (2008) START website
<http://www.start.umd.edu/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4470> at February
19, 2009.
“Terrorist Organization Profile: al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers” (2008) START
website <http://www.start.umd.edu/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4416> at
February 19, 2009.
“Terrorist Organization Profile: Jaish-e-Mohammad” (2008) START website
<http://www.start.umd.edu/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=58> at February 19,
2009.
“Terrorist Organization Profile: Lashkar-e-Taiba” (2008) START website
<http://www.start.umd.edu/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=66> at February 19,
2009.
“Terrorist Organization Profile: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)” START website
<http://www.start.umd.edu/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=85> at February 19,
2009.
“Terrorist Trial Report Card: U.S. Edition: September 11, 2001- September 11, 2006: Appendix B,
Chronologic Table of Cases”, The Center on Law and Security
<http://www.lawandsecurity.org/publications/TTRC_US_2006_Appendix_B.pdf> at June 12,
2008.

414

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
The 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Against the United States: Official Government Edition (2004) US Government Printing
Office.
The Associated Press, “Philippine Authorities Arrest Three Middle Eastern Nationals Allegedly Plotting
to Bomb Embassies” The Jakarta Post, March 7, 2008.
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/03/06/philippine-authorities-arrest-3-middleeastern-nationals-allegedly-plotting-bomb-emb> at May 9, 2009.
“The Attempted Bombings of 21/7 (Op. VIVACE)” Crown Prosecution Service, undated
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2007.html#a03> at June 27, 2010.
“The Blackburn Resistance: Three Men ‘Intoxicated by Evil of Terrorism’, Court Hears” The Telegraph,
February 19, 2010 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/7265135/TheBlackburn-Resistance-three-men-intoxicated-by-evil-of-terrorism-court-hears.html> at July 3,
2010.
“The Columbus Mall Plot” NEFA Foundation, August 2007
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/ColumbusMall_Plot.pdf> at June 1, 2010.
“The Guantanamo Docket” New York Times, May 16, 2010 <http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo> at
June 5, 2010.
“The Herald Square Plot” NEFA Foundation, 2008
<www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/.../HeraldSquarePlot.pdf> at February 23, 2010.
“The Middle Class Terrorist from Bristol” Bristol Evening Post, July 18, 2009
<http://www.thisisbristol.co.uk/news/article-1177052-detail/article.html> at July 6, 2010.
“The Muslim Population in the United States” American Muslim Council, undated
<http://www.islam101.com/history/population2_usa.html> at June 15, 2010.
“‘Threats to UK Security’ Detained” BBC News, August12, 2005
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4141000.stm> at May 20, 2010.
“Three Men Admit Using Internet to Incite Terrorism in First British Case” Crown Prosecution Service,
July 5, 2007 <http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/press_releases/137_07/> at June 25, 2010.
“Three Brothers Sentenced to Life Prison Terms for Conspiring to Kill U.S. Soldiers” US Department of
Justice, April 28, 2009 <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/842.pdf > at
June 11, 2010.

415

“Three Guilty of Bomb Conspiracy” BBC News, September 8, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7528483.stm> at July 1, 2010.
“Three Jailed for Publisher Arson” BBC News, October 2, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/8139076.stm> at July 6, 2010.
“Three Jailed in Bosnia for Planning Suicide Attack” Reuters, January 10, 2007
<http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L10385465.htm> at June 25, 2010.
“Three Sentenced for Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Acts Against Americans Overseas” US Department
of Justice, October 22, 2009 <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/October/09-nsd-1136.html> at
June 5, 2010.
“Timeline: Failed Car Bomb Attacks” BBC News, July 6, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6260626.stm> at July 5, 2010.
“Timeline: The Muhammad Cartoons” The Times, February 6, 2006
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article725158.ece> at July 2, 2010.
“Tip-off Saved Bristol Shoppers from Bombing” Bristol Evening Post, July 18, 2009
<http://www.thisisbristol.co.uk/news/Tip-saved-Bristol-shoppers-bombing/article-1177067detail/article.html> at July 6, 2010.
“Trial Verdicts” BBC News, September 8, 2008 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7605011.stm> at
July 1, 2010.
“Totally Arbitrary: Marty Slams EU, UN Terror Blacklists” Spiegel Online International, November 13,
2007 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,517043,00.html> at November 13,
2007.
Tran, Mark, “Activist Tried to Raise Cash for Iraq Insurgents” The Guardian, February 4, 2008
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/feb/04/terrorism.ukcrime/print> at June 25, 2010.
Tran, Mark, “Confession Triggers Appeal in Daniel Pearl Case” The Guardian, March 19, 2007
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/mar/19/pakistan.alqaida> at June 23, 2010.
“Transcript: ‘7/7 Bombing Not Even Breakfast for Me’” The Times, February 26, 2008
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article3438323.ece> at June 20, 2010.
Travis, Alan, “Islam4UK to be Banned, Says Alan Johnson” The Guardian, January 12, 2010
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/jan/12/islam4uk-banned-alan-johnson-islamist> at
June 25, 2010.

416

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Travis, Alan, “Officials Think UK’s Muslim Population Has Risen to 2m” (2008) The Guardian, April 8,
2008 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/08/population.islam> at September 3, 2008.
Travis, Alan, “Y, the Bookshop Worker Held to be a National Security Threat” The Guardian, August 25,
2006 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/aug/25/terrorism.immigrationpolicy> at June 23,
2010.
“Treasury Department Statement Regarding the Designation of the Global Relief Foundation” U.S.
Department of the Treasury, October 18, 2002,
<http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3553.htm> at April 17, 2010.
Turner, John, “Social Categorization and the Self-Concept: A Social Cognitive Theory of Group
Behavior” (1985) In E. J. Lawler (Ed.), Advances in Group Processes: Theory and Research,
Vol.2, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, pp. 77-122.
“Two Terror Suspects are Released” BBC News, September 6, 2006
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5318844.stm> at June 28, 2010.
Tyler, Patrick, Van Natta Jr., Don, Oppel Jr., Richard, & Lipton, Eric, “British Charge 8 with Conspiracy
in a Terror Plot” New York Times, August 18, 2004
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/18/world/british-charge-8-with-conspiracy-in-a-terrorplot.html?scp=10&sq=Mohammed%20Naeem%20Noor%20Khan&st=cse> at June 22, 2010.
“UK Camps ‘Preparation for Terror’” BBC News, October 17, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7039608.stm> at June 20, 2010.
“UK Unveils National Security Strategy Before Review” Jane’s Country Risk Daily Report, October 19,
2010.
“UK Fertiliser Bomb Plot” BBC News, undated
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457032/html/nn1page6.stm> at May 20,=
2010.
“UK Fertiliser Bomb Plot: 7/7 Links” BBC News, undated
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457032/html/nn5page1.stm> at June 24,
2010.
“UK Militant ‘Killed in Pakistan’” BBC News, November 22, 2008
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7743334.stm> at July 1, 2010.

417

“UNC Grad Allegedly Ran Down Students to Avenge Muslims” USA Today, March 6, 2006
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-03-06-unc-crash_x.htm> at June 10, 2010.
United States v. Abdul Tawala Ibn Alishtari & Brian Anderson, Superseding Indictment, United States
District Court Southern District of New York, Case No. S1 07 CR-115 (AKH) March 26, 2007
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/364.pdf> at June 9, 2010.
United States v. Abu Doha (2001) United States Southern District of New York, Sealed Complaint, July
2nd, 2001
<http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/abudoha/usabudoha70201cmpt.pdf > at
February 19, 2008.
United States v. Adham Amin Hasson, Kifah Wael Jayyousi, Kassem Daher and Jose Padilla,
Superseding Indictment, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Case No. 04
60001-CR-COOKE, November 17, 2005
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Padilla_SpcIndictment.pdf> at
June 1, 2010.
United States v. Adnan Babar Mirza, Superseding Indictment, United States District Court Southern
District of Texas, Case No. H-06-421 S, September 19, 2007
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Mirza_SpcIndictment.pdf> at
June 9, 2010.
United States v. Ahmad Omar Saeed Sheikh, Indictment, United States District Court District of New
Jersey, March 2002
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Sheikh_Indictment.pdf>
at June 23, 2010.
United States v. Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed, Sentencing Memorandum, United States District
Court Middle District of Florida, Case No. 8:07-CR-342-T-23MAP, November 4, 2008
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/US_v_Mohamed_SentencingMe
mo.pdf > at June 12, 2010.
United States v. Ahmed Ali Omar, Khalid Mohamud Abshir, Zakaria Maruf, Mohamed Abdullahi Hassan
& Mustafa Ali Salat, Second Superseding Indictment, Case No. 09-50 (JMR/SRN), August 20,
2009 <http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/US_v_Salat_indictment.pdf> at June 11,
2010.

418

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
United States v. Ahmed Ibrahim Bilal, Plea Agreement, United States District Court for the District of
Oregon, Case No. 02-399-03-JO, September, 2003
<http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/usabilal91803plea.pdf> at June
1, 2010.
United States v. Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, Appeal, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
Case No. 06-4334, June 6, 2008
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/589.pdf> at June 3, 2010.
United States v. Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, Indictment, United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, Case No. 1:05CR53, February 23, 2005
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/86.pdf> at June 3, 2010.
United States v. Ali Asad Chandia and Mohammed Ajmal Khan, Indictment, United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, Case No. 1:05-CR-401, September 14, 2005
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1087.pdf> at June 3, 2010.
United States v. Bryant Neal Vinas, Superseding Information, United States District Court Eastern
District of New York, Case No. CR-08-823 (NGG) January 28, 2009
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/US_v_Vinas_spcindictment.pdf>
at June 13, 2010.
United States v. Cabdullahi Ahmed Faarax & Abdulweli Yassin Isse, Affidavit, United States District
Court State and District of Minnesota, October 8, 2009
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/US_v_Faarax_complaint.pdf> at June 11, 2010.
United States v. Christopher Paul, Indictment, United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, Case No. 2:07-CR-087-GLF, April 11, 2007
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Paul_Indictment.pdf> at June 1,
2010.
United States v. Christopher Paul, Plea Agreement, United States District Court, Southern District of
Ohio, Eastern Division, Case No. 2:07-CR-087-GLF, June 2, 2008
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/US_v_Paul_plea.pdf> at June 1,
2010.
United States v. Daniel Joseph Maldonado, Criminal Complaint, States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, Case No. CR-H-07-125M, February 13, 2007

419

<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Maldonado_Complaint.pdf> at
June 11, 2010.
United States v. Daniel Joseph Maldonado, Exhibit: Handwritten Notes, United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas, Case No. CR-H-07-125M, February 21, 2007
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Maldonado_HandwrittenNotes.
pdf> at June 11, 2010.
United States v. Daniel Patrick Boyd et al (2009) Superseding Indictment, United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina, 5:09-CR-216-1-FL
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1075.pdf> at May 25, 2010.
United States v. Derrick Shareef, Affidavit, United States District Court Northern District of Illinois, Case
No. 06-CR-0919, December 8, 2006
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Shareef_Complaint.pdf> at June
10, 2010.
United States v. Dhiren Barot, Nadeem Tarmohamed & Qaisar Shaffi, Indictment, United States District
Court Southern District of New York, Case No. 05 CRIM. 311, April 2005
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Barot_Indictment.pdf> at June
22, 2010.
United States v. Enaam Arnaout, Indictment, United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, Case No. 02 CR 892, April 2002
<http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/usarnaout10902ind.pdf> at June
1, 2010.
United States v. Hamid Hayat and Umer Hayat, First Superseding Indictment, United States District
Court for the Eastern District of California, Case No. CR: 05-240 GEB, September 22, 2005
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/176.pdf> at June 6, 2010.
United Stated v. Iyman Faris, Statement of Facts, United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, Case No. 03-189-A, May 2003
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/229.pdf> at June 3, 2010.
United States v. Jeffrey Leon Battle et al, United States District Court for the District of Oregon, Case No.
CR 01-399 HA, October 2, 2003

420

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
<http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/usbattle100302ind.pdf> at June
1, 2010.
United States v. John Doe, Transcript for Motion to Close Courtroom, United States District Court
Eastern District of New York, Case No. 08-CR-823 (NGG) January 28, 2009
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/US_v_Vinas_guiltytranscript.pdf
> at June 13, 2010.
United States v. Kevin James, Levar Washington, Gregory Patterson and Hammad Samana, Indictment,
United States District Court for the Central District of California, October 2006
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1089.pdf> at June 7, 2010.
United States v. Khalid Ouazzani, Information, United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri, Case No. 10-00025-01-CR-W-HFS, May 19, 2010
<http://www.justice.gov/usao/mow/news2010/ouazzani_information.pdf> at June 14, 2010.
United States v. Khalid Ouazzani, Plea Agreement, United States District Court for the Western District
of Missouri, Case No. 10-00025-01-CR-W-HFS, May 19, 2010
<http://media.kansascity.com/smedia/2010/05/19/15/ouazzani_plea.source.prod_affiliate.81.pdf
> at June 14, 2010.
United States v. Kobie Diallo Williams and Adnan Babar Mirza, Indictment, United States District Court
Southern District of Texas, Case No. H 06-421, November 22, 2006
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Williams_Indictment.pdf> at
June 9, 2010.
United States v. Maher Mofeid Hawash, Plea Agreement, United States District Court for the District of
Oregon, Case No. 02-399-07-JO, August 6, 2003
<http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/usvhawash80603plea.pdf> at
June 2, 2010.
United States v. Mahmud Faruq Brent, Complaint, United States District Court Southern District of New
York, August 3, 2005 <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1086.pdf> at
June 4, 2010.
United States v. Mark Robert Walker, Criminal Complaint, United States District Court Western District
of Texas, Case No. 04-5015 G, November 12, 2004
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/943.pdf> at June 7, 2010.

421

United States v. Michael Curtis Reynolds, Superseding Indictment, United States District Court Middle
District of Pennsylvania, Case No. 3:CR-05-493, October 3, 2006
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Reynolds_SpcIndictment.pdf>
at June 9, 2010.
United States v. Mohammad Radwan Obeid, Sentencing Memorandum, United States District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio, Case No. 3:05-CR-149, May 26, 2006
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Obeid_USGSentencingM
emo.pdf> at June 9, 2010.
United States v. Mohammed Abdullah Warsame, Affidavit in Support of Pretrial Detention, United States
District Court District of Minnesota, Case No. 04-29 (JRT/FLN) February 6, 2004
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/US_v_Warsame_FBIaffidavit.pdf
> at June 4, 2010.
United States v. Mohamad Ibrahim Schnewer, Dritan Duka, Eljvir Duka, Shain Duka & Serdar Tatar,
Search Warrant Affidavit, Case No. 07-459 (RBK)
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/US_v_Shnewer_SearchWarrantAf
fidavit.pdf> at June 11, 2010.
United States v. Mohamad Ibrahim Schnewer, Dritan Duka, Eljvir Duka, Shain Duka & Serdar Tatar,
Superseding Indictment, United States District Court District of New Jersey, Case No. 07-459
(RBK) January 15, 2008
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Shnewer_SpcInd.pdf> at June
11, 2010.
United States v. Mohammed Junaid Babar, Waiver of Indictment, United States District Court Sothern
District of New York, Case No. 04-CR, 2004
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/97.pdf> at June 5, 2010.
United States v. Mohammed Zaki Amawi, Marwan Othman El-Hindi, Wassim Mazloum, Zubair Ahmed &
Khaleel Ahmed, Superseding Indictment, United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio, February 2007 <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/448.pdf> at
June 5, 2010.

422

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
United States v. Mustafa Kamel Mustafa, Indictment, United States District Court Southern District of
New York, Cr. 04 356, April 19, 2004 <http://www.cdi.org/news/law/ushamza.pdf> at June 21,
2010.
United States v. Mustafa Kamel Mustafa, Oussama Abdallah Kassir & Haroon Rashid Aswat, Indictment,
United States District Court Southern District of New York, Case No. S2 04 Cr.356 (JFK)
February 6, 2006 <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/507.pdf> at May
20, 2010.
United States v. Narseal Batiste et al, Indictment, United States District Court, Southern District of
Florida, Case No. 06-20373, June 22, 2006
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/742.pdf> at June 9, 2010.
United States v. Nuradin Abdi, Appeal, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Case No. 05
4199 September 22, 2006
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Abdi_6thCircuitAppealsOpinio
n.pdf> at June 1, 2010.
United States v. Rahman et al. (1999) United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 189 F.3d 88.
United States v. Randall Todd Royer et al, Indictment, The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, Case No. 03-, June 2003
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/156.pdf> at June 3, 2010.
United States v. Richard Colvin Reid, Indictment, United States District Court District of Massachusetts,
Case No. CR-2-10013-WEY, January 16, 2002
<http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2002/01/reidindictment.pdf> at June 21, 2010.
United States v. Ronald Allen Grecula, Superseding Indictment, United States District Court Southern
District of Texas, Case No. H-05-257-S, August 8, 2006
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/336.pdf> at June 8, 2010.
United States v. Ruben Luis Leon Shumpert, Complaint, United States District Court Western District of
Washington, Case No. 06-631-M, November 29, 2006
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Shumpert_Complaint.pdf
> at June 12, 2010
United States v. Ruben Luis Leon Shumpert, Sentencing Memorandum, United States District Court
Western District of Washington, Case No. CR-04-494-MJP, CR-04-495-MJP, July 18, 2006

423

<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Shumpert_SentencingMe
morandum.pdf> at June 12, 2010.
United States v. Saajid Mohammed Badat, Superseding Indictment, United States District Court District
of Massachusetts, Case No. CR-04-10223 (GRO) September 2004
<http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/reid/usbadat904ind.pdf> at June 21, 2010.
United States v. Syed Haris Ahmed, Second Superseding Indictment, United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, Case No. 1:06-CR-147-WSD-GGB, December 9, 2008
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/750.pdf> at June 8, 2010.
United States v. Syed Hashmi, Indictment, United States District Court Southern District of New York,
Case No. 06 CR.442, 2006 <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/421.pdf>
at June 6, 2010.
United States v. Syed Mustajab Shah, Muhammed Abid Afridi & Ilyas Ali, Indictment, United States
District Court, Southern District of California, Case No. 02-CR-2912, October 30, 2002
<http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/usshah103002ind.pdf> at June
4, 2010.
United States v. Tarek Mehanna, Criminal Complaint, United States District Court District of
Massachusetts, Case No. 08-148-LTS, November 7, 2008
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/726.pdf> at June 11, 2010.
United States v. Umer Hayat, Affidavit, United States District Court Eastern District of California, June
7, 2005 <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/174.pdf> at June 6, 2010.
United States v. Usama bin Laden et al. (1998) United States District Court Southern District of New
York, S (10) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS)
<http://news.corporate.findlaw.com/legalnews/us/terrorism/cases/background.html> at May 20,
2010.
United States v. Uzair Paracha, Indictment, United States District Court Southern District of New York,
Case No. 03 CR., 2003 <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/243.pdf> at
June 5, 2010.
United States v. Yassin Muhiddin Aref & Mohammed Mosharref Hossain, Superseding Indictment,
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, Case No. 1:04-CR-402

424

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
(TJM) September 29, 2005 <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/181.pdf>
at June 5, 2010.
United States v. Zubair Ahmed and Khaleel Ahmed, Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant, February 16,
2007
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_ZubairAhmed_FBIAffidavit.pdf
> at June 5, 2010.
United States v. Zubair Ahmed and Khaleel Ahmed, Indictment, United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, Case No. 1:07CR 647, December 13, 2007
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/760.pdf> at June 5 , 2010.
“U.S. Citizen Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to Conspiring Provide Material Support to Al
Qaeda” US Department of Justice, April 27, 2010
<http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1219.pdf> at June 6, 2010.
“US Citizen Pleads Guilty to Training to Fight Jihad” US Department of Justice, April 19, 2007
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Maldonado_DOJPR_GuiltyPlea
.pdf> at June 11, 2010.
“U.S. Commander Sees Fewer Foreign Fighters in Iraq” Reuters, June 16, 2009
<http://www.military-world.net/Iraq/1613.html> at June 25, 2010.
“U.S. Convicts Pakistani of Providing Support to Al Qaeda” US Department of Justice, November 25,
2005
<http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Paracha_DOJPRConviction.pdf
> at June 5, 2010.
US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, The Department of Justice’s
Internal Controls Over Terrorism Reporting (2007) Audit Report 07-20
<http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/DOJreport.pdf> at September 3, 2008.
“US ‘Identifies’ Terror Tape Man” BBC News, November 10, 2004
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3999801.stm> at June 1, 2010.
“US Man Pleads Guilty to Aiding al-Qaeda” BBC News, April 28, 2010
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8647985.stm> at June 6, 2010
“US Muslim Charity Head Arrested” BBC News, May 1, 2002
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1960650.stm> at June 1, 2010.

425

“US Seeks to Deport to Haiti Man who was Cleared in ‘Liberty City 7’ Terrorism Case” Associated Press
Worldstream, February 6, 2008, via Highbeam Research
<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1A1-D8UKUO8G0.html> at June 9, 2010
Vidino, Lorenzo, Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad (2006) New York:
Prometheus Books.
Vidino, Lorenzo, “Current Trends in Jihadi Networks in Europe” (2007) Terrorism Monitor, 5:20, 8-11.
Vidino, Lorenzo, “Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New and Occasional
Phenomenon?” (2009) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 32:1, 1-17.
Vidino, Lorenzo, “The Hofstad Group: The New Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe” (2007) Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, 30:7, 579-592.
“Virginia: Terror-Related Verdict Upheld” New York Times, June 24, 2008
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9802EED71738F937A15755C0A96E9C8B63
&&scp=1&sq=Sabri%20Benkahla&st=cse> at June 4, 2010.
Wald, Jonathan, “N.Y. Man Admits He Aided al Qaeda, Set up Jihad Camp” CNN, August 12, 2004
<http://edition.cnn.com/2004/LAW/08/11/ny.terror.suspect/> at June 5, 2010.
Waldman, Amy, “Arrested Qaeda Operative: Life of Degrees and Aliases” New York Times, August 6,
2004
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/06/world/threats-responses-go-between-arrested-qaedaoperative-life-degreesaliases.html?scp=1&sq=Mohammed%20Naeem%20Noor%20Khan&st=cse> at June 22, 2010.
Walker, Marlon, “Man Gets 33 Years for Plowing SUV into UNC Students” Boston Globe, August 27,
2008
<http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2008/08/27/man_gets_33_years_for_pl
owing_suv_into_unc_students/> at June 10, 2010.
Walker, Peter, “Man Convicted of Keeping Terror Manuals” The Guardian, July 5, 2007
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/jul/05/alqaida.terrorism> at July 2, 2010.
Walsh, James, “Court Records Details Minnesota Somalis’ Path to Terrorism” Minneapolis Star Tribune,
July 15, 2009
<http://www.startribune.com/local/50806557.html?elr=KArksi8D3PE7_8yc+D3aiUo8D3PE7_e
yc+D3aiUiD3aPc:_Yyc:aUUr> at June 11, 2010.

426

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Walsh, James, & Merryhew, Richard, “Alleged Somali Recruiter Arrested, Linked to Minnesota”
Minneapolis Star Tribune, November 11, 2009
<http://www.startribune.com/local/69713097.html?elr=KArksi8cyaiUjc8LDyiUiD3aPc:_Yyc:a
UU> at June 11, 2010.
Walsh, James, & Mayhew, Richard, “Plea Deal for Somali Terrorism Suspect” Minneapolis Star Tribune,
August 13, 2009, via Highbeam Research <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1205755302.html> at June 11, 2010.
Warr, Jane, “Suicide Bomber ‘Was UK Muslim’” BBC News, December 28, 2000
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1091056.stm> at May 19, 2010.
Warr, Mark, “Organization and Instigation in Delinquent Groups” (1996) Criminology, 34:1, 11-37.
Wasserman, Stanley, & Fauss, Katherine, Social Network Analysis (1994) Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press.
Weatherston, David, & Moran, Jonathan, “Terrorism and Mental Illness: Is There a Relationship?” (2003)
International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 47:6, 698-713.
“Web Designer Guilty of Inciting Murder at Cartoon Protest” The Times, July 5, 2007
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article2031503.ece?token=null&offset=0> at July 2,
2010.
“‘Weeks’ before al-Qaeda Judgement” BBC News, October 17, 2005
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4351204.stm> at June 23, 2010.
Weinberg, Leonard, Pedahzur, Ami, & Hirsch-Hoefler, Sivan, “The Challenges of Conceptualizing
Terrorism” (2004) Terrorism and Political Violence, 16:4, 777-794.
Weine, Stevan, Horgan, John, Robertson, Cheryl, Loue, Sana, Mohamed, Amin, & Noor, Sahra,
“Community and Family Approaches to Combating the Radicalization and Recruitment of
Somali-American Youth and Young Adults: A Psycho-Social Perspective” (2009) Dynamics of
Asymmetric Conflict, 2:3, 181-200.
“Westchester Man Sentenced to 121 Months in Prison in Manhattan Federal Court for Attempting to
Finance Terrorism and Perpetrating Massive Investment Fraud” US Department of Justice, April
19, 2010 <http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/US_v_Alishtari_dojprsent.pdf> at June
9, 2010.

427

Wheatley, Joseph, & McCauley, Clark, “Losing your Audience: Desistance from Terrorism in Egypt after
Luxor” (2008) Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 1:3, 250-268.
Whitlock, Craig “Britain Pays to Keep Suspects from U.S. Hands” Washington Post, May 2, 2009
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/01/AR2009050102919.html>
at May 20, 2010.
Wictorowicz, Quintan, “A Genealogy of Radical Islam” (2005) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 28,
75-97.
Wictorowicz, Quintan, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement” (2006) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,
29:3, 207-239
Wiktorowicz, Quintan, “Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory: A New Direction for Research”
(2002) Mediterranean Politics, 7:3, 187-211.
Wiktorowicz, Quintan, “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam” (2004) Presented at The
Roots of Islamic Radicalism Conference, Yale University, New Haven, May 10
<http://www.yale.edu/polisci/info/conferences/Islamic%20Radicalism/papers/wiktorowicpaper.p
df> at February 7, 2009.
Wiktorowicz, Quintan, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (2005) Lanham, Maryland:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Wilensky-Lanford, Ethan, & Rohde, David, “Relatives Noticed Changes in Accused Plotters” New York
Times, May 11, 2007
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/11/nyregion/11plot.html?bl&ex=1179028800&en=0109c8f1
6c4caee4&ei=5087%0A> at June 11, 2010.
Wilkinson, Matthew, “Al Qaida Terrorists Jailed for Credit Card Fraud Fund” Birmingham Post, April 2,
2003 via Highbeam Research <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-99485868.html> at June 22,
2010.
Wilkinson, Paul, (ed) Homeland Security in the UK: Future Preparedness for Terrorists Attack Since
9/11 (2007) Oxon: Routledge.
Weerman, Frank, “Co-Offending as Social Exchange: Explaining Characteristics of Co-Offending”
British Journal of Criminology (2003) 43, 398-416.
Willing, Richard, “Pursuit of al-Qaeda Keeps Coming Back to Fla.” USA Today.com, June 15, 2003
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-06-15-florida-usat_x.htm> at February 23, 2010.

428

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
Williams, Dave, ‘The Bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York City’ (1998) International
Criminal Police Review, 469-471; reproduced in Politics of the “War on Terrorism”
<http://www.learnworld.com/COURSES/P72/P72.2002.Q4.ReaderOne.pdf> at December 11,
2007.
Williams, Rachel, “7/7 Bombing Retrial Likely after Jury Discharged” The Guardian, August 2, 2008
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/aug/02/july7.uksecurity> at July 4, 2010.
Whitlock, Craig, “Trial of French Islamic Radical Sheds Light on Converts’ Role” The Washington Post
(Washington) January 1, 2006.
Whitney, Craig, “40 on Trial in Paris on Charges of Aiding ’95 Algerian Bombers” The New York Times
November 27, 1997 <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/27/world/40-on-trial-in-paris-oncharges-of-aiding-95-algerianbombers.html?n=Top%2fReference%2fTimes%20Topics%2fSubjects%2fT%2fTerrorism> at
November 10, 2007.
“Woman Guilty of Terror Charge (Oldham)” Greater Manchester Police, undated
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/GMP_RomaGuilty.pdf> at July 5,
2010.
“Woman Sentenced for Jihad Leaflet” BBC News, March 30, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7972580.stm> at July 5, 2010.
“Woman Sought by FBI Reportedly Arrested in Pakistan” NBC News, April 3, 2003
<http://web.archive.org/web/20070416115222/http://www.intellnet.org/news/2003/04/03/191371.html> at October 27, 2010.
Woolcock, Nicola, “Plumber ‘Planned to Bring Down Jet’ in Rocket Attack” The Times, June 20, 2007
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article1729047.ece> at June 29, 2010.
Woolcock, Nicola, “Student’s Wife ‘Encouraged him to Become a Terrorist’” The Times, May 31, 2007
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article1862719.ece> at July 2, 2010.
Woolcock, Nicola, “Three Students Jailed for Inciting Terrorism on ‘Holy War’ Websites” The Times,
July 6, 2007 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article2034011.ece> at June 25,
2010.
“Wyotech Terror Suspect Gets Two Years” Trib.com (Wyoming) May 1, 2005

429

<http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/article_11db83eb-2d3e-5715-9ce2-1bd5a6d2f33e.html>
at June 7, 2010.
“Yassim Nassari (Op BIVALVE)” Crown Prosecution Service, undated
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2007.html#a12> at July 2, 2010.
Yeoman, Fran, “Four Jailed for Hate Crimes at Cartoon Protest” The Times, July 18, 2007
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article2097883.ece> at July 2, 2010.
Yuen, Laura, & Baran, Madeleine, “Charges Against 8 in Missing Somali Case Unsealed” Minnesota
Public Radio, November 23, 2009
<http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/11/23/somali-update/> at June 11, 2010.
Zambelis, Chris, “A Profile of Radical Jamaican-Born Cleric Sheikh Abdullah al-Faisal al-Jamaikee”
(2010) Militant Leadership Monitor, 1:2, 2-4.
Zill, Oriana, “Portrait of Wadih El Hage, Accused Terrorist” Frontline, September 12, 2001
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/upclose/elhage.html> at October 10,
2008.

430

Appendix A Part 1:
List of US Cases Included in the Sample in Chronological Order

N = 46 cases, 91 individuals

Case #

Name

Case description

1

Christopher Paul

Long term AQ involvement

Date
range
from
1990

2

Enaam Arnaout

BIF

1985

2002

3

Jose Padilla

1993

2002

3

Adham Amin Hassoun

1993

2002

3

Kifah Wael Jayyousi

1993

2002

4
5
6
7
7

Ali Saleh Kalah al‐Marri
Nuradin Abdi
Iyman Faris
Ali al‐Timimi
Randal Todd Royer
Ibrahim Ahmed al‐
Hamdi
Masoud Ahmad Khan
Yong Ki Kwon
Mohammed Aatique
Seifullah Chapman
Hammad Abdur‐
Raheem
Donald Thomas Surrat
Khwaja Mahmood
Hasan
Ali Asad Chandia

1998
1999
2000
2000
2000

2003
2003
2003
2003
2003

Virginia jihad network

2000

2003

Virginia jihad network
Virginia jihad network
Virginia jihad network
Virginia jihad network

2000
2000
2000
2000

2003
2003
2003
2003

Virginia jihad network

2000

2003

Virginia jihad network

2000

2003

Virginia jihad network

2000

2003

Virginia jihad network

2000

2005

8

Mohammed Abdullah
Warsame

Trained & fought in
Afghanistan; maintained
contact with al‐Qaeda

2000

2003

9

John Walker Lindh

American Taliban

2000

2001

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

432

Conspiracy to murder
overseas + material support
Conspiracy to murder
overseas + material support
Conspiracy to murder
overseas + material support
KSM sleeper agent
Plot to attack shopping mall
Brooklyn bridge plot
Virginia jihad network
Virginia jihad network

Date
range to
2007
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Case #

Name

Case description

10
10
10
10

Portland 7
Portland 7
Portland 7
Portland 7
Portland 7

1998

2002

Portland 7

1998

2002

Portland 7

1998

2002

11
12

Abdulla al‐Saoub
Jeffrey Battle
Patrice Lumumba Ford
Ahmed Ibrahim Bilal
Muhammad Ibrahim
Bilal
Habis Abdulla al‐Saoub
October Martinique
Lewis
Adam Gadahn
Ilyas Ali

Date
range
from
1998
1998
1998
1998

1997
2002

...
2002

13

Ahmed Omar Abu Ali

2000

2003

14

Mohammed Junaid
Babar

2002

2004

15

Tarik Ibn Osman Shah

AQ Spokesman
Drugs for missiles
Plan to assassinate George
W. Bush
Support to AQ; involvement
in UK Crevice group &
others
Support for terrorists
abroad; offering services to
AQ

2001

2005

15

Rafiq Sabir

Support for terrorists
abroad; offering services to
AQ

2001

2005

15

Mahmud Faruq Brent

Support for terrorists
abroad; offering services to
AQ

2001

2005

15

Abdulrahman Farhane

Support for terrorists
abroad; offering services to
AQ

2001

2005

16

Uzair Paracha

Plot to facilitate Khan's
entry to US for attacks

2003

2003

17

Yassin Muhiddin Aref

$ laundering for JeM terror
attack in NYC

2003

2004

Mohammed Mosharref
Hossain
Hamid Hayat

$ laundering for JeM terror
attack in NYC
Trained in Pakistan

2003

2004

2003

2005

10
10
10

17
18

Date
range to
2002
2002
2002
2002
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Case #

Name

Case description

Date
range
from

19

Mohammed Zaki
Amawi

Training at home for jihad
abroad

2003

2006

19

Marwan Othman el‐
Hindi

Training at home for jihad
abroad

2003

2006

19

Wassim Mazloum

Training at home for jihad
abroad

2003

2006

20

Saifullah Anjum Ranjha

Illegal $ transfer with 6
others; thought $ was for
al‐Qaeda

2003

2007

21

Ryan Anderson
Ahmed Hassan Al‐
Uqaily
James Elshafay
Shahawar Matin Siraj

Military intell to AQ
Angry at Iraq; bought
weapons from FBI
Herald Square plot
Herald Square plot

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004
2004

2004
2004

24

Mark Robert Walker

Providing support, inc.
websites, for Al‐Ittihad al‐
Islamia

2004

2004

25
25
25
25

Kevin James
Levar Washington
Gregory Patterson
Hammad Samana

2004
2004
2004
2004

2005
2005
2005
2005

26

Syed Hashmi

2003

2006

27

Syed Haris Ahmed

Trained at home; sought
jihad abroad; global
contacts.

2004

2006

27

Ehsanul Islam
Sadequee

Trained at home; sought
jihad abroad; global
contacts.

2004

2006

28

Zubair Ahmed

Training at home for jihad
abroad

2004

2007

28

Khaleel Ahmed

Training at home for jihad
abroad

2004

2007

29

Ronald Allen Grecula

Freelancing services to AQ
+ revenge on wife

2005

2005

30

Mohammad Radwan
Obeid

Online recruiting

2005

2005

22
23
23
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JIS
JIS
JIS
JIS
Sent military gear to al‐
Qaeda associates

Date
range to
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Case #

Name

Case description

Date
range
from

Date
range to

31

Michael Reynolds

Offered services to AQ for
money

2005

2005

32

Kobie Williams

Trained at home + sent
money to Taliban

2005

2006

2005

2006

2005
2005
2005
2005
2005

2006
2006
2006
2006
2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2003
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006

2006
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007

2006

...

Adnan Babar Mirza
33
33
33
33
33
34

Narseal Batiste
Patrick Abraham
Stanley Grant Phanor
Burson Augustin
Rotschild Augustine
Abdul Tawala Ibn Ali
Alishtari

Trained at home + sent
money to Taliban
Sears Tower Plot
Sears Tower Plot
Sears Tower Plot
Sears Tower Plot
Sears Tower Plot
Fraud + terror financing

36
37
37
37
37
37
38

Mohammed Reza
Taheri‐Azar
Derrick Shareef
Serdar Tatar
Mohamad Schnewer
Dritan Duka
Shain Duka
Eljvir Duka
Daniel Maldonado

39

Omar Hammami

40

Ruben Luis Leon
Shumpert

Counterfeit $; fled to
Somalia

2006

2008

41

Ahmed Abdellatif
Sherif Mohamed

Training at home;
possession of weapons &
explosive materials; online
instructional vid

2007

2007

42

Bryant Neal Vinas

Trained with al‐Qaeda;
fired rocket at US base

2007

2008

35

Ran people over at N.
Carolina campus
Cherryvale mall plot
Fort Dix plot
Fort Dix plot
Fort Dix plot
Fort Dix plot
Fort Dix plot
Captured in Somalia
Became a leader in al‐
Shabaab
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Case #

Name

Case description

43
43
43
43
44
45
46
46
46
46

Abdifatah Isse
Salah Osman Ahmed
Kamal Said Hassan
Shirwa Ahmed
Khalid Ouazzani
Aafia Siddiqui
Jamal Sheikh Banna
Burhan Hassan
Zakaria Maruf
Mohamoud Hassan

Minnesota Somali jihad net
Minnesota Somali jihad net
Minnesota Somali jihad net
Minnesota Somali jihad net
Sending money to AQ
Gun attack in Afghanistan
Minnesota Somali jihad net
Minnesota Somali jihad net
Minnesota Somali jihad net
Minnesota Somali jihad net
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Date
range
from
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008

Date
range to
2008
2008
2008
2008
2010
2008
2009
2009
2009
2009

Appendix A: Part 2
United States Case Summaries
(Presented in chronological order according to when cases began)

Case#1: Christopher PaulLong-term Islamist militant & al-Qaeda member (...1990-2007)
Key Features:


Long-term militant & member of al-Qaeda



Trained and fought overseas



Maintained contact with foreign jihadis



Planned attacks in Europe



Also in contact with domestic terrorists

Paul was born Paul Kenyatta Laws in Columbus, Ohio in 1964. He reportedly converted
to Islam while attending college during the mid-1980’s1 and changed his name twice,
settling on Christopher Paul in 1994.2 According to the indictment, he left the US in
1990 and in 1991 he received paramilitary training in Pakistan and Afghanistan and
formally joined al-Qaeda, after which he returned to Columbus where he taught martial
arts at a mosque.3 He travelled extensively throughout the 1990’s (taking part in the
conflict in Bosnia4) and in 1998 conducted outdoor training exercises with others in
Ohio. Between 1999 and 2000, Paul was in contact with co-conspirators in Germany,
whom he sent money and equipment and visited in person in April ’99 giving
instructions on how to make explosives. The purpose of this collaboration (which he
later pleaded guilty to) was to carry out attacks on European tourist resorts popular with
Americans, and/or on government buildings.5
Paul also allegedly amassed a collection of jihadi materials on topics such as
bomb-making, and conducted research into remote control model vehicles and flight
simulators as late as 2006.6 Furthermore, in August 2002 Paul met with Nuradin Abdi
and Iyman Faris (see case #5 & 6) to discuss Abdi’s idea to bomb a shopping mall in
the US (for which Paul was not indicted and apparently dismissed as a “stupid idea”).7
He was arrested at home in Ohio on April 11th 20078 and on June 2nd 2008 he pleaded
guilty to conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction against United States nationals

outside of the United States (referring to the German plot), thereby accepting a sentence
of 20 years.9

Case #2: Enaam ArnaoutBenevolence International Foundation (...1992-2002)
Key Features:


Long-term associations with militants overseas



Alleged fundraising for terrorism



Convicted on charges of fraud

Arnaout was born in Syria around 1963. His family moved to Saudi Arabia and from
there he went to Afghanistan during the mid to late-1980’s.10 According to the
indictment,11 Arnaout was associated with Osama bin Laden and other founders of alQaeda as well as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and whilst in Afghanistan he was involved in
the organisation of training camps for mujahedin. In 1987, a charitable organisation
named the Islamic Benevolence Committee was formed in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in
order to support mujahedin. During the early 1990’s it was renamed the Benevolence
International Foundation (BIF) and incorporated in the United States and elsewhere, and
Arnaout –who had come to the US around 199012- acted as the director of BIF from
about 1993 onwards.13 After 9/11 BIF had its assets frozen in the US for suspected ties
to terrorism, its offices were raided on December 14th 2001, and Arnaout was arrested,
aged 39, on April 30th, 2002.14
Although the indictment goes into considerable detail regarding Arnaout’s past
activities, he was ultimately charged with defrauding BIF donors by concealing the fact
that proceeds were not only used for humanitarian purposes, but between $200,000 to
$400,000 was also used to support armed Islamist factions in Bosnia, Chechnya and
elsewhere. He eventually pleaded guilty to racketeering and was sentenced to 11 years
in August 2003, the sentencing judge noting that his association with bin Laden and
others raised suspicion, but that there was insufficient evidence to show that Arnaout
supported terrorism.15 The sentence was reduced to 10 years in 2006.16
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Case #3: Jose Padilla, Adham Amin Hassoun and Kifah Wael JayyousiAmerican jihadi support-cell, conspiring to commit murder overseas (...1993-2002)
Key Features


Long-running jihadi support-network



US-based fundraising, recruitment & facilitation of overseas training/combat



Worldwide contacts



Alleged plans to conduct domestic attacks



Convicted for conspiring to murder overseas and providing material support

From as early as 1993, Jayyousi –a resident of San Diego and later Detroit- was active
in incorporating the American Islamic Group, which he used to publish The Islam
Report, a newsletter that promoted violent jihad overseas and solicited funds in support
of mujahedin.17 He was reported to be an avid supporter of Sheikh Omar Abdel
Rahman, whom he kept in contact with after the latter was incarcerated.18 Throughout
the 1990’s, in collaboration with Hassoun (an active fundraiser for mujahedin based in
Broward County, Florida) and other co-conspirators in Canada, Egypt and elsewhere,
Jayyousi made sustained efforts to raise funds in support of foreign mujahedin (notably
in Bosnia and Chechnya) and to recruit others to join the fighting abroad.19 The most
high-profile of those recruits was Padilla, a former gang member in Chicago who had
been incarcerated from 1991-1993 for a road-rage incident,20 and who became involved
with Hassoun at the Masjid al-Iman mosque in Fort Lauderdale from at least 1996
onwards.21 On September 5th, 1998 Padilla flew from Florida to Cairo where he met
with Mohamed Hesham Youssef (also a resident of Broward County until 1996)
arranged for by Hassoun.22
By September/October 2000 Padilla was in Afghanistan training at al-Qaeda’s
al-Farouq camp, where he met with Mohammed Atef.23 In April 2001 he returned to
Egypt and then in June went back to Afghanistan, where he reportedly underwent
specialist training in how to destroy apartment buildings alongside a former associate
from Florida (whose whereabouts remain unknown), Adnan El Shukrijumah. This plan
was temporarily abandoned and Padilla allegedly then became involved in a plot to
develop a radioactive ‘dirty’ bomb (inspired by online research). However, after
meeting with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the original plot to destroy apartment
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buildings was apparently renewed. Padilla was given $10,000 and returned to the US,
arriving in Chicago O’Hare airport on May 8th 2002 at which point he was arrested.24
The allegations of a domestic terrorism plot were never followed up, Padilla’s
case instead being incorporated into that of his recruiters, Hassoun, Jayyousi and
colleagues. In August 2007 all three were convicted of conspiring to murder, kidnap and
maim individuals abroad and of providing material support to terrorists.25 They were
judged to have been part of a North American support cell that operated in several cities
in the US and Canada, communicated with other support networks and sent money,
equipment and recruits overseas to wage violent jihad.26 In January 2008 Padilla was
sentenced to 17 years and 4 months; Hassoun received 15 years and 8 months, and
Jayyousi received 12 years and 8 months.27

Case#4: Ali Saleh Kalah al-MarriAl-Qaeda ‘sleeper’ agent (...1998-2001)
Key Features


‘Sleeper agent’ sent by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to research attacks in the US



Contact with senior al-Qaeda figures overseas



Pleaded guilty and sentenced in 2009

Al-Marri, a dual national of Qatar and Saudi Arabia was educated in Peroria, Illinois
during the 1980’s.28 From 1998 to 2001 he is alleged to have trained at al-Qaeda camps
in Afghanistan, also spending three months in the US from May to August 2000, during
which time he set up a fake business and used stolen credit card details to fund it.29 At
the direction of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, he returned to the US on a graduate student
visa on September 10th, 2001, bringing his wife and five children with him. Information
linking him to other al-Qaeda figures including Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi (an alleged
key financier of 9/11) led to al-Marri’s arrest on December 12th, 2001, whereupon
authorities uncovered hundreds of stolen credit card details and evidence of extensive
research into the manufacture of hydrogen cyanide on his computer.30 He was held on
charges of fraud until June 2003 when he was designated an enemy combatant, and then
was formally charged with conspiracy to provide material support to al-Qaeda in
February 2009.31 In April 2009 he pleaded guilty to the charges against him, accepting
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the government’s allegations and in October the same year he was sentenced to 8 years
and 3 months.32

Case #5: Nuradin AbdiAttempted jihadi training overseas, alleged domestic plot (...1999-2003)
Key Features


Entered the US illegally



Associated with Islamist terrorists in Ohio



Alleged plans to carry out a domestic attack on a civilian target (not charged)



Pleaded guilty to conspiracy to provide support to terrorists overseas

Abdi, a Somali citizen, came to the US on a false passport in 1995, left for a period and
then re-entered from Canada in 1997 and was granted asylum based on false statements
that he made.33 In 1999 Abdi left the US again, seeking (but failing to find) jihadi
training in Kosovo, Chechnya, and Ethiopia before meeting with an Islamist ‘warlord’
in Somalia. It is not explicitly alleged that he actually received any training. He returned
to the US again in March 2000, being picked up at Columbus airport by Iyman Faris
(see case #6), whom he had befriended along with Christopher Paul (case #1) during his
previous time in Ohio.34
Between August 2002 and March 2003 Abdi discussed with Faris and Paul his
idea to bomb a Columbus shopping mall,35 and although they did not join him in his
plans, Abdi is alleged to have received instructions on explosives-making from one of
them.36 Faris was arrested in a separate investigation in March 2003 and gave
information on Abdi, which led to his arrest on November 28th of the same year.37 There
is no information to indicate that Abdi was close to carrying out his plans, however
authorities reported that between June and November 2003 he had made calls to
approximately 40 different numbers associated with terrorism activity.38
Ultimately Abdi pleaded guilty not to plans of domestic terrorism (with which
he was not charged, seemingly given that it did not proceed beyond discussion) but to
the charge of conspiracy to provide support to terrorists overseas, referring to his
attempts to find training camps, corroborated by bank and travel records as well as
items seized under search warrants.39 He was sentenced to 10 years in prison in
November 2007.40
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Case #6: Iyman FarisAl-Qaeda plan to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge (...2000-2003)
Key Features


Pakistani naturalised US citizen, trained in Afghanistan



Given assignments by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed



Conducted online research for attacks in the US

Born in Kashmir in 1969, Faris came to the US in 1994 (settling in Columbus, Ohio)
and became a naturalised citizen in 1999.41 Late in 2000, Faris left the US for Pakistan
where he rendezvoused with a friend he had known from the jihad against the Soviets
during the 1980’s. Together they travelled to Afghanistan and underwent training at an
al-Qaeda camp. Early in 2001 Faris conducted online research into ultra-light airplanes
as requested by individuals at the camp, and around a year later he was tasked by a
senior al-Qaeda figure (later revealed to be Khalid Sheikh Mohammed42) with
researching the possibility of bringing down the Brooklyn Bridge in New York by
cutting the suspension cables with ‘gas-cutters’, and also how to derail trains.43
Faris returned to the US in April 2002, conducted online research as instructed
and maintained contact with his friend back in Pakistan. Early in 2003 after carrying out
surveillance on the Brooklyn Bridge he sent a coded email indicating that the plot was
unlikely to succeed.44 He was arrested in March 2003 and in May pleaded guilty to
providing material support to al-Qaeda, including carrying out research for domestic
attacks.45 He was sentenced to 20 years in October 2003.46

442

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW

Case #7: Ali al-Timimi, Randall Todd Royer, Ibrahim Ahmed al-Hamdi, Seifullah
Chapman, Masoud Ahmad Khan, Yong Ki Kwon, Mohammed Aatique, Khwaja
Mahmoud Hasan, Hammad Abdur-Raheem, Donald Thomas Surratt & Ali Asad
Chandia–
Virginia jihad network, tried to join the Taliban (...2000-2003)
Key Features


Relatively large group guided by ‘spiritual leader’ al-Timimi



Engaged in domestic training



Several group members trained with LeT in Pakistan



Also assisted a senior LeT representative in purchasing military equipment

This group of eleven individuals from the Washington suburbs came together as a group
through social meetings, among other places at the Dar al-Arqam mosque in Falls
Church, Virginia, where they congregated to listen to the teachings of US-born imam,
Ali al-Timimi.47 Timimi was a respected Salafist preacher (whose sermons were also
distributed on the Internet) and was a proponent of armed jihad to defend Muslims
around the world. He is described as the group’s ‘spiritual’ leader and a key, influential
figure behind their actions.48 Timimi’s ‘personal assistant’ was Ali Asad Chandia.49 At
the same time group members were inspired by American Muslim convert Randall
Todd Royer, who had fought in Bosnia between 1994 and 1997, and had trained with
(and allegedly fought for) Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan in April/May 2000.50
From as early as January 2000 members of the group engaged in live firearms
practice at various shooting ranges. In June that year, Royer told the group about his
exploits with LeT and -as arranged for by Royer- al-Hamdi trained with LeT from
August to September 2000 (during which time he reportedly fired on Indian positions in
Kashmir) and Chapman underwent training in September 2001.51
Throughout 2001, the group practiced military tactics in the US using paintball
guns in addition to live firearms. Four days after 9/11 on September 15th, al-Timimi
gathered the group at Kwon’s house and urged them to join with LeT in preparation for
jihad, telling them that American troops in Afghanistan would be legitimate targets.52
At the end of the month Aatique, Khan, Kwon and Hasan travelled in pairs to Pakistan
and trained with LeT near Muzafrabad from October to November.53 Whilst there they
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met with LeT-member Mohammed Ajmal Khan (see UK case #11) and also with
Chandia, who stayed in Pakistan from November 2001 to February 2002.54 Al-Timimi,
Royer and al-Hamdi further encouraged the others back home to go and train, although
no-one else did.
During 2002 into 2003 emails were exchanged between members of the group
including Kwon, Chapman, Hasan, Chandia and Ajmal Khan. Ajmal Khan visited the
US and was assisted by Chandia in particular in purchasing equipment, including
paintball rounds and wireless video technology for use with a remote control aircraft,
which were sent to Pakistan for use by LeT.55
Nine arrests were made in the US in June 2003, and 3 others (Chapman, Hasan
and an associate, Sabri Benkahlai) were later detained in Saudi Arabia and handed over
to American authorities at the end of the year.56 In November 2003 Kwon, Hasan and
Surratt (who had all pleaded guilty to conspiracy and illegal use of firearms) were
sentenced to 11 years, 6 months; 11 years, 3 months; and 3 years, 10 months
respectively.57 Mohamed Aatique pleaded guilty to similar charges and was sentenced
to 10-and-a-half years in December 2003.58 In March 2004, Masoud Khan, Chapman
and Abdur-Raheem (who, as an ex-soldier, had led domestic training exercises) were all
convicted for providing support to LeT and in June were sentenced to life; 85 years; and
8 years.59 In April 2004, Royer (who had pleaded guilty to facilitating the others’
offences) was sentenced to 20 years, and al-Hamdi (who pleaded guilty to possessing a
firearm and carrying a grenade launcher during training) received 15.60
Timimi, who had been excluded from the original indictment, was arrested and
charged with soliciting the others to engage in war against the United States in
September 2004 and in April 2005 he was convicted.61 He was sentenced to life in
prison.62 Finally, Chandia was arrested on September 15th 2005, charged with providing
material support to LeT. He was found guilty and in August 2006 was given a 15 year
prison sentence.63

i

Benkahla (who also knew Ahmed Omar Abu Ali- see case #13) was acquitted of involvement with the
Virginia group but was later tried and convicted for lying when he denied overseas training which he
undertook in 1999. He was sentenced to 10 years (“Virginia: Terror-Related Verdict Upheld” New York
Times, June 24, 2008
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9802EED71738F937A15755C0A96E9C8B63&&scp=1
&sq=Sabri%20Benkahla&st=cse> at June 4, 2010).

444

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW

Case #8 Mohammed Abdullah WarsameTrained in Afghanistan, maintained contact with foreign terrorists (...2000-2003)
Key Features


Trained with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan prior to 9/11



Maintained contact with al-Qaeda operatives and sent money on one occasion



Came to the US in 2002 and continued to email his jihadi contacts

Warsame was born in Somalia in 1973 and claimed refugee status in Canada in 1989,
later becoming a naturalised citizen there.64 He married a woman living in Minneapolis
in the US in 1995 although they continued to live in separate countries for the next
seven years (Warsame is described as shuttling back and forth between the two
locations65). From 2000 into 2001 he trained at two al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and
fought on two occasions for the Taliban. He was encouraged by an al-Qaeda official to
return home rather than stay in Afghanistan, and was given the money for his plane
ticket in April 2001. Warsame gained legal permanent residency status in the US and
joined his wife in Minneapolis in April 2002. Since leaving Afghanistan he also
maintained contact with al-Qaeda associates via email, apparently passing on
information about border entries and the whereabouts of other jihadis, and on one
occasion wired $2,000 to an al-Qaeda operative in Pakistan.66 This continued until
December 2003 when he was arrested as a material witness for a case in New York and
was then charged in Minnesota for providing material support to al-Qaeda. He pleaded
guilty and was sentenced to 7 years, 8 months in jail to be followed by deportation to
Canada.67
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Case #9: John Walker LindhThe ‘American Taliban’ (...2001)
Key Features


Went overseas to learn about Islam



Trained with al-Qaeda and fought for the Taliban

Lindh grew up in Marin County, California from the age of ten.68 In 1997, aged 16, he
converted to become a Muslim and in July 1998 he spent 9 months in Yemen studying
Islam. He returned to the US briefly before leaving for Yemen again in February 2000.
Then in October of that year he left for Pakistan, joining Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HuM)
around May 2001. Lindh trained with HuM for several weeks but became disillusioned
with them and sought out the Taliban in Afghanistan.69 From June 1, 2001 he spent
seven weeks training at al-Qaeda’s al-Farouq camp, where he was reportedly invited
(but declined) to pledge an oath of allegiance to bin Laden. He then joined the Taliban
frontlines fighting against the Northern Alliance and was eventually captured late in
November along with numerous other Taliban fighters at Mazar e-Sharif.70 In February
2002 back in the US Lindh was charged with a ten count indictment and in July pleaded
guilty to providing services to the Taliban and carrying weapons during those duties.71
He was sentenced to 20 years.72

Case #10: Habis Abdulla al-Saoub, Jeffrey Battle, Patrice Lumumba Ford, Ahmed
Ibrahim Bilal, Muhammad Ibrahim Bilal, Maher Mofeid Hawash & October
Martinique LewisThe ‘Portland 7’ (...2001-2002...)
Key Features


Influential group leader with prior combat experience



Motivated to help Muslims



Conducted training exercises at home



Travelled overseas in attempt to join the Taliban



Only one member successful, later killed

Al-Saoub –by all accounts the leader or ‘emir’ of the group by virtue of his previous
experience fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan73- came to the US in 1996, settling in
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Portland.74 Over the next five years these seven individuals (all American citizens)
came together as a group, apparently meeting each other at local mosques. Guided by
al-Saoub they developed a collective sense of outrage at the plight of Muslims around
the world and by the summer of 2001 several members including al-Saoub, Battle, Ford,
the Bilal brothers and others were undergoing training exercises in Oregon using
firearms in order to prepare themselves for violent jihad.75
This continued after 9/11. In response to the imminent US invasion of
Afghanistan, and at al-Saoub’s direction, the group made preparations to go to Pakistan,
intending to train and fight alongside the Taliban. On October 17th, 2001 al-Saoub and
Battle left the US for Hong Kong, followed on the 20th by Ford and the Bilals, and
finally Hawash, who left on the 24th.76 From Hong Kong, the group entered China and
then unsuccessfully tried to cross the border into Pakistan. They kept in touch with
Lewis (Battle’s partner) back home via email and she sent money to Battle in order to
help his efforts.77
Group members then returned home individually to the United States, with the
exception of al-Saoub, who eventually did make it to Pakistan (helped financially by his
friends back in Portland) and Ahmed Bilal, who travelled to Malaysia. At the beginning
of October 2002, Battle, Ford, Muhammad Bilal and Lewis were arrested in the US.78
Ahmed Bilal handed himself in in Malaysia and was extradited shortly afterwards,
while Hawash was arrested in March of 2003.79 In November 2003 Battle and Ford both
received 18 years in prison having pleaded guilty to conspiring to levy war against the
US,80 and in November Lewis was sentenced to 3 years for providing financial
assistance.81 Hawash, Ahmed Bilal and Muhammad Bilal pleaded guilty to conspiring
to aid the Taliban and were sentenced in February 2004 to 7, 10 and 8 years,
respectively.82 Meanwhile al-Saoub remained at large until October 2003 when it was
reported that he had been killed in Pakistan.83
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Case#11: Adam GadahnAmerican al-Qaeda Spokesman (...2002-Ongoing...)
Key Features


American convert radicalised prior to 9/11



Rose to prominence as al-Qaeda spokesman in 2004



Charged with treason in 2006



Remains at large

Gadahn’s case is one of the few that fall short of the sampling criteria for this study but
are nevertheless still included. His appearance in al-Qaeda propaganda videos leaves
little doubt about his convictions and associations.
Gadahn is reported to have become involved with known extremists Hisham
Diab and Khalil Deek at an Orange County mosque around 1996, shortly after
converting to Islam at the age of seventeen.84 By late 1997 he had left America for
Pakistan and by 2001 is thought to have been associated with prominent al-Qaeda
figures including Abu Zubaydah and to have worked as a translator based at the alFarouq camp. He is reported to have worked on an audio translation of a speech by bin
Laden in 2002, and Zubaydah (captured that year) revealed to interrogators that he knew
him. Likewise, Khalid Sheik Mohammed (captured in 2003) allegedly described
numerous meetings with Gadahn.85 Therefore, despite the fact that he did not become a
wanted man until mid-2004, 2002 is chosen as a conservative estimate of the starting
point of his ‘offending’ (indeed, the available information indicates that his association
with radicals began prior to 9/11).
In May 2004 the FBI publicly declared that they were looking for Gadahn,86 and
in October ’04 he appeared in an al-Qaeda propaganda video in which he warned that
more attacks on the US were forthcoming, stating that “after decades of American
tyranny and oppression, now it's your turn to die.”87 He has since appeared in numerous
other videos, which are widely accessible via the Internet, in which he continues to
issue threats and warnings and to condemn the West and Israel for injustices against
Muslims.
In October 2006 Gadahn was indicted in the US for treason as well as providing
material support to al-Qaeda,88 however he has continued to release new videos (ripping
up his American passport in 2008 and denigrating the Obama administration in 200989)
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and his whereabouts remain unknown. Reports that he had been captured in Pakistan in
March 2010 have since been refuted.90

Case #12: Ilyas AliPlot to trade drugs for missiles (...2002)
Key Features


Drug-trafficking conspiracy with two associates from Peshawar



Attempted to acquire missiles, intending to sell them to the Taliban/al-Qaeda

On April 11th, 2002 Ali (an Indian-born US national based in Minneapolis) met with an
undercover officer in San Diego to negotiate a large drug-deal on behalf of two
associates from Peshawar, Syed Mustajab Shah and Muhammed Afridi.91 In September
all three flew to Hong Kong via Karachi and on the 20th met with more undercover
agents in a hotel to finalise a price for 5 tons of hashish and 600kg of heroin. During the
meeting they stipulated that the price could be offset against the cost of four Stinger
missiles, which they intended to sell to the Taliban/al-Qaeda.92 All three were deported
to the US in January 2003 and pleaded guilty to charges of drug trafficking and
attempting to provide support to al-Qaeda. Ali and Afridi were both sentenced to 4
years, 8 months, while Shah received an 18 year sentence.93

Case #13: Ahmed Omar Abu AliPlot to assassinate George W. Bush (...2002-2003)
Key Features


US citizen joined an al-Qaeda cell in Saudi Arabia



Underwent training in explosives, firearms and forgery



Discussed plans to assassinate George W. Bush and hijack planes

Abu Ali, a US citizen and resident of Falls Church, Virginia, spent several months
studying Islam in Medina, Saudi Arabia during 2000, returning to America in August.94
In September 2002 he flew back to Medina, telling associates there that he wished to
join al-Qaeda. He became involved with approximately ten other individuals associated
with that organisation and discussed plans to assassinate George W. Bush either by
shooting or car-bomb, and received a religious blessing to do so. He also discussed
449

plans to hijack US-bound airplanes for use in attacks.95 His associates gave him money
to buy equipment including a laptop and mobile phone, and trained him in the use of
firearms, explosives and forgery (Ali had wanted to go to Afghanistan for training but
was denied a visa).96 He was finally arrested in Saudi Arabia on June 8th 2003 and held
without charge until being sent back to the US in February 2005.97 On November 22nd
2005 Ali was convicted on all nine counts of a superseding indictment, including
charges of providing resources to al-Qaeda, conspiracy to assassinate the President and
to hijack and destroy aircraft.98 He was subsequently sentenced to 30 years,99 which was
increased to life imprisonment in 2009.100

Case #14: Mohammed Junaid BabarProvided support to al-Qaeda, including a group of British jihadists planning
attacks in the UK (...2002-2004)
Key Features


Radicalised via Internet and subsequent contact with al-Muhajiroun



Moved to Pakistan and established a jihadi training camp



Supplied equipment and money to al-Qaeda



Turned informant against his former associates

Babar was born in Pakistan in 1975 and moved with his family to the US in 1977. As an
adult he became involved in the New York chapter of the London-based group, alMuhajiroun (which he first encountered via the Internet) and nine days after 9/11 he left
the US for Pakistan, going via the UK.101 He apparently stayed at al-Muhajiroun’s
Lahore office until 2002 when he bought a house.102 From at least December 2002
Babar helped establish a jihadi training camp (which he kept supplied with necessary
materials and equipment) where others could learn weapons and explosives skills, and
early in 2003 was joined by a group of British jihadis and fellow members of alMuhajiroun led by Omar Khyam (see UK case#14).103 Whilst there the Britons learned
how to make bombs in preparation for a planned attack on civilian targets in the UK,
which was later foiled after the group was arrested back in Britain in March 2004.104
After the British group left around August 2003, Babar continued his support
activities, supplying military gear (including night vision goggles, sleeping bags and
waterproof ponchos105) and money, which was passed on to al-Qaeda operatives in
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South Waziristan. Babar personally delivered such an assignment early in 2004, then in
April returned to the United States and was arrested soon afterwards.106 In August 2004
he pleaded guilty to five counts of providing material support to al-Qaeda and entered
into a plea agreement in which he agreed to provide information and to testify against
his former associates.107 He was the ‘star’ witness in the trial of the UK jihadis and that
of a Canadian member of the group, Mohammed Momin Khawaja.108 Babar was
reported to be joining his family in a witness protection program after law-enforcement
officials were done with him.109

Case #15: Tarik Ibn Osman Shah, Rafiq Abdus Sabir, Mahmud Faruq Brent &
Abdulrahman FarhaneOffered expertise to al-Qaeda (...2002-2005)
Key Features


Relatively loose network of likeminded individuals linked together by Shah



Desire to support overseas mujahedin



One individual trained with LeT in Pakistan

Shah, a martial arts instructor based in New York, met with Sabir, a doctor, during the
mid-1990’s.110 As early as 1998 the two men allegedly tried to make it to Afghanistan
for paramilitary training but were unsuccessful.111 During the summer of 2001, Brent
lived with Shah, received martial arts instruction from him at a Beacon, New York
mosque and watched jihadi videos about Bosnia. Brent also introduced Shah to
Seifullah Chapman (case #7) at around this time. Shah then had to cease the training
after 9/11 as mosque officials felt it was inappropriate, and in February 2002 Brent
travelled to Pakistan where he received training at an LeT camp (which he later told
Shah about after returning to the US in June).112 Meanwhile Shah had become involved
in a money laundering conspiracy in which he and Farhane (along with an informant)
discussed ways to send money overseas for mujahedin in Afghanistan and Chechnya.113
Beginning around September 2003 until May 2005, Shah in particular, later
accompanied by Sabir, participated in a number of meetings with individuals they
believed to be recruiters for al-Qaeda (but were in fact an informant and undercover
agent).114 During these meetings Shah repeatedly expressed his desire to help al-Qaeda
and offered himself and Sabir as a ‘package’, stating that he could provide martial arts
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training, while Sabir could treat injured mujahedin. In between these meetings Shah
also took steps to find suitable locations for domestic jihadi training. Then at a meeting
on May 20th, 2005, Shah and Sabir both swore allegiance to al-Qaeda in the presence of
the ‘al-Qaeda recruiter’, and Sabir informed him he was going to Saudi Arabia to work,
and provided his details to be passed on to operatives there. The two were arrested days
later, Brent was arrested in August, and Farhane was apprehended in February 2006.
Shah, Brent and Farhane each pleaded guilty and received sentences of 15; 15; and 13
years respectively. Sabir was convicted at trial and sentenced to 25 years in November
2007.115

Case #16: Uzair ParachaScheme to facilitate entry of an al-Qaeda operative into the US (...2003)
Key Features


Agreed to help assist an al-Qaeda operative enter the US to carry out attacks

Uzair Paracha was born in Pakistan and spent his life shuttling back and forth between
Karachi and New York studying in his country of birth and working as a gas station
manager in the US, where he had permanent legal resident status. His father Seifullah
(also indicted, but at the time resident in Pakistan) had also lived in New York from
1971-1986.116 In January 2003 Uzair was present at a meeting with accused al-Qaeda
operatives Ammar al-Baluchi and Majid Khan (both later detained at Guantanamo Bay
along with Seifullah Paracha117). Uzair agreed to pose as Majid Khan back in America,
using his identity documents once there, so that Khan could then obtain immigration
clearance to re-enter the US in furtherance of an alleged plan to carry out attacks on gas
stations.118 As part of the agreement Khan would also invest $200,000 into Seifullah’s
business, which would later be reclaimed when required by al-Qaeda.
As agreed, between February and March 2003, Uzair made phone calls posing
as Khan and used his credit card to make it look as if Khan was in the US. When
detained at the end of March he also had in his possession a key to a post-office box
opened by Aafia Siddiqui (see case #45) which she had opened for Khan’s immigration
documents to be sent to, once obtained.119 Uzair was convicted of all counts against him
including providing material support to al-Qaeda and was sentenced to 30 years.120
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Case #17: Yassin Muhiddin Aref & Mohammed Mosharref HossainAgreed to launder money in order to facilitate a domestic terrorist attack (...20032004)
Key Features


Sting operation initiated by an FBI informant



Engaged in money laundering, believing it would help terrorists

From December 2003 to August 2004 the FBI orchestrated a sting operation whereby a
cooperating informant approached two leaders of an Albany mosque, Aref and
Hossain.121 The informant told them that he had sold a Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM)
for $50,000 and that it was going to be used by Jaish e-Mohammed (JeM) operatives to
assassinate a Pakistani diplomat in New York. Hossain agreed to take $50,000 from the
informant and pay $45,000 back in instalments of $2,000, with Aref acting as witness
and guarantor for the transactions. They also continued to participate in the scheme after
the informant continued to make clear that he was working for JeM and that the
assassination was imminent. Prosecutors asserted that Hossain was involved for the
money while Aref (a former member of the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan who had
also known Mullah Krekar, the founder of Ansar al-Islam) was ideologically
motivated.122 Aref was found guilty of charges relating to money laundering and lying
about his terrorist associations, while Hossain was convicted of all charges, including
conspiracy to provide support to JeM. They were sentenced to 15 years each in March
2007.123

Case #18: Hamid HayatReceived training at a jihadi camp in Pakistan (...2003-2005)
Key Features


Admitted to training in Pakistan



Alleged willingness to carry out attacks in the US on receipt of orders

Hamid Hayat was born in California but lived in Pakistan for 10 years before coming
back to the US in 2000 to live with his parents.124 In April 2003 he then flew back to
Pakistan and for about six months from 2003 into 2004 he trained at an al-Qaeda-run
camp, allegedly facilitated by his grandfather who ran the madrassah that he was
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attending.125 At the end of May 2005 he returned to the US and was arrested shortly
afterwards, after initially denying and then admitting not only that he had received
paramilitary training but that he was returning to the US to await orders and was
prepared to carry out an attack. His father, Umer, was also arrested after lying and then
admitting that he had paid for his son’s plane ticket and sent him $100 per month
allowance, knowing that he was going to attend a terror training camp.126 Back at the
Hayat’s residence, officers also uncovered a number of jihadist publications.127
It further emerged that federal authorities had been paying an informant to
secretly tape conversations within the Lodi Pakistani community for approximately
three years.128 In connection with the Hayat’s case they arrested three other men- two
Pakistani religious leaders in Lodi and one of their sons. They alleged that these men
were in contact with a Taliban leader and were going to give Hamid his orders once his
mission had been decided. However, no such charges were brought and these three
individuals were deported to Pakistan after voluntarily choosing not to fight
immigration charges brought against them.129
Hamid was convicted of attending a terror training camp knowing that his
training would be used for attacks within the United States, and in September 2007 he
was sentenced to 24 years in jail. After a mistrial, his father, Umer, pleaded guilty to
lying to the FBI about the amount of money he had taken with him when leaving the US
for Pakistan in April 2003 and in August was sentenced to time served.130

Case #19: Mohammed Zaki Amawi, Marwan Othman El-Hindi & Wassim
MazloumConspiracy to kill US soldiers overseas (...2003-2006)
Key Features


Enlisted the help of a ‘trainer’ to help prepare for jihad



Engaged in domestic firearms and explosives practice



Downloaded bomb-making instructions



Communicated with individuals abroad via the Internet



Attempted to provide equipment to mujahedin overseas

From as early as 2002, El-Hindi (a naturalised US citizen from Jordan) was in contact
with a government informant whom he asked for security and bodyguard training,
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referred to in the indictments as ‘the Trainer’, later identified as Darren Griffin, an exsoldier.131 In October 2003 Amawi went to Jordan and tried unsuccessfully to enter Iraq
for jihad, returning to the US in March 2004, after which the group’s plans began to
escalate. From mid-2004 to February 2006 they collectively downloaded jihadi
materials including instructions on bomb-making, accessed secure jihadist websites,
watched videos of attacks on American troops, engaged in training exercises with the
Trainer on the use of IEDs, and practised with firearms. They also discussed ways in
which they could raise money for jihad overseas, and how they might be able to get into
Iraq (e.g. by using Mazloum’s used car business as a cover).132
Group members communicated with each other (as well as individuals out-with
the immediate group) via email and phone, and often used code to disguise their
conversations. Amawi was in online contact with an individual in the Middle East with
whom he discussed trying to obtain chemicals for, to be used in the manufacture of
explosives, and who told him a group of ‘Brothers’ were preparing to enter Iraq. No
chemicals were acquired but in August 2005 Amawi and the Trainer flew to Jordan,
taking with them five laptops intended for the mujahedin (although they did not manage
to deliver them).133
In February 2006 El-Hindi and Mazloum were arrested in Ohio, and Amawi was
detained in Jordan and promptly returned to the US. In June 2008 they were found
guilty of all charges against them, including conspiring to kill US soldiers abroad and to
provide material support to terrorists. Amawi was sentenced to 20 years in prison; ElHindi received 13 years; and Mazloum was given 8 years and 4 months.134

Case #20: Saifullah Anjum RanjhaIllegal money transferring, believed the money was for al-Qaeda (...2003-2007)
Key Features


Operated illegal money transfer business



Criminal opportunist, laundered money intended for al-Qaeda

Beginning in 2003, federal investigators began ‘Operation Cash-Out’, a sting operation
aimed at uncovering illegal money transfer businesses using the informal hawala
system and failing to adhere to legal regulations.135 The investigation took place on an
international scale, with participants in the scheme based in various locations in the US,
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Europe, Australia and Pakistan. In Maryland in the US, a cooperating witness
approached Ranjha who agreed to transfer money for him after being told it had been
raised through drug dealing and was going to be given to al-Qaeda.136 In September
2007 they arrested dozens of individuals involved, although only Ranjha faced charges
in connection with terrorism, given that he was apparently the only one who knew the
intended destination of the money. He pleaded guilty to conspiring to launder money
and to concealing terrorist financing and was sentenced to 9 years and 2 months in
prison in November 2008.137

Case #21: Ryan AndersonAttempted to give military secrets to al-Qaeda (2004)
Key Features


American Muslim convert serving in the US National Guard



Supplied intelligence to individuals he thought were al-Qaeda

Anderson converted to Islam while studying for his degree, and then joined the National
Guard in 2002.138 An investigation into his activities was apparently begun after a US
judge posing as an Islamist extremist came in contact with him online via a jihadi
website and notified authorities, and a sting operation was set up.139 Between January
and February 2004 (a few weeks before he was due to serve in Iraq) Anderson
communicated via oral, written and electronic means with individuals he believed were
al-Qaeda operatives. During these exchanges he expressed his affinity with their cause
and supplied information on US Army movements, troop strength, tactics and weapons
systems intending to help al-Qaeda stage attacks.140 Tearful and apologetic, Anderson
was found guilty of all charges in a military tribunal and in September 2004 was
sentenced to life in prison.141
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Case #22: Ahmed Hassan al-UqailySting operation, bought weapons intending to carry out a domestic attack (...2004)
Key Features


Iraqi-born US resident angry at the war in Iraq



Stated he was “going jihad” against the US



Purchased machine guns and grenades in a sting operation

Al-Uqaily immigrated to the US from Iraq in around 1994 and settled in Nashville.142 In
August 2004 he bumped into an old acquaintance and expressed his anger at the
situation in Iraq, saying he wanted to blow something up.143 The acquaintance went to
the police and cooperated in the ensuing investigation. Over the next two months AlUqaily asked about acquiring machine guns, grenades and missiles. He reportedly
expressed resentment at the Jewish community and stated that he was “going jihad”
against America, but did not identify any specific targets. Finally, in October 2004 he
met with the cooperating witness and an undercover agent and paid $1000 in return for
disassembled machine guns and grenades plus ammunition, and was arrested.144 He
pleaded guilty to illegal possession of unregistered firearms and in October 2005 was
sentenced to 4 years and 8 months to be followed by deportation.145

Case #23: Shahawar Matin Siraj & James ElshafayPlot to bomb the 34th St. Herald Square subway station in New York (...2004)
Key Features


Radicalised in New York after 9/11



Approached by paid informant who colluded in plotting



Planned to bomb a subway station

The radicalisation of both Siraj and Elshafay appears to have begun shortly after 9/11.
Siraj (who came to the US in 1999 from Pakistan) began working at his uncle’s Islamic
bookstore and became increasingly outraged at US support for Israel, the invasion of
Iraq and the abuses at Abu Ghraib.146 Around the same time, American-born Elshafay
was disturbed by anti-Muslim sentiments expressed in the backlash after 9/11 and after
visiting family in Egypt in 2002 expressed greater interest in learning about Islam. The
two men subsequently met at the bookstore where Siraj worked and became friends,
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spending their time watching jihadi videos and discussing their outrage at injustices
against Muslims, which they blamed on America.147
As a result of tip-offs from members of the public, the NYPD sent a paid
informant, Osama Eldawoody, to befriend Siraj around September 2003.148 Eldawoody
claimed that he was a member of an Islamic ‘Brotherhood’ and encouraged the two men
from June through to August 2004 as they discussed various possible attacks, eventually
becoming focussed on planting a bomb at the Herald Square subway station, intending
to cause economic damage but not to kill anyone.149 On August 21st, 2004 Siraj and
Elshafay conducted surveillance of the station and drew diagrams to help them plant the
bomb, although at the time they had not acquired any explosives (Eldawoody telling
them that he would provide them).150
The two men were arrested on August 27th 2004 and Elshafay pleaded guilty to
conspiring to destroy a subway using explosives. He testified against Siraj (his
‘mentor’) who was ultimately convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison in January
2007.151 Elshafay was sentenced to 5 years.152

Case #24: Mark Robert WalkerAttempted to obtain supplies and join the Somali jihad (...2004)
Key Features


Lone individual seemingly radicalised online



Established own website and sought contact with other jihadists



Wanted to support and join Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya

A student in Wyoming, Walker reportedly became interested in Islam at a mosque in his
hometown of Rochester, New York.153 From as early as January 2004 he began using
the Internet to try and connect with Somali jihadis (specifically the group Al-Ittihad AlIslamiya) with the expressed intent of providing them with funds and equipment and in
hope of joining them to help fight for an Islamic government in Somalia. To this end he
reportedly established his own jihadist website, of which he was the administrator,
visited other online jihadi forums, researched equipment such as bullet-proof vests and
night-vision goggles, and was in communication with an individual named ‘Khalid’
with whom he was discussing his plans.154
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In October 2004 Walker’s roommate discovered that he had been accessing
extremist websites on his computer and notified the police. Walker then fled to Mexico
and was planning to meet up with Khalid at El Paso International Airport in Texas,
however he was apprehended as he tried to re-enter the US. He readily admitted his
plans and acknowledged that $2,100 cash he had on him was to buy supplies for the
Somali mujahedin.155 He pleaded guilty to conspiring to supply goods or services to a
foreign terrorist organisation (a slightly lesser version of providing material support156)
and was sentenced to 2 years in prison.157

Case #25: Kevin Lamar James, Levar Haney Washington, Gregory Patterson,
Hammad Riaz SamanaJam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS) jihadi group formed in prison (...2004-2005)
Key Features


Terrorist group formed in prison



‘Ideological offshoot’ of global Sunni Islamist terrorism



Conducted armed robberies to fund planned domestic attacks



Used the Internet to research targets

Kevin James was imprisoned in California State Folsom prison in 1996 for a gangrelated armed robbery offence.158 From about 1997 he founded a secretive Islamist
organisation in prison called Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS, or ‘The Assembly of
Authentic Islam’). He actively recruited others to the group, demanded that prospective
members swear an oath of allegiance to him and preached that infidels –the US
Government and Jews in particular- must be killed.159 James’ ‘star’ recruit turned out to
be Levar Washington. Washington had been in and out of prison since his early teens,
had converted to Islam while serving an earlier prison sentence for robbery and then
joined JIS whilst serving a term at Folsom.160
In November 2004 Washington was paroled and, as instructed by James,
proceeded to recruit others to his ‘cell’ in order to carry out attacks. He managed to
persuade two individuals, Gregory Patterson and Hammad Samana, who attended the
same Inglewood (Los Angeles) mosque to join him. 161
The three men (keeping in contact with James in prison) then proceeded to carry
out online research on potential targets for attack including the Israeli Consulate, Jewish
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events in LA and US military sites in the area, and Samana compiled a written list
entitled ‘Modes of Attack’.162 They also engaged in physical training and firearms
practice and Washington continued unsuccessfully to try and recruit others to help them.
Moreover, beginning in May 2005 Washington and Patterson began carrying out armed
robberies of gas stations –sometimes in pairs and sometimes alone- in order to fund
their planned attacks.163
The case was discovered after Patterson reportedly dropped his mobile phone
during the course of one of the robberies- investigators then began a surveillance
operation and arrested Washington and Patterson during another robbery on July 5th
2005.164 Bullet-proof vests, jihadi literature and lists of targets were found in subsequent
searches, and Samana was also apprehended at the start of August.165
James, Washington and Patterson all eventually pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
levy war against the US and were sentenced to 16 years; 22 years; and 12 years, 7
months respectively, Washington then had another 22 years added as a result of a
separate armed robbery charge.166 Samana (described as a ‘lesser’ figure in the pot) was
initially deemed mentally unfit to stand trial but was later sentenced to 5 years and 9
months in prison.

Case #26: Syed HashmiHelped supply military gear to al-Qaeda in South Waziristan (...2004-2006)
Key Features


Affiliated with al-Muhajiroun



Moved to London



Assisted Mohammed Junaid Babar sending military equipment to al-Qaeda

Syed Hashmi was born in Pakistan, but moved to the US at the age of 3.167 He
reportedly became involved with the London-based al-Muhajiroun in the late 1990’s
and was described as a ‘mentor’ to Mohammed Junaid Babar in New York.168 In 2003
Hashmi moved to London, travelling on a student visa and completed a master’s degree
in international relations whilst there. Between January 2004 and May 2006 he also
assisted his old associate Babar by letting him stay at his home in London, lending him
money and helping him store and ship military gear (including clothing and night vision
goggles) which were sent to South Waziristan in Pakistan to be used by al-Qaeda.169 He
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was arrested in June 2006 at Heathrow airport on his way to Pakistan and was extradited
the following year. In April 2010 he pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to
provide support to al-Qaeda and was sentenced to 15 years in prison.170

Case #27: Syed Haris Ahmed & Ehsanul Islam SadequeeTrained at home and sought jihad abroad (...2004-2006)
Key Features


Met at local mosque and reached out to jihadis online



Established worldwide contacts with numerous future convicted terrorists



Made and distributed a domestic surveillance video



Travelled abroad in search of training

Ahmed (born in Pakistan) and Sadequee (whose parents are from Bangladesh) grew up
in the Atlanta area of Georgia in the US and apparently met each other at a local
mosque.171 Beginning in late 2004 through to April 2006 the two friends discussed their
shared outrage at injustices being suffered against Muslims around the world (Ahmed is
reported to have cried about it172) and progressively developed plans to take part in
violent jihad, undergoing rudimentary physical training and reaching out to fellow
jihadists online.173
In March 2005 they travelled together to Toronto where they stayed for about a
week and met with Fahim Ahmad (the ringleader of a terror-group planning attacks in
Canada, arrested in June 2006174) and some of his associates, and discussed both
overseas training and domestic attacks.175 They maintained email contact with Ahmad
and other future convicted terrorists including Younis Tsouli and Aabid Khan in the UK
(see UK cases #19 and #25), Zubair Ahmed in the US (see case #28) and Mirsad
Bektasevic in Bosnia. In April 2005, in a bid to establish their credentials with Khan,
whom they believed could arrange training in Pakistan, Ahmed and Sadequee drove to
Washington and made ‘surveillance tapes’ of landmarks and potential attack sites. They
then sent digital versions of the tapes to Khan who stored them on his computer.176
On July 17th 2005 Ahmed flew to Pakistan, intending to study Islam at a
madrassa and then train at an LeT camp.177 He was met there by Khan, who reportedly
decided that Ahmed was too immature and a liability and so did not arrange for his
training.178 He returned to the US on August 19th 2005 and was interviewed by the FBI.
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Even after being approached by federal authorities Ahmed researched shaped explosive
charges and ways to beat surveillance, and continued to communicate with his
associates in code (as they had before) expressing his desire to return to Pakistan for
jihad.179 Meanwhile Sadequee (all the while in contact with Ahmed via email and
phone) had travelled to Bangladesh to get married, study Islam and continue his own
pursuit of jihad. In fact Sadequee allegedly agreed with Bektasevic, Tsouli and others to
form an organisation called ‘Al-Qaeda in Northern Europe’ which they planned to base
in Sweden.180
Ahmed was arrested in Atlanta at the end of March 2006 and Sadequee was
arrested in Bangladesh on April 20th. Both men pleaded not guilty at trial but were
convicted (Ahmed on one count and Sadequee on four counts) of conspiring to provide
support to terrorists. In December 2009 Ahmed was sentenced to 13 years and Sadequee
was sentenced to 17.181

Case #28: Zubair Ahmed & Khaleel AhmedConspiracy to train for jihad (...2004-2007)
Key Features


Maintained email contact with other jihadis



Continued efforts to obtain military-style training

In May 2004, American-born cousins Zubair and Khaleel Ahmed travelled to Egypt,
allegedly intending to try and make contact with foreign jihadis, but were intercepted
and discouraged in Cairo by Marwan El-Hindi (see case #19) whom they had been in
contact with via email, and Zubair’s father.182 Back in the US in July 2004 they
travelled to Cleveland and met with El-Hindi and an informant whom El-Hindi
introduced as someone who could provide them with military-style training. They
maintained intermittent contact with these individuals via email, as well as another
individual in Atlanta (Syed Haris Ahmed183- case #27) with whom they discussed
training and otherwise preparing for jihad. Up until the time of their arrest in February
2007 they also practised with firearms on a handful of occasions and downloaded jihadi
videos and military instruction manuals.184 Their case was added to that of El-Hindi and
colleagues and in January 2009 they both pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide

462

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW
material support to terrorists abroad.185 At the time of writing their sentences have not
yet been publicised, although they face up to 15 years in prison.

Case #29: Ronald Allen GreculaOffered services to al-Qaeda in scheme to make money/ regain custody of children
(...2005)
Key Features


Troubled personal life



Criminal opportunist angry at the government



Offered to build a bomb in exchange for money/ help ‘getting rid’ of his wife

Estranged from his family, Grecula was arrested in Malta in 2002 for having kidnapped
his children from his wife.186 By July the same year he was in contact with an individual
who was acting as an informant for the FBI, and whom he tried to enlist the help of in a
plot to either have his wife killed or set up in possession of heroin so that he could
regain custody of his children. He supplied $2,800 for the heroin and also allegedly
brought up that he would be willing to build bombs for anti-American groups.187
The informant was deported to Guyana in December but Grecula remained in
contact with him over the next two years and in April 2005 notified the FBI that
Grecula was seeking to locate a buyer for an explosive device. An undercover agent
then contacted him and claimed to represent a number of anti-American ‘clients’
including al-Qaeda. Over the course of the next few weeks Grecula persisted in trying to
offer his services, saying that he could build a laser-detonated bomb of ‘nuclear’
capabilities using materials bought from a hardware store.188
Finally on May 20th 2005 Grecula flew to Houston to meet with the undercover
agent and the al-Qaeda ‘client’ during which he repeated his willingness to build a
bomb and also to train al-Qaeda operatives as pilots in order help kill Americans. He
was arrested soon afterwards, and a mercury switch and one-and-a-half pounds of
lithium nitrate was recovered at his residence.189 He pleaded guilty to conspiring to
provide material support to al-Qaeda and was sentenced to 5 years in jail.190
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Case #30: Mohammad Radwan ObeidOnline recruiting for jihad (...2005)
Key Features


Accused of recruiting people online for jihad



Prosecuted for lying about his email address and for immigration violations

Obeid reportedly married a US woman in Jordan and came to the US in 2001, divorcing
her five months later and moving to Piqua, Ohio.191 Early in 2005 David Vasquez, a
police officer in training at the time, contacted Obeid online via two websites, one of
them being jihadwatch.org, which is geared towards counter-terrorism. Obeid allegedly
tried to recruit Vasquez for jihad, telling him “we are starting a big operation that will
make 9/11 nothing but a little bit of headache” and Vasquez notified the FBI.192 On
March 11th a librarian at an Ohio public library witnessed Obeid sending an email from
one of the library computers in which he talked about gun silencers and hydrogen
bombs, and also notified federal authorities.193 Meanwhile Interpol had independently
become aware of Obeid’s online activities and were using him as an example of how
terrorists are using the Internet to communicate and recruit.194
The resultant investigation revealed that Obeid had been visiting ‘terrorist’
websites and had “aggressively attempted to recruit various individuals [in the US and
worldwide] via the Internet into his radical Islamic causes and enterprise.”195
However, no terrorism charges were brought against him. Obeid was originally
arrested for immigration violations (failing to report his divorce) and was prosecuted
only for lying, saying he had not used a particular email address when he had. In
December 2005 he pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI and in July 2006 was sentenced to
12 months in prison, to be followed by deportation for the immigration offence.196

464

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW

Case #31: Michael Curtis ReynoldsOffered serviced to al-Qaeda in exchange for money (...2005)
Key Features


Lone individual with a criminal history, struggling financially



Angry at the US government over the invasion of Iraq, plus personal reasons



Tried to contact al-Qaeda online to offer his services

Beginning in October 2005, Reynolds posted comments on an Internet chat forum
(‘OBLCrew’) soliciting help in carrying out terrorist attacks in the US in order to coerce
the government into withdrawing troops from Iraq.197 He thus came in contact with an
informant (the same one as in the case of Ryan Anderson- see case #21) who he
believed was a member of al-Qaeda and offered his services in identifying targets,
planning attacks and offering advice on bomb-making. Specifically, he suggested
enlisting units of al-Qaeda operatives and targeting energy-infrastructure including
natural gas pipelines, intending to cause panic, economic cost and opposition to the Iraq
war.
On December 5th 2005 he travelled to a remote location in Idaho to pick up
$40,000 which he had requested as partial payment for his intended services and was
arrested.198 Said to be motivated by a combination of anger at the situation in Iraq,
personal angst at previously having his passport revoked whilst in Thailand, and
personal greed, Reynolds was convicted in July 2007 of multiple charges including
attempting to provide material support to al-Qaeda, soliciting others to assist him, and
possession of an unregistered grenade. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison.199

Case #32: Kobie Diallo Williams and Adnan Babar MirzaEngaged in domestic training and collected funds for the Taliban (...2005-2006)
Key Features


Houston residents angered by US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq



Engaged in domestic training exercises and collected funds to sent to the Taliban

Beginning around May 2005, Williams and Mirza conspired to join the Taliban in
response to the US military in Afghanistan and Iraq.200 In preparation for this they
465

began conducting camping and training exercises in rural areas of Texas and at shooting
ranges, using firearms which Williams provided. At least three others accompanied
them on some of these expeditions, two of whom (both Pakistanis in the US on student
visas, like Mirza) were later prosecuted for firearms violations. The third man
apparently thought things were ‘going too far’ at an early stage and became an
informant for the FBI.201
Williams and Mirza trained at least eight times from May 2005 until June 2006
and also attempted to make financial contributions to the Taliban. Mirza collected
around $900 (accepting around $350 from Williams) which he passed on to an unnamed
individual who agreed to make sure it would go to the intended recipients.202
The men were eventually arrested and charged in November 2006. Williams
pleaded guilty and Mirza was convicted of several charges including conspiring to
support the Taliban. Williams was sentenced to 4 and half years in prison, while
Mirza’s sentence remains outstanding at the time of writing.203

Case #33: Narseal Batiste, Patrick Abraham, Stanley Grant Phanor, Burson
Augustin & Rotschild Augustine‘Liberty City 7’ Plot to bomb the Sears Tower (...2005-2006)
Key Features


Group established around a charismatic leader



‘Ideological offshoot’ combining Moorish Science and violent Islamism



Pledged allegiance to ‘al-Qaeda’ and had plans to attack civilian and
government targets



Requested $50,000 in furtherance of their plans



Did not possess any weapons or explosives

At some point prior to 2005 Narseal Batiste built a group of followers around him,
based in the ‘Liberty City’ area of Miami. They called themselves the Seas of David and
adhered to a religious ideology derived from the Moorish Science Temple, which
combines aspects of Christianity, Judaism and Islam.204 Towards the end of 2005 an
individual from Yemen contacted the FBI while in America, reporting that he had been
asked by Batiste about making contact with foreign Islamist extremists to help fund his
plans to overthrow the United States government.205 An undercover FBI agent posing as
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an al-Qaeda representative then made contact with Batiste and over the course of the
next six months made covert recordings of their conversations.
From as early as December 2005 Batiste and the others met with the so-called
al-Qaeda representative, spoke of plans to develop an ‘Islamic Army’, requested
military equipment and weapons from him in order to wage jihad, and practised martial
arts.206 They further discussed plans to bomb the Sears Tower in Chicago and attack
government buildings, and conducted video and photographic surveillance of several
potential targets. Batiste also requested $50,000 to help them buy the necessary
equipment, and in March 2006 the group pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, repeating an
oath dictated to them by the undercover agent.207
The group did not progress any further (they possessed no weapons and
reportedly split due to a dispute on religious grounds some time after the pledge in May)
but were arrested in June 2006. Seven individuals were originally charged. Two
mistrials ensued, with one individual being acquitted,ii and in the third trial in May 2009
one man was acquitted while five were convicted of conspiring to provide material
support to al-Qaeda and related charges.208 Batiste was sentenced to 13 and a half years;
Burson and Rotschild Augustine received 6 and 7 years respectively; Abraham was
sentenced to 9 years and 4 months; and Phanor received 8.209

Case #34: Abdul Tawala Ibn Ali AlishtariFraud and terror-financing (...2006)
Key Features


Long-term multi-million-dollar fraudster



Agreed to transfer $152,000 believing it was destined for Islamist terrorists

From at least 1998 through to 2004 Alishtari was involved in an investment fraud
scheme in which he and a co-conspirator stole upwards of $18 million from their
victims.210 In 2006 he was approached by an undercover officer with whom he met on
numerous occasions, and in June of that year he agreed to help conceal the transfer of
$152,000, which the officer made clear was going to be used to buy equipment for, and

ii

Lyglenson Lemorin, a legal immigrant from Haiti was acquitted, yet US immigration officials have
since moved to deport him based on the same charges (“US Seeks to Deport to Haiti Man who was
Cleared in ‘Liberty City 7’ Terrorism Case” Associated Press Worldstream, February 6, 2008, via
Highbeam Research <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1A1-D8UKUO8G0.html> at June 9, 2010).
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fund a terrorist training camp in Pakistan or Afghanistan. In agreeing to do so he
reportedly stated “Muslims don’t fight; we defend” and accepted a fee of $15,000 for
his services.211 In accordance with the plan, on August 17th 2006 Alishtari transferred
$25,000 from New York to Montreal.212 He was arrested in February 2007 and later
pleaded guilty to terrorism financing and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. He was
sentenced to 10 years and 1 month in prison.213

Case #35 Mohammed Reza Taheri-AzarVehicular attack at a North Carolina college campus (2006)
Key Features


Lone, ‘troubled’ individual



Influenced by a family friend with extremist views



Selective, self-teaching of the Quran- developed an idiosyncratic, extremist
interpretation



Angry at US foreign policy and the plight of Muslims around the world



A personalised, ‘ideological offshoot’ of the global jihad

On March 3rd 2006 Taheri-Azar deliberately drove a rented four-wheel-drive vehicle at
students at the Chapel Hill campus of the University of North Carolina, where he had
previously graduated from. He injured nine people, though none critically, then called
911 and waited for police to arrest him.214
Taheri-Azar’s stated motivations were to avenge the death of Muslims
worldwide, which he blamed on the United States. In court he declared “I hate all
Americans and all Jews... death to Israel”215 and expressed similar sentiments in
numerous letters which he wrote to local news outlets. In one such letter to Eyewitness
News he declared “The U.S. government is responsible for the deaths of and the torture
of countless followers of Allah, my brothers and sisters. My attack on Americans at
UNC-CH on March 3rd was in retaliation for similar attacks orchestrated by the U.S.
government on my fellow followers of Allah in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Saudi
Arabia, and other Islamic territories. I did not act out of hatred for Americans, but out of
love for Allah instead.”216
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He later pleaded guilty to nine counts of attempted murder and was sentenced to
33 years in prison.217 The inclusion of this case in the current sample is slightly more
controversial than most, however, and requires additional justification.
Authorities did not classify this attack as an act of terrorism- partly it seems
because he was acting entirely alone and was an apparently ‘troubled’ individual, and
partly because despite expressing hatred for America and claiming his actions were
retribution for Muslims, Taheri-Azar did not express a coherent ideology that could be
immediately identified as ‘bin-Laden-inspired’. The fact that he was born in Iran
(moving to the US at age 2) and expressed support for the Iranian Shia regime218 would
also seem reason to exclude this case from a study of ‘global’ Sunni Islamist terrorism.
However, he was not raised as a Shiite and came from a liberal family that had
attended a Baptist Church when he was 4.219 Taheri-Azar’s family reported that he had
become influenced by a one-time family friend living in Canada who held extremist
views and was described a “religious mentor” to him.220 By his own account he began
reading the Quran himself out of curiosity about his heritage around 2003, and by July
2004 had become focussed on “the militant verses throughout the Quran”.221 His
personal radicalisation thus appears to have been the combination of being influenced
by another individual and selective self-teaching of the Quran. In letters to the
University newspaper after the attacks, ‘Ray’ –as he was known- also expressed support
for al-Qaeda and described Mohammed Atta as his role model.222
Although entirely disconnected from Islamist terror-networks and following an
individual interpretation of the Quran, Taheri-Azar’s idiosyncratic path to extremism
nevertheless took place within the broader context of post-9/11, post-Iraq-war America.
Thus, whether he is seen as a ‘terrorist’, a ‘lone-wolf’ or just a ‘nut-case’, his beliefs
and actions were undoubtedly shaped in that context and are relevant to understanding
the different ways in which the global Salafi jihad has been adopted by different
individuals.
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Case #36: Derrick ShareefPlot to attack Illinois shopping mall (...2006)
Key Features


Young convert with extremist associations



Expressed desire for violent jihad and collaborated with an FBI informant in
planning a domestic attack on a civilian target

Shareef converted to Islam around 2001 (aged 17) and a year later met Hassan
Abujihaad (later prosecuted for providing Islamist extremists with intelligence on battle
manoeuvres whilst serving with the navy in 2001).223 From around 2003 to 2005
Shareef lived with Abujihaad –who gave him advice and encouragement- in Phoenix
and then moved to Genoa, Illinois to live with his mother and step-father. He
maintained contact with Abujihaad but became disgruntled with him over time as
Shareef became more eager to pursue violence, while his former friend and mentor did
not endorse his ideas.224
In September 2006 Shareef then became acquainted with an individual in Illinois
who, unbeknownst to him, was acting as an informant with the FBI.225 Shareef told the
informant that he was planning acts of violent jihad against the US and the FBI began
recording their conversations. From November 29th they discussed attacking numerous
different targets. Shareef mentioned that he had previously considered attacking a
synagogue and had used Mapquest to view potential targets online, but was eager to
strike government facilities. They decided instead to go with the informant’s suggestion
of setting off grenades at a crowded shopping mall and proceeded to surveil a local mall
on two occasions discussing logistics of the attack. The following day, on December 2nd
they recorded martyrdom videos together in which Shareef declared his willingness to
die for jihad (although the plan did not involve deliberate martyrdom).226
Finally on December 6th 2006 Shareef and the informant met with the
informant’s ‘contact’, who was an undercover agent posing as an arms dealer, who had
ostensibly agreed to supply them with grenades and a handgun in exchange for a set of
stereo speakers owned by Shareef. Once the exchange was made, Shareef was
detained.227 He pleaded guilty to charges of conspiring to destroy the mall and to use a
weapon of mass destruction, and in September 2008 was sentenced to 35 years.228
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Case#37:Serdar Tatar, Mohamad Ibrahim Schnewer, Dritan Duka, Shain Duka &
Eljvir DukaPlot to attack Fort Dix (...2006-2007)
Key Features


US-raised immigrants ‘inspired’ by bin Laden, angry at the US



Planned domestic attacks on military sites

Members of this group had known each other since their teens- the Duka brothers grew
up in the same household and Eljvir had gone to high school with Schnewer and Tatar
in 1999.229 Exactly how and when their radicalisation began is unclear but relatives
report that in the years leading up to their arrest in 2007 they had become noticeably
more religious to the point that relations with family and friends had become strained.230
The investigation into their activities began in January 2006 when an employee
at a video retail store alerted the FBI after members of the group had brought in a video
to be converted to DVD showing 10 men firing weapons and calling for jihad.231 In
March 2006 a paid informant (Omar) infiltrated the group by befriending Schnewer, and
a second informant (Bakkalli) later infiltrated the group in June 2006.232
Up until the time of their arrest in May 2007, members of the group acquired
and watched jihadi videos (including speeches by bin Laden and footage of US forces
being attacked in Iraq) and stored them on their computers. They attempted to recruit
others to their cause, engaged in tactical training exercises using paintball guns,
obtained and practised with live firearms and discussed various methods and targets for
attack.233 In particular they talked about carrying out an assault on government facilities
and military installations in their area using firearms, intending to kill as many as
possible before escaping. In August 2006 one member of the group, Mohamad
Schnewer, conducted surveillance (accompanied by Omar) of several military bases234
and in November, Tatar obtained a map of Fort Dix from his father’s pizzeria (which
used to deliver to the base) and gave it to Omar to help plan the attack.235 In fact the
group were looking to Omar (the informant) to lead the attack, based on his enthusiasm
for the plot and prior military experience in the Egyptian army.236
Finally, in March 2007 Dritan Duka and Schnewer arranged through Omar to
purchase three AK-47’s, four fully automatic M16 assault rifles and four handguns.
Arrests were made on May 7th 2007 after Dritan and Shain Duka met with Omar’s
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‘source’ to pick up the weapons.237 The attack itself had not been immediately imminent
(members of the group had raised the need to obtain a fatwa endorsing their plans238)
however the group had achieved operational capability.
A sixth man, Agron Abdullahu, was also arrested in May and although he knew
of the group’s violent intentions and had supplied them with firearms at an earlier stage
(also giving instructions at some of the training sessions239) he was charged only with
illegally providing firearms. He quickly pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 1 year and
8 months in prison.240
The five main suspects went to trial and were convicted of conspiracy to murder
members of the US military, plus firearms offences. Schnewer, Dritan and Shain Duka
were each sentenced to life in prison plus 30 years; Eljvir Duka was sentenced to life;
and Serdar Tatar received 33 years.241

Case #38: Daniel Joseph MaldonadoJoined the Somali jihad (...2006-2007)
Key Features


American convert sought ‘pure’ form of Islam



Moved to Egypt and then Somalia



Underwent basic jihadi training before being captured whilst fleeing to Kenya



The first case of an American being charged for joining the Somali jihad

Daniel Maldonado grew up in New Hampshire before moving to Massachusetts where
he converted to Islam at his local mosque around 2000.242 He became increasingly
austere in his observance of religion and critical of others to the point that he was asked
to leave the mosque if he didn’t keep his views to himself. He left accordingly and in
August 2005 moved to Houston, which was around the time that authorities became
aware of him.243
In November 2005, Maldonado, his wife and three children moved to Egypt,
according to him to look for a place to live where they did not feel oppressed or out of
place practicing their faith.244 Disillusioned with Egypt, the family then travelled to
Somalia to find ‘true’ Islam and so that Maldonado could join the Somali jihad,
“fighting against all those who are against an Islamic state”.245 He received an AK-47
and basic training in Mogadishu before travelling south to Kismaayo for more advanced
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training where he was taught to use explosives and reported seeing fighters belonging to
al-Qaeda.246 Whilst there he also telephoned an associate (Tarek Mehanna, currently
facing terrorism charges) back in America to tell him about it.247 Maldonado did not,
however, complete the training as he contracted malaria (his wife is reported to have
died from it248) and fled further south to Kenya to escape encroaching Ethiopian forces.
He was captured by Kenyan authorities on January 21st 2007 and returned to America.
He pleaded guilty to training with a foreign terrorist organisation and received a
sentence of 10 years.249

Case #39: Omar Hammami aka Abu Mansoor al-AmrikiBecame prominent member of al-Shabaab, appears in recruitment videos (...2006Ongoing...)
Key Features


Converted in his teens and radicalised in the US



Inspired by the pursuit of a ‘true’ Islamic state



Has become a leading figure and visible recruiter for al-Shabaab

Hammami reportedly converted to Islam while in high school, going on to enrol in
university in 2001.250 After 9/11 he was drawn to Salafism as he strove to find out more
about his religion and soon became dogmatic and intolerant, causing conflict at home.
He dropped out of university in December 2002, undertook several menial jobs and
continued to focus on religion. He became increasingly politicised after moving to
Toronto in 2004. Then in March 2005 he married a Somali woman and in September
they lived in Egypt for a while, travelling with friends in search of a more Islamic
existence. Hammami then became acquainted with Daniel Maldonado (see case #38)
whom he met via an online chat forum. The two became consumed by events in
Somalia and in November 2006 Maldonado went to Somalia (leaving his family behind)
and enlisted with al-Shabaab soon afterwards.251
Reportedly charismatic, fluent in English and Arabic, skilled with computers
and adept on the battlefield, Hammami soon rose to prominence amongst the Somali
militants, and in October 2007 he appeared in his first recruitment video for them,
which was aired on al-Jazeera.252 He since appeared several times as Abu Mansoor alAmriki, showing his face for the first time in April 2008 and more recently criticising
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US President Barack Obama in July 2009, while calling for more volunteers to join alShabaab.253 Hammami (allegedly facing charges back in the US254) remains at large.

Case #40: Ruben Luis Leon ShumpertJoined the Somali jihad (...2006-2008)
Key Features


Convicted felon and local promoter of jihad



A leading figure in a network of individuals facing criminal charges



Fled the US to Somalia, joined insurgents and later killed in an airstrike

Shumpert came under the scrutiny of the FBI after an investigation was initiated in 2002
into a bank-fraud racket.255 It transpired that Shumpert –who had previously converted
to Islam while in prison- was a leading figure in a group of individuals who would
gather at his barber shop in Seattle to discuss jihad and watch al-Qaeda and related
propaganda videos.256 Informants reported that Shumpert would get children who came
to his shop to watch the videos too and was aggressive towards anyone that disagreed
with him.257 However, the group was not planning anything specific and were described
as ‘wannabes’, despite their criminal backgrounds and propensity to violence.258
Despite being deemed not to be a direct terrorist threat, arrests were made in
November 2004 on criminal charges. Shumpert had been detained already for assault,
and was then charged with use of counterfeit bills and possessing a firearm as a
convicted felon. He was allowed out on bail in May 2006, pleaded guilty in September
and then absconded, calling the FBI on November 18th to notify them that he was in
Somalia and was not coming back. He called again nine days later stating that he and
his Muslim associates would destroy everything the United States stood for.259
Shumpert is thought to have joined with violent Islamist factions up until the time of his
death, which reportedly occurred in a US airstrike against insurgents some time before
October 1st 2008.260
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Case #41: Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif MohamedDomestic training, possession of explosive materials, online instructional video
(...2007)
Key Features


Came to the US from Egypt as a post-graduate student



Researched and manufactured explosive materials



Posted instructional video on how to make a remote-control detonator online

Mohamed came to the US as a post-graduate civil engineering student at the University
of South Florida on January 1st 2007.261 He spent time on the Internet researching how
to make explosives and then going out and buying the necessary components. He and a
friend (Youseff Megahed, who was later acquitted262) also made repeated attempts to
purchase firearms and went to a shooting range in July 2007 to practice. Later that same
month they received a citation for firing a pellet gun at wildlife at a park in Tampa (after
which they made a video recording in which Mohamed talked of his hatred for
Americans).263
Mohamed (and Megahed) were then stopped for speeding on August 4th 2007
and police found sections of PVC pipe filled with potassium nitrate explosives in the
boot of their car.264 Further examination of Mohamed’s laptop also revealed a wealth of
jihadi propaganda, literature and videos, including a video that Mohamed himself had
made and posted online on Youtube, depicting how to use a remote-controlled toy as a
detonator for explosive devices. Speaking in Arabic in the video, he “made it clear that
his intention was to assist “brethren” in carrying out “martyrdom operations” that
involve the murder of American soldiers.”265
Mohamed was subsequently charged with a seven count indictment and in June
2008 pleaded guilty to providing material support to terrorists.266 He was sentenced to
15 years.267
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Case #42: Bryant Neal VinasJoined al-Qaeda in Pakistan/Afghanistan (...2007-2008)
Key Features


American convert joined al-Qaeda in Pakistan



Participated in attempted attack on US military



Met with numerous other operatives and provided senior figures with
information useful for planning attacks in New York

Bryant Vinas grew up as a Catholic in a middle class neighbourhood in New York.268
Around 2004 he converted to Islam and attended his local mosque, the Islamic
Association of Long Island. He took his conversion very seriously, began wearing
Arabic robes, encouraged his father to convert and became “reclusive and
headstrong”.269 Then in September 2007, without telling anyone he was leaving, he left
for Pakistan, by his own admission “with the intention of joining a jihadist group to
fight American soldiers in Afghanistan”.270
Friends of Vinas’ back in New York had reportedly arranged for him to meet
with family members in Pakistan who in turn referred him to a cousin in the Taliban,
and within weeks of arriving in Lahore Vinas was taken in by Islamist militants.271
Beginning in March 2008 through to August he then received training in combat and
explosives from al-Qaeda and in September participated in a mission where he fired
rockets (which missed) at an American military base near the Afghan/Pakistan
border.272
During his time in al-Qaeda Vinas was in contact with senior al-Qaeda
operatives including Abu Yahya al-Libi and British-Pakistani Rashid Rauf, who was
implicated in a number of Western attack plots before reportedly being killed in a
missile strike in November 2008.273 Furthermore he provided detailed information on
the operation of the Long Island railroad system, allegedly agreed to carry out a suicide
attack and met with operatives from several other countries, including a group of
Belgian militants arrested in December 2008.274 Vinas himself was arrested in Peshawar
in November 2008 (just days before Rauf was killed). Back in the US he was charged
with (and has pleaded guilty to) conspiracy to kill US nationals overseas, providing
material support to al-Qaeda and receiving military-type training from a terrorist
organisation.275 He is yet to be sentenced at the time of writing.
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Case #43: Abdifatah Isse, Salah Osman Ahmed, Kamal Said Hassan & Shirwa
AhmedMinnesota Somali jihad network (...2007-2008...)
Key Features


A number of individuals in the Minnesota area actively recruited volunteers for
the Somali jihad



Relatively large network of Somali-American immigrants involved



The first of several groups to travel overseas for training and combat

These four individuals are part of a much larger network, primarily young SomaliAmericans living in the Minnesota area, who, since 2007 have been ‘disappearing’
abroad to join the jihad in their homeland.276 The four included here are among eight
whose ‘outcome’ is known; four more individuals from this networks are included as a
separate case (case #46 below); another eleven are currently excluded pending more
information, and more still are likely to be involved.
According to indictments and press reports, at least 20 youths of Somali origin
living in Minnesota have gone overseas to fight for al-Shabaab, which was designated a
terrorist organisation by the United States government in February 2008.277 Speculative
allegations have been made against an official based at a Minneapolis mosque, which
served as a meeting point for members of the network.278 Meanwhile more substantial,
legal accusations have been made against a handful of significant figures within the
network who were also regulars at the mosque, some of whom appear to have had prior
combat experience in Somalia.279 In particular, Mohamud Said Omar (currently fighting
extradition from the Netherlands) stands accused of financing the travel of recruits to
Somalia, as well as the purchase of weapons.280 Cabdullahi Faarax (whereabouts
currently unknown) is alleged to have encouraged others to fight by telling them of this
own experience of ‘brotherhood’ while fighting.281 And Ahmed Ali Omar and Khalid
Mohamud Abshir (both of whom left for Somalia) were reportedly active in soliciting
others to go with them, beginning around September 2007.282 For now, we focus only
on those who have returned and pleaded guilty to charges against them, or who have
been confirmed killed overseas.
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The first wave of recruits to fly out from Minnesota left at the end of 2007.
Shirwa Ahmed left on December 4th, going on the hajj to Saudi Arabia before joining
the others at a camp in Somalia.283 Two days later Kamal Hassan and Salah Osman
Ahmed left, followed another two days later by Abdifatah Isse (on the same flight as
Ahmed Ali Omar).284 The men purportedly stayed at guest-houses on their arrival
before proceeding to an al-Shabaab training compound where they were given
instructions on the use of firearms and explosives and were ‘indoctrinated’ in antiEthiopian, anti-US, anti-Israeli and anti-Western rhetoric.285
Of the four recruits covered here, Shirwa Ahmed became the most (in)famous.
Following training he is reported to have taken part in an ambush on Ethiopian troops
along with Omar Hammami (see case #39) that was featured in a video posted on
Youtube in the summer of 2008.286 Then, on October 29th 2008, he became one of five
suicide bombers who simultaneously hit mostly governmental targets in northern
Somalia, resulting in approximately 20 deaths including the bombers.287 Shirwa Ahmed
thus became the first confirmed American suicide bomber.
The exact length of time that Hassan, Isse and Salah Ahmed stayed in Somalia is
unclear but all three returned to the US. According to one report, Isse and a companion
left the camp within a couple of weeks and had returned home by May 2008.288 Hassan
meanwhile apparently fought for al-Shabaab for a time before returning to Minnesota
via Yemen, and was interviewed by the FBI in February 2009.289
Early in 2009, striking plea-deals as cooperating witnesses, Isse and Salah
Ahmed each pleaded guilty to one count of providing material support to a foreign
terrorist organisation and have yet to be sentenced.290 Hassan pleaded guilty to lying to
the FBI, having denied the extent of his activities in Somali, and is also cooperating and
awaiting sentence.291
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Case #44: Khalid OuazzaniFinancial support for al-Qaeda (...2007-2010)
Key Features


Committed fraud to raise funds & money laundering to send finances overseas



Sent $23,500 to al-Qaeda



Pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda via a foreign co-conspirator

A naturalised US citizen and native of Morocco, Ouazzani operated a used car parts
business in Kansas City.292 From at least 2006 he engaged in bank-fraud, purchasing
properties at low prices through tax foreclosure sales before obtaining equity loans for a
much higher value (later defaulting on a total of $415,000). Part of this money he used
to buy a property in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).293 In August 2007 he agreed
through a co-conspirator (whose location has not been disclosed) to make a payment of
$6,500 to al-Qaeda, which was made on his behalf and which he later repaid. Then in
June/July 2008 Ouazzani made a further contribution to al-Qaeda of $17,000 from the
sale of the property in UAE. Around the same time he swore an oath of allegiance to alQaeda via a co-conspirator.294 No further terror-related crimes were recorded up until
the time of his arrest in February 2010. In May 2010 he pleaded guilty to bank fraud,
money laundering and conspiring to provide material support to al-Qaeda and is
awaiting sentence.295

Case #45: Aafia SiddiquiCaptured in Afghanistan, attempted to kill US investigators (...2008)
Key Features


Educated in the US, returned to Pakistan



Investigated for ties to terrorists



Attempted to murder US officials in Afghanistan

Siddiqui came to the US from Pakistan around 1991, where she obtained degrees from
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Brandeis University, becoming a
qualified neuroscientist.296 She apparently became involved with jihadists before
returning to Pakistan in June 2002, allegedly opening up a post-office box in the name
of accused al-Qaeda operative Majid Khan, which was to be used by Uzair Paracha (see
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case #16). Early in 2003 she then married Ammar al-Baluchi (nephew to Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed and currently detained in Guantanamo) and in March the FBI issued a
global alert for her and her new husband.297 She was reportedly arrested in Karachi and
questioned in April 2003298, after which she disappeared.
Siddiqui was eventually apprehended (travelling with her 12 year old son) on
July 17th 2008 in Afghanistan, carrying handwritten notes referring to a “mass casualty
attack” and listing various locations in the United States.299 While in custody the
following day, she managed to grab an M4 rifle and fired at the US interview team. She
missed and was shot in the abdomen.300
Back in the US Siddiqui was charged with seven counts all relating to the
attempted murder of US personnel. Despite being uncooperative she was deemed
mentally fit to stand trial and in February 2010 was convicted of all charges against
her.301 She faces life in prison at the time of sentencing.

Case #46: Zakaria Maruf, Burhan Hassan, Jamal Sheikh Bana & Mohamoud
HassanMinnesota Somali jihad network (...2008-2009...)
Key Features


Part of later wave of Minnesota-based Somali-Americans going home for jihad



All confirmed dead

These men represent another part of the network of Somali-Americans based in
Minnesota who were drawn back to their homeland to fight for Islamist factions in the
brutal Somali civil war (see case #43 above). All four are reported dead by their
families.
Maruf flew out from Minneapolis on February 23rd 2008 and was apparently
active as a recruiter, calling home and encouraging others like him to follow in his
footsteps.302 Bana and the two Hassans (not seemingly related) each heeded his call,
leaving the US at the start of November in 2008.303 Seven months later, Burhan Hassan
was reported dead in June 2009 (allegedly shot for refusing to follow an order); Bana
and Maruf were killed in July; and Mohamoud Hassan was killed in September.
As yet unconfirmed reports suggest that a fifth man, convert Troy Kastigar, may
have been killed alongside Mohamoud Hassan304 and that a sixth, Omar Mohamud may
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have blown himself up in a suicide attack, also in September 2009,305 but no more
information has been released.
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Name

Case description

Sami al‐Arian

PIJ support

Date
from
1984

Bashir Noorzai

Taliban heroin smuggling

Muhamed Mubayyid
Emadeddin Muntasser
Samir al‐Monla

Date to

Reason excluded

2003

Palestinian

1990

2004

Non‐resident

CARE International
CARE International
CARE International
Lied re. terror
memberships
Shooting at Virginia CIA
building

1991
1991
1991

2003
2003
2003

Not charged
Not charged
Not charged

1993

1994

Pre‐9/11

1993

1997

Rashid Baz

Brooklyn bridge shooting

1994

1994

Tarik Abdulmelik
Hamdi

US rep of Committee for
the Defense of Legitimate
Rights: delivered sat phone
to OBL

1994

2002

Not charged

Ghassan Elashi

Financial dealings with
Mousa Abu Marzook

1995

2001

Non‐GSJ

Bayan Elashi

Financial dealings with
Mousa Abu Marzook

1995

2001

Non‐GSJ

Basman Elashi

Financial dealings with
Mousa Abu Marzook

1995

2001

Non‐GSJ

Ali Hasan Abu Kamal

Empire State Building

1997

1997

Ghazi Ibrahim Abu
Meizar

NY subway suicide bomb
plot

1997

1997

Lafi Khalil

NY subway suicide bomb
plot

1997

1997

Pre‐9/11/ Non‐
GSJ

1998

1999

Pre‐9/11

1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998

2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001

1999

2001

Pre‐9/11
Pre‐9/11
Pre‐9/11
Pre‐9/11
Pre‐9/11
Pre‐9/11
Pre‐9/11
Pre‐9/11
Pre‐9/11/
Outcome pending

Fawaz al‐Damrah
Mir Aimal Kazi

Raed Hijazi
Kamel Derwish
Jaber Elbaneh
Sahim Alwan
Yahya Goba
Yaein Taher
Faysal Galab
Shafal Mosed
Mukhtar al‐Bakri
Pirouz Sedaghaty

AQ operative: sentenced to
death in Jordan
Lackawanna 6
Lackawanna 6
Lackawanna 6
Lackawanna 6
Lackawanna 6
Lackawanna 6
Lackawanna 6
Lackawanna 6
Al‐Haramain Islamic
Foundation

Pre‐9/11/ Non‐
GSJ
Pre‐9/11/ Non‐
GSJ

Pre‐9/11/ Non‐
GSJ
Pre‐9/11/ Non‐
GSJ

Soliman Hamd al‐
Buthe

Al‐Haramain Islamic
Foundation

1999

2001

Pre‐9/11/
Outcome pending

Earnest James Ujaama

Oregon training site

1999

2002

Pre‐9/11

497

Name

Case description

Date
from

Date to

Reason excluded

1999

2001

Pre‐9/11

1999

2001

Pre‐9/11

1999

2001

Pre‐9/11

1999

2006

Non‐GSJ

Zeinab Taleb‐Jedi

Helped Omar Abdel
Rahman
Helped Omar Abdel
Rahman
Helped Omar Abdel
Rahman
Joined Shia terrorists in Iraq

Hassan Abu Jihaad

Sharing classified navy info

2000

2001

Pre‐9/11

Imran Mandhai
Shueyb Mossa Jokhan
Rabih Haddad
Sabri Benkhala

National Guard, Florida plot
National Guard, Florida plot
Global Relief Foundation
Virginia paintball jihad

2000
2000
2000
2000

2001
2001
2001
2003

Pre‐9/11
Pre‐9/11
Not charged
Acquitted

Mohammad Salman
Farooq Quereshi

Lied to FBI about ties to
Wadih El Hage & Help
Africa People/ Africa Help

2000

2004

Association only

Nabil al‐Marabh

Entered US illegally; had
trained in Afghanistan.

2001

2001

Not charged

Sajjad Nasser

Entered US illegally; had
trained with JeM

2001

2003

Not charged

Tarek Mehanna

Conspiring to support
terrorists overseas

2001

2008

Outcome pending

Ahmed Abousamra

Conspiring to support
terrorists overseas

2001

2008

Outcome pending

Adnan El Shukrijumah

Trained with Padilla;
possible surveillance in US

2001

At large

Outcome pending

Hesham Mohamed
Hadayet

El Al ticket counter attack

2002

2002

Non‐GSJ

IARA
IARA
IARA
IARA
IARA
IARA
Co‐conspirators of Uzair
Paracha

2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002

2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004

Outcome pending
Outcome pending
Outcome pending
Outcome pending
Outcome pending
Outcome pending

2003

2003

Non‐resident

Lynne Stewart
Mohammed Yusry
Ahmed Abdel Sattar

Mubarak Hamed
Ali Mohamed Bagegni
Ahmad Mustafa
Khalid al‐Sudanee
Abdel Azim el‐Siddig
Mark Deli Siljander
Saifullah Paracha
Majid Khan

Co‐conspirators of Uzair
Paracha

2003

2003

Non‐resident

Amar al‐Baluchi

Co‐conspirators of Uzair
Paracha

2003

2003

Non‐resident

Majid al‐Massari

Ran the CDLR website

2004

2004

Borderline‐ not
terrorism
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Name

Case description

Date
from

Date to

Reason excluded

Fnu Lu

Iraqi translator stole
military documents

2004

2005

Non‐GSJ

Adnan Babar Mirza

Training at home + money
to Taliban

2005

2006

Outcome pending

Assem Hammoud

Virtual plot to attack NYC
tunnels

2005

2006

Non‐resident

Unnamed 1

Virtual plot to attack NYC
tunnels

2005

2006

Non‐resident

Unnamed 2

Virtual plot to attack NYC
tunnels

2005

2006

Non‐resident

Unnamed 3

Virtual plot to attack NYC
tunnels

2005

2006

Non‐resident

Unnamed 4

Virtual plot to attack NYC
tunnels

2005

2006

Non‐resident

Unnamed 5

Virtual plot to attack NYC
tunnels

2005

2006

Non‐resident

Unnamed 6

Virtual plot to attack NYC
tunnels

2005

2006

Non‐resident

2005

2006

Non‐resident

2005
2005

2006
2006

Acquitted
Acquitted

2006

2006

Not terrorism

2006
2006
2006
2006
2006

2007
2007
2007
2007
2007

Outcome pending
Outcome pending
Outcome pending
Outcome pending
Outcome pending

2006

2009

Outcome pending

Unnamed 7
Naudimar Herrera
Lyglenson Lemorin
Saleh Al Suwailem
Rahmat Abdir
Russell DeFreitas
Kareem Ibrahim
Abdul Kadir
Abdel Nur
Tahawwhur Hussain
Rana

Virtual plot to attack NYC
tunnels
Sears Tower Plot
Sears Tower Plot
Said was going to blow up
plane
Sent supplies to JI brother
JFK fuel line plot
JFK fuel line plot
JFK fuel line plot
JFK fuel line plot
Planning attacks in
Denmark; helped plan
Mumbai

David Coleman
Headley

Planning attacks in
Denmark; helped plan
Mumbai

2006

2009

Outcome pending

Youseff Samir
Megahed

Training at home;
possession of weapons &
explosive materials; online
instructional video

2007

2007

Acquitted
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Name

Case description

Date
from

Date to

Reason excluded

Luqman Ameen
Abdullah

Masjid al‐Haqq weapons
training

2007

2009

Non‐GSJ

Mohammad Abdul
Bassir

Masjid al‐Haqq weapons
training

2007

2009

Non‐GSJ

Muhammad Abdul
Salaam

Masjid al‐Haqq weapons
training

2007

2009

Non‐GSJ

Abdul Saboor

Masjid al‐Haqq weapons
training

2007

2009

Non‐GSJ

Mujahid Carswell

Masjid al‐Haqq weapons
training

2007

2009

Non‐GSJ

Abdullah Beard

Masjid al‐Haqq weapons
training

2007

2009

Non‐GSJ

Mohammad Philistine

Masjid al‐Haqq weapons
training

2007

2009

Non‐GSJ

Yassir Ali Khan

Masjid al‐Haqq weapons
training

2007

2009

Non‐GSJ

Adam Hussain Ibrahim

Masjid al‐Haqq weapons
training

2007

2009

Non‐GSJ

Garry Laverne Porter

Masjid al‐Haqq weapons
training

2007

2009

Non‐GSJ

Ali Abdul Raqib

Masjid al‐Haqq weapons
training

2007

2009

Non‐GSJ
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Name

Case description

Ahmed Ali Omar
Khalid Mohamud
Abshir

Minnesota Somali jihad net

Date
from
2007

Minnesota Somali jihad net

Date to

Reason excluded

2009

Outcome pending

2007

2009

Outcome pending

Minnesota Somali jihad net

2007

2009

Outcome pending

Minnesota Somali jihad net

2007

2009

Outcome pending

Minnesota Somali jihad net

2007

2009

Outcome pending

Minnesota Somali jihad net
Minnesota Somali jihad net
Minnesota Somali jihad net

2007
2007
2007

2009
2009
2009

Omar Mohamud

Minnesota Somali jihad net

2007

2009

Outcome pending
Outcome pending
Outcome pending
Reported dead‐
unconfrimed

Abdow Munye Abdow

Minnesota Somali jihad net

2007

2009

Peripheral‐ lied
re. involvement

Adarus Abdulle Ali

Minnesota Somali jihad net

2007

2009

Peripheral‐ lied
re. involvement

Daniel Boyd

Overseas jihad + plot to
attack military sites in
Virginia

2008

2009

Outcome pending

Hysen Sherifi

Overseas jihad + plot to
attack military sites in
Virginia

2008

2009

Outcome pending

Anes Subasic

Overseas jihad + plot to
attack military sites in
Virginia

2008

2009

Outcome pending

Zakariya Boyd

Overseas jihad + plot to
attack military sites in
Virginia

2008

2009

Outcome pending

Dylan Boyd

Overseas jihad + plot to
attack military sites in
Virginia

2008

2009

Outcome pending

Jude Kenan
Mohammad

Overseas jihad + plot to
attack military sites in
Virginia

2008

2009

Outcome pending

Mohammad Omar Ali
Hassan

Overseas jihad + plot to
attack military sites in
Virginia

2008

2009

Outcome pending

Ziyad Yaghi

Overseas jihad + plot to
attack military sites in
Virginia

2008

2009

Outcome pending

Mohamed Abdullahi
Hassan
Mustafa Ali Salat
Cabdulaahi Abdul
Faarax
Abdiweli Yassin Isse
Mahamud Said Omar
Omer Abdi Mohamed
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Name

Case description

Date
from

Date to

Reason excluded

James Cromitie

Plot to attack National
Guard base + Jewish targets
in Bronx

2008

2009

Outcome pending

David Williams

Plot to attack National
Guard base + Jewish targets
in Bronx

2008

2009

Outcome pending

Onta Williams

Plot to attack National
Guard base + Jewish targets
in Bronx

2008

2009

Outcome pending

Laguerre Payen

Plot to attack National
Guard base + Jewish targets
in Bronx

2008

2009

Outcome pending

Michael Finton

VBIED outside Federal
building in Springfield

2008

2009

Outcome pending

Colleen LaRose

Online plot to kill Swedish
cartoonist

2008

2009

Outcome pending

Jamie Paulin Ramirez

Online plot to kill Swedish
cartoonist

2008

2009

Outcome pending

Najibullah Zazi

Undeveloped plot to use
IEDs in NYC

2008

2009

Outcome pending

Zarein Ahmedzay

Undeveloped plot to use
IEDs in NYC

2008

2009

Outcome pending

2008

2010

Outcome pending

2008

2009

Outcome pending

2008

2009

Outcome pending

Nidal Malik Hasan
Umar Farouk
Abdulmuttalab

Trained with Najibullah Zazi
in Pakistan
Fort Hood shooting
Christmas Day plane attack
attempt

Abdulhakim Mujahid
Muhammed

Army recruitment centre
shooting

2009

2009

Outcome pending

Betim Kaziu

Pursued jihad overseas,
Kosovo

2009

2009

Outcome pending

Hosam Maher Husein
Smadi

Inert VBIED attempt in
Dallas

2009

2009

Outcome pending

Adis Medunjanin
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Name

Case description

Date
from

Date to

Reason excluded

Ramy Zamzam

Arrested in Pakistan on
suspicion of JeM
involvement

2009

2009

Outcome pending

Umer Farooq

Arrested in Pakistan on
suspicion of JeM
involvement

2009

2009

Outcome pending

Ahmed Abdullah Minni

Arrested in Pakistan on
suspicion of JeM
involvement

2009

2009

Outcome pending

Waqar Khan

Arrested in Pakistan on
suspicion of JeM
involvement

2009

2009

Outcome pending

Aman Yasin

Arrested in Pakistan on
suspicion of JeM
involvement

2009

2009

Outcome pending
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Appendix B Part 1:
List of UK Cases Included in the Sample in Chronological Order

N = 51 cases, 114 individuals (112 excluding double-counts)
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Case
#

Name

Case description

Date range
from

Date
range to

1

Omar Mahmoud
Mohammed Othman

Bombings in Jordan +
Influential preacher

1995

2002

2

Andrew Rowe

Fought in Bosnia + In
possession of coded
notes on explosives

1995

2003

3

Mustafa Kamel Mustafa

1998

2004

4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6

Richard Reid
Saajid Badat
Dhiren Barot
Abdul Aziz Jalil
Nadeem Tarmohamed
Junade Feroze
Mohammed Naveed Bhatti
Zia Ul Haq
Omar Abdur Rehman
Qaisar Shaffi
Brahim Benmourzouga
Baghdad Meziane

1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001

2001
2001
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2001
2001

7

Feroz Abbasi

2001

2001

8

Abdullah El‐Faisal

Inciting murder +
Numerous charges
Shoe‐bomb plot
Shoe‐bomb plot
US/UK terror plots
US/UK terror plots
US/UK terror plots
US/UK terror plots
US/UK terror plots
US/UK terror plots
US/UK terror plots
US/UK terror plots
Terror financing
Terror financing
Captured in
Afghanistan
Inciting murder

2002

2002

9

Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh

Kidnap of Daniel Pearl

2001

2002

10

Hemant Lakhani

2001

2003

11

Mohammed Ajmal Khan

Weapons sale for jihad
Directing & supporting
LeT

2001

2005

12

Abbas Boutrab

2002

2003

13

Kamel Bourgass

Downloaded jihadi
military instructions
Ricin plot + murder

2002

2003

14

Omar Khyam

Crevice‐ fertiliser plot

2003

2004

14

Jawad Akbar

Crevice‐ fertiliser plot

2003

2004

14

Salahuddin Amin

Crevice‐ fertiliser plot

2003

2004

14

Waheed Mahmood

Crevice‐ fertiliser plot

2003

2004

14

Anthony Garcia

Crevice‐ fertiliser plot

2003

2004

15

Mohammed Atif Siddique

Online distribution of
terror materials

2003

2006
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Case
#

Name

Case description

Date range
from

Date
range to

16

Abu Izzadeen

Soliciting funds for
terrorism

2004

2004

16

Simon 'Sulayman' Keeler

Soliciting funds for
terrorism

2004

2004

16

Ibrahim Abdullah Hassan

Soliciting funds for
terrorism

2004

2004

16

Shal Jalal Hussein

Soliciting funds for
terrorism

2004

2004

16

Abdul Rehman Saleem

Soliciting funds for
terrorism

2004

2004

16

Abdul Muhid

Soliciting funds for
terrorism

2004

2004

17

Mohammed Siddique Khan

7/7

2004

2005

17
17
17
18
18
18
18
18
18
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20

Shehzad Tanweer
Jermaine Lindsay
Hasib Mir Hussain
Mukhtar Said Ibrahim
Yassin Omar
Hussain Osman
Ramzi Mohammed
Manfo Kwako Asiedu
Adel Yahya
Younis Tsouli
Waseem Mughal
Tariq al‐Daour
Mohammed Hamid
Atilla Ahmet
Mohammed al‐Figari
Kibley da‐Costa
Kader Ahmed
Mohammed Kyriacou
Yassin Mutegombwa
Hassan Mutegombwa
Mustafa Abdullah

7/7
7/7
7/7
21/7
21/7
21/7
21/7
21/7
21/7
Online jihadis
Online jihadis
Online jihadis
UK training camps
UK training camps
UK training camps
UK training camps
UK training camps
UK training camps
UK training camps
UK training camps
UK training camps

2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004

2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
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Case
#

Name

21

Parviz Khan

21
21
21
21
21
21
22

Mohammed Irfan
Zahoor Iqbal
Hamid Elasmar
Mohammed Nadim
Shahid Ali
Sabir Mohammed
Abu Bakr Mansha

23

Khalid Khaliq

24

Kazi Nurur Rahman

25

Aabid Khan

25

Sultan Muhammad

25

Hammaad Munshi

26

Rangzieb Ahmed

26

Habib Ahmed

27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27

Abdulla Ahmed Ali
Assad Ali Sarwar
Tanvir Hussain
Umar Islam
Ibrahim Savant
Arafat Khan
Waheed Zaman
Adam Khatib
Mohammed Shamin Uddin
Nabeel Hussain

28

Abdul Patel

Case description
Terror support +
beheading plot
Terror support
Terror support
Terror support
Terror support
Terror support
Terror support
Plotting to kill soldier
Possession of AQ
manual
Weapons sting
Propaganda &
recruitment
Propaganda &
recruitment
Propaganda &
recruitment
AQ member;
possession of terror
docs
AQ member;
possession of terror
docs
Aircraft plot
Aircraft plot
Aircraft plot
Aircraft plot
Aircraft plot
Aircraft plot
Aircraft plot
Aircraft plot
Aircraft plot
Aircraft plot
Possession of terror
docs

Date range
from

Date
range to

2004

2007

2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2005

2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2005

2007

2007

2005

2005

2005

2006

2005

2006

2005

2006

2005

2006

2005

2006

2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006

2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006

2006

2006
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Case
#

Name

Case description

Date range
from

Date
range to

29

Malcolm Hodges

Sent letters
encouraging terrorism

2006

2006

30

Mizanur Rahman

Soliciting murder &
stirring up racial hatred

2006

2006

30

Umran Javed

Soliciting murder &
stirring up racial hatred

2006

2006

30

Abdul Rehman Saleem

Soliciting murder &
stirring up racial hatred

2006

2006

30

Abdul Muhid

Soliciting murder &
stirring up racial hatred

2006

2006

31

Omar Altimimi

Jihadi computer files +
fraud

2006

2006

32

Yassin Nassari

Rocket instructions on
computer

2006

2006

33

Sohail Qureshi

Preparing for terroris
abroad + possession of
terror docs

2006

2006

34

Kevin Gardner

2005

2007

35

Abdul Rahman

2006

2007

36

Nicholas Roddis

2006

2007

37

Pa Modou Jobe

2006

2007

38

Rizwan Ditta

2006

2007

38

Bilal Mohammed

2006

2007

39

Abbas Iqbal

2006

2008

39

Ilyas Iqbal

2006

2008

40
40

Mohammed Shakil
Waheed Ali

2007
2007

2007
2007

41

Bilal Abdulla

2007 London/Glasgow
attacks

2007

2007

41

Kafeel Ahmed

2007 London/Glasgow
attacks

2007

2007

Terror plans in prison
Manchester terror
support net
Hoax bomb on bus
Possession of terror
docs
Possession/
distribution of terror
docs
Possession/
distribution of terror
docs
Online jihadis &
'Blackurn Resistance'
Online jihadis &
'Blackurn Resistance'
Accused 7/7 support
Accused 7/7 support

‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam
Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW

Case
#

Name

Case description

Date range
from

Date
range to

42

Hassan Tabbakh

Preparing for terrorism

2007

2007

43

Ishaq Kanmi

Online jihadis &
'Blackurn Resistance'

2006

2008

44

Shella Roma

Produced jihad leaflet

2007

2008

45

Andrew Philip Michael
Ibrahim

Shopping mall plot

2007

2008

46

Mohammed Abushamma

Tried to go to
Afghanistan for
training

2008

2008

47

Krena Lusha

Downloaded materials
+ in contact with Kanmi

2008

2008

48

Ali Beheshti

Arson attack on
publisher

2008

2008

48

Abrar Mirza

Arson attack on
publisher

2008

2008

48

Abbas Taj

2008

2008

49

Houria Chentouf
Mohammad Rashid Saeed‐
Alim
Saeede Ghafoor

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2009

50
51

Arson attack on
publisher
USB terror materials
Attempted suicied
attack in Exeter
Threats to attack
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Appendix B: Part 2
United Kingdom Case Summaries
(Presented in chronological order according to when cases began)

Case#1: Omar Mahmoud Mohammed Othman aka Abu QatadaRenowned extremist preacher (...1995-2002)
Key Features


Highly influential Islamist preacher during the 1990s



Issued fatwas legitimising acts of terrorism



Actively recruited and raised funds for violent jihad



Held without charge since 2002

The inclusion of Abu Qatada in the current sample is a case that strictly speaking sits
outside of the relatively stringent criteria applied in this study. However, despite having
not been tried and convicted in a British court, there is enough evidence that is accepted
as fact –by his own admission- which makes him highly relevant to understanding
Islamist militancy in the UK. As an extremely highly regarded Islamist preacher,
Qatada’s exclusion from the sample would be more difficult to justify.
Born near Bethlehem in 1960, Qatada lived in Jordan until 1989 when he fled
the country on the basis of political persecution. He lived in Pakistan, working as a
teacher in Peshawar, and is thought to have met bin Laden and al-Zawahiri during his
time there. In 1993 he came to the UK and was granted asylum.1
Based at the Four Feathers mosque (and later at the Fatima Centre mosque) in
central London, Qatada’s reputation among jihadists grew as the spiritual advisor of the
Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Writing for the GIA magazine al-Ansar
produced in London, and in sermons that were often videotaped and circulated globally,
he issued influential fatwas justifying all manner of atrocities. These ranged from the
killing of wives and children of ‘apostates’ (issued in March 1995), the breaking of
Western laws by Muslims –including taking Western women for sex or sale (September
1998) and the killing of Jews (including children) and by extension, Americans and
English whom he described as no different.2
Having given the GIA the religious authorisation to do as they pleased, Qatada
was then forced to distance himself from them –denouncing them in late 1997/early ’98-
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as people began to realise the scale of the escalating violence in Algeria. He promptly
emerged as spiritual leader for the GIA’s successor, the Salafist Group for Preaching
and Combat (GSPC) and acted in a similar role for violent Islamist organisations in
Morocco, Tunisia and Libya, as well as for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Al-Tawhid
organisation in Iraq.3
Throughout his time in London Qatada also associated with violent Islamist
extremists, many of them convicted for terrorism offences. Among them are Khalid alFawwaz (described as bin Laden’s representative in London, detained since 1998 and
fighting extradition to the US), Rachid Ramda (sentenced to life in prison in France for
his role in the 1995 metro bombings), Djamel Beghal (jailed for plotting an attack on
the US embassy in Paris), Abu Doha (detained in the UK and facing charges in Europe
and the US), Abu Dahdah (convicted for running an al-Qaeda cell in Spain) and Abu
Hamza (see case #3).4
Within these circles Qatada is further considered to have been an active recruiter
and fundraiser for militant Islamists and reportedly travelled the country delivering
speeches, encouraging people to join the jihad and soliciting funds.5 The following
summary of his activities is offered by the Special Immigration and Appeals
Commission (SIAC) which deals with cases pertaining to national security: “[Abu
Qatada] has given advice to many terrorist groups and individuals, whether formally a
spiritual adviser to them or not. His reach and the depth of his influence in that respect
is formidable, even incalculable. It is not a coincidence that his views were sought by
them. He provides a religious justification for the acts of violence and terror which they
wish to perpetrate; his views legitimised violent attacks on civilians, terrorist group
attacks more generally, and suicide bombings.”6
Despite Qatada’s significance in the world of Islamist extremists, which British
security services were aware of (MI5 made contact with him on a number of occasions
during the late 1990s) and despite two convictions in absentia in Jordan in 1999 and
2000 for allegedly playing a role in terrorist plots there, no action was taken until
February 2001.7 Police then arrested Qatada and questioned him in connection with an
investigation into the Abu Doha network behind the Christmas 2000 planned attacks in
Strasbourg. At his home in west London they found £170,000 in cash (including an
envelope containing £805 and a note stating that it was for the Chechen mujahedin) but
there was insufficient evidence to mount a prosecution.8
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In October 2001, the UK Treasury froze Qatada’s financial assets for suspected
ties to terrorism and then in December, just as new powers to detain foreign nationals
suspected of terrorist involvement were being introduced, Qatada went into hiding
(during which time he continued to communicate with followers using the Internet).9
Ten months later, in October 2002, he was found in south London and was detained
without formal charge on grounds of national security. Ever since then he has been
embroiled in legal battles fighting his ongoing detention and possible deportation to
Jordan. He was briefly released on stringent bail conditions twice during 2005 and 2008
but was re-arrested both times.10 Although he was awarded £2,500 along with several
others for being unlawfully detained after 9/11, he remains in custody.11

Case #2: Andrew RoweLong-term jihadist, agreed to act as a courier of explosives (...1995-2003)
Key Features


Convert and long-term Islamist militant



Paid operative tasked with transporting explosives to Chechnya

Rowe –whose parents are Jamaican- was born and raised in London.12 By the age of 19
he was involved in drug dealing and petty crime, but then converted to Islam and in
1995 –reportedly influenced by people talking about it at mosque- left for Bosnia. He
took part in the war there, sustaining an injury, and travelled extensively within Islamist
militant networks, also visiting Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and claiming four British
passports within seven years.13
Rowe was under surveillance for some of the time in 2003 when he travelled to
the Netherlands, Germany and France from August through to October.14 He was
reported to have met several times with a contact in Frankfurt whom he refused to name
but was suspected to be Lionel Dumont (a French veteran of the Bosnian war sentenced
to 30 years in 2005 for his role in the ‘Roubaix gang’ robberies and an attempted carbomb attack on a police station in 199615).
Towards the end of October 2003 Rowe was arrested as he was returning from
France to the UK via the Channel Tunnel and traces of explosives were found on a
rolled up ball of socks in his luggage.16 Searches of his flat in West London and his
estranged wife’s home in Birmingham uncovered a 20-page notebook containing
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detailed notes on weaponry and military equipment, and a code for referring to different
kinds of explosives and targets as models of mobile phone.17 During his trial he
admitted that he had been given a coded list and was asked to act as a courier, tasked
with picking up explosives in Eastern Europe and taking them to countries near the
Chechen border (although the prosecution claimed they were intended for use in
Europe).18
Charged with possession of materials likely to be of use to terrorists, Rowe was
convicted and sentenced to 15 years in prison, the judge remarking that “you were a
paid operative over a substantial period of time, travelling the world and furthering the
cause of Muslim fundamentalism.”19

Case #3: Mustafa Kamel Mustafa aka Abu Hamza al-MasriRenowned extremist preacher, convicted for inciting hatred and murder (...19972004)
Key Features


Long-term British resident/ citizen, emerged as highly influential extremist
preacher



Numerous allegations regarding involvement with Islamist terrorists worldwide



Convicted for inciting racial hatred and murder



Still facing charges in the US

Abu Hamza first came to the UK from Egypt in 1979, settling in London and marrying
so that he could stay in the country.20 He was not religious to begin with but ‘reverted’
to his faith beginning around 1986 after enrolling in a civil engineering degree at
Brighton University. In the summer of 1987 he went on the hajj to Mecca where he met
Abdullah Azzam and from there on became increasingly immersed in violent Islamism.
From 1991 to 1993 he and his family (then with his second wife) lived in Pakistan and
Afghanistan, during which time he lost both hands and an eye in an explosion under
disputed circumstances.21
Back in the UK he excelled as a student of Abu Qatada and was invited to
preach at a mosque in Luton, where he attracted numerous followers. In 1994 he set up
his own organisation, the Supporters of Sharia (SoS) and in 1995 travelled to Bosnia on
three separate occasions.22
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Hamza became more and more prominent as an extremist preacher from 1997
onwards when he secured the position of imam at Finsbury Park mosque in North
London.23 He was arrested but released without charge in March 1999 after it emerged
that his son and step-son were part of a group of Britons accused (and convicted) of
plotting terrorist attacks in Yemen, and that Hamza had been communicating via
satellite phone with a group of Yemeni terrorists calling themselves the Islamic Army of
Aden during a related hostage situation in which several Westerners were killed.24 At
the time police found hundreds of copies of his sermons and eleven volumes of the
Encyclopaedia of the Afghani Jihad but no formal charges were made and Yemen’s
extradition requests were ignored.25
Hamza’s activities at Finsbury Park continued unabated as the mosque became a
gathering point for Islamist militants from around Europe and the world, earning
London the nickname ‘Londonistan’.26 By the end of 1999 he was allegedly involved in
dispatching followers of his to the US where they investigated the possibility of setting
up a jihadi training camp in Oregon (so far leading to one related guilty plea and one
conviction in the US).27 He was also actively involved in recruitment for armed jihad
and allegedly played an instrumental role in sending at least one individual (Feroz
Abbasi -case #7) to train and fight in Afghanistan.28
As an illustration of the content of Hamza’s sermons (for which he was
convicted) he is quoted as having declared the following to an audience in London in a
lecture on the second Palestinian Intifada: “Anything that will help the intifada, just do
it. If it is killing, do it. If it is paying, pay, if it is ambushing, ambush, if it is poisoning,
poison. You help your brothers, you help Islam in any way you like it, anywhere you
like it...They are all kuffar and can all be killed. Killing a kuffar who is fighting you is
OK. Killing a kuffar for any reason, you can say it is OK, even if there is no reason for
it.”29
But despite such inflammatory rhetoric –which security services were aware ofno legal action was taken against him until January 2003 when Finsbury Park mosque
was raided in connection with an investigation into an alleged plot to develop the deadly
poison, ricin.30 A variety of military equipment was found in the mosque, including
knives, gasmasks, a CBRN warfare protection suit and three blank-firing handguns, plus
“hundreds” of forged passports and stolen credit cards.31 Yet Hamza was not charged
and although he was officially removed from his position at the mosque (for failing to
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pay bills and letting it fall into a state of disrepair) he continued to preach outside in the
street.32
He was eventually arrested in May 2004 pursuant to an extradition request from
the US, who indicted him for his role in the kidnapping in Yemen in 1998, planning the
Oregon training camp, and for sending recruits to Afghanistan (namely Abbasi).33 Then
in August British police charged him with multiple counts of inciting racial hatred,
soliciting murder and possession of documents likely to be useful for terrorism
(referring to speeches recorded between 1997 and 2000, and to the Encyclopaedia of the
Afghani Jihad, which police had given back to him after the raid on his home in
1999).34 He was convicted of 11 of 15 charges against him and sentenced to 7 years in
prison in February 2006.35 In July 2008 his extradition to the US on completion of his
sentence was also approved36 although a recent ruling was made against such
extraditions where individuals potentially face life without parole.37

Case #4: Richard Reid & Saajid BadatShoe-bomb plotters (...1999-2001)
Key Features


Two very different individuals both radicalised at Finsbury Park mosque



Trained in Afghanistan



Accepted suicide mission to bomb planes using explosives hidden in shoes



Reid attempted the bombing but failed while Badat backed out

Both Reid (a former criminal who had converted to Islam) and Badat (a studious,
lifelong Muslim) began attending Finsbury Park mosque around 1997, and from 1998
through to 2001 they both separately travelled overseas, visiting numerous countries
between them and attending al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan.38 It was there that
they accepted their mission to act as suicide bombers by blowing themselves up
onboard commercial flights bound for America, using explosives hidden in their shoesa plot that was allegedly masterminded by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and delegated by
him to his nephew Ammar al-Baluchi.39
Despite travelling separately, Badat and Reid maintained contact with each other
and with their shared contact in Belgium, Nizar Trabelsi (another former Finsbury Park
worshipper, later sentenced to 10 years in prison for planning to suicide bomb a US
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airbase in Belgium40) via email and phone.41 On September 11th 2001 Badat was at the
British embassy in Brussels claiming a replacement passport to hide his previous travels
to Afghanistan.42 During November 2001 both men travelled to Pakistan and then early
in December Badat returned to the UK. Reid separately attended the same embassy in
Brussels on December 5th 2001 to claim his own new passport, after which he
proceeded to Paris via Amsterdam.43
Soon after returning to the UK Badat had a change of heart and emailed his
“handlers” notifying them that he was withdrawing from the plot.44 It is unclear whether
Reid knew of Badat’s change of heart but in any case he proceeded. He was questioned
at the airport in Paris, missing his original flight (after which he also emailed the
handlers, who reportedly encouraged him to proceed) and then on December 22nd 2001
he boarded American Airlines Flight 63 en route to Miami.45 Reid attempted to detonate
the bomb mid-flight, using matches to light the fuse in his shoe, but it failed to ignite
quick enough and he was restrained by passengers and flight staff.46
Reid was promptly detained in the US and charged with a 9-count indictment
with charges ranging from interference with flight crew to attempted use of a weapon of
mass destruction.47 He was convicted and in January 2003 was sentenced to life in
prison plus 110 years and a $2 million fine.48
Meanwhile Badat simply hid the detonator cord and explosives at home in his
parents’ house and resumed his life, enrolling at the College of Islamic Knowledge and
Guidance in Blackburn.49 Police eventually tracked Badat down via phone cards found
in Reid’s possession, which Badat had used to call Trabelsi, and he was arrested in
November 2003. Police also found that the length of cord in Badat’s house was the
exact same as that used by Reid, which had been cut in half to form the two fuses.50 He
pleaded guilty to conspiring to blow up an airliner and in April 2005 was sentenced to
13 years, a relatively light sentence given in light of a genuine change of heart and
cooperation with police.51 Badat still faces charges in the US.
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Case #5: Dhiren Barot, Abdul Aziz Jalil, Nadeem Tarmohamed, Junade Feroz,
Mohammed Naveed Bhatti, Zia Ul Haq, Omar Abdur Rehman & Qaisar ShaffiPlanning to attack ‘soft’ targets first in the US, then UK (...2000-2004)
Key Features


Led by Barot, a convert to Islam and long-term jihadist



Conducted surveillance for attacks in the US and UK



Produced exceptionally detailed plans for simultaneous attacks on civilian
targets



Endorsed by senior figures in al-Qaeda

Barot was born in India but his family moved to the UK a year later.52 He was raised as
a Hindu but converted to Islam around age 20 (1991), was influenced by the teachings
of Abu Hamza and Abdullah El-Faisal, and in 1995 he left for Pakistan where he
received instruction at a terrorist training camp in Kashmir.53 Barot reportedly trained
there for at least 5 months and wrote a book about his exploits, ‘The Army of Madinah
in Kashmir’ published in the UK in 1999 (which he dedicated to Tarmohamed).54 He
travelled extensively over the next few years and by 1998 was allegedly a “lead
instructor” at a terror training camp in Afghanistan.55 In late 1998/ early 1999 Barot
(operating under the names Issa al-Britani/ al-Hindi) was then sent by Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed to Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia to learn about the South East Asian jihad
from Hambali (Riduan Issamudin).56
According to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, he then sent Barot to the US to
conduct surveillance of Jewish and financial targets early in 2001 at the direction of bin
Laden.57 In fact Barot had applied for a place at a New York college in June 2000,
which he used to gain entry to the US (never attending any classes).58 On August 17th
2000 Barot and Tarmohamed flew from the UK to New York and over the next few
weeks conducted video surveillance of financial targets including the New York Stock
Exchange building and the International Monetary Fund world headquarters in
Washington DC. Tarmohamed returned to the UK in September, followed by Barot in
November.59 Then in mid-March 2001 through to early April, Barot conducted a second
reconnaissance trip, accompanied first by Shaffi and then by Tarmohamed after Shaffi
fell ill.60
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Assisted to varying degrees by his accomplices, Barot produced extremely
detailed dossiers on each potential target, describing the best possible methods of attack.
However, after 9/11 the planned attacks in the US were put aside in favour of operations
in the UK and over the next three years members of the group worked studiously on
developing their plans. These included the ‘Gas Limos Project’, which involved plans to
destroy buildings using limousines as car-bombs and a number of subsidiary plots
intended to be carried out simultaneously, including the deployment of a radioactive
‘dirty’ bomb, an attack on the London underground, and driving a petrol tanker into an
undecided target.61
Barot used multiple fake identities and bank accounts and the group employed
anti-surveillance techniques and communicated in code. Tarmohamed, Jalil, Feroz and
Bhatti were described as Barot’s most trusted confederates62, but each individual helped
out according to their abilities and circumstance: Bhatti provided storage for planning
materials and other documents, plus transportation and financial support63; Feroz –
thought to have trained in Pakistan in 2001- acted as a driver and ‘minder’ for Barot
during visits from his home in Blackburn and also assisted with researching attacks and
by using his garage to dispose of cars used by the group64; Jalil was another
driver/minder who also assisted in research, rented a safe house for Barot and looked
into obtaining a Large Goods Vehicle driver’s licence65; Tarmohamed assisted with the
US surveillance and researched electrical circuits necessary for building IEDs66; Ul-Haq
–who had been in Pakistan for 9 months in 1998- helped plan both the US and UK
attacks and accompanied Barot on at least one surveillance trip in the UK67; Shaffi had
assisted with the second round of surveillance in the US and was in possession of
extracts from the Terrorist’s Handbook68; and finally, Rehman –who apparently didn’t
meet Barot until 2004 and was involved only in the UK plotting- helped by researching
how to disable fire-alarm systems in buildings so that maximum death and destruction
could be achieved.69
Early in 2004 Barot flew to Pakistan to present the finalised plans for approval
and gave copies to his contacts there.70 Meanwhile authorities remained unaware of the
plot until June 13th 2004 when an al-Qaeda operative, Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan
was arrested in Lahore and copies of Barot’s plans were found on his laptop.71 The
resultant investigation led police back to the UK and arrests were carried out on August
3rd, 2004.72
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Barot pleaded guilty to conspiracy to murder and in December 2006 was
sentenced to life in prison with a minimum term of 30 years (cut down from 40 on
appeal).73 All but Shaffi also pleaded guilty to conspiracy to cause explosions. Jalil was
sentenced to 26 years in prison; Feroz received 22; Tarmohamed and Bhatti got 20
years each; Ul Haq was sentenced to 18 years; and Rehman to 15. Shaffi was convicted
at trial and also received 15 years imprisonment.74 Barot, Tarmohamed and Shaffi have
also been indicted in the US.75

Case #6: Brahim Benmerzouga & Baghdad MezianeTerror-financing ring (...2001)
Key Features


Part of extensive network involved in fraud and manufacturing false documents



Proceeds used to finance Islamist militants



Also convicted of recruiting individuals to al-Qaeda

Benmerzouga and Meziane –both illegal immigrants from Algeria- were part of a
relatively large network of North African immigrants involved in fraud and the
manufacture and trade of false documents, which operated in Leicester, London
(including direct links to Finsbury Park mosque) and across Europe.76 During the late
1990s both men associated with Djamel Beghal and Kamel Daoudi (both later convicted
for planning to bomb the US embassy in Paris) and were described as followers of Abu
Qatada77 whom Meziane was in daily contact with.78
The network was unravelled when Beghal was detained in the United Arab
Emirates in July 2001 and gave information on where to find Daoudi. Hearing of
Beghal’s arrest, Daoudi fled from Paris and was tracked to Leicester where he was
staying with Benmerzouga, and multiple arrests ensued in both Leicester and London,
beginning on September 25th 2001.79
An array of extremist material was found at the homes of Benmerzouga and
Meziane and between them and their accomplices they were also found in possession of
equipment used to produce false identity documents, computer programs used for
cloning credit cards, and stolen details of more than 300 cards used to obtain more than
£250,000 in cash plus travellers cheques, US dollars and gold.80 It further transpired that
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they had previously facilitated Daoudi’s travel to Afghanistan to attend an al-Qaeda
training camp.81
In April 2003 Benmerzouga and Meziane were convicted for running a fraud
conspiracy used to finance terrorism, and for recruiting people to al-Qaeda, making
them the first people in Britain to be convicted for being part of bin Laden’s
organisation.82 They were sentenced to 11 years each in jail. Meanwhile Daoudi was
extradited to France where he was later convicted on terrorism charges83, and 17 others
(all illegal North African immigrants) were convicted of non-terrorism offences relating
to fraud and possession of false documents.84

Case #7: Feroz AbbasiCaptured in Afghanistan serving with the Taliban (...2001)
Key Features


Convert to Islam, frequented Finsbury Park mosque



Went to Afghanistan as facilitated by Abu Hamza



Trained with al-Qaeda and was captured in December 2001



Released without charge from Guantanamo in 2005 but openly admits activities

Abbasi came to the UK from Uganda with his family at the age of 8.85 He enrolled in
college around 1998 but dropped out, went travelling in Europe and reportedly took an
interest in Islam after meeting a Kashmiri refugee in Switzerland.86 On his return to the
UK he converted to Islam, began frequenting Finsbury Park mosque and by the spring
of 2000 was living there.87 He apparently joined Abu Hamza’s Supporters of Sharia and
became increasingly enamoured with militant Islamism, helping set up a website raising
funds for mujahedin overseas.88
Then in December 2000, allegedly arranged for and at least partly financed by
Abu Hamza, Abbasi left for Pakistan, accompanied by another of Hamza’s followers,
Earnest James Ujaama (who later pleaded guilty to terrorism charges in the US).89 From
Pakistan Abbasi went on to Afghanistan with a group of other volunteers (minus
Ujaama) and underwent training at the al-Farouq camp beginning early in 2001.90
Shortly after hearing of the assassination of Ahmed Shah Massoud in September 2001
Abbasi volunteered for a suicide operation but Afghanistan soon descended into chaos
with the US invasion.91 In December 2001 –having seen no front-line action until then520
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he became separated from a small unit of mujahedin and was captured near Kandahar
with grenades strapped to his legs.92
Abbasi was taken to Guantanamo and was held there until January 2005 when
he was released without charge.93 Despite not having been charged or convicted Abbasi
nevertheless remained defiant and openly admitted his activities, explaining, “I actually
left Britain to either join the Taleban or fight for the sake of Allah in Kashmir.”94

Case #8: Abdullah El-FaisalExtremist preacher convicted of stirring up hatred and soliciting murder (...20012002)i
Key Features


Jamaican-born convert to Islam educated in Saudi Arabia



Gained notoriety as an extremist preacher in London during the 1990’s



Charged in 2002, imprisoned and later deported



Remains a controversial and influential figure

Born in Jamaica as Trevor Forest, El-Faisal reportedly converted to Islam around the
age of 16 and left for Guyana, where he spent a year learning Islam and Arabic, before
moving on to Saudi Arabia, staying for 8 years and obtaining a degree in Islamic
studies.95 He came to the UK in 1991, settling in Brixton in London and married an
English woman. During the mid-1990s he was an imam at Brixton mosque (attended by
Zacarius Massaoui and Richard Reid- although it is not clear whether their time there
overlapped) before being ousted from his position by mosque authorities who deemed
him too extreme.96
El-Faisal continued to preach his extreme form of Islam at study circles in
London throughout the 1990s and was stopped at Heathrow airport in 2000, when
copies of his lecture notes were made but no charges were issued.97 He came to the
attention of authorities again after one of his tapes was found by chance in a police
investigation and he was arrested in February 2002 and charged with stirring up racial
hatred and soliciting murder.98 He was convicted and sentenced to 7 years (cut on

i

The exact dates of the speeches El-Faisal made which formed the basis of his conviction are not
specified; however he was almost undoubtedly delivering such oratory throughout the 1990’s. The
offence range beginning in 2001 is thus a conservative one, based on the fact that it is certain that some of
the speeches in question did occur after 9/11.
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appeal from 9) and was then deported in 2007 after serving half of his sentence.99 ElFaisal’s sermons are still widely circulated and remain popular among jihadis (among
those said to have been influenced by him is Jermaine Lindsay, one of the 7/7 bomberssee case #17).100 He also continues to preach in Jamaica and in several African nations,
where he has courted controversy and run into increasing travel restrictions as countries
seek to bar him from visiting.101

Case #9: Ahmed Omar Saeed SheikhKidnap of Daniel Pearl (...2001-2002)ii
Key Features


Long-term Islamist militant also accused in an earlier kidnapping



Played a facilitating role, luring Pearl into being kidnapped (and killed) by coconspirators in Pakistan

Sheikh was born in London and spent most of his formative years there, save for 4 years
in Pakistan from 1987-1991.102 By all accounts he was a character with a certain amount
of charisma but was not particularly religious. That began to change in 1992 when, after
enrolling at the London School of Economics, he was moved by witnessing
documentaries depicting the torture of Muslims in a Bosnia awareness week.103 Not
long after that he travelled to Bosnia as a charity aid work for the organisation Convoy
of Mercy. He apparently, however, fell ill and while in hospital in Croatia met with an
experienced jihadi who urged him to join the jihad in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Sheikh
returned to the UK but then dropped out of University and left the country, by his own
account receiving paramilitary training at a camp in Afghanistan, where he met
Maulana Masood Azhar, a senior member in Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HuM) and future
founder of Jaish e-Mohammed (JeM).104
In 1994 Sheikh was arrested in India for helping to kidnap three Britons and an
American, who were intended to be exchanged for Pakistani prisoners but who were
rescued by police.105 He was apparently acquitted for his part in that conspiracy in 1998
due to a lack of evidence, but was kept in detention pending a retrial.106 Then in
December 1999 an Indian Airlines passenger plane was hijacked by Islamist militants
ii

This is another very conservative offence range, which is restricted by the fact that the study primarily
remains focussed on offences for which individuals were convicted. Sheikh was in fact acquitted of an
earlier kidnapping offence and there are few other details of his actions outside of the Pearl kidnapping.
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who took the plane to Afghanistan and Sheikh was released alongside Azhar in
exchange for the hostages.107
Sheikh continued to associate with Islamist militants in Pakistan and
Afghanistan and allegedly trained at Afghan camps during September and October of
2001 and fought for the Taliban and al-Qaeda.108 Beginning in January 2002 Sheikh
then played an active role in luring Wall St Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, who was in
Pakistan researching Islamist militants for a story, into a kidnap. Sheik sent emails to
Pearl arranging a time and place for a meeting to take place and his co-conspirators
subsequently kidnapped Pearl on January 23rd and sent emails to media outlets
criticising the treatment of Pakistani detainees in Cuba and demanding their release to
be tried in their home country.109 Sheikh reportedly sent an email to Pearl’s captors
saying to release him but by then it was too late- they had beheaded him on January 30th
2002 (although they continued to send out demands via email suggesting that he was
still alive).110
Sheikh was arrested in Lahore on February 12th 2002 and was later convicted for
the kidnap and murder of Pearl.111 He was not believed to have personally killed Pearl
(a feat which Khalid Sheikh Mohammed has claimed responsibility for) and neither did
three accomplices each jailed for life.112 Sheikh was nevertheless attributed with a key
role in the conspiracy and was sentenced to death in July 2002 and currently remains on
death row.113

Case #10: Hemant LakhaniArranged to sell a missile to ‘Somali terrorists’ in US sting operation (...2001-2003)
Key Features


Non-Muslim criminal opportunist



Agreed to sell missiles to an individual he believed was an Islamist terrorist

A London-based Hindu businessman, Lakhani had reportedly been involved in
supplying military equipment from Ukraine to Angola and in December 2001, at the
advice of a criminal associate, made contact with an individual who was working as an
informant for the FBI.114 Lakhani met with the informant in New Jersey in January 2002
and agreed to obtain and sell a shoulder-fired missile to him, even though the informant
claimed to be a member of a militant Islamist organisation from Somalia and that the
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missile would be used to bring down a plane in America.115 Indeed, he repeatedly
concurred with the informant’s intentions, expressing distaste for America and praise
for bin Laden.116
In mid October 2002 a down-payment of $30,000 was paid to associates
nominated by Lakhani (Yehuda Abraham and Moinuddeen Ahmed Hameed, both
prosecuted for non-terrorism offences117) and in July 2003 Lakhani and the informant
met with arms dealers in Moscow who were really undercover Russian intelligence
officers.118 The Russians showed them a single (inert) missile and Lakhani agreed to
pay $70,000 for it, intending to sell it to the informant for $85,000 and thereafter
negotiate a much larger deal for more missiles.119
Finally, on August 12th 2003 Lakhani met the informant at Newark Liberty
International Airport hotel to finalise the deal and physically hand over the missile,
during which he remarked ““50 at one time, simultaneously,” in different cities. “It will
shake them. They will run. They will think the war has started””.120 He was arrested and
in April 2005 was convicted in the US for conspiring to provide material support to
terrorists, arms dealing and money laundering. He was sentenced to 47 years in
prison.121

Case #11: Mohammed Ajmal KhanSenior Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT) operative (...2001-2005)
Key Features


Long-term jihadist and senior LeT operative with global contacts



Engaged in purchasing and supplying equipment to LeT in Pakistan

There is very little background information available on Khan, except that he was born
in Coventry in the UK but spent considerable time in Pakistan, and by September 2001
had trained with, and held a “senior role” in Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT).122 According to the
US indictment, in October 2001 Khan was stationed at an LeT office in Lahore where
he met with several members of the ‘Virginia jihad network’ (see US case #7).123
Khan’s key contact among the group of American jihadists appears to have been Ali
Asad Chandia, who was in Pakistan between November 2001 and February 2002 when
he returned to the US.124
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Khan (who had returned to the UK at an unspecified time) then flew out to
America as well. He was there until the end of February, and then visited again during
March 2003. During his time there he went about purchasing equipment for LeT
including Kevlar body armour, paintballs and a remote controlled aircraft, and was
assisted by Chandia and other members of the Virginia network.125 Khan and his US
associates contacted companies via phone, email and in person to get information and
organise purchases, and also maintained email contact with each other to coordinate
their activities and arrange for equipment to be shipped to Pakistan for use by LeT.126
Khan was also assisted by at least 2 individuals living in the UK, although they
did not appear to have knowledge of his links to terrorism (one was later cleared of all
charges, the other was convicted of mortgage fraud127). Then in June 2003 most of
Khan’s Virginia-based contacts were arrested in the US, with the exception of Chandia
who wasn’t detained until September 2005128 (6 months after Khan). Khan was arrested
in the UK on March 1st 2005 and charged with directing a terrorist organisation,
providing LeT with funds and equipment, and being a member of LeT. He was said to
have had access to “millions of pounds” raised for that organisation.129 He pleaded
guilty and was sentenced to 9 years in prison (including 1 year for contempt of court for
refusing to answer questions).130

Case#12 Abbas BoutrabDownloaded terrorist instruction manuals (...2002-2003)
Key Features


Illegal Algerian immigrant travelling on false documents



Downloaded bomb-making instructions

Boutrab, an illegal Algerian immigrant, is reported to have spent four years in the
Republic of Ireland and to have successfully obtained political asylum in 2001 using a
fake identity.131 He then moved from Dublin to Belfast in Northern Ireland (NI) in
2002, using another false identity, after becoming the main suspect in a knife attack on
an asylum seeker.132 Boutrab was detained as an illegal immigrant in April 2003 and
then re-arrested in prison in November after terrorist materials were found at his former
home in County Antrim, NI.133
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It emerged that between October 2002 and April 2003 he had downloaded 25
discs worth of material including details on how to manufacture explosives and smuggle
them onboard a plane, as well as how to make a silencer for a gun.134 Boutrab had also
made modifications to the circuitry of a tape player, which was cited as evidence of
intent to follow through on the instructions; he was in possession of numerous false
passports (‘Abbas Boutrab’ was even thought to be another alias) and was suspected of
being part of wider Islamist militant networks.135 He was found guilty of collecting and
possessing articles connected with the preparation of acts of terrorism as well as
possession of a false passport.136 He was sentenced to 6 years in prison in December
2005.137

Case #13: Kamel BourgassRicin plot and murder of DC Stephen Oake (...2002-2003)
Key Features


Algerian immigrant part of Islamist militant networks in London



Had been trying to develop poisons for terrorist attacks



Murdered a police officer at the time of his arrest

Bourgass is alleged to have trained in Afghanistan and came to the UK as an illegal
immigrant in 2000, settling in London and becoming part of the network of Algerians
based around Finsbury Park mosque.138 He made an unsuccessful asylum claim in 2001
but stayed in the country and was arrested for shoplifting in June 2002. Police in the UK
came across an associate of Bourgass’s named Mohammed Meguerba, who they
arrested as part of an investigation into a North African terror-fundraising network in
September 2002; however Meguerba was charged only with immigration offences and
was given bail, after which he fled back to Algeria.139 Meguerba was then arrested in
Algeria in December and, under interrogation, informed on his former associates in
London.140
Meguerba’s information led police to a flat in Wood Green, north London,
which they raided on January 5th 2003.141 Inside they found ingredients and recipes for
manufacturing poisons including ricin, and at the time also believed they had discovered
actual traces of ricin (although it later turned out that the initial forensic tests were
mistaken).142 Four initial arrests were made, and police began the hunt for Bourgass
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after finding passport photos of him inside an envelope addressed to ‘Nadir Habra’ (one
of his aliases) at Finsbury Park mosque.143 In fact Bourgass had been sleeping at the
mosque the night the flat was raided and days later fled north to Manchester, going via
Bournemouth where more arrests were made.144
Bourgass was eventually found by chance on January 14th 2003 in Manchester
when police were searching for another Algerian immigrant. During the search of the
premises, which went on for over an hour, Bourgass was left unrestrained and suddenly
grabbed a kitchen knife and began lashing out, killing DC Stephen Oake in the
process.145
In June 2004 Bourgass was jailed for life for the murder of DC Oake, then in
April 2005 he was also found guilty of conspiracy to cause a public nuisance using
poisons or explosives and was given an additional 17 year sentence.146 12 other people –
all North African immigrants- were charged at various times in relation to the ricin
conspiracy, however the plot was clearly undeveloped and evidence against the others
was scant. Four individuals were cleared in the same trial as Bourgass and a second trial
against yet more people suspected of involvement was subsequently abandoned.147
However, a number of those cleared of terrorism charges were still subject to
deportation proceedings on grounds of national security.148

Case #14: Omar Khyam, Jawad Akbar, Salahuddin Amin, Waheed Mahmood &
Anthony Garcia‘Operation Crevice’ fertiliser bomb plot (...2003-2004)
Key Features


Part of wider network of militant Islamists



Obtained explosives training in Pakistan



Intended to carry out domestic terrorist attacks using explosives

Five individuals were convicted in the UK as part of the ‘Operation Crevice’ plot (the
name of the police investigation). However, numerous others were also involved to
varying degrees. In particular two others were prosecuted overseas in relation to their
roles in this conspiracy: an American, Mohammed Junaid Babar (see US case #14) and
a Canadian, Mohammed Momin Khawaja.149
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The UK group –all based in the south of England not far from Londonradicalised during the late 1990’s in response to events in Kashmir, Chechnya and
elsewhere, and met each other at local mosques and meetings of al-Muhajiroun between
around 1998 to 2002.150 They thus became involved in a burgeoning network of Islamist
radicals operating in Crawley, Luton and elsewhere, some of whom were involved in
raising funds for, and sending over equipment to Islamist militants in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. An individual known as Mohammed Qayum Khan, based in Luton, was
suspected of being a lead figure in this network while at the time Khyam was thought to
be no more than a courier.151 Khyam and his colleagues, however, were not content with
mere supporting roles and actively sought out paramilitary training in Pakistan.
Khyam, who emerged as a leading member of the group, briefly attended a
jihadi training camp in Pakistan from January to March 2000 before family members
found him and sent him home. However, he went back again in June 2001 and also
spent some time in Afghanistan where he met with members of the Taliban before
returning to the UK.152 Towards the end of 2001 Waheed Mahmood moved to Pakistan
where he met Babar (who was a member of the New York chapter of al-Muhajiroun and
had moved to Lahore days after 9/11).153 Babar subsequently visited the UK on a
fundraising trip in November 2002 where he met with Khyam and Garcia and according
to Babar, Khyam told him that he was working for senior al-Qaeda operative Abdul
Hadi al-Iraqi, sending money and supplies to the mujahedin overseas.154
From the beginning of 2003 back in Pakistan, Babar and Mahmood discussed
the idea of staging attacks in the UK and as the year progressed this became the group’s
primary objective after obtaining training with explosives.155 Khyam, Amin and Garcia
were apparently the first to receive such training in Kohat in Pakistan where they were
trained over a two day period early in 2003 by a man known to them as Tarik, whose
“real name is probably Majid.”156 With the help of Babar they then managed to organise
their own training camp in Malakand running from June to July/August of the same
year, attended by Khyam, Garcia and Babar among others, who were joined in July by
Akbar from the UK and Khawaja from Canada.157 Two other men of note also attended,
both from the UK: namely Mohammed Siddique Khan158 (case #17) and Kazi Nurur
Rahman159 (case #24). It was there in Pakistan over the course of several weeks that the
aspiring jihadists practiced with firearms and learned how to make bombs using
ammonium nitrate fertiliser and aluminium powder.
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Following training, Khyam, Mahmood, Akbar and Garcia reconvened in the
United Kingdom by the end of the year but maintained contact with Amin, Babar and
Khawaja via email (using codes to disguise the nature of their communication).160
Beginning in October 2003, Khyam and Garcia purchased and stored over 600kg of
fertiliser to be used in manufacturing a bomb, and from February 20th-22nd 2004 –by
which time the Security Services had become aware of their intent to attack and had
mounted a covert surveillance operation161- Khawaja visited from Canada to share his
expertise on building a remote detonator.162 In February 2004 Khyam also contacted
Amin asking for details on the exact ratios of bomb-ingredients to mix since he had
forgotten.163 Amin –described by police as a “facilitator”164- duly found out from his
“superior”, Abu Munthir, who was in Pakistan and whom he had previously known
from meeting at a mosque in Luton.165
Throughout March, the UK plotters expressed increasing impatience to carry out
an attack and discussed multiple targets including energy infrastructure as well as
civilian sites including shopping centres and nightclubs.166 Although MI5 had switched
the fertiliser for an inert substance, they had gathered enough evidence and arrests were
made at the end of March.167 Khawaja was arrested in Canada on March 29th 2004;
Khyam, Akbar, Mahmood and Garcia were all arrested the following day in the UK;
and in April 2004 Babar and Amin were separately detained in the US and Pakistan
respectively (Amin being returned to the UK in February 2005).168
The five Britons (plus two more who were acquitted) were charged with
conspiring to cause explosions and endanger life. They were convicted and sentenced to
life in prison.169

Case #15: Mohammed Atif SiddiqueOnline distribution of terrorist material (...2003-2006)
Key Features


Radicalised online by ‘connected’ terrorist



Downloaded propaganda and set up websites with links to terrorist materials



Arrested trying to leave for Pakistan

Siddique was barely out of high school at the time he came into contact online with
Islamist ‘recruiter’ Aabid Khan (see case #25) who was instrumental in his
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radicalisation, beginning in 2003.170 Siddique went on to become absorbed with jihadi
propaganda and openly courted the image associated with it, earning him the nickname
‘suicide bomber’ after he enrolled at college in Glasgow.171 From March 2003 through
to April 2006 Siddique downloaded extremist material, communicated online with
fellow extremists who formed a worldwide network of terrorists (including Khan and a
group of individuals in Toronto convicted for planning attacks in Canada) and set up his
own jihadi websites which featured instructional materials on the use of firearms and
explosives.172
After several months of surveillance police eventually arrested Siddique on
April 5th 2006 as he attempted to board a flight to Pakistan with his uncle.173 He was
questioned and then re-arrested on April 13th at home in Alva. Siddique was charged
and was initially convicted of possessing articles useful for terrorism, setting up
websites with links to terrorism, circulating documents encouraging terrorism and a
breach of the peace (for showing beheading videos to fellow students at college).174 He
was jailed for 8 years in October 2007 but then in January 2010 his conviction for
possession of articles useful for terrorism was quashed as there was no established link
to any specific act of terrorism, which had accounted for 6 years of his sentence.
Siddique was released in 2010 but remains convicted of the other three charges.175

Case #16: Abu Izzadeen aka Omar Brooks, Simon Keeler, Ibrahim Abdullah
Hassan, Shal Jalal Hussein, Abdul Rehman Saleem aka Abu Yahya & Abdul
MuhidSoliciting funds for terrorism & inciting terrorism overseas (...2004)
Key Features


Long-term Islamist activists angered by the Iraq war



Made inflammatory speeches in support of terrorism overseas



Tapes of the speeches discovered within a separate investigation

All of the individuals involved in this case are long-term Islamist activists, heavily
involved with al-Muhajiroun (AM) and Omar Bakri Mohammed.176 Abdul Saleem
(better known as Abu Yahya) is reported to have been a member of AM since at least
2001 and to have previously trained with militants in Afghanistan.177 Abu Izzadeen
allegedly acted as Bakri Mohammed’s bodyguard and in November 2005 (after AM had
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disbanded and Mohammed had left the country) he was involved in the launch of the
AM-offshoot organisation al-Ghurabaa alongside Keeler and Yahya and other
prominent British radicals including Anjem Choudary and Abu Uzair.178
Abu Izzadeen went on to gain infamy in the press after heckling Home Secretary
John Reid in September 2006, and AM and its offshoots have since been banned in the
UK under new laws outlawing the glorification of terrorism.179 However, the offences
for which Izzadeen and colleagues were prosecuted took place on November 9th 2004 at
London’s Central Mosque in Regent’s Park. They were allegedly attending the mosque
for Ramadan but began speaking out against the war in Iraq (at a time when the battle
for Fallujah was taking place) and became increasingly inflammatory, specifically
calling for people to join the fight against British and American troops and to donate
money for the Iraqi mujahedin.180 The mosque authorities expelled them but they
continued their speeches outside.
At the time the incident passed by unknown to police but tapes of the speeches
were discovered in 2006 after an investigation began into protests against the Danish
cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad (which also resulted in prosecutions, including
Saleem and Muhid- see case #30).181 In total eight men (2 of whom were cleared) were
arrested in April 2007 and charged with soliciting funds for terrorism overseas; five of
them faced additional charges of inciting terrorism overseas; and Hassan was also
charged with possessing a document entitled ‘How Can I Prepare Myself for Jihad?’ of
potential use for terrorism.182
In April 2008 Izzadeen and Keeler were both convicted of inciting terrorism
overseas and fundraising for terrorism; Saleem and Hassan were convicted of inciting
terrorism only; and Muhid and Hussein were convicted of the fundraising charge
only.183 Izzadeen and Keeler were sentenced to 4-and-a-half years each; Saleem was
sentenced to 3 years; Hussein received 2 years and 3 months (including time for
temporarily absconding); and Muhid and Hassan both received 2 year sentences. Saleem
and Muhid’s sentences were to be served on completion of time they were already
serving for similar offences carried out in February 2006184 (making them the only
repeat offenders in the sample, although the offences were prosecuted in reverse order).
All of the defendants also appealed in this case and 5 had their sentences reduced in
May 2009. Izzadeen’s sentence was reduced to 3-and-a-half years and he was released,
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but then re-imprisoned for breaching the terms of his bail.185 Details for the other
defendants have not been reported.

Case #17: Mohammed Siddique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Jermaine Lindsay &
Hasib Mir Hussain7/7 London bombings, July 7th 2005 (...2004-2005)
Key Features


Part of wider extremist network



Motivated by global events affecting Muslims including Afghanistan and Iraq



Received explosives training in Pakistan



First suicide bombing in the UK

Exactly how and when each of the London bombers radicalised and when they began
their plans to attack the UK are unknown. Khan, the leader of the group, lived a secular
life until some time during the 1990’s when he reportedly turned to religion after an
incident in a night club.186 By 2001 he was associating with Islamist militants and was
observed taking part at a training camp in West Yorkshire that had been organised by
two known extremists (although he was not identified at the time).187 During the
summer of that year he went on his first known overseas jihadi training expedition to
the Kashmiri mountains, accompanied by Waheed Ali (case #39).188
At the beginning of 2003 Khan then went on the hajj to Mecca with his wife and
in April of that year he is known to have gone on a camping and outdoor activities trip
in the UK with Shehzad Tanweer and other young men.189 Indeed, Khan was well
known in his local community as a youth worker and mentor who engaged with young
men at the local gym, mosques and elsewhere. It is through these activities that he is
thought to have met Tanweer and Hussain in Beeston, and Lindsay most likely in
nearby Huddersfield, where the latter had lived before moving down south to
Buckinghamshire in September of 2003.190 Hussain is reported to have become more
serious about his faith following a trip to Mecca in 2002191 and Lindsay is said to have
been influenced by the teachings of Abdullah El-Faisal,192 but ultimately Khan appears
to have been the biggest influence in the lives of his accomplices beginning around
2003.
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During July and August of 2003 Khan was in contact via telephone with
Mohammed Qayum Khan from Luton (a suspected lead figure in an al-Qaeda
facilitation network, including Omar Khyam –case #14- involved in sending funds and
supplies to Pakistan and Afghanistan).193 During the same period he reportedly travelled
to Pakistan where he was picked up at the airport in Islamabad by Salahuddin Amin and
subsequently met with Omar Khyam and attended his training camp in Malakand for
two weeks.194 Back in the UK, Khan, accompanied by Tanweer, met with Khyam and
his associates on a number of other occasions during February and March 2004
(although there was no indication that they were planning attacks at this time).195
By September 2004 Khan began a long period of absence from his job as a
teaching mentor, which culminated in him being sacked in November, by which time
the group had become close associates. That same month, Khan and Tanweer left for
Pakistan where they stayed until the beginning of February 2005 and it is believed that
they underwent explosives training during that time196 (note that the bombs they put
together in the UK used a peroxide-based explosive called HMDT, or hexamethylene
triperoxide diamine197, as compared to the aluminium and fertiliser-based ingredients
Khyam et al were developing).
By late 2004 both Hussain and Lindsay are reported to have suddenly switched
from wearing traditional Muslim robes to Western clothing and not long after Khan and
Tanweer returned from Pakistan there was a flurry of activity on Khan’s credit card and
the first traceable purchases of materials necessary to make the bombs were made in
March 2005.198 The bomb-making ‘factory’ (a flat in Leeds) was then rented in May
and Khan, Tanweer and Lindsay went on a ‘dummy’ reconnaissance run of the London
Underground on June 28th.199 Finally, early in the morning of July 7th 2005 Khan,
Tanweer and Hussain journeyed from Leeds to London, bringing their bombs with them
in rucksacks and meeting Lindsay at Luton. At King’s Cross, the four men hugged
before splitting up. Khan, Tanweer and Lindsay all blew themselves up on the
Underground at about 8.50am while Hussain did the same about an hour later on the no.
30 bus at Tavistock Square. Together they killed 52 people and injured more than
700.200 Two months later in September a pre-recorded martyrdom video by Mohammed
Siddique Khan was aired on al-Jazeera TV, in which he blamed the attacks on UK
foreign policy and worldwide mistreatment of Muslims.201 A similar video recorded by
Tanweer was shown on the same station on the first anniversary of the bombings.202
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Case #18: Muktar Said Ibrahim, Yassin Omar, Hussain Osman, Ramzi
Mohammed, Manfo Kwaku Asiedu & Adel Yahya21/7 failed London bombings (...2004-2005)
Key Features


African immigrants to UK radicalised around the turn of the millennium



Influenced by Abu Hamza and part of a London network of Islamists



The leader, Ibrahim trained in Pakistan at the same time as Mohammed Siddique
Khan and Shehzad Tanweer but plots were separate

Each of the men responsible for the failed London bombings of July 21st, 2005 had
separately come to the UK from East Africa during the 1990s, with the exception of
Asiedu who arrived in 2003 from Ghana.203 Ibrahim, who emerged as the group leader,
was a former petty criminal who reportedly turned to radical Islamism while serving a
prison sentence for robbery.204 He was released in 1998 and met Omar around 2000.
Between then and early 2004 the group gradually came together via meeting at London
mosques, Islamic ‘study circles’ and Speaker’s Corner in Hyde Park and a number of
them attended speeches by Abu Hamza at Finsbury Park.205
Ibrahim spent two months in Sudan in 2003, claiming on his return to have
attended a jihadi training camp and in May 2004 he was accompanied by Omar, Osman,
Mohammed and Yahya on a domestic training expedition in the Lake District organised
by Mohammed Hamid206 (case #20). Then, allegedly assisted by a man named
Mohammed al-Ghabra and travelling with two others, Shakeel Ismail and Razwan
Majid, Ibrahim left the UK for Pakistan on December 11th 2004.207 Whilst there he
learned how to make bombs from hydrogen peroxide and chapatti flour, and in March
2005 returned to the UK, after which the plot swiftly gathered pace.208
A peripheral figure in the plot, Yahya left the UK on June 11th, but prior to
leaving he had helped by making enquiries at cosmetics stores about obtaining large
quantities of high-strength hair bleach necessary to make the bombs.209 Asiedu and the
others went about purchasing hundreds of bottles of bleach from April through to July,
using Omar’s flat as the bomb factory.210 Finally, on July 21st 2005, two weeks after the
successful ‘7/7’ attacks, Ibrahim, Omar, Osman, Mohammed and Asiedu ventured into
central London wearing rucksacks containing the explosives. Targeting the Tube and a
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bus, they all attempted to detonate their bombs except Asiedu, who backed out after
they split up and abandoned his device in a West London park.211 The bombs failed to
explode (because the concentration of hydrogen peroxide wasn’t strong enough212) and
they went on the run.
Asiedu handed himself in on July 26th, most of the others were arrested days
later and Yahya was detained in Ethiopia in November.213 In July 2007 Ibrahim, Omar,
Osman and Mohammed were all convicted of conspiracy to murder and were sentenced
to life in prison with minimum terms of 40 years.214 Asiedu pleaded guilty to conspiracy
to cause explosions and was sentenced to life with a minimum term of 33 years, and
Yahya pleaded guilty to collecting information useful for terrorism, relating to his part
in researching hydrogen peroxide.215 Ten more individuals (family and friends of the
bombers) were also later convicted for having assisted when the men tried to escape and
having failed to disclose information to police- three of whom had some prior
knowledge of the bomb plot- and were sentenced to between 3 and 15 years.216 They are
listed in Appendix B Part 3 (excluded cases) because they helped in an ad-hoc manner,
seemingly driven more by loyalty to family members than by genuine collusion in their
activities.
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Case #19: Younis Tsouli, Wassim Mughal & Tariq al-Daour‘Irhabi 007’ online promoters of jihad (...2004-2005)
Key Features


Established reputation by distributing jihadi videos



Made contact online with Islamist extremists worldwide



Financed via large-scale online credit-card fraud

Younis Tsouli came to the UK from Morocco in 2001, settling in West London and
doing a computer course at college. By 2003 he was posting instructions online on how
to hack computer systems and in 2004 he turned his talents to the world of Islamist
extremism.217 He began by resizing and re-distributing online videos posted by Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi’s militant organisation (which in October 2004 became known as alQaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers).218 This directly solved problems that the
organisation had been facing in making videos with large file sizes readily available and
earned Tsouli (operating under the name ‘Irhabi007’iii) direct praise from the head of alZarqawi’s media wing.219
Tsouli went on to become the administrator of a number of password-protected
jihadi websites and earned a significant reputation amongst fellow extremists online as
he distributed propaganda videos, instructions on bomb-making and advice on how to
get into Iraq to take part in jihad.220 Very little about the nature of his relationship with
his accomplices has been made public except to say that al-Daour was the financier of
operations, conducting £1.8 million worth of fraud (using computer programs to steal
people’s credit card details) and that both men kept in contact with Tsouli online.221
Tsouli and al-Daour had apparently never met in person.222
As ‘Irhabi007’ grew in stature on the Internet he also made contact with
numerous extremists both in the UK and worldwide. On the domestic stage he was
associated with Aabid Khan (case #25) with whom he ran the ‘At-Tibyan’ website.223
They were both in contact with Syed Haris Ahmed and Ehsanul Islam Sadequee (see
US case #27) in the US, who in April 2005 sent Khan and Tsouli copies of surveillance
tapes they had conducted in Washington DC and together they were all in contact with a
group of future convicted terrorists in Toronto.224 Most significantly however, Tsouli et
iii

‘Terrorist007’ translated from Arabic.
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al were in communication with Mirsad Bektasevic, a Swedish-Bosnian who, assisted by
two others, was planning suicide attacks in Europe.225 Bektasevic and his accomplices
were arrested in Sarajevo on October 19th 2005 in possession of explosives, firearms
and a martyrdom video.226 Moreover, police checked Bektasevic’s recent phone calls
and found that he been calling a number in London, which led them to Tsouli.227
Tsouli, Mughal and al-Daour were all arrested on October 21st and 22nd 2005
and were found in possession of extremist literature including instructions on bomb
making.228 Moreover, their computers revealed the extent of their online activities
including Tsouli’s identity as Irhabi007 and al-Daour’s massive credit card fraud, which
had been used to purchase website domains as well as operational resources for
mujahedin overseas.229 The three men originally faced multiple charges including
conspiracy to cause explosions and murder, but ultimately pleaded guilty to inciting
others via the Internet to commit acts of terrorism wholly or partly outside of the UK,
and conspiracy to commit fraud.230 Tsouli was sentenced to 16 years in prison, Mughal
received 12, and al-Daour was given a 10 year sentence (each of which were increased
to that in December 2007 after it was deemed their original sentences had been too
lenient).231

Case #20: Mohammed Hamid, Atilla Ahmet, Mohammed al-Figari, Kibley daCosta, Kader Ahmed, Mohammed Kyriacou, Yassin Mutegombwa, Hassan
Mutegombwa & Mustafa AbdullahDomestic terror training (...2004-2006)Key Features


Group leaders taught directly by Abdullah El-Faisal and Abu Hamza



Part of London network of Islamist radicals, including the 21/7 bombers



Organised domestic training camps in preparation for jihad



Infiltrated by an undercover officer

This was another group of individuals operating within the wider network of Londonbased Islamist extremists. Mohammed Hamid, a former drug addict with several
criminal convictions, apparently ‘reverted’ to Islam some time during the 1990’s and
opened an Islamic book-shop in Hackney, east London in 1997.232 Towards the end of
2001 he spent several months in Pakistan and Afghanistan delivering aid, and back in
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Britain was a student of Abdullah El-Faisal (case #8) and was associated with Abu
Hamza (case #3).233 Atilla Ahmet was a convert to Islam and acted as a ‘bodyguard’ for
Hamza before the cleric was arrested in May 2004.234 Ahmet also took over the
Supporters of Sharia in Hamza’s absence and became a close associate of Hamid.235
Together they acted as the group leaders.
From at least 2004 onwards Hamid hosted discussion groups at his home,
attended by Ahmet and numerous others, at which he espoused anti-Western rhetoric
and encouraged jihad.236 Moreover, he organised camping and paintballing weekends in
the Lake District and various locations in the south of England at which group members
learned military tactics in preparation for jihad.237 Among those who attended in May
2004 were the men later convicted for the attempted London bombings of July 21st
2005, including Muktar Ibrahim who had previously helped out at Hamid’s bookstore
and been arrested alongside him for racially abusing two policemen.238 Ibrahim trained
with Hamid and others again in August 2004, and his confederates Ramzi Mohammed
and Hussain Osman trained with Hamid in Kent at the beginning of July 2005.239
In April 2006 an undercover police officer infiltrated Hamid’s group by
approaching him at his bookstore and the men were placed under surveillance.240
Arrests eventually took place in September 2006241 and individuals were charged and
convicted according to their specific roles. Hamid was convicted of soliciting murder
and providing terrorism training and was sentenced to indefinite detention with a
minimum term of 7-and-a-half years; Ahmet pleaded guilty to soliciting murder
(encouraging recruits to kill ‘kuffar’ or non-Muslims) and received 7 years; da-Costa
was convicted of not only attending but also providing terrorism training, as he had
helped instruct the others, and also for possessing articles useful for terrorism- he was
sentenced to 5 years; al-Figari, Ahmed and Yassin Mutegombwa were sentenced to 4.5,
3.75 and 3.5 years respectively for attending terrorism training; Kyriacou received 3.5
years for the same charge as well as possessing articles useful for terrorism; Hassan
Mutegombwa received a 10 year sentence for obtaining funds for terrorism, having
asked the undercover officer for financial assistance so he could go overseas to train,
and was later stopped at Heathrow airport en route to Kenya after borrowing the funds
from others; finally Mustafa Abdullah was jailed for 2 years for possessing articles
useful for terrorism in the form of an al-Qaeda manual.242
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Case #21: Parviz Khan, Mohammed Irfan, Zahoor Iqbal, Hamid Elasmar,
Mohammed Nadim, Shahid Ali & Sabir MohammedSending supplies to Afghanistan and plotting to behead a British Muslim soldier
(...2004-2007)
Key Features


Birmingham-based terror support network led by Khan



Co-conspirators assisted with sending supplies to Pakistan for Islamist militants



Khan also plotting to kidnap and murder a British Muslim soldier

Parviz Khan, from Birmingham, lived a relatively secular life until his early 30s (from
about 2000 onwards, two years after his mother was diagnosed with cancer and he
became her full-time carer).243 From then on he became increasingly religiously
observant and is reported to have frequented Finsbury Park mosque. He also became
more politicised and began collecting clothes to send to Muslims in Chechnya and
Afghanistan.244 Khan then bought a house in Pakistan and at some point unknown made
contact with Islamist militants there -whose names are not publicly known- and from at
least December 2004 began sending over packages for the mujahedin, including
camping and outdoor equipment, military clothing and a variety of electrical goods,
from walkie-talkies to ‘bug detectors’ and video equipment for recording propaganda
films.245
Aided by his associates, who collectively helped by providing access to
wholesalers’ supermarkets, going out and buying the items on Khan’s ‘shopping lists’
and helping package and send the items, Khan sent four shipments between December
2004 and December 2006 weighing over a ton and worth thousands of pounds.246 The
packages would be sent to his address in Pakistan and he would travel over in person to
collect and hand them over to militants. Khan and associates also collected money from
people in the UK telling them it was for charitable reasons including an earthquake
appeal, and while Khan was in Pakistan Iqbal sent over in excess of £12,000 between
February 2006 and January 2007.247
However, Khan was not content with playing a support role and after his
“superiors” in Pakistan denied his requests to engage in combat he began plotting to
take action at home.248 Inspired by videos of beheadings and outraged at Muslim
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soldiers serving in the British army, Khan devised a plan to befriend a British Muslim
soldier on a night out, lure him into a car and subdue him with the help of drug-dealers.
He would then take him back to a lock-up garage and behead him whilst videoing it.249
Between July and December 2006 he approached two separate individuals trying to
enlist their help although neither did (one of whom was later cleared and the other –
Basiru Gassama- convicted for not going to the police250).
From at least 2006 MI5 had the group under surveillance and had been recording
their conversations. On January 31st 2007 Khan, Iqbal, Irfan and Elasmar were all
arrested.251 Khan pleaded guilty to the kidnap and murder plot as well as supplying
goods to terrorists and was sentenced to life with a minimum term of 14 years. Iqbal,
Irfan and Elasmar were each convicted for their part in helping to supply the goods and
were sentenced to 7, 4 and 3 years and 4 months respectively while a fifth man was
cleared.252 Finally, Nadim, Ali and Mohammed were arrested in October 2008 and
pleaded guilty to having assisted with sending the supplies to Pakistani militants. Nadim
was jailed for 3 years and Ali and Mohammed received sentences of 2 years and 4
months each, while a fourth man –Abdul Raheem- was jailed for having known about
their activities and failing to inform authorities.253

Case #22: Abu Bakr ManshaPlotted to kill a British soldier (...2005)
Key Features


Seemingly lone individual inspired to kill a soldier in revenge for publicised
bravery fighting in Iraq



Influenced by Islamist propaganda and unnamed others

In December 2004 The Sun newspaper published an article about the exploits of a
British soldier in Iraq, which earned him the Military Cross for bravery.254 Some time
after then, Abu Bakr Mansha began plotting to kill the soldier, obtaining his address and
acquiring a blank-firing pistol, which was being converted to fire live rounds at the time
he was caught.255 Police somehow found out and raided Mansha’s home in South
London in March 2005 where they found the weapon, a copy of the newspaper article
and a handwritten note with the soldier’s address as well as notes requesting the
addresses of a rich Jewish man and a Hindu businessman. He was also in possession of
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extremist Islamist DVDs including footage of Ken Bigley being beheaded. He was
convicted of possessing articles useful for someone for preparing an act of terrorism and
sentenced to 6 years in prison in January 2006. The judge mentioned that his low
intelligence and the influence of others were mitigating factors although no other
individuals were named as having made specific contributions in the plot.256

Case #23: Khalid KhaliqPossession of terrorist training manual (...2005)
Key Features


Friend of 7/7 bombers



In possession of terror-training manual

Khaliq, a resident of Beeston, Leeds, was a close friend of Mohammed Siddique Khan
and had been on a white-water rafting trip with him and Shehzad Tanweer in the UK in
June 2005.257 He was also one of several trustees –including the bombers- of the ‘Iqra’
Islamic bookshop, where local Islamists would congregate.258
Khaliq’s home was searched in July 2005 and police found a CD, which
contained jihadi propaganda and a copy of an al-Qaeda terrorist training manual (which
had been downloaded from a US government website and was thus missing the section
on bomb-making but retained instructions on preparing assassinations and other
activities259). No action was taken against Khaliq until the investigation was followed
up and he was arrested and charged in May 2007. He was eventually convicted of
possessing an article likely to be useful for terrorism and sentenced to 16 months in
jail.260
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Case #24: Kazi Nurur RahmanWeapons-buying sting (...2005)
Key Features


Long-term London-based Islamist



Allegedly trained in Pakistan alongside Omar Khyam et al



Caught in sting operation trying to buy submachine guns

Rahman appears to have been a long-term Islamist and part of the network of militant
extremists which emerged in London during the 1990s. In 1995 he was charged in
connection with the murder of a Nigerian student by a young Islamist outside Newham
College, East London but the charges against him were dropped.261 He was also
interviewed by a reporter in Lahore in October 2001 speaking about British Muslims
volunteering to fight against Western troops in Afghanistan, and allegedly trained
alongside the ‘Crevice’ attempted bombers (case #14) in Pakistan in 2003. Mohammed
Junaid Babar went as far to testify that Rahman was the head of an East London terror
cell.262
Rahman had been kept under surveillance following the Operation Crevice
arrests in March 2004 and was eventually caught in a weapons sting. In June 2005
undercover officers posing as arms dealers offered to sell Rahman firearms and he
accepted.263 He reportedly stated that it was “no problem” to obtain £70,000 for missiles
and Rocket Propelled Grenade Launchers (RPGs) and in November 2005 he met with
the ‘arms dealers’ to purchase Uzi submachine guns at £1,000 a piece, at which point he
was arrested. In April 2007 he pleaded guilty to attempting to obtain property intending
to use it for acts of terrorism and as prosecutors elaborated “[t]he terrorist purpose,
which the defendant accepts by his plea but does not define, was to cause death, injury
and damage for the religious and political purposes of al-Qaeda.”264 He was sentenced
to 9 years in prison.265
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Case #25: Aabid Khan, Sultan Muhammad & Hamaad MunshiDistributed Islamist propaganda, involved in recruitment for jihad (...2005-2006)
Key Features


Leader –Khan- terrorist recruiter and facilitator



Global online contacts



Travel to Pakistan

Aabid Khan’s radicalisation began at the age of 12 (around 1996/1997) when he became
angered by Muslims being killed in Chechnya.266 From then onwards he monitored
related news online, collected information on pyrotechnics, accessed jihadi chat-forums
and gradually amassed “the largest cyber “encyclopaedia” of articles promoting
terrorism yet seized in Britain.”267 Khan, based in Bradford, also set up and
administered influential jihadi websites and was active in encouraging others to take
part in jihad (among them Mohammed Atif Siddique –case #15- whom he allegedly
recruited in 2003)268 and went on to build up a global network of contacts.
By 2005 Khan was co-running the ‘At-Tibyan’ website, popular among
jihadists, along with a London-based associate, Younis Tsouli (case #19).269 In March
of that year he reportedly flew to Toronto to meet with Fahim Ahmad and others later
convicted for planning terrorist attacks in Canada270 and in April he was sent
surveillance footage of landmarks in Washington DC recorded by contacts in America
(US case #27).271
It was also in 2005 that Khan recruited schoolboy Hamaad Munshi, with whom
he maintained frequent online and telephone contact.272 Munshi spent hours on the Web
researching jihadi propaganda and instructional material including how to make suicide
vests and would send copies to Khan.273 Khan’s cousin, Muhammad, played a similar
role in collecting and sharing information.274
All the while maintaining contact with fellow jihadists online, Khan spent four
months in Pakistan from June to September 2005, and in December in the UK carried
out surveillance on security vans, although no further action was taken.275 Meanwhile,
following information gleaned from the arrest of Tsouli in London in October, Khan
was placed under surveillance. He again left for Pakistan in January 2006 where he met
with one of his American contacts, Syed Haris Ahmed (US case #27) and returned to
the UK in June and was arrested.276 His clothes tested positive for explosives,
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suggesting time at a militant training camp, and he was found in possession of a huge
amount of propaganda, terrorist instructional material and details he had downloaded on
the addresses of members of the Royal family.277
Widely described as a recruiter and facilitator of terrorism believed to be moving
ever closer to preparing an attack of some sort himself, Khan was convicted on three
counts of possessing articles for purposes of terrorism and was sentenced to 12 years in
prison.278 Muhammad was convicted of the same types of charge plus one of making a
document for terrorism (a document entitled ‘Draft Ideas’ offering details on how to
prepare for acts of terrorism) and was originally sentenced to 10 years, reduced on
appeal to 8. Finally, Munshi was also convicted of making a document useful for
terrorism, namely a file called ‘How to Make Napalm’ which he had created from
material on the Internet, and received a 2 year sentence. A fourth individual was
acquitted.279
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Case #26: Rangzieb Ahmed & Habib AhmedMembers of al-Qaeda (...2005-2006)
Key Features


Rangzieb, long-term Islamist militant and global terrorism operative



Assisted by Habib



First convictions in UK for being members of al-Qaeda

Rangzieb Ahmed was born in Manchester but grew up in Pakistan. He was imprisoned
in India from 1994 to 2001 for illegally crossing the border into Kashmir (during which
time Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh –case #9- allegedly sent him money280) and in May he
returned to Manchester, during which time he appears to have met Habib (no
relation).281 Rangzieb left the UK again for over a year beginning in April 2004, during
which time he is thought to have joined Harakat-ul-Mujahedin (HuM) and al-Qaeda in
Pakistan, and then in May 2005 he flew back to Pakistan accompanied by Habib.282
Rangzieb is alleged to have been given a mission to carry out somewhere
overseas by senior al-Qaeda operative Hamza Rabia and was in China along with
wanted terrorist Mohammed Zillur Rahman when Rabia was killed in December
2005.283 Rangzieb subsequently flew to Dubai where he met with Habib and gave his
accomplice three diaries containing multiple contact details of al-Qaeda operatives
written in hidden ink.284 The two men (by this time under surveillance) then separately
returned to the UK but again Rangzieb didn’t stay long. He flew back to Pakistan in
January 2006 and was arrested there in August.285 Back in the UK Habib (and his wife,
who was later cleared of sending him money knowing it was for terrorism) was arrested
in September.286
Rangzieb was sent back to the UK in September 2007 and in December 2008 he
was convicted of directing a terrorist organisation and being a member of al-Qaeda.
Habib was also convicted of membership of al-Qaeda plus possession of documents
useful for terrorism (the diaries) but was cleared of attending a terrorist training camp in
Pakistan in 2006.287 They were respectively sentenced to life (with a minimum term of
10 years) and 10 years in prison.288
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Case #27: Abdulla Ahmed Ali, Assad Ali Sarwar, Tanvir Hussain, Umar Islam,
Adam Khatib, Nabeel Hussain, Mohammed Shamin Uddin, Ibrahim Savant,
Arafat Khan & Waheed ZamanTransatlantic aircraft plot using liquid explosives (...2005-2006)
Key Features


Part of London-based network of Islamist militants



Angered by Western foreign policy



Leading members received explosives training in Pakistan



Believed to have been directed from overseas

Despite the huge amount of press-coverage that this case received, the details of what
happened are relatively scarce. By his own admission, the leader of the plot, Ali,
became increasingly politicised in his teens (around the mid- to late-1990s) and in 2003
he travelled to Pakistan with a London-based Islamic charity called ‘The Islamic
Medical Association’ where he worked in refugee camps near the Afghan border.289
This experience is thought to have had a radicalising effect on Ali, and at least four
others from the group, Tanvir Hussain, Ibrahim Savant (both of whom knew Ali from
school) plus Assad Ali Sarwar and convert Umar Islam, are reported to have worked for
the same charity (as did Mohammed Hamid- case #20).290 Others, including Waheed
Zaman, appear to have met whilst attending mosques in London.291
Ali went on to make numerous other trips to Pakistan, associated with known
extremists including Muktar Said Ibrahim (case #18) from at least 2004/2005 and
became known to the security services around that time.292 It is not known exactly
when, but Ali is thought to have come into contact with suspected British-Pakistani
terrorist Rashid Rauf293 while in Pakistan, who allegedly put him in contact with senior
al-Qaeda militants there, including Abu Obeida al-Masri.294 It is of significance that Ali
was in Pakistan from August 2004 through to January 2005, which overlaps with the
time spent there by Mohammed Siddique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer (case #17) and
Ibrahim. All three groups learned how to make bombs from hydrogen peroxide using
organic materials (pepper, flour and powdered soft drink respectively) as fuel for the
explosives.295
Further significant trips to Pakistan occurred in June 2005 when Ali, Adam
Khatib and Sarwar were all there and after which the plot reportedly became
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operational, with Khatib beginning detailed Internet research on hexamine peroxide.296
However, it wasn’t until MI5 secretly searched Ali’s luggage (discovering batteries and
large amounts of ‘Tang’ soft-drink powder) as he returned to the UK from yet another
trip to Pakistan in June 2006 that the group was suspected of possibly planning an attack
and was placed under 24-hour surveillance.297
In July, Ali acquired access to an East London flat that became the ‘bomb
factory’ (originally it was reported that he had paid £138,000 cash for it, but a later
report stated that it was his brother’s property and he had promised to help fix it up).298
He and Sarwar went about buying the necessary materials for constructing the
explosives and then, assisted by Tanvir Hussain, Ali conducted experiments back at the
flat.299 The alleged plan was to inject the peroxide-based explosives into soft-drink
bottles, which could be resealed and smuggled onto planes, and then use an adapted
disposable camera to detonate the bomb while the planes were in mid-air.iv The charge
would be powerful enough to blow a hole in the side of an aircraft, causing it to crash,
and multiple planes were to be targeted.300
In preparation for the plan (the full details of which appear to have been known
only to the three men directly involved in the bomb-making) six members of the group
recorded martyrdom videos at the flat on Forest Road, which were then stored at
Sarwar’s house.301 Ali, Tanvir Hussain, Islam, Khan, Savant and Zaman each made
recordings in which they vilified Western foreign policy as led by the US and made
threats of more attacks to come. Ali –who also researched the details of flights which
would leave Heathrow for the US and Canada at around the same time302- declared that
he was “over the moon...to lead this blessed operation.”303
On August 6th, 2006 Ali and Sarwar met with an individual who was accused
(but later cleared304) of having been sent to the UK to oversee the final stages of the plot
and then, following the arrest of Rashid Rauf (with whom Ali had been in “near
constant” contact with via phone, email and text305) in Pakistan on the 9th, 24 arrests
were made in the UK.306
Although bomb-making materials were found in the flat on Forest Road and
hidden in nearby woods, no bombs had been fully constructed and tickets for flights had
not been bought.307 However, the unexpected arrest of Rauf was deemed a possible
iv

Note that other targets were also considered including gas terminals and oil refineries (“Accused
Admits Larger Plan” BBC News, June 11, 2008 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7448798.stm> at
July 1, 2010).
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trigger for action and a significant amount of evidence had already been collected from
the surveillance operation.
Three related trials have taken place so far, resulting in four people being cleared
and ten convicted.308 Ali, Sarwar and Tanvir Hussain were found to have known the full
details of the plot. They were each convicted of conspiracy to murder by detonating
explosives on airplanes and were sentenced to life in prison with respective minimum
terms of 40, 36 and 32 years. Significantly, the sentencing judge remarked that evidence
in the form of e-mails that the men had sent showed that “the ultimate control of this
conspiracy lay in Pakistan”.309
Umar Islam and Adam Khatib were convicted of conspiracy to murder without
knowing the full details and were sentenced to life with minimum terms of 22 and 18
years.310 Nabeel Hussain (Tanvir’s brother) was convicted of preparing for an act of
terrorism plus possession of documents useful for terrorism, while Mohammed Shamin
Uddin was convicted of the latter charge and also pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm.
Hussain received an 8 year sentence and Uddin received 15 months for the terrorism
charge to run consecutively with a 5 year and 9 month sentence for the firearms
charge.311
Savant, Khan and Zaman underwent a second retrial (i.e. the third trial for them)
after they were cleared of being fully involved in the plot but no verdict was returned on
whether they were guilty of the less specific conspiracy to murder.312 All three of them
had previously pleaded guilty in the first trial to conspiracy to cause a public nuisance313
(claiming, like the others did, that the martyrdom videos they recorded were part of a
publicity stunt) and in July 2010 they were each convicted of the conspiracy to murder
charge as well.314 They were each sentenced to life with minimum terms of 20 years.315
Finally, Rashid Raufv (since implicated in a number of other cases including
American Bryant Neal Vinas316 –US case #42) escaped from prison in Pakistan and was
then reported to have been killed in a missile strike in November 2008.317

v

Note that Rauf is not included in the sample as a separate case because there is not enough information
available in the public domain to confirm the allegations against him.
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Case #28: Abdul PatelPossession of terrorism documents (...2006)
Key Features


Arrested in connection with much larger investigation



In possession of jihadi literature and bomb-making manual



Not thought to be radicalised

Abdul Patel’s father, Mohammed, had allegedly fought in the Afghan-Soviet war, ran a
charity shop in East London and had sent money to Bosnia and Chechnya. Abdul
apparently worked for a time in the shop, which was frequented by Islamist extremists,
until his father left the UK.318 Abdul was arrested in August 2006 in connection to the
investigation into the ‘aircraft plot’ (case #27) and was found in possession of a US
federal authorities’ explosives manual, letters from ‘martyrs’ going to fight in Bosnia
and other material including a book on the Taliban and instructions on the use of nightvision goggles.319 He was found guilty of one count of possessing a document likely to
be of use for terrorism and was sentenced to 6 months in a young offenders’ institute, to
be released in 3.320 The judge remarked that he did not think Patel was truly radicalised
and accepted that he had been holding the material for a friend of his father’s.321

Case #29: Malcolm HodgesSent letters encouraging others to commit acts of terrorism (2006)
Key Features


‘Troubled’ individual encouraged terrorism over a ‘festering’ personal grudge

Malcolm Hodges had failed an accountancy exam and was then fined by the
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) during the 1990’s for telling
employers that he was in fact qualified.322 He was jailed for ten weeks in 2000 for
sending a fax threatening to kill an ACCA official but continued to harbour a grudge.
Then in November 2006, having dwelled upon what he perceived as a “grave injustice”
against him for some 13 years, Hodges decided to get revenge. He sent out “several
hundred” identical letters to mosques around the country claiming that he was a
follower of Osama bin Laden and explaining to his “brothers” that rather than targeting
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planes and such like they should strike the “infidels where it hurts most”, namely
chartered accountants.323 Hodges also wrote to the Queen and the Prime Minister. He
was arrested in April 2007 (by which time the ACCA had spent £140,000 on additional
security measures) and was jailed for 2 years for recklessly encouraging terrorism, the
judge remarking that Hodges appeared to be suffering from “a seriously abnormal
mental condition”.324 He is included in the sample because although he did not
personally subscribe to violent Islamist ideology he nonetheless was willing to try and
use it to his advantage and is thus still relevant for understanding how it is manifest and
the full range of its use in British society.

Case #30: Mizanur Rahman, Umran Javed, Abdul Saleem & Abdul MuhidStirring up racial hatred & soliciting murder at Danish cartoon protests (2006)
Key Features


Islamist activists formerly affiliated with al-Muhajiroun



Made inflammatory speeches at protest against cartoons of the Prophet
Muhammad

In September 2005 the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published cartoons of the
Prophet Muhammad, which were subsequently re-printed elsewhere in Europe in 2006
and which sparked a wave of protests around the world.325 On February 3rd 2006 a
protest was (illegally) organised in London by former al-Muhajiroun (AM) second-incharge Anjem Choudary.326 Rahman, Javed, Saleem and Muhid –all affiliates of AM
and its offshoots- each took turns leading the protest using a megaphone to shout
inflammatory remarks including “bomb, bomb the UK”327 and “we want to see another
9/11 in Iraq... in Denmark... in Spain... in France... all over Europe”.328 They also called
for the killing of Western troops in Iraq and elsewhere and carried placards calling for
non-Muslims to be beheaded.329
Rahman was convicted of soliciting murder and stirring up racial hatred and was
sentenced to 6 years imprisonment.330 Javed and Muhid were convicted of soliciting
murder only and sentenced to 6 years each, which was cut to 4 on appeal. Finally,
Saleem was convicted of stirring up racial hatred and received a 2-and-a-half year
sentence on appeal.331 Both Saleem and Muhid received further convictions for similar
behaviour at a march in 2004 (case #16).
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Case #31: Omar AltimimiPossession of jihadi computer files (...2006)
Key Features


Failed asylum-seeker, real identity unknown



Formerly associated with convicted terrorists



Involved in money-laundering scheme in the UK



In possession of Islamist propaganda and terrorist instruction manuals

Omar Altimimi came to the UK via the Netherlands sometime between 2002 and 2004
and lodged an asylum claim in the name of Abou Hawas, which was rejected, although
he continued to stay in the country.332 Maintaining two addresses and creating at least
three identities for himself, Altimimi became involved in a money-laundering scheme
worth close to £30,000, which involved stealing money from the Yemen Tourist
Promotion Board.333 He was arrested in connection with this operation in March 2006
and a subsequent examination of his computers revealed a wealth of jihadi material
including instructions on how to set up a terrorist cell, how to build bombs and
detonators and footage of hostages being beheaded.334
Based on the nature of the material and Altimimi’s former association with
known, convicted terrorists in the Netherlands as well as convicted British terrorist
Junade Feroz (case #5) police believed that he was potentially a key terrorism planner
and the sentencing judge described him as “a sleeper for some sort of terrorist
organisation”.335 Altimimi was convicted on six counts of possessing material useful for
terrorism and two counts of money-laundering and was sentenced to 9 years in prison.
An accomplice in the money-laundering, Yousuf Abdullah, was sentenced to 3 years.336
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Case #32: Yassin NassariPossession of missile blue-prints (...2006)
Key Features


Radicalised at home in the UK while at university



Visited extremist websites and communicated online with similar others



In possession of instructions on how to build rockets

Nassari apparently radicalised beginning round 2002-2003 while studying cognitive
science at the University of Westminster in London.337 He dropped out of his studies,
then in March 2005 married a Dutch national and they moved to Syria until November
when they went to the Netherlands while his wife gave birth.338 On their return to the
UK on May 13th 2006 they were stopped at Luton airport and Nassari was found to have
large amounts of jihadi material on his computer hard drive.339 In particular he had
instructions on how to make a ‘Qassam’ missile as used by Hamas and a letter from his
wife encouraging him to become a martyr and also stating that she hoped that their son
could join him.340 It further transpired that Nassari had been a regular visitor to the ‘AtTibyan’ website and that he had been in communication with Tariq al-Daour (case #19)
before he was arrested.341 A search of their home in West London also uncovered
approximately 500 CDs and DVDs relating to jihad.342
Nassari’s wife was cleared of failing to disclose information relating to an act of
terrorism but he was convicted of possessing articles likely to be useful for terrorism.
He was sentenced to 3-and-a-half years and was released in February 2008. At
sentencing the judge had remarked that although Nassari had immersed himself in jihadi
materials there was no indication that the instructional material was going to be used by
anyone.343
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Case #33: Sohail QureshiPreparing for terrorism overseas (...2006)
Key Features


Educated individual from overseas



Claimed to have been a member of al-Qaeda



Attempted to fly to Pakistan for armed jihad

Born in Pakistan, raised in Saudi Arabia and educated in Russia, Qureshi came to the
UK in 2004 and worked as a dental assistant in London.344 He was active in online
jihadi forums on which he claimed to have been a former instructor at a terrorist training
camp in Pakistan and to have been sent to the UK by al-Qaeda as a fundraiser.345 No
evidence of dedicated fundraising has been reported but towards the end of 2006 he
made preparations to go to Pakistan for jihad. He was arrested on October 18th 2006 as
he was attempting to board a flight from Heathrow to Islamabad and was found to be in
possession of £9,000 cash, night vision goggles, two sleeping bags and some medical
supplies.346
Further investigation revealed jihadi propaganda and a farewell letter stored on
his laptop in which he declared “Pray that I kill many, brother. Revenge, revenge,
revenge”.347 It also transpired that he had been in communication with a female Islamist
extremist from West London, Samina Malik, who had provided him with information
about airport security checks and who later had a conviction quashed for possession of
documents useful for terrorism.348 Qureshi pleaded guilty to preparing for acts of
terrorism and possession of articles and documents useful for terrorism and was
sentenced to 4-and-a-half years.349 Prosecutors appealed for a longer sentence based on
his apparent long-standing dedication to Islamist militancy but it was rejected.350
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Case #34: Kevin Gardner aka Abbas ShafiqTerror plans in prison (...2006-2007)
Key Features


Paranoid schizophrenic converted to Islam in prison



Drew up detailed plans to attack a British army base

In October 2001 Kevin Gardner was given a prison sentence for assault after punching a
fellow Territorial Army (TA) cadet.351 He was released early but then sent back to Stoke
Heath Young Offender’s Institute in January 2005 for breaching his licence. Shortly
afterwards he converted to Islam, apparently as a result of watching programs about it
on television and in October 2006 he was transferred to adult prison.352 Searches of his
cells in both institutions between April 2006 and January 2007 revealed that he had
adopted an extremist Islamist interpretation of his faith, influenced by books he read in
the prison library, and that he had researched how to make bombs out of household
chemicals. He also drew up detailed plans to attack soldiers at his old army base
(believing that “the deaths of British soldiers on home soil [would] encourage the
believers”353), conducted crude experiments using batteries to try to make explosives,
and (unsuccessfully) attempted to recruit a fellow prisoner to join in his plans.354
Despite this Gardner was released in January 2007 and then re-arrested in
February and charged with collecting information useful for terrorism and preparing for
an act of terrorism. He eventually pleaded guilty to collecting information for terrorism
in April 2009. Gardner had, however, been suffering from severe mental illness since
2002 and was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. He was ordered to be indefinitely
detained in a secure hospital.355
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Case #35: Abdul RahmanManchester terror-support network (...2006-2007)
Key Features


Entered the UK on a student visa



Accused of playing a key role in a jihadi support network in Manchester

Rahman came to the UK from Pakistan in September 2004 on a student visa to study at
Dundee but never attended any classes and went straight to Manchester where he
resided with another Pakistani, Aslam Awan.356 Awan left the country in August 2006,
allegedly joining mujahedin in Afghanistan and engaging in combat against coalition
forces. Rahman was then arrested in January 2007357 after he helped pay for an
unnamed British man to escape from the UK to Pakistan to avoid being subject to a
terrorism-related control order. Police then found a letter from Awan to Rahman
detailing his exploits in Afghanistan and urging him to distribute it to others in order to
motivate them to join the jihad overseas. They also found a package that Rahman had
put together containing combat knives and other items to be sent over to Pakistan.358
Finally, he was in possession of jihadi literature including a document entitled ‘How
can I train myself for jihad?’359
British police assert that Rahman was “at the centre” of a jihadi support network
involved in recruiting volunteers to fight overseas and sending over equipment for
Islamist militants360; and although information outside of the immediate offences is not
available, it is noteworthy that Rahman’s contact details were reportedly included in the
‘invisible ink’ diaries possessed by al-Qaeda operatives Rangzieb and Habib Ahmed361
(see case #26).
Rather than go to trial Rahman accepted a plea deal in which he pleaded guilty
to possessing articles for the purpose of terrorism, disseminating information in
connection with terrorism and aiding and abetting another person breach a Home Office
control order. He was sentenced to 6 years in prison, which was reduced to 5-and-a-half
years on appeal.362
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Case #36: Pa Modou JobePossession of terrorist instruction manuals (...2006-2007)
Key Features


Illegal immigrant, downloaded large amount of jihadi material



Also in possession of footage of police HQ

Born in Gambia, Jobe apparently came to the UK having been deported from the US
and was employed as a care worker in Birmingham.363 In December 2006 he was
arrested in relation to suspected immigration and passport offences and police seized his
computer and other equipment including DVDs, an iPod and mobile phone.364 On
examination these items were found to hold “a vast quantity” of Islamist propaganda
and training manuals, plus mobile phone footage of the West Midlands police
headquarters, and he was re-arrested in May 2007.365 Following a series of appeals
Jobe’s initial plea of guilty to four counts of possessing articles useful for terrorism was
upheld and he was sentenced to 3 years and 9 months in jail.366

Case #37: Rizwan Ditta & Bilal MohammedPossession & distribution of terror-related material (...2006-2007)
Key Features


Two British-born men angered by British foreign policy



Downloaded and distributed terrorist publications

Ditta reportedly radicalised in his teens and Mohammed, who grew up in the same town
and met Ditta at their local mosque, is said to have come under his influence.367 They
came under surveillance from the security services after Ditta visited Pakistan in 2005
and 2006 and were arrested in their home-town of Halifax, West Yorkshire in January
2007.368 Both were in possession of jihadi literature and DVDs, mostly downloaded
from the Internet, and it transpired that Mohammed had been travelling around the
country selling copies to people from a market stall that he operated.369
Ditta pleaded guilty to two counts of possessing information useful to terrorists
(including an instructional video on how to make a suicide bomb vest) and in December
2007 was sentenced to 4 years in prison.370 Mohammed pleaded guilty to possessing
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terrorist publications with a view to distribute/ sell them (making him the first person to
be prosecuted under new laws making it illegal to glorify terrorism) and in March 2008
was sentenced to 3 years, reduced to 2 on appeal.371

Case #38: Abbas Iqbal & Ilyas Iqbal‘Blackburn Resistance’ (...2006-2008)
Key Features


Angry at the war in Iraq, fascinated with violent jihad



Downloaded jihadi material and engaged in mock domestic military training

Between March 2006 and August 2008 the Iqbal brothers downloaded and shared
extremist videos including speeches calling for violent jihad and footage of
executions.372 They also collected weapons including air-rifles, knives and a cross-bow
and made notes on urban combat and attack planning. They furthermore engaged in
domestic ‘military-style’ training in a local town park (wearing combat fatigues in the
middle of the day) which they filmed, and referred to themselves as the ‘Blackburn
Resistance’.373
They came under surveillance as part of a wider police investigation, which
resulted in the almost simultaneous arrests of two other individuals linked to the Iqbals,
Ishaq Kanmi (case #43) who they knew from school,374 and Krenar Lusha (case #47).375
Abbas Iqbal was in fact arrested on August 14th 2008 alongside Kanmi at Manchester
airport attempting to board a flight to Helsinki where police allege they intended to
radicalise others. Ilyas Iqbal was arrested the same day.376
Abbas was convicted of preparing for acts of terrorism and disseminating
terrorist publications (referring to the ‘Blackburn Resistance’ video he was taking with
him to Finland) while Ilyas was convicted of possessing a document likely to be useful
for terrorism. They were sentenced to 2 years and 1-and-a-half years respectively.377 A
third man, a Muslim convert, was cleared of all charges.
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Case #39: Mohammed Shakil & Waheed Ali aka Shipon UllahAssociates of 7/7 bombers, planned terror training abroad (...2007)
Key Features


Long-term supporters of jihad



Associated and trained overseas with Mohammed Siddique Khan



Cleared of assisting in the planning of 7/7



Convicted for planning further jihadi training

Both Shakil and Ali grew up in Beeston, Leeds, and were friends with Mohammed
Siddique Khan and the rest of the 7/7 bombers (case #17).378 Shakil admits to training at
a militant camp in Kashmir as far back as 1999 and the two men made several similar
trips over the next few years.379 Ali trained in Kashmir and Afghanistan along with
Khan in 2001; Shakil went with Khan to train in Pakistan in 2003; Ali then
accompanied Khan and Tanweer when they met with Omar Khyam (case #14) in
Crawley in February and March 2004, and finally in December he attended another
terrorist training camp with them in Pakistan.380
It was not, however, their overseas activities that were the main concern for
police (and they were not charged in relation to previous training). Investigators had
uncovered Ali’s DNA and a spare car-key belonging to Shakil inside the flat used by
Khan et al to make their bombs.381 Furthermore, both men had travelled with Hasib
Hussain down to London on December 16th 2004, meeting with Jermaine Lindsay. They
spent two days there on what they say was a family visit and sight-seeing trip, and what
prosecutors alleged was ‘hostile reconnaissance’ to assist their friends in identifying
potential targets for attack.382
The first trial ended in a mistrial after the jury failed to reach a verdict, then in
April 2009 Ali, Shakil and a third man (who had also previously trained abroad) were
cleared of assisting in the reconnaissance.383 Ali and Shakil were, however convicted of
conspiring to attend a terror training camp in Pakistan in 2007 after they had been
arrested at Manchester airport in March. Prior to attempting to leave the country,
surveillance teams had observed them purchasing outdoor equipment that they would
need in the camps (which was in their luggage) and making efforts to conceal their
activities. They were each jailed for 7 years.384
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Case #40: Nicholas RoddisHoax bomber (...2007)
Key Features


Convert, “obsessed” with Islamist terrorism



Collected jihadi literature, bomb-making instructions and ingredients



Placed hoax bomb on bus

Roddis, a convert to Islam from Rotherham in South Yorkshire, appears to have learned
about his adopted faith largely through material that he accessed on the Internet,
including speeches by Abu Hamza.385 He apparently developed a fascination with jihadi
violence and at work he would show other Muslims videos of Western troops and
hostages being killed in Iraq, and declared that Western troops were the real
terrorists.386
Sometime after having lost his job, Roddis boarded a local bus on May 8th 2007
wearing a false beard and glasses to the reported amusement of other passengers.387
When he alighted however, he left a carrier bag containing what appeared to be a bomb
with a note written in crude Arabic declaring that Britain must pay, signed the al-Qaeda
organisation in Iraq. Only later did it transpire that the ‘bomb’ was a hoax made using a
bag of sugar and a clock bought on e-Bay along with the disguise.388
Roddis was arrested in June when he turned up at his old work-place for a job
interview and showed people what he told them were landmines (in fact railway box
signals) in his bag. A subsequent search of his home uncovered a collection of jihadi
videos downloaded from the Internet, bomb-making instructions, hydrogen peroxide,
nails and his false beard.389
Giggling in court after being asked to don his disguise in front of the jury,
Roddis claimed to have done it out of boredom for a laugh and to impress people since
when he’d made a similar device back in school other pupils had told him it was “right
good”.390 He was jailed for 7 years for preparing for an act of terrorism and placing the
hoax bomb on the bus.391
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Case #41: Bilal Talal Abdul Samad Abdulla & Kafeel AhmedAttempted bombings in London and Glasgow (...2007)
Key Features


Doctor and engineering student angry at the invasion of Iraq



Attempted car-bombings in the absence of any known external control or
assistance

Bilal Abdulla, born in the UK but raised in Iraq, is reported to have become increasingly
radicalised after the 2003 invasion of Iraq.392 After qualifying as a doctor in Baghdad he
came to Cambridge to take a course that would allow him to practise in the UK, and it is
there that he met Kafeel Ahmed, an Indian doctoral student studying computational
fluid dynamics.393 The two men are reported to have spent time together discussing
politics with members of the radical Islamist organisation Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT) and
became close with one another during this time.394
After Ahmed returned to India to look after his father in the summer of 2005 the
two men kept in touch via email.395 In December 2006 Abdulla took a position at the
Royal Alexandria Hospital in Paisley in Scotland and in April 2007 he rented a house in
nearby Houston. Ahmed joined him in May (telling his family he was going to the UK
to work on a confidential project) and over the next few weeks the two men went about
purchasing the necessary components –including three cars- to construct improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) which they had researched online.396
On July 28th 2007 they left Scotland, driving south to London in two Mercedes
packed with petrol, gas canisters and nails. In the early hours of the 29th they parked one
of the cars outside a nightclub and the other around the corner and then tried to explode
them by calling mobile phones inside the cars, which they had rigged as detonators.
Neither bomb went off and police soon became aware of them after smoke was spotted
coming from one of the cars.397 Meanwhile Abdulla and Kafeel stayed overnight in
London at a hotel they had used during a reconnaissance trip in May, and the next day
made their way back north using public transport.398
On the afternoon of June 30th 2007, as police were closing in on the two men
using mobile phone records to track them down, Ahmed drove a four-wheel drive jeep
into the main terminal at Glasgow airport with Abdulla in the passenger seat. They had
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again packed their vehicle with gas canisters and ignited it with petrol, hoping for an
explosion, but airport personnel and passers-by intervened after they crashed and the
fire was extinguished. With the exception of Ahmed, who suffered massive burns and
died four weeks later, no-one was injured.399
Following a string of arrests in the UK and one in Australia, Abdulla went on
trial with one other man (who was acquitted) accused of conspiracy to cause explosions
and to murder. Both he and Ahmed had written farewell letters and had intended to die
in the attack. Ahmed had sent his to his brother, who read it after the attack took place
and was subsequently deported for failing to come forward with evidence.400 Abdulla’s
‘will’ meanwhile was recovered from a burnt laptop that had been in the jeep, which he
had addressed to Sunni Iraqi insurgents and had reportedly written, “God knows that the
days I spent with you were the best and most rewarding days of my life.”401 Yet despite
this remark and despite speculation in the press regarding time that he spent in Iraq, plus
an alleged trip to Pakistan that Ahmed made,402 there have been no reports that either
man received any form of terrorist training or was affiliated with any organisation.
Acting alone, Abdulla explained that they had aimed at giving people a “taste” of what
was happening in Iraq.403 He was found guilty and sentenced to life, with a minimum
term of 32 years.404

Case #42: Hassan TabbakhBomb-making (...2007)
Key Features


Syrian asylum-seeker with no reported accomplices or terrorist associations



Caught in the process of manufacturing bombs

Tabbakh came to the UK around the year 2000, claiming asylum on the grounds that he
had been tortured in his native Syria, and was granted indefinite leave to remain in
2005.405 It is not clear how he came to the attention of the police but he was arrested on
December 18th 2007, and when his home in Birmingham was searched they found
several bottles in which he was mixing together chemicals in order to make bombs.406
Analysis revealed that they contained a mixture of plant food, acetone, nitrocellulose
and white spirit but were not at a high enough concentration to be explosive.407
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In addition, Tabbakh had compiled hand-written notes in Arabic, which
appeared to be a set of instructions for an unknown third party. They instructed the user
to mix the chemical with fertiliser and aluminium foil and insert a detonator to complete
the bombs, and furthermore stated “I have put everything separately for safety and quick
transport. Don't use the bottles in which I put the liquids because my fingerprints are on
them. I pray that Allah would keep you safe and grant you success in the work for the
sake of Allah.”408
He was also in possession of extremist propaganda including speeches by bin
Laden and others, and his computer showed evidence of having visited jihadi websites,
although it is unclear how exactly he gained the know-how to make bombs.409 Tabbakh
was found guilty of preparing an act of terrorism and was sentenced to 7 years in jail.410
Although it was declared that he was suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) in relation to previously being tortured it was not deemed to have contributed to
his actions and his sentence was upheld on appeal.411

Case #43: Ishaq KanmiOnline threats (...2007-2008)
Key Features


Seemingly self-radicalised individual



Part of loose network of ‘wannabe’ terrorists



Downloaded and distributed jihadi material



Threatened attacks online in protest against British foreign policy

Kanmi is described as “lonely” and as having spent his time using the computers at his
local library, where he became increasingly immersed in violent Islamist ideology.412 In
addition to downloading jihadi propaganda and videos, Kanmi also frequented extremist
websites and in January 2008 posted a message encouraging British Muslims to
undertake martyrdom operations against non-believers, in particular Tony Blair and
Gordon Brown. In the same message he warned that attacks would take place within
two months if British troops were not withdrawn from Afghanistan and Iraq, and
Muslim prisoners not released from Belmarsh prison. He signed the message,
‘Leadership of al-Qaeda in Britain.’413
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By this time police were already aware of Kanmi’s activities after a US-based
website moderator had notified them of similar posts back in May 2007, which resulted
in Kanmi being banned from that website.414 The resultant surveillance operation
recorded him downloading jihadist material at the public library and revealed that
“Kanmi was at the heart of a network of radicalised young men who intended to support
or promote terrorism against the West”415 including the Iqbal brothers (case #38) and
Krenar Lusha (case #47).
He was eventually arrested on August 14th 2008 at Manchester airport,
accompanied by Abbas Iqbal, intending to fly to Helsinki. At the time he was in
possession of three digital storage devices and a mobile phone, all containing jihadi
material that he intended to distribute.416 He eventually pleaded guilty to claiming to be
a member of a proscribed organisation (al-Qaeda), inviting support for a proscribed
organisation, collecting or making a record useful for terrorism, and disseminating
terrorist publications. He was sentenced to 5 years in prison.417

Case #44: Shella RomaProduced & distributed jihadi leaflet (...2007-2008)
Key Features


Wrote and distributed pro-jihadi leaflet

A mother of one from Oldham, Greater Manchester, Roma produced an eight-page
leaflet sometime between October 2007 and January 2008 entitled ‘The Call’, which
exhorted readers to engage in violent jihad against the West.418 Police arrested her and
her husband (who was later acquitted) on January 31st after an employee at a photocopy
shop alerted them that they had been asked to make 200 copies of the leaflet, which they
had done.419
137 of the 200 copies were recovered and the rest remain unaccounted for.420
Roma was charged and convicted of disseminating a terrorist publication and was given
a 3 year community order.421
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Case #45: Isa Ibrahim aka Andrew IbrahimPlanning to bomb shopping mall (...2007-2008)
Key Features


‘Troubled’ individual obsessed with Islamist terrorism



Researched explosives online and succeeded in manufacturing HMTD



Caught because of tip-off from Muslim community

Andrew Ibrahim grew up in Bristol and exhibited ‘difficult behaviour’ from at least the
age of 12 when he began taking drugs and experimenting with explosives in order to
‘feel cool’.422 Although he was expelled from three different schools he did eventually
obtain his GCSE’s (the basic level of high school education in the UK) with relatively
good grades but thereafter developed a drug addiction. He converted to Islam in 2005
and in February 2007 (by which time he was living in homeless accommodation and
studying for AS and A-Levels at college) he changed his name to Isa.423
Still struggling with drug addiction, Ibrahim reportedly had trouble interacting
with others, and attended several different mosques. One of the officers involved in the
investigation into his activities commented that “every time he got into something he
went to the extreme” and his religion was no exception.424 From at least December 2007
he was looking up information on Palestinian militants online and over the next few
months proceeded to download speeches by Abu Hamza (case #3) and Omar Bakri
Mohammed as well as the 7/7 bombers’ (case #17) martyrdom videos.425
In February 2008 Ibrahim was given a council flat to live in and at the start of
April he conducted reconnaissance of a Bristol shopping mall, taking notes on areas that
would result in maximum carnage. He researched how to make the explosive
hexamethylene triperoxide diamine (HMTD), went about buying bleach and other
necessary ingredients and then filmed himself conducting experiments.426 On April 14th
he succeeded in injuring himself, causing cuts to his hands, and felt the need to tell
some people he knew at one the mosques he attended. The resulting tip-off police
received from concerned members of Bristol’s Muslim community initiated the
investigation into his activities.427
Ibrahim was arrested just three days later in the city centre and back at his flat
police found the explosive HMTD, 2 suicide vests, a crude electrical circuit he had
constructed to serve as a detonator and items which had been collected to serve as
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shrapnel.428 He was convicted of engaging in conduct with the intention of committing
acts of terrorism and possession of explosives with intent. The judge sentenced Ibrahim
to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 10 years.429

Case #46: Mohammed AbushammaAttempted travel to Afghanistan for jihad (...2008-2008)
Key Features


Radicalised out of rebelliousness and time spent online



Made ‘amateur’ attempt at going to Afghanistan to fight

Abushamma reportedly radicalised as a combination of rebellion against his father and
spending time on the Internet accessing jihadi websites.430 He carried out “detailed
online research into jihad and indicated he would be involved in violence “with a Koran
in one hand and an AK47 in the other””.431 Then in March 2008, accompanied by a
friend (who was later acquitted) Abushamma flew to Turkey where he and his
accomplice applied for visas for Afghanistan. They were spoken to by Turkish and
British authorities and voluntarily returned to the UK where they were arrested at
Heathrow on April 22nd. Abushamma later pleaded guilty to preparing for an act of
terrorism (albeit in a “haphazard and foolhardy” manner) and was sentenced to 3-and-ahalf years in prison.432

Case 47# Krenar LushaCollecting jihadi materials & stockpiling petrol (...2008)
Key Features


Albanian immigrant entered the UK illegally 8 years previously



Made contact with other UK-based Islamist radicals online



Downloaded large amounts of jihadi propaganda & bomb-making instructions



Stockpiled petrol

Lusha entered the UK as an illegal immigrant in January 2000 but was granted leave to
remain the following year and in June 2008 he bought a house in Derby.433 He spent his
free time on the Internet and somehow made contact with Ishaq Kanmi (case #43) with
whom he communicated via email and telephone.434 He also reportedly spent time
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online talking to females in different countries and would tell them that he was a
‘terrorist’ and a ‘sniper’ and described how he liked to watch videos of US soldiers
being killed.435
Police became aware of Lusha as part of a wider investigation that netted Kanmi
and other associates of his in Blackburn (case #38) who were arrested on August 14th
2008. On August 26th police raided Lusha’s home and found him asleep although his
laptop was left on and was downloading a video on how to make a suicide bomb vest.436
He was found to be in possession of multiple Islamist terrorist publications with detailed
instructions on bomb-making, had stockpiled more than 70 litres of petrol in his
basement and was in possession of 2kg of potassium nitrate (an ingredient in
gunpowder).437
Originally charged with ten counts of possessing articles useful for terrorism,
Lusha was convicted in relation to five: namely the petrol, Hizballah Military
Instruction Manuals, an article called ‘Ragnar’s Detonators’, ‘The Bomb Book’ and a
video, ‘Mobile Detonators’. He was sentenced to 7 years in prison, to be deported back
to his home country of Albania after servicing half of it.438

Case #48: Ali Beheshti, Abrar Mirza & Abbas TajArson attack on publishing house (2008)
Key Features


Small group lead by Islamist activist



Angry at the planned publication of a book which ‘offended Muslims’



Attempted to burn down the publisher’s home

Ali Beheshti was formerly affiliated with al-Muhajiroun and had gained press coverage
in 2006 when he took his baby daughter with him on a protest against the Danish
cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad and had dressed her in a hat that read “I love alQaeda”.439 In September 2008 British publisher Martin Rynja announced that he would
be publishing a controversial book entitled ‘The Jewel of Medina’, which was about the
Prophet Muhammad’s child bride and which had been cancelled for publication by a
number of other houses for fear of offending Muslims. Beheshti et al took exception to
this and decided to inflict punishment.440
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Less than a week later, Mirza drove past Rynja’s Islington home and took
photographs and the following day used Google Earth to view routes to and from the
property. On September 25th Beheshti bought a quantity of diesel and stored it at Taj’s
house. Finally, in the early hours of September 27th 2008 the three men went first to
Regent’s Park Mosque for Ramadan, and then drove to Rynja’s home. Beheshti and
Mirza got out of the car, poured diesel through the letterbox and set it alight. Police,
who already had the men under surveillance and had bugged Taj’s car following a tipoff, arrested them at the scene and apprehended Taj nearby. No-one was in the house
and the fire was extinguished.441
Beheshti and Mirza pleaded guilty and Taj was convicted of conspiracy to
commit arson, being reckless as to whether it endangered life. Although not prosecuted
under terrorism legislation they clearly intended to send a message in the name of Islam
by using violence, hence their inclusion in the sample. They were each sentenced to 4and-a-half years.442

Case #49: Houria Chahed ChentoufPossession of jihadi material (...2008)
Key Features


Single mother with mental health issues, apparently ‘obsessed’ with jihad



In possession of large amounts of propaganda and instructional material



No indication of genuine intent to act

A divorced mother of six with dual Moroccan and Dutch citizenship, Chentouf was
stopped and questioned at Liverpool airport on October 16th 2008 entering the UK from
the Netherlands.443 During the course of being interviewed a USB stick fell out from her
burka, which was kept for examination and she was temporarily let go. She was then
arrested in Longsight in Manchester after it was discovered that the memory stick
contained “a mini encyclopaedia of weapons-making” and jihadi propaganda.444 Further
investigation revealed that she had “known, established links to extremists abroad”445
and that she had tried to contact Islamist preachers Omar Bakri Mohammed and
Abdullah El-Faisal.446 She had also visited online jihadi forums expressing support for
martyrdom and in her home in the Hague a handwritten note was found asking
forgiveness that she and her children would be “bombs for the sake of this religion.”447
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Chentouf admitted two charges of possessing documents likely to be of use for
terrorism (referring to an explosives manual and a file on how to construct electronic
detonators) and was given a 2 year sentence.448 The judge took into account the fact that
she apparently had mental health problems triggered by the death of a family member
and, having served half of her time already on remand, she was released.449
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Case #50: Mohammad Abdulaziz Rashid Saeed-Alim aka Nicky ReillyAttempted suicide bombing (...2008)
Key Features


Lone individual with history of mental illness



Radicalised and groomed online by contacts in Pakistan



Attempted suicide bombing of Exeter restaurant

Nicky Reilly had a long history of behavioural difficulties and mental illness, having
been placed in residential care at the age of 16 following a suicide attempt and
subsequently being diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome and treated for anxiety and
depression.450 Not long afterwards, around 2002-2003, he converted to Islam and it
appears that from early on he developed an interest in violent expressions of his new
religion. In 2003 he told his psychiatrist that he wanted to study engineering in order to
make a bomb (which was passed on to police at the time but he was not recognised as a
credible threat)451 and the following year he changed his name to Mohammed Abdulaziz
Rashid Saeed-Alim, reported to be a tribute to two of the 9/11 hijackers, Mohamed Atta
and Abdulaziz al-Omari.452
However, despite these early indications of an interest in militant Islamism
Reilly did not attract further attention to himself over the course of the next four years.
He took his religion seriously, grew a beard and later became noticeably intolerant of
others, but no-one guessed how radicalised he was becoming.453 It seems that he spent
an increasing amount of time on the Internet and by early 2008 he was in contact online
with two men in Pakistan via his Youtube page ‘Chechen 233’.454 The two Pakistanis,
one of whom used the name ‘Adel Khan’,455 tutored Reilly and in particular directed
him to extremist websites and offered advice on where he could learn how to make
bombs online. As 2008 progressed they also discussed possible targets for attack, with
Reilly opting for a civilian site.456 He proceeded to buy the materials he needed and to
manufacture crude but functioning bombs using glass bottles containing kerosene,
caustic soda and nails for shrapnel.457
Finally, on the morning of May 22nd 2008 Reilly left a suicide note at home
demanding the withdrawal of Western troops from Muslim lands and took a bus into
Exeter city centre carrying six bottles containing the explosive mixture in a rucksack.458
He walked around for a while then made his way to the Giraffe Restaurant where he
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bought a diet coke and then proceeded to the toilets to ready his devices. However, as he
prepared them in a cubicle the explosives went off prematurely and he suffered a
number of cuts to his face. Nobody else was harmed and Reilly was arrested soon
afterwards.459
Reilly’s psychological difficulties (including a mental age of ten) and the fact
that police recognised that he had been “preyed on and radicalised” were not deemed to
be mitigating factors, given that he knew what he was doing and intended to kill other
people as well as himself.460 He pleaded guilty to attempted murder and additional
preparation for acts of terrorism (referring to research he had conducted into other
explosives and potential targets) and was sentenced to life in prison with a minimum
term of 18 years.461 Three other local men had been arrested as part of the investigation
but were all released without charge, and although there may have been some local
influence Reilly had been acting alone except for his Pakistani contacts who remain at
large.462

Case #51: Saeed GhafoorRepeated threats to carry out attacks (...2008-2009)
Key Features


Seemingly ‘troubled’ individual with unclear motivations



Threatened to carry out attacks in line with basic militant Islamist ideology



No developed means or genuine, demonstrable intent

Ghafoor’s case is one that is difficult to classify. On the face of it he does not appear to
be genuinely involved in Islamist terrorism; however he has demonstrated a willingness
to make use of Islamist terrorism for his own ends (whatever they may be) and so is
thus relevant to understanding the continuum of behaviours related to this activity.
Jailed for 12 months in January 2008 for assaulting his sister, Ghafoor made
repeated claims whilst in prison that he intended to bomb the Bluewater shopping centre
in Kent (named as a target in the ‘Crevice’ case- case #14) although he believed it was
in Exeter.463 He claimed that he was protesting against British troops in Afghanistan and
Iraq and that he would use gas-canisters and limousines to cause explosions
(reminiscent of Dhiren Barot’s ‘gas-limos’ project- case #5). He was released on license
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in March but then re-arrested in relation to the threats and in June 2008 was jailed for
another year for threatening to cause criminal damage.464
In October –as his release-date was coming up- he made similar threats, saying
he was going to attack a Hampshire hospital this time in order to make people aware of
Muslim issues, simultaneously expressing his support for al-Qaeda.465 Unable to say
exactly how he would get his bombs to work, and apparently “enthusiastic” about
pleading guilty, Ghafoor was sentenced to a further 16 months.466 A third set of threats
has since been reported as taking place in May 2009, with a related court appearance
taking place in September.467 A prison imam who spoke with him after the first set of
threats had formed the opinion that he was “susceptible to brainwashing”468, although at
no stage did he develop the means nor demonstrate genuine intent to follow through on
his words. That said, there is no telling what avenues Ghafoor’s fantasies might have
taken him down were he left to his own devices; his case is undoubtedly unusual and is
both an example of early intervention and of the rather diverse ways in which Islamist
terrorism can be ‘consumed’ by individuals living in the West.
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Appendix B Part 3:
List of UK Cases Excluded from the Sample in Chronological Order

N = 55 cases, 112 individuals

Name

Case description

Date
from

Date to

Reason excluded

Bashir Musa Mohammed
Nafi

Accused PIJ founder &
long‐time activist

1980

2003

Charges ignored

Rachid Ramda

GIA operative sentenced
in Algeria & France

1993

1995

Pre‐9/11

Khalid al‐Fawwaz

Ran the ARC: involved in
'98 embassy bombings

1993

1998

Pre‐9/11/
Outcome
pending

Yasser al‐Sirri

Sentenced to death in
Cairo; accused of AQ
support; runs IOC

1993

2001

Charges dropped

Moazzam Begg

Long‐term Islamist &
gitmo detainee

1993

2002

Anas al‐Liby

Leading AQ figure: in UK
from 95‐2000

1993

2000

Saad al‐Faqih

Run MIRA & CDLR; linked
to AQ

1994

2004

Mohammed al‐Massari

Run MIRA & CDLR; linked
to AQ

1994

2004

Not formally
charged

Farid Hilali

Accused of 9/11
involvement

1997

2001

Charges dropped

Babar Ahmad

Ran jihadi websites

1997

2004

Syed Talha Ahsan

Ran jihadi websites

1997

2004

Ali Bin Zidane Chehidi

European recruiting
network: extradited

1997

2005

No further info

Mohamed Salah Ben
Hamadi Khemiri

European recruiting
network: extradited

1997

2005

No further info

1997

2005

No further info

1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998

1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998

Pre‐9/11
Pre‐9/11
Pre‐9/11
Pre‐9/11
Pre‐9/11
Pre‐9/11

1998 Yemen plot

1998

1998

Pre‐9/11

1998 Yemen plot
1998 Yemen plot
Hamas membership

1998
1998
1998

1998
1998
2001

Numerous AQ plots

1998

2001

Pre‐9/11
Pre‐9/11
Palestinian
Pre‐9/11:
Outcome
pending

Habib Ignaoua
Amer Mirza
Shahid Butt
Malik Nassar Harhra
Samad Ahmed
Mohsin Ghailan
Ghulam Hussein
Mohammed Mostafa
Kamel
Ayaz Hussein
Shazad Nabi
Adnan Abdelah
Abu Doha
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European recruiting
network: extradited
Firebombed barracks
1998 Yemen plot
1998 Yemen plot
1998 Yemen plot
1998 Yemen plot
1998 Yemen plot

Released w/o
charge
Pre‐9/11/
Outcome
pending
Not formally
charged

Outcome
pending
Outcome
pending
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Name

Case description

Date
from

Date to

Mohammed Abdullah
Azam

Posession of terrorist
books

1998

2002

Haroon Rashid Aswat

Oregon training charges

1999

2000

Djamel Ajouaou

Close associate of Abu
Qatada: Was held in UK
without charge

1999

2001

Not formally
charged

Abdenour Sameur

Gitmo detainee

1999

2002

Released w/o
charge

Bilal Mohammed 1

Suicide bombing in
Kashmir

2000

2000

Pre‐9/11

Rabah Kadre

Involvement in the
Strasbourg plot +
Numerous allegations
dropped in the UK

2000

2000

Pre‐9/11

Moinul Abedin
Sulayman Balal
Zainulabidin

1st 'AQ' plot in UK
Sakina Security Services‐
offered jihadi training

2000

2000

Pre‐9/11

2000

2001

Acquitted

Ruhal Ahmed

Gitmo detainee

2001

2001

Released w/o
charge

Asif Iqbal

Gitmo detainee

2001

2001

Released w/o
charge

Shafiq Rasul

Gitmo detainee

2001

2001

Released w/o
charge

Ahmed Belbacha

Gitmo detainee

2001

2001

Not formally
charged

Shaker Aamer

Gitmo detainee

2001

2001

Released w/o
charge

Ahmed Rashidi

Gitmo detainee

2001

2001

Released w/o
charge

Omar Deghayes

Gitmo detainee & accused
LIFG member & AQ
affiliate

2001

2002

Released w/o
charge

Richard Dean Belmar

Gitmo detainee

2001

2002

Released w/o
charge

Tarek Dergoul

Gitmo detainee

2001

2002

Released w/o
charge

Reason excluded
Collected pre‐
9/11
Outcome
pending
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Name

Case description

Date
from

Date to

Reason excluded

Martin Mubanga

Gitmo detainee‐ detained
in Zambia

2001

2002

Released w/o
charge

Binyam Mohammed

Gitmo detainee

2001

2002

Released w/o
charge

Bisher al‐Rawi

Gitmo detainee‐ detained
in Gambia

2002

2002

Released w/o
charge

Jamil El‐Banna

Gitmo detainee‐ detained
in Gambia

2002

2002

Released w/o
charge

Jamal Abdullah Kiyemba

Gimo detainee

2002

2002

Released w/o
charge

Jamal Malik al‐Harith

Gitmo detainee

2002

2002

Released w/o
charge

Abdellah Abdelhafid

Edinburgh cell linked to
ricin suspects

2002

2002

Charges dropped

Mourad Ider Abes

Edinburgh cell linked to
ricin suspects

2002

2002

Charges dropped

Ghalem Belhadj

Edinburgh cell linked to
ricin suspects

2002

2002

Charges dropped

Karim Benamghar

Edinburgh cell linked to
ricin suspects

2002

2002

Charges dropped

Salah Moullef

Edinburgh cell linked to
ricin suspects

2002

2002

Charges dropped

Hakim Ziem

Edinburgh cell linked to
ricin suspects

2002

2002

Charges dropped

Sofiane Lahamar Hassim
Ziem

Edinburgh cell linked to
ricin suspects

2002

2002

Charges dropped

Fouad Lasnami

Edinburgh cell linked to
ricin suspects

2002

2002

Charges dropped

Mohammed al‐Ghabra

UN Designated terrorist
for AQ

2002

2006

Not formally
charged

Mohammed al‐Garbuzi

Radical cleric; accused
leader of GICM;
sentenced in absentia for
2003 Casablanca attacks

2003

2003

Fled‐ outcome
pending

2003
2003

2003
2003

2003

2005

2003

2005

Asif Mohammed Hanif
Omar Khan Sharif
Zeeshan Siddique
Rauf Mohammed
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2003 Tel Aviv attack
2003 Tel Aviv attack
Trained with Crevice
group
Made terror tape;
acquitted

Palestinian
Palestinian
Not formally
charged
Acquitted
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Name

Case description

Ismail Kamoka
Khalid Abusalama Alalagi
Abdul Bourouag

Fundraising for LIFG
Fundraising for LIFG
Fundraising for LIFG
LIFG affiliate: Possession
of terror docs

Abd al‐Rahman al‐Faqih

Date
from
2004
2004
2004

Date to

Reason excluded

2005
2005
2005

Libyan‐ non‐GSJ
Libyan‐ non‐GSJ
Libyan‐ non‐GSJ

2005

2005

Libyan‐ non‐GSJ

Omar Bakri Mohammed

Influential jihadi preacher

2005

2005

Muhedin Ali
Wahbi Mohammed
Ismail Abdurahman
Siraj Ali
Abdul Sherif
Yeshiemebet Girma
Mulumebet Girma
Esayas Girma
Mohammed Kabashi
Fardosa Abdullahi
Abdulbasit Abdulrahim
Adelrazag Elsharif Elosta
Maftah Mohamed
Elmabruk

Assisted 21/7 bombers
Assisted 21/7 bombers
Assisted 21/7 bombers
Assisted 21/7 bombers
Assisted 21/7 bombers
Assisted 21/7 bombers
Assisted 21/7 bombers
Assisted 21/7 bombers
Assisted 21/7 bombers
Assisted 21/7 bombers
LIFG fundraising
LIFG fundraising

2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005

2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2008
2008

Not formally
charged
Ad‐hoc help
Ad‐hoc help
Ad‐hoc help
Ad‐hoc help
Ad‐hoc help
Ad‐hoc help
Ad‐hoc help
Ad‐hoc help
Ad‐hoc help
Ad‐hoc help
Libyan‐ non‐GSJ
Libyan‐ non‐GSJ

LIFG fundraising

2005

2008

Libyan‐ non‐GSJ

Mohammed Irfan Raja

Bradford 'extremist'
students‐ acquitted

2006

2006

Acquitted

Awaab Iqbal

Bradford 'extremist'
students‐ acquitted

2006

2006

Acquitted

Aitzaz Zafar

Bradford 'extremist'
students‐ acquitted

2006

2006

Acquitted

Usman Malik

Bradford 'extremist'
students‐ acquitted

2006

2006

Acquitted

Akbar Butt

Bradford 'extremist'
students‐ acquitted

2006

2006

Acquitted

Rashid Rauf

AQ facilitator

2006

2008

Escaped; killed;
not enough info
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Name

Case description

Date
from

Date to

Reason excluded

Ahmed Mohamed

Somali terror fundraising
& possession of terror
docs: acquitted

2006

2008

Acquitted; re‐
trial pending

Musse Yusuf

Somali terror fundraising
& possession of terror
docs: acquitted

2006

2008

Acquitted; re‐
trial pending

2007
2008

2007
2008

2008

2009

Sadeer Saleem
Jamal Ahmed
Munir Ahmed Farooqi

Accused 7/7 support
Hoax bomb threats
Encouraging/planning
jihad

Acquitted
Not enough info
Outcome
pending

Haris Farooqi

Encouraging & planning
jihad

2008

2009

Outcome
pending

Matthew Ronald Newton

Encouraging & planning
jihad

2008

2009

Outcome
pending

Israr Hussain Malik

Encouraging & planning
jihad

2008

2009

Outcome
pending

Ghuma Abd'Rabbah

UN‐listed LIFG affiliate

u/k

2009

Not formally
charged

Tahir Nasuf

UN‐listed LIFG affiliate

u/k

2009

Not formally
charged

Abdulbaqi Mohammed
Khaled

UN‐listed LIFG affiliate

u/k

2009

Not formally
charged

Mohammed Benhammedi

UN‐listed LIFG affiliate

u/k

2009

Not formally
charged

Abdelkader Sahli

Hoax bomb threats

2009

2009

Out‐with sample
time‐period
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Name

Case description

Date
from

Date to

Reason excluded

Abid Naseer

Operation Pathway

2009

2009

Released w/o
chargei

Tariq Ur Rehman

Operation Pathway

2009

2009

Released w/o
charge

Hamza Khan Shenwari

Operation Pathway

2009

2009

Released w/o
charge

Abdul Wahab Khan

Operation Pathway

2009

2009

Released w/o
charge

Ahmed Faraz Khan

Operation Pathway

2009

2009

Released w/o
charge

Sultan Sher

Operation Pathway

2009

2009

Released w/o
charge

Janas Khan

Operation Pathway

2009

2009

Released w/o
charge

Mohammed Ramzan

Operation Pathway

2009

2009

Released w/o
charge

Mohammed Umer Farooq

Operation Pathway

2009

2009

Released w/o
charge

Mohammed Rizwan Sharif

Operation Pathway

2009

2009

Released w/o
charge

Muhammad Adil

Operation Pathway

2009

2009

Released w/o
charge

Shoaib Khan

Operation Pathway

2009

2009

Rajib Karim

Arrested BA worker

2010

2010

Released w/o
charge
Outcome
pending

i

Naseer and Ur Rehman have since been indicted in the US in relation to the prosecution of Najibullah
Zazi and others. Shoaib Khan has been explicitly cleared of involvement in the UK plot.
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